Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 033-092
Date: Saturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:15 PM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.
Recording device: White House Telephone
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/033-092

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[0:00] Yeah.
[0:01] Dr. Kissinger, sir.
[0:02] Yeah.
[0:02] Mr. Pez, it seems to me you ought to inform Bunker that I have directed that we go ahead so that Bunker knows we're taking a hard line on the thing.
[0:11] Absolutely.
[0:12] And inform him so that Chew knows that there's no fooling around here and that this bargaining time is over.
[0:20] I mean, that fellow has got to be out of his mind to think that after the letter that I wrote, if after that we don't get anything, why?
[0:29] It just may be one of those breaking of relations.
[0:31] They want to send an emissary to see you personally, too.
[0:34] Is that what they said?
[0:36] Yeah.
[0:37] No.
[0:38] They can't do that while we are negotiating in Paris.
[0:41] No, no, no.
[0:43] There's not going to be any emissary.
[0:44] I've got everything.
[0:46] Anything they have to say—Bunker's to say is to be transmitted through Bunker.
[0:54] That's the way it's to be done.
[0:55] Right.
[0:56] Right.
[0:58] that we've had enough emissaries and that sort of thing.
[1:01] So I'll just say that we're ready to—if they have any.
[1:07] I just think Munker has got to get to him a message from me to the effect that you're going ahead.
[1:15] As I pointed out in my letter, we're going to negotiate as hard as we can, get the best position that we can, and that we're on this course.
[1:27] He must realize that we will not be subjected to pressure or harassment on this thing.
[1:36] Right.
[1:37] I think that is essential.
[1:38] This is a negotiation.
[1:40] There's no ultimatums to be come from them under any circumstances.
[1:45] Right.
[1:46] But you don't have the substance of what they're beating about.
[1:48] Yes, now I have the substance.
[1:49] It just came in.
[1:52] And again, the trouble with them is we have...
[1:57] You see, every draft we give back to them already incorporates 70% of their changes.
[2:04] This has now been going on for three weeks.
[2:07] Now they've sent us another batch of changes.
[2:10] I would say, again, we could accept 50% of them.
[2:15] The trouble is that if we accept all of these on top of all of the others,
[2:20] We have an entirely new document, and Lee Doctor is going to walk out.
[2:24] No, no, no.
[2:27] Just say that the document that we already have is the basic framework, and that that's that, and that we're going to do the best that we can.
[2:34] And he needs to know that that's the situation.
[2:36] After Haig went out there, when Haig went out there, we already incorporated all the changes they made to me when I was there.
[2:43] Since then, we have made two more revisions.
[2:46] based on comments they gave to him and comments they sent us afterwards.
[2:51] Now they have given us yet another, oh, ten pages of comments.
[2:57] And the end result of that is to kill the agreement.
[3:01] How does it kill it?
[3:02] Well, because they are changing everything.
[3:05] For example, wherever they talk about the United States, say the United States will withdraw its forces, they want to say the North Vietnamese will withdraw its forces.
[3:13] No, no, no, no.
[3:15] The withdrawal has got to be handled on the basis that we've already suggested.
[3:20] And so they keep putting in needles in practically where it says, replace—there's a phrase that says, U.S. forces and those allied with the United States.
[3:32] You really feel now that Munker can handle this?
[3:35] We don't need to send an emissary there.
[3:38] I don't mean Haig, but the Connelly ploy.
[3:40] I think we should wait until we see what we get.
[3:44] kicks us in the teeth, then we don't have a problem.
[3:48] But if Hanoi accepts the changes which we are bringing, then an already good agreement becomes excellent.
[3:56] And then we might consider sending somebody.
[3:58] Yeah.
[3:59] All right.
[4:00] That's the way it's to be.
[4:00] But be sure Bunker tells them we're going to go forward and the document is already—that we already have will be the basis for it.
[4:10] We'll do the best we can.
[4:12] that a negotiation involves give and take on both sides.
[4:16] Incidentally, I talked to Peterson this morning, and I think he will almost certainly accept it.
[4:22] Oh, you do, huh?
[4:23] Yeah.
[4:23] Well, it's the best thing.
[4:24] It's a better job for him.
[4:26] It's a better job for him.
[4:28] His talent is really in foreign policy.
[4:30] That's right.
[4:30] And it gives him a chance then to move in commerce.
[4:34] He'll simply be a second man to Schultz and all the others.
[4:36] That's right.
[4:37] I told him he'd have
[4:38] access to the White House and write, which is what you apparently had already discovered with that.
[4:43] Okay.
[4:44] Right.