Nixon phone call with Kennedy on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Talks

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Hello, Mr. President?

Yes.

This is Colonel Kennedy, sir.

Yes.

What is the report from Paris?

Oh, we have a, it's a very long one, sir.

Yeah.

And I was going to bring it over to you, or have it brought over to you right away.

We're just having it retyped so you could read it easily.

Oh, I see.

Fine.

He, they were pretty tough.

Well, I expected that.

And he feels that

It just might be that we're going to have to break off negotiations, that they're just not going to move.

It's possible that in fact they're playing a little chicken using us on the assumption that we have a problem here vis-a-vis Saigon on the one hand and domestically on the other that they can use to

go back, really, beyond the understandings that we tried to create.

So Henry believes that we ought to just go in and be tough and indicate that we want to insist on the changes of last week and boil the remaining two issues down to the correct Vietnamese translation on the administrative structure.

And one of our formulations, we had three of them on establishing the principle that the North Vietnamese do not have any legal right to intervene indefinitely in South Vietnam.

Then we could drop all our other requests in exchange for their dropping their changes on civilian prisoners and the U.S. civilian personnel.

Now, if they were to buy that, of course, then we would have had some significant gains.

which would still leave us with some problem with Saigon, but at least a wholly defensible position in respect to them.

On the other hand, if they don't, this, he believes, would give us a tenable position domestically, however difficult it will be.

Nonetheless, we could rightly say that we were tricked in the translation, and we'd always reserved on it, as we said at the beginning, and that they're trying to

distort the phrase by describing the consul as a governmental institution.

And on the military side, they were in effect trying to produce an agreement which ratified their continued presence, the presence of their forces in South Vietnam.

Well, I think what we'd better do is to, I really think I can sense from, without having to read the whole message and going into the details of it, that you'd better message him to the effect that we should stick firmly to our

I mean, what you have described, of course, is what we had agreed in advance, that we cannot give—we cannot go back beyond what they've agreed to before.

Is that first?

Yes.

And second, that he must play the hard line with them, and if necessary,

We'll have to break off.

Right.

There's really no other choice because basically we can't just go to Saigon with nothing.

Well, I think that's exactly his point.

If we go the other way, we'd wind up in a situation in which we'd be going back to Saigon indeed with having accomplished nothing of what they had been working with us for now for the past several weeks.

Right.

And this would cause perhaps some domestic problems, too, because people would see that nothing had been accomplished.

And Kew probably, in his view, that if we were to do this and cave on it, Kew would probably simply go down.

He couldn't survive such a thing.

Well, that's really Henry's point, isn't it?

His point being that

we've got to have as a minimum what we've agreed to up to this point.

Yes, sir.

Well, you just sent him a message that we must stick to the positions that we have previously insisted upon and that they either have to take it or leave it.

Right.

the choices theirs and that we have other choices that we can make too.

In that, Henry notes that he instructed me earlier today to call to Brennan and lay it out to him in the most categorical terms that in fact it's the other side's intransigence which is causing this problem and if they have any influence they better bring it to bear.

That's correct.

I did so.

He also saw the Chinese ambassador tonight.

Yeah.

And did the same in Paris.

Right.

Okay.

Well, I think the main thing is that before he meets in the morning, it's now midnight there, that you just send a message that he's on the right course to stick to it.

All right, sir.

And that we'll have to let

to make the record so that it's their intransigence that breaks it off rather than our insistence on changes.

This is precisely the threat of his approach.

And that's really what it is, too.

Right.

Because he feels that if it in fact has to be broken off, that in all probability that you would have to step out

and make a case to the people, again, rallying them, as you've done in the past, with firm and clear direct appeals.

And he outlines some of the points that would be made precisely along the lines that you suggested, making the point that it is their intransigence and their clear trickery that's caused this breakdown.

Well, that's a...

somewhat of a weak read at this point.

I mean, I realize that Henry's thinking of past circumstances, of course, where we were able to do so.

The difficulty is that we're, well, we may have to do that, that we have to realize that we ourselves are bucked somewhat into a corner here by reason of the, you know, the hopes that have been raised.

Oh, yes, sir.

You see?

Yes, sir.

So I think you should indicate in the message that the idea of going to the people is a very tenuous situation, I would say.

I mean, I don't consider that as being a very viable option.

I think that we probably are better off

break it off and then just do what we have to do for a while.

I think Henry must not rely on the fact that he thinks, well, we can just go to the people as we did in November 3rd and Cambodia and May 8th and so forth, and it'll all come around again.

But the situation has changed quite drastically since then, you see, as a result of what has happened.

And so, but the main point is he's got to stay hard on the course, but don't assume that we can go to the option of my, you know, making a big television speech calling for the— Well, he feels that we'd have to—

We'd have to step up the bombing again.

Oh, I understand that.

I understand that.

We may do that.

Yes.

But I don't think that going on television for the purpose of doing it and so forth is not something that I think is really a viable option.

I think we have to do it.

I think he's just got to indicate that.

And then the other...

The only other course, of course, is to keep the negotiations open any longer.

And I guess he can't do that either, can he?

Well, of course, that's what he'd be trying to do with this option.

Going back again, cutting down our proposals to those two and insisting that both sides stick with those things that have been agreed last week.

That's right.

Well, that's the thing to say.

We will stick to those things we've agreed to last week, or else we have no choice but to break off the negotiations.

But be sure to put the message to Henry, the fact that he must not assume that we should go on national television for the purpose of doing it.

I think we're just going to have to just do it this time.

Right.

Because going on television isn't quite—

probably too viable an option.

When do they meet again?

Tomorrow afternoon, Paris time, 1500.

That's 9 o'clock.

No, yes, 9 o'clock our time.

9 o'clock our time.

Yes, sir.

Now, well, I really think that that's really all we have to pass on to him tonight, then.

All right, sir.

I'll get it off right away.

I mean, we've got to stick the course.

We've got to insist on

as a minimum what we have already agreed to.

And if they are not going to go with that, then we will have to assume that they've engaged in deceit and trickery, and we will have to look to our other options, which we are really going to do.

But I don't want him to be under any illusions on the point that we'll then go make a big

here in this country.

I mean, the domestic situation is one that will not really carry that at this point as much as we would like to.

It just isn't there right now.

Well, because of the tremendous pressure the press has put on all of this, it's built up to a crescendo.

That's right.

And the disappointment is going to be there, but on the other hand, I think that— That's correct.

On the other hand, we understand.

I have no question about doing it.

Right.

I'm just questioning the idea of escalating it even further by—in terms of saying, well, the negotiations have broken down, announcing it all, and now we're going back to unlimited bombing and all that sort of thing.

Yes.

I think the thing to do is just to go back to the bombing and so forth.

We'll go back to what we do, but I don't think we can assume that we can go back to simply making a big speech about it.

Yes, sir.

I think you should think about that as he develops it.

Okay?

All right, sir.

All right, fine.

I'll get this over with.

And the other is just now finished, and I'll have it brought over.

Yes, his message.

You can send it over.

I don't think it's going to change much.

It's just really a blow-by-blow, right?

Yes, sir.

That's right.

But it goes on and elaborates on what we've spoken about.

Right, okay.

All right.

Nixon phone call with Kennedy on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Talks

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Also recorded on December 5, 1972

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