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Conversation 034-015

TapeTape 34StartMonday, December 4, 1972 at 8:23 PMEndMonday, December 4, 1972 at 8:32 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kennedy, Richard T. (Col.)Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon instructed Col. Richard T. Kennedy to relay specific directives to Henry Kissinger regarding the ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations. Nixon emphasized that if the North Vietnamese remained intransigent, Kissinger should ensure the record clearly blamed them for the breakdown due to disputes over political agreements and the presence of North Vietnamese forces. Nixon decided against a televised address to the American public in the event of failure, preferring to let a significant escalation in military action, including B-52 strikes on the Hanoi-Haiphong complex, demonstrate U.S. resolve.

Vietnam WarHenry KissingerPeace NegotiationsMilitary StrategyB-52 BombingNorth VietnamDiplomacy
AudioNARA Description

On December 4, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Col. Richard T. Kennedy talked on the telephone from 8:23 pm to 8:32 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 034-015 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 34-15

Date: December 4, 1972
Time: 8:23 pm - 8:32 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Col. Richard T. Kennedy.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Message to Henry A. Kissinger
                 -Instructions
                        -Option Two
                        -Break off of talks
                              -North Vietnamese responsibility
                                    -Explanation for record
                                    -Political issues
                                           -Reneging on meaning of agreement
                                                  -Translation problem
                                    -Military issues
                                           -North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam
                                    -Possible television [TV] statement by the President
                                           -Alternative
                                                  -Kissinger’s return
                                                  -US bombing
                                           -The President’s view
                                             -15-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. Dec.-07)

                                                             Conversation No. 34-15 (cont’d)

                                                 -Possible conversation with Kissinger
                                     -North Vietnamese publicity
                                     -Briefings by Kissinger
                                           -Blame on North Vietnam
             -Recent call from Kissinger
                  -Meeting
                         -Timing
                               -Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China [PRC]
             -Message to Kissinger
                  -Negotiations
                  -The President’s possible actions
                         -B-52s
                               -Hanoi-Haiphong complex
                                     -Timing
                  -Continuation
                         -Appearance
                         -Bombing
                  -Break off
                         -Kissinger’s return
                         -North Vietnamese publicity
                         -Briefing by Kissinger
                  -Possible TV statement by the President
                         -Compared to the President’s Cambodia and May 8, 1972 statements
                               -Public hope for success
                         -Bombing
                         -Recreations
                               -Soviet Union
                               -PRC
                               -Domestic front
                               -Saigon
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Okay.
Hello.
Mr. President.
Oh, I've had a chance to just get this thing and, yes, so that you can have it directly, just say that, uh, that, uh, Mr. Kissinger, you should proceed on the, uh, the second option.
Uh, that, uh, this is a minimum.
required for a settlement.
And then second, make the record as clear as possible in the talks that the responsibility is theirs for the breakdown.
The fact that they have
reneged on the by reasons of their of the translation problem reneged on the meaning of the agreement on the political side and that they have insisted on on maintaining the right of
of communist North Vietnamese forces to remain permanently in South Vietnam.
However, in going that route, I have serious questions about
my addressing the American people on this matter.
I think what we have to do is to make the record.
If the talks, if the North Vietnamese are intransigent, return here to report to me.
And
then we will act immediately on the military side.
I have to escalate the breakdown by a melodramatic appeal to the American people, I think would be a mistake.
although we can discuss that when you return.
The major objective you should pursue tomorrow is to first make the record, one, that when it is made public by the North Vietnamese,
you can brief categorically and effectively in a way that will put the blame squarely on them.
Then we will let our actions speak this time rather than our words.
Okay.
Yes, sir.
Henry called just a couple of minutes ago and said that he's thinking now that he'll postpone that meeting until Wednesday morning to give it a little more time.
Now, I'm sure that he has in mind here both the North Vietnamese a little more time to think this thing through and see where they're going and also to get some reaction from both the Russians and the Chinese.
All right, which seems to make sense.
I think the post, then you could add that keeping the negotiations going, postponements, et cetera, are in our interest.
But in the meantime, he can assume that I will order a
a very substantial increase in military action against the North, including the use of B-52s over the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
I also question him as to whether he said that I would be willing to order that even tomorrow, prior to
his Wednesday meeting.
But in any event, we should have it on salvo, ready to go the moment the talks break down, in the event they do.
The better course from the standpoint of the situation here is for him to
have it appear that the talks are continuing.
And at the same time, then, we will by our actions, stepped up military action, the bombing of the North, show our intent to see the thing true.
On the other hand,
if it works out that they are totally intransigent, then we have no other choice but to let the talks break.
He would then return, and we will act effectively.
And then if they go public, then
rather than having me go to the American people again, that he would brief on it.
The problem of my addressing the American people as distinguished from Cambodia and May 8th is that
in both of those instances there was hope for light at the end of the tunnel for success.
This time it would, after the buildup of expectations in this country, it would appear like just a continuation of more of the same.
My view is that
I have no problem in continuing and stepping up the bombing of the North.
I think, however, that the option of raising this to the presidential level forces
the Russians to react, the Chinese to react.
It also would get at best a mixed reaction here in the United States and might give Saigon more hope.
Well, make Saigon more difficult to deal with than we had expected than they presently are.
Okay?
Yes, sir.
That's really my feeling.
All right, sir.
Pass that on.
All right, sir.
And I'll let you know as soon as possible.
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