Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 034-030
Date: Sunday, December 10, 1972 at 12:04 PM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Dobrynin, Anatoliy F.
Recording device: White House Telephone
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/034-030

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[0:00] Oh, good morning, Mr. President.
[0:04] I hope we didn't get you up too early.
[0:06] No, no, thank you.
[0:07] You see, now is the time we have to be early.
[0:10] That's right.
[0:14] Mr.
[0:14] Ambassador, I had a couple of personal things and then one substantive thing I wanted to talk to you about briefly, if I could.
[0:20] Yes, of course.
[0:22] First, to thank you for the very gracious way that you and Mrs. Dobrynin
[0:30] are helping our children on their trip.
[0:34] They're looking forward to it.
[0:35] It'll be the high point of their
[0:37] travel, and I just hope they aren't too much bother to your people.
[0:40] Oh, they're really nice kids, kids, really very nice.
[0:43] We enjoyed being with them the whole evening.
[0:45] Well, they told me, and they just had a wonderful time, the movies and everything, and they'll be good representatives over there.
[0:54] I'm sure about it, no doubt.
[0:56] And Mr. President, if I discuss with him when I was in Moscow, he will take care of it.
[1:02] He asked me to tell you that he will take care about everything will go right.
[1:05] You shouldn't bother.
[1:08] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[1:10] All right.
[1:12] The second point is that I wanted to thank you for, as you know, I'm very much on top of these negotiations and so forth, and I want to thank you for the
[1:26] work that you have done, you and your government.
[1:28] And without you and your government, well, you know, we've got our problem.
[1:34] And I've handled that personally, as you know.
[1:37] I know.
[1:38] And I've gotten that coming along, although it's tough.
[1:45] I mean, I must say it's tough.
[1:48] But you've got—you and your government have the other problem.
[1:54] There's really only one issue left.
[1:58] Yeah.
[1:58] And it's the issue really is to me it's hard.
[2:04] I just think very, very hard for me to understand how they can go back on what we had agreed on October 8.
[2:17] I just have to take a position on that which is
[2:23] I want you to know that I'm not doing it in order to, you know, I don't want to give you an impossible problem, but I've had to put some impossible problems to chew, you know, like the withdrawal of forces, and I've done it.
[2:36] And on this one, like the DMZ, you and I know what the DMZ means.
[2:43] Symbolically, we know also what it means as a matter of fact.
[2:48] And on this one, we just can't let these talks fail.
[2:53] to that one item.
[2:54] And I just wanted you to know that I—that when Haig reported to me about some compromise language, I said that just wouldn't do.
[3:04] I just think we have to have the—I mean, we agreed to this language long ago.
[3:08] It's the right kind of language.
[3:11] And I wanted—I just want you to know that—hear it directly from me, you see?
[3:18] Yes, I do.
[3:19] Now, I don't say this for the purpose of
[3:22] You know I'll never do this because, let me put it quite candidly.
[3:27] Yeah.
[3:28] Mr. Brezhnev and I and your government and I, we got bigger fish to fry than this damn thing.
[3:34] Exactly.
[3:34] The main thing is to get this one out of the damn frying pan so that we can get busy on with other things.
[3:39] We'll go on with the other things anyway.
[3:40] You understand, not that.
[3:42] Yeah, I understand.
[3:43] But this always is an irritant.
[3:45] And now is the opportunity.
[3:46] And frankly, I think the biggest step toward...
[3:51] toward the great goal that Mr. Barstaff and I are working together and that you and Henry and all of us have been working for to get this thing out of the way and out of the way tomorrow.
[4:03] But we just can't let this one clause where we had agreed on a clause
[4:09] And then it turned around.
[4:11] We just can't get it to turn, to stop.
[4:13] But that's, see, I just want you to know how I felt about it.
[4:17] And if you would convey it, I would appreciate it.
[4:20] I will definitely.
[4:21] And thank you very much, Mr. .
[4:22] And I'll, I just like to take one minute.
[4:27] Al Haig is here with me.
[4:28] Yes.
[4:29] And if there's any, I just, he's listening.
[4:32] And if he has any technical thing to add, I'll have him say a word to you.
[4:37] Okay.
[4:38] I'll stay on the line with you.
[4:40] Do you have another minute?
[4:41] Yes, of course.
[4:42] Yeah, yeah.
[4:42] Of course.
[4:43] All right, here's Haig.
[4:44] Thank you very much, Mr. President.
[4:46] And on the first point, it's a real pleasure.
[4:48] On the second, I will send a message to Mr. President.
[4:51] Yes, thank you very much.
[4:53] Good.
[4:53] Mr.
[4:53] Ambassador, this was the issue I told you this morning.
[4:56] If I understand correctly, the compromise you proposed is not good, so you're coming to that one, which was before, yes?
[5:02] Yes.
[5:03] But you see, Mr.
[5:05] Ambassador, the compromise was something that...
[5:08] you know, Henry, everybody there, they all get tired and they say we will compromise.
[5:13] And he hadn't recognized the fact that I've got, you know, I've got to get the other people in line.
[5:21] And I just, the compromise won't do.
[5:25] And it isn't all that important.
[5:29] Hell, the DMZ is there.
[5:31] It's written into everything, and so to put in some language about whether civilians move across or this or that, I think it's just nonsense, really, really to have a talk break down about such a small issue.
[5:47] Yeah, I understand.
[5:48] See, that's my feeling, and I want you to know how that I felt here, that we just had to, we're going to have to insist tomorrow on the original language, and I just want you to know that
[5:59] If that is done, then we're going to be able to do other things that are very important, because when we come right down to it, let's look at it.
[6:08] North Vietnam is a dragon huge like it is on us.
[6:14] Then I can get into the Congress, and I can get some of that economic assistance and so forth that they need, and I can do it on a strong, positive note, which I want to do, because I just...
[6:28] and this is no thought of defeating anybody or anything.
[6:33] It's going to be one of those things where neither side, most sides will claim victory, neither will have it.
[6:40] The main thing is
[6:41] that it will, what we're trying to do here, Mr.
[6:44] Ambassador, to accomplish, which I know you want and we want, we want to remove this irritant between our relations.
[6:51] That's the real thing.
[6:53] We can't allow this damn place to interfere in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.
[6:59] That's really what it gets down to.
[7:00] And this is what our approach to you is.
[7:03] This is exactly it.
[7:04] The only one question, Mr. President.
[7:05] Yes, sir.
[7:06] You referred to
[7:07] or the formulation of October 8, but my impression is that this question of GMZ really arises only on a
[7:14] the previous session, which was two weeks ago.
[7:17] Well, that's right, that October 26th.
[7:19] Yeah, yeah, I'm sorry, I got...
[7:20] So it was not...
[7:21] I had my, no, I had my day wrong.
[7:23] October 26th is what I, if I said October, I meant October 26th.
[7:27] When they have the last meeting, the last previous one.
[7:29] That's right, that's right, it was the October 26th one, that's what I meant.
[7:33] I see.
[7:33] No, the October 8th one was the first one, before they got this spelled out.
[7:37] Then it was, when they have the next meeting, I think it was really, even in November,
[7:43] Right.
[7:44] Yes, and then .
[7:45] Right, right, I know.
[7:47] It's clear.
[7:47] But the point is that we came to that position, we had an agreement on it, and then now they...
[7:53] Yes, we just want to have that agreement which was agreed.
[7:55] Right, right.
[7:56] And we just want to go to the language that we did agree to at one point and just have it done with, and then we'll, I can assure you, you'll have every possible support from our side.
[8:08] And we would hope also from your side.
[8:11] Yeah, I understand.
[8:13] The only thing is there's no rather short time left.
[8:16] In Moscow it's already midnight.
[8:18] The meeting will be tomorrow morning, so it's rather short time.
[8:23] You understand what I mean?
[8:24] It's a physical possibility.
[8:28] Now it's in Moscow.
[8:31] How could we go to 3 o'clock tomorrow afternoon?
[8:34] Something maybe...
[8:36] I'll tell you what we'll do.
[8:38] Let me see if I can get Henry to have the meeting at 3 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.
[8:41] Would that be better?
[8:42] Yes, I think it's a little bit better, but still maybe even in the evening, because now I have to send Moscow to Hanoi.
[8:50] Oh, boy.
[8:52] Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[8:54] Right.
[8:55] I get it.
[8:55] All right.
[8:58] I'll get at that right now.
[9:00] They're working on technical details anyway.
[9:02] I would just say they do.
[9:03] They might have, but then we wait a little bit earlier.
[9:05] I don't know what will be the final result.
[9:07] They could meet by, say, 3 or 4 in the afternoon.
[9:10] Yes, I'm sure that my government will interfere, but I don't know what will be the final response of Hanoi.
[9:16] I understand.
[9:17] And I can assure you that when I talk to Saigon, I can't tell you what they're going to do either.
[9:23] But I would like to have a time, because I know for my government, to have a time to be in communication with Hanoi.
[9:29] But I just wanted to know you.
[9:31] how strongly I felt.
[9:32] It isn't a matter of me trying to embarrass or humiliate him.
[9:38] It's just one of those things that this is what's going to make or break the deal.
[9:42] Yeah.
[9:44] Okay.
[9:44] All right.
[9:45] Thank you.
[9:45] Thank you very much.
[9:48] Bye-bye.