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Conversation 034-054

TapeTape 34StartTuesday, December 12, 1972 at 8:31 PMEndTuesday, December 12, 1972 at 8:38 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon and Alexander Haig discussed the status of Vietnam peace negotiations following an update from Henry Kissinger, focusing on the administration's frustration with Hanoi's delays and the need to pressure South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. Nixon directed Haig to initiate a subtle, low-key communication with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin to cancel the upcoming visit of Tricia Nixon Cox to the Soviet Union. This action was intended as a calculated diplomatic signal to the Soviets that the U.S. was preparing to resume significant military activity in Vietnam.

Vietnam WarHenry KissingerAnatoliy DobryninDiplomatic relationsNguyen Van ThieuTricia Nixon Cox
AudioNARA Description

On December 12, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 8:31 pm to 8:38 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 034-054 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 34-54

Date: December 12, 1972
Time: 8:31 pm – 8:38 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Henry A. Kissinger’s message
                  -Length
                  -Tone
                         -Compared to telephone call
                  -Protocols
                         -Work by experts
                  -Washington Star article
                         -Kissinger’s return
                  -Military plan
                         -Gradualness
                               -Wire to Kissinger
                               -Reconnaisance
                  -Demilitarized zone [DMZ]
                         -Le Duc Tho
                               -Politburo difficulty
                  -Message exchange
            -Telephone call from Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                  -Trip [by Tricia Nixon Cox and Edward R. F. Cox]
                         -Possible cancellation
                               -Avoidance of embarrassment
            -Haig’s recent conversation with Dobrynin
            -Kissinger’s message
                  -Settlement agreement
                         -Prospects
                                             -47-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. Dec.-07)

                                                             Conversation No. 34-54 (cont’d)

                              -Exchange of messages
                              -North Vietnamese delays
             -Call to Dobrynin
                    -Trip cancellation
                          -US bombing
                    -Timing
                    -Kissinger’s message
                          -Tone
                          -Nguyen Van Thieu
                                -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew’s and Haig’s possible trip
             -Exerting pressure on Thieu
                    -Withdrawals
                          -Effect on Hanoi
                    -Financial assistance
                          -Melvin R. Laird
                    -Public comment
                          -Thieu
                    -Message for Ellsworth F. Bunker
                    -Kissinger at Paris
                          -William J. Porter
                          -Thieu’s speech to the South Vietnam National Assembly December
                           12, 1972
                          -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] analysis
             -Call to Dobrynin
                    -Trip cancellation
                          -Leonid I. Brezhnev
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

General Hicks.
Hello.
Yes, Mr. President.
Anything new?
Yes, sir.
I've finally gotten Henry's message, which is a lengthy one, but which is, I think, quite a bit less pessimistic than his telephone.
Really?
What he's going to do is they're going to leave
the experts working on the protocols there, so it's not going to look like a terminal accident.
Yeah, I noticed the headline in the Star said, Very Hopeful, Henrik's Returning.
I don't know, for Christ's sake, these assholes be... And then he's also got a military plan, which is sort of gradual.
No, no, he's...
You're to wire him immediately.
I will not accept graduality.
Right, sir.
I don't...
I will not accept it.
Yeah.
I don't mean in that context.
I mean, we have to do reconnaissance.
Zuan Tui, or late Octo, told him that he had to go back because he could not move the Power Bureau on this DMZ issue.
It's now in a state, according to Henry, that everything has been settled but a couple of issues.
and in a way that a message exchange could have a peace agreement.
Right.
Well, now the thing I want to tell you is this, that I want you to give DeBrennan a call.
I think he should know this, that, uh, tell him that, and do it very low key, that the president doesn't want to embarrass him or anything, but that, because this is, he doesn't, he never wants to mix personal with other things, but that he, uh,
It doesn't want it to be any embarrassment to the Soviet government that the president, of course, will have to cancel.
He could not have his daughter visiting the Soviet Union at a time that we have to resort to more military activities in Vietnam.
You got my point?
Yes, sir.
I understand.
All right.
Get that across.
It's just a good little signal right across the bow.
Right, sir.
And I will do it, too.
They cannot be there at a time that we're—because, you know, they might give them a rough time.
That's absolutely right.
Right.
I just say that I just wanted to know that—I put it in a way that I just wanted to inform him that—
that we didn't want it to be embarrassing to him, so we wanted him to know that the President is prepared that we'll work it out in a mutually convenient way so it wouldn't be embarrassing, but that they will not be there in the Soviet Union at a time that we have to engage in additional military activities against the North.
And I just wanted to tell him that the President just wants to be sure that
that it doesn't cause any strain in our relations that we have to make this kind of decision.
You see what I mean?
You do it in a very subtle way.
He'll get the point.
Right, exactly.
And I talked to him earlier.
He called and I didn't give him too much.
I wanted to keep him on edge.
Right.
Henry also said, he said that this settlement we can have just as soon as Hanoi gives the okay.
And all we have to do is exchange a few messages and it's done.
The fact is that they've decided to string us along for time.
Right.
And he said, well, I want to bring in a note, though, that I'm going to cancel the visit of the kids in the event that this doesn't work out.
Exactly.
That's cold turkey.
Exactly.
And that I just cannot have them there and tell them at a time that I'm going to have to take additional military activities against the North.
You understand.
He'll get the point.
If you do that, give him a call right now.
Right, sir.
Well, he's called me.
He said he wouldn't be available for anything more until 11 tonight, but I can call him at 11.
All right.
You do it.
Good.
All right, sir.
But as a matter of fact, as far as the message is concerned, it isn't quite as bad as Henry... No, no, not at all.
And he feels that we've got to get two on board and that the Vice President and I ought to go over there as part of this thing and just lay it down to him because we'll just be back in another... Well, the only thing that I'm concerned about is this.
Al, goddammit, the Vice President, you should go, but I want to be able to withdraw something.
Now, we've got $29,000.
Bring it down to $15,000.
Just like that.
Yes, sir.
We, well... Do something.
Do something.
We don't want Hanoi to be encouraged either.
Hanoi, you don't have to encourage it too much.
Just do it in a quiet way.
Yes, sir.
Do things.
We'll cut off money then, but can't we discover some things to cut off some money?
We're going to drill on it all night.
We've got several things and...
I want it done right now, though, Al.
I don't want it said publicly.
I just want, I just want, I don't want Hanoi to see it.
But I want to do some things that will get through to you.
Now, you've also, I want to be sure that Munker has the message.
Nobody is to communicate with a son of a bitch now without specific authority from Washington.
Right.
And what Henry did, he just broke off in Paris.
He said, I will not meet or discuss with you anymore.
He did that today.
He had to meet with him.
But we also have an analysis, incidentally, a very careful one by our expert in CIA.
And he says the two's speech today was very carefully worded not to get himself out on the land.
But that's their judgment.
They think he'll come.
And I think this kick in the ass will do it and we'll put some screws on him.
All right, fine.
All right, sir.
OK, but you understand.
I don't want you to do anything with the brain of the night.
I just wanted to do it.
in a way that said, look, the president is very, he put it this way, the president very much treasures his personal relationship with Brezhnev.
He does not want to jeopardize that by having his children there on a personal visit that might embarrass Brezhnev and me.
And therefore, he would like to work out a conservatory way to cancel it.
Because of what we're going to have to do on Vietnam.
Exactly.
That'll get the message through.
See my point?
Yes, sir.
Okay.
Very good.
Right.
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