Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 34 › Conversation 034-069

Nixon phone call with Haig on Vietnam War and Henry Kissinger

Wednesday, December 13, 1972 · 8:55 PM–9:07 PM ET · White House Telephone · 12 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Conversation034-069 on Tape 34StartWednesday, December 13, 1972 at 8:55 PMEndWednesday, December 13, 1972 at 9:07 PMRecording deviceWhite House TelephoneSourceNixon Library record for 034-069 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 647841742 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Alexander Haig discuss the deteriorating status of Vietnam peace negotiations and the necessity of resuming military action to break the current diplomatic impasse. They determine that Henry Kissinger’s suggestion to continue talks in Paris into January is unacceptable, as it would expose the administration to charges of deceit. Instead, they decide to move forward with aggressive military measures, including mining and bombing, while framing the escalation as a necessary response to North Vietnam’s failure to return American prisoners of war. To ensure internal unity, they plan a small, private National Security Council meeting to align key advisors like Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on this strategy.

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NARA Description

On December 13, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 8:55 pm to 9:07 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 034-069 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 34-69

Date: December 13, 1972
Time: 8:55 pm - 9:07 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Henry A. Kissinger’s arrival
                                -55-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                                  Conversation No. 34-69 (cont’d)

      -Haig’s meeting
      -Communication breakdown
-Kissinger’s memorandum
      -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew’s trip
            -Purpose
                  -Compared to the President’s possible television [TV] statement
                  -Nguyen Van Thieu
      -The President’s view
-US military action
      -Options
      -Agnew
      -Option Two
            -Resumption of talks in Paris
                  -Timing
                        -January 1973
            -Possible public relations [PR] effort
                  -Deceit charges
                  -Negotiation record
                        -Peace issue
      -Effectiveness
      -Option One
            -Agnew’s trip
                  -Appearance
-North Vietnamese stance
      -Nguyen Van Thieu
      -Congress
      -Delays
-US military action
      -Melvin Laird, William P. Rogers
Show the rest of the log (65 more lines)
-Pressure on Thieu
-US public opinion
      -The President’s previous decisions
      -Thieu
-Pressure on Thieu
      -Agnew’s trip
-Option One
      -US military action
            -Timing
                  -Agnew’s trip
                        -Thieu
                                -56-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                                  Conversation No. 34-69 (cont’d)

-PR
      -Haig’s conversation with Ronald L. Ziegler
      -Ziegler’s possible briefing
      -Kissinger’s schedule
            -Mexico
      -Ziegler’s possible briefing
            -North Vietnamese reneging, lack of goodwill
            -Communications
            -US military action
            -Peace with honor
-US military action
      -Timing
            -Congress
            -Kissinger
            -Reseeding mines
                  -Reconnaissance
            -Bombing
            -PR
-Tricia Nixon Cox and Edward R. F. Cox
      -Trip to Soviet Union
            -Possible cancellation
-US military action
      -Duration
      -Bargaining position
      -Prisoners of War [POWs]
            -Congress
                  -Cut off of funds
            -Kissinger
-Haig’s forthcoming conversation with Kissinger
      -Tone
      -People’s Republic of China [PRC], Soviet Union initiatives
      -Laird
      -Rogers
-US military action
      -Rogers
      -Laird
            -Defense budget
-National Security Council [NSC] meeting
      -Public notification
      -Rogers, Laird, Richard M. Helms, Agnew
                                             -57-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                                             Conversation No. 34-69 (cont’d)

             -The President’s schedule
                  -Kissinger

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Hello.
General Hayes.
Yes, Mr. President?
What time is the arrival on Henry now?
It's now 1210, sir.
All right.
All right.
I'll go on in there.
You go to meet him?
Yes, sir.
All right.
I'll go over the various considerations.
We've had a communication breakdown that was plain all afternoon.
Well, I got the memorandum of his first thoughts, whatever they were, and went over it.
The one thing that's really terribly important is that you buffer him down a bit and get the Agnew's trip in perspective so we really know what we're doing here, whether we're
Are we shooting this big bullet for the purpose of, frankly, you know, in effect
rationalizing and justifying mistakes we've made in the past, or are we shooting it for a specific purpose for the future?
Is that my point?
Exactly.
And it's a very close call, and I don't think Henry's quite thought that through.
You know, he says, well, it's like what he thought, oh, put the president on television right away and knock the North Vietnamese.
Now we'll have the vice president go out and break his pick on Q.
Well, no, that's not right either, unless it's the right thing to do.
Understand, I'm willing to do it, but
I think, as I read Henry's memo, I think it was half rational and half irrational.
I agree.
Am I wrong?
I don't know.
I don't want to be—I mean, I'm not trying to be very objective, but I think it's part rational and part irrational.
I think what we have to decide first is what military courses of action must be taken.
Right.
Once that's decided, then we have to decide about the vice president.
what he would accomplish and what would come out afterwards.
That second option that Henry offered, another round in Paris in January, I believe would expose us to charges of deceit to the American people.
I really do.
And I think at the end of that period, people would—and in view of the negotiating record this week,
They expect more than that, don't they?
That's right.
That's bad stuff, and it's only going to raise the peace issue, raise impatience, and then to find out at the end that we haven't got the thing solved would be a tragedy.
Now, on the other hand, we've got to realize if we take military action this week, it may not solve it either.
No, it may not, and that's what we have to consider.
But I think option two is very bad.
Option two is unacceptable, that's for sure.
The question is whether or not
on option one, sending the vice president out there, is, you know, is really worth doing unless we're prepared to do a hell of a lot of other things.
That's right.
I don't think what we need is theater now.
That's the point.
The vice president is basically, I'm afraid, too much theater.
I'm not sure.
I'm not sure.
It may be that we have to have it, but it is theater.
It is, and that we have to be careful of if it's consistent with the facts.
If he's doing what is consistent with the facts,
I mean, we should do it.
Now, you read all the stuff.
Yes, sir.
How do you analyze it all?
I guess they are being entrenched and difficult, backing off and all that.
How important is it all?
I think it's important.
I think they have determined that they've got us on a wicket, which puts us with two, and at times on their side.
And I'm talking a briefer period.
But they also think that if they can ride through the Christmas period, we get the Congress back.
We've added more frustration with delays and yet a delay on the peace wicket that we're going to be confronted with a hell of a situation in which we will not be able to react.
And so we may be faced with a tough judgment.
We have to react now.
That's my view.
That's my view.
That's not a very happy arrival.
But I've layered Rogers going up the wall.
Yes, sir.
But I don't think it's as tough as—you know, we have done an awful lot of rationalizing to support getting Chew on board.
We've done an awful lot of things in our own subjective thought process, which was designed to put pressure on him.
And some of it we tend to believe.
I don't think the American people, after what you've done for four years, taken every tough decision, met it head-on, and brought us to the point where they were nearly ready to settle.
I want to see you take something that is less than a cave—that's a cave-out.
Oh, I agree.
And I think the American people— But they don't want me to—on the other hand, they don't want me to cave to two.
No, not the two.
We've got to take him on, too, in this process.
Yeah.
That's where the Vice President might come in.
That's right.
In other words, if you have the Vice President's thing combined with military action.
That's what I believe.
And I'm more inclined to think we should do it if we go course one.
But it should be—that should start before he gets out there.
It cannot look like the— Oh, hell yes.
That he, the hawk, ordered it.
That's right.
That's exactly right.
Because that would look like we succumbed to two blandishments.
We're doing this because of North Vietnamese treachery.
And I quite frankly think the way to handle this, I've talked a little bit to Ron about it as a possible contingency.
And he's got a very good way, I think, of solving it.
That is that he ought to go out, not Henry.
I think we ought to send Henry away, frankly, for arrest and get him the hell away from the press and everybody else.
Oh, I couldn't agree more.
Where do you want to send him?
Well, he could go to Mexico or anyplace else where it's hard to get on the telephone.
Oh, I know.
And then, but Ron just very matter-of-factly, as a spokesman of the United States government, stated we want peace.
We've tried to do it.
When we got into the exploration of the details,
There was reneging on some aspects of the agreement and further revelations which made this too high a risk and shows that they were not of the same goodwill that they indicated originally.
We want peace, and we're prepared to meet at any time.
We're going to keep communications with them.
But in the meantime, we're going to resume the activity that...
But we're not going to have peace at any price, and we're going to have peace at an honorable peace, and that's what we're insisting upon.
That's right, sir.
Now, I think it's also important.
The reason I say we have to do it now is that we want it well underway before the Congress comes back.
That's right.
And not have to be faced with it when you'd have to bring congressional leaders in before you could act.
And I tell you, sir, I am confident...
It got built before Christmas, actually.
That's right.
And that means right now.
That means right now, I think.
You see, that's why, although Henry reacted negatively to it, that's why my thought was on the reseeding and everything else.
Move on it right now.
Move, move, move.
And I think my intuition is correct here.
Get the goddamn thing going.
That's right, sir.
I think we'll have the mines in on Saturday.
We won't do the reconnaissance until we put the mines in because that will alert them and risk the surprise that we need.
Just dump the mines in, start the reconnaissance concurrently, and then Monday start the other.
And I don't think it's going to—the disappointment isn't going to be with the bombing.
It's going to be that the talks haven't gone, and we've got to fill that in with words that are reasonable and understandable.
And I think— Not say that this means an end.
It just means that this is one of those things that we have to do.
We'll meet again as soon as they're prepared.
We've come a long way.
We've made great progress.
On a personal sense, don't you think I'd better have Tricia and Ed cancel their trip?
I wouldn't do it just yet, sir.
I'd just wait.
I'd finish tomorrow's considerations.
I think we could
Oh, in a sense, maybe it's just as well they go.
Yes, sir.
I wouldn't make— Maybe it's just as well—maybe we don't even let that hang on it.
It just acts as if this is just usual.
That's right.
That leg, if it could be canceled— It comes at the end anyway.
That's right.
Anyway, they're not going to be there except in a personal sense.
That's right, sir.
And another thing to keep in mind, this air action we're talking about is—it's going to be tough initially, but I don't think we're going to be able to keep it up.
No.
It's a three-day.
I know.
Although I don't know of any other way to get this thing back on the track.
And I think— We've got to improve our bargaining position, isn't that it?
We have to do it.
And I think the American people and I think the Congress, they're not going to vote a cutoff of funds while Hanoi's holding our prisoners.
They just will not vote.
Well, we're going to put it on that basis then, you see.
Here's where Henry is correct.
We know it's a sort of a—
cynical thing.
We're going to say we're doing this because they won't return our prisoners before Christmas.
That's right.
That's right.
They were supposed to do it.
They wouldn't agree, and we're going to bond and we get those prisoners back.
That's what I put it on, yes, sir.
I think it's understood.
And as a matter of fact, it's reassuring to a lot of people who are beginning to worry that there may be some soft spots in this thing.
All right.
Okay.
Well, when you see Henry, you first build him up, say that, now look, Henry, for Christ's sake, quit talking about martyrdom.
Just hit him hard right in the face on that, because that's what he needs.
That's right.
That's a real slap.
Now look, the president, when he says that's ridiculous, he's the indispensable man, and the man that we work China together, we work Russia together, we're not going to allow this pipsqueak little country to drag him down.
Exactly.
Put it that way, you see, so he doesn't just think it's me.
Yes, sir.
And then he said, but now we're going to work this thing out together.
You could also—I think you should build up both Laird and Rogers a bit.
Say they are right on salvo here.
Right.
They're not undercutting, and by God, we'll bring them in line.
And they haven't been.
No, sir.
They haven't been.
We haven't had a peep from Secretary Rogers on this thing.
He's been nothing but supportive.
It'll be tougher than that.
What do you think Laird will say when we decide on this course of action?
I don't think we'll get too much trouble from Secretary Rogers.
I think Laird is going to be more concerned about the economics of his budget.
It's going to be a hell of a mess for him in that sense because he's already counted the savings.
far as the right course of action.
He's always stood when he's had to.
Yes, and Laird will stand.
He knows he's going—they don't want to go out as a defeatist.
That's right.
Even though as a peacemaker, Rogers will realize that we've—I wonder if we don't have to have an NSC meeting.
It might be the best thing to do to be sure they all sing from the same sheet of music.
Right.
No, just a small one.
A small one that we have no public notification of.
No.
Because I think our best thing is business issues.
Rogers, Laird, Helms.
Right.
And Agnew, of course.
Right.
Okay, we'll get him set, and then...
Are we, should we plan to meet, I'll be ready any time after 9 o'clock, but, you know, tell Henry he doesn't have to get up until 10.
Okay, good.

Also recorded on December 13, 1972

  • 034-065 4:47 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Milton Friedman talked on the telephone from 4:47 pm to 4:48 pm.
  • 034-066 4:48 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:48 pm and 11:59 pm.
  • 822-012 4:53 PM · 1 hr 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, Manolo Sanchez, Alexander P. Butterfield, John D. Ehrlichman, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:53 pm and 6:09 pm.
  • 822-013 6:09 PM · 15 sec — Stephen B. Bull and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 6:09 pm and 11:59 pm.
  • 822-014 6:09 PM · 10 sec — Stephen B. Bull and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 6:09 pm and 11:59 pm.
  • 822-016 6:09 PM · 18 sec — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 6:09 pm and 11:59 pm.
  • 034-067 8:51 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, and Manolo Sanchez talked on the telephone from 8:51 pm to 8:54 pm.
  • 034-068 8:54 PM · 13 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:54 pm and 8:55 pm.

All 45 conversations from December 13, 1972 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 034-069, December 13, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 647841742). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/034-069 (accessed November 15, 2026).