On December 17, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler talked on the telephone from 9:52 am to 9:55 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 034-109 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Hello.
I have Mr. Ziegler.
Yeah.
There you are.
Hello.
I just looked at the three papers.
What was your evaluation of the handling of the Henry thing?
Well, I've only gotten to the post.
They were late on the other two, and I'm getting to those now.
They're about all the same.
I think the way the sublime talks at impasse, Kissinger said, you know, annoys accused at reneging, sets it up pretty well.
It probably sets up what we have to do pretty well.
That's what I mean.
Naturally, it's important that it be.
laid out there so that they can understand what the situation is.
I don't think that anybody needs to be all concerned about that.
of his, you know, that pieces of hand statement.
I mean, it was just one of those slights of rhetoric that Henry gets into sometimes.
But when you come down to it, it was.
And I think the fact that he's got in the statement that it's ninety-nine percent complete, but they won't do that just about means it, don't you think so?
Yes.
What was your reaction on that?
Well, my reaction—I was—I was—no, I was less—I am less concerned, quite
Perhaps I was overly concerned even about that piece as that hand statement.
I thought they would go at him a little more, but they didn't.
Yeah, well, I would have advised them that.
It seemed obvious, but I think—I don't know what happened to him.
I think Henry outlined the fact that we were—he, you know, had made an effort under your direction was to— Did he get in the—I didn't read the transcript, but he—did he get in around the point that—
the points that I had directed him to do this so that there wasn't an appearance that he was sort of—the main thing we had to get him off of was that earlier wicket earlier in the week where he was thinking in personal terms, you know.
He had traveled so many times and they hadn't talked.
Well, that's irrelevant.
He can travel a thousand times.
Sure.
No, he did.
He didn't get into that, I hope.
No, he wove it into it.
For example, you had directed Haig to come back and the consultations and so forth.
He made that clear, yes, in your direction, absolutely.
Because we must avoid the appearance that his emotional peaks and so forth have anything to do with what
decisions we make here, that would be a very bad thing, you know, to get the impression that our negotiations are going to be determined depending upon how he feels.
But you didn't sense any of that in his briefing?
No, not at all.
He was steady throughout, steady throughout.
I noticed Murray Marder said that he had ups and downs, upbeat and downbeat in his analysis.
You know, Henry, what I think Marder was reflecting having been there was the fact that, you know, the substance of what he said and so forth, but he was firm and constant and did not, if I could use a word, I don't want to really use, but he wasn't, you know, apologetic or defensive or, you know, whiny type, you know.
Right, right, good.
All right, then we're all set for tomorrow.
Okay.
Okay, sir.
All right.