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Conversation 034-125

TapeTape 34StartSunday, December 17, 1972 at 3:29 PMEndSunday, December 17, 1972 at 3:35 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger coordinated logistics for a dinner event before pivoting to a critical discussion regarding stalled Vietnam peace negotiations. They debated the merits of pursuing a bilateral deal with North Vietnam while assessing the risks of a potential collapse of the South Vietnamese government under President Thieu. The two leaders also analyzed the psychological impact of recent U.S. mining and bombing campaigns on Hanoi, while strategizing how to manage domestic political pressure and potential leaks regarding the failed talks.

Vietnam WarParis Peace AccordsHenry KissingerNorth VietnamNguyen Van ThieuU.S. Foreign PolicyDomestic Politics
AudioNARA Description

On December 17, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 3:29 pm to 3:35 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 034-125 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 34-125

Date: December 17, 1972
Time: 3:29 pm - 3:35 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Alice Roosevelt Longworth dinner
                                     -100-

            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                 (rev. Dec.-07)

                                                      Conversation No. 34-125 (cont’d)

     -Timing
     -Black tie
     -Guest list
          -Joseph W. Alsop and [Susan Mary Jay (Patten) Alsop]
                 -Stephen B. Bull
          -Richard L. Wilson
                 -[Katherine Young (Macy) Wilson]
          -Howard K. Smith

Vietnam negotiations
     -Letter for Nguyen Van Thieu
           -The President’s work with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
           -Tone
     -Bilateral deal
           -Thieu
                  -Possible collapse
                  -Fear of political contest
                        -North Vietnam army
                  -US aid
           -Timing
                  -Congress
                        -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                              -Michael J. Mansfield
                              -George S. McGovern
     -Mining
           -Hanoi reaction
                  -Radar
     -[US bombing]
           -Haig’s view
     -December 13, 1972 meeting
           -Transcript
     -Previous week’s meeting
           -Tone
                  -The President’s recent conversation with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                  -Haig’s and Vice President Spiro T. Agnew’s schedules
                        -Saigon
     -December 13, 1972 meeting
           -Transcript
                  -Possible leak to press
                        -Hanoi’s possible action
                                               -101-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                         (rev. Dec.-07)

                                                            Conversation No. 34-125 (cont’d)

             -US bombing
                  -B-52s
                  -North Vietnamese reaction
                       -Settlement
                              -Timing
                  -Duration
                       -US domestic situation
                              -Democrats
                                   -Edward M. Kennedy
                                         -The President’s 1972 election victory margin

       The President’s schedule
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello, Mr. President.
We are on that dinner tomorrow night.
It's 7 rather than 7.30.
We're having it early.
And just put on a black tie.
I mean, it's nothing formal, though.
Right.
And did you find out whether the ALSOPS are back?
I'm having somebody check and notify Steve.
Fine.
Well, there's no problem.
I can get an answer to that.
Good.
Just let it go.
We'll see.
But at the present time, it'll just be a 5 or 6.
Now, the only other one that I can think of is Dick Wilson.
I'll check that out in the morning, see if he's... Yeah, Wilson would be good.
He'd be good if he's...
I don't know what his situation is at the present time.
I don't think he's...
I think his wife died.
Yeah.
Okay.
I'm going to run that by as I'm just trying to think of any other...
in the foreign field.
I mean, I don't like to— Howard Smith would be good.
Howard Smith, yeah.
Okay, I'll do a little checking around.
Anyway, you can plan seven o'clock.
I worked over that letter with Haig, and I toughened it up.
I just think we just have to lay it out there so there's no goddamn doubt.
Why I'm beginning to lean towards the bilateral solution, Mr. President, is with this bastard's attitude, he may just collapse if we go ahead on the other course.
Suppose we go bilaterally while he also collapses?
No, I think he can struggle on longer.
His nightmare is a political contest.
I think all this business about the North Vietnamese Army, that's no problem to him.
He knows he can handle this.
He doesn't know how to handle a semi-free political contest.
So, okay, he'd like for us.
The whole thing then would depend on our ability to continue to get aid to him.
And I'm telling you, that is going to be a hell of a problem.
That is true.
See, that's the problem I'm concerned about, if we can.
I think it may get break.
We don't have to do it on January 2nd.
We can wait.
The Congress won't do a hell of a lot.
Except that we just don't want the Congress in talking.
That's the main thing, you know.
We'd rather want to do something before the Congress gets a chance to make its goddamn speeches so it looks like we followed them.
There's the problem, but I see.
I mean, also, we have to now, if we go bilaterally, look to our political situation here to an extent.
The point is that if, for example, as Jack has, it's like Mansfield and McGovern say, why don't we have prisoners for this or that?
And then we come up with it, Henry.
That I would not want.
I don't want us to lead them.
That's the point.
I don't want to lead on a damned issue.
Don't you agree?
I agree.
And— We'll have a good chance to talk about that between us.
We'll get some reaction.
But then the next thing is very interesting, is Hanoi hasn't reacted to this mining yet.
No.
And we know from their radar that they picked up the planes.
Sure.
I think it shakes the hell out of them.
Hague agrees with you.
He says he thinks this will crack him.
I think so, too.
But it may not.
My point is I'm just totally resigned to it.
We have to be resigned to it.
Fatalistic as hell.
It ought to crack him.
But if you read the transcript, I don't want to inflict it on you of the last meeting, Mr. President.
Yeah, Mike and I know.
You know they were toying with us, in fact.
Sure, of course.
Listen, I could tell.
I'm toying with this, Henry, not just from the transcript from the last meeting, but from the ups and downs of the whole week.
That's right.
For Christ's sake, they were tough the first two days, and they came on the third day, and we talked to their brain, and then you sent Haig back, and then they toughened up on Monday.
That's enough.
No, we met the vice president, and Haig was standing by to go to Saigon.
That's right.
That's right.
And this is just...
those things.
So I'm not a bit concerned about that.
But we might consider, if the heat gets high, whether we shouldn't show that last day's transcript to a new selected newsman.
Because that's a pretty gory— Yeah.
Sure, if they start particularly—if they start putting the heat on, I might as—what I meant is, apart from the newsman, let us suppose—if the left-wing newsmen, which are
course be straight out of Hanoi.
Or if Hanoi starts to put a knee on, then we'll play it right back with them and give them hell.
I couldn't agree more.
Yeah.
But in the meantime, we'll go and we'll hope to God that the B-52s have enough, whether they can hit something.
Well, at least a number of them will do.
Well, I think they're going to be shooting to their core.
They're going to be so goddamn surprised, I think.
Whether they're going to go three months or whether they're going to decide to
quickly that we can't tell.
There's no question in my mind, Mr. President, that if we could go six months, that they're going to crash.
I agree with that.
You see, the problem we have there is our domestic situation has become involved.
We can't hold them six months.
I'm not sure that the Democrats are going to be that eager to take you on right out of the... No, I don't think they would.
I don't think they're going to be perfect.
I don't think they're going through the first month.
You know what I mean?
What I meant is if it drags for six months, I mean, I just don't see it going.
By April or March, they may start to take you on.
But they can't overlook, Mr. President, particularly you take people like Kennedy.
They can't overlook that 61%.
It's true.
That's right.
That's what we're going to do, aren't we?
That's right.
Okay.
We'll see you tomorrow.
Bye.
Bye.
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