Conversation 037-049

TapeTape 37StartSunday, March 4, 1973 at 11:50 AMEndSunday, March 4, 1973 at 11:59 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone

On March 4, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 11:50 am to 11:59 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 037-049 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 37-49

Date: March 4, 1973
Time: 11:50 am-11:59 am
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Kissinger's dinner with China correspondents
              -President’s telegram
              -President’s trip to the People’s Republic of China [?] [PRC]
                      -Nostalgia
                      -Moscow summit 1972
                                       - 34 -

                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                                  (rev. Sept-09)

       -Attendees
       -Kissinger’s remarks

President's conversation with William P. Rogers
       -Sudan hostages
               -Return of bodies
                       -Belgian diplomat
       -President's visit to the State Department
               -Sympathy
               -Support of diplomats
       -US policy on ransom
               -Survey of Foreign Service
                       -Voluntary service
Vietnam Settlement
       -Prisoners of War [POWs] release
               -Film
               -Public statements
               -Prisoners held by Viet Cong
                       -Prisoners held in Hanoi
                       -Treatment
       -Rogers’ support
               -Involvement in POW release
               -Credit

Monetary Policy
      -Europeans
      -Japanese reaction
              -Kakeui Tanaka
                      -Gratitude
                      -Emissary
      -Europeans
              -Effect of US–Japan relations
              -Effect on Britain
                      -Willy Brandt
                      -Wire
                      -[Earl of Cromer] George R.S. Baring
              -US position
                                      - 35 -

                       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                                 (rev. Sept-09)

       -Convertibility
              -Arthur F. Burns's views
              -US responsibility
       -Europeans' choices
              -Economic summit
              -US strategy
              -Brandt
              -Britain
                       -Nuclear cooperation
                       -Britain-Europe relations
              -Unilateral versus bilateral actions
              -Brandt

President's schedule
       -Camp David

Kissinger's schedule
       -Nuclear treaty with Britain
               -Arrival of Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
       -Meeting with the Earl of Cromer
               -Message from Brandt
               -Currency issue
                      -European integration

President's schedule
       -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
       -State Department dinner
               -Diplomatic Corps
               -Timing

President's meeting with Nancy S. Maginnes
       -Support for President
               -Maginnes’ view of newsmen

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yes, sir.
I have Dr. Kissinger.
There you are.
Hello.
Hi, Henry.
How was the Peking duck?
Oh, it was very nice, and your telegram was really very well received.
Good.
Everybody had a good time.
It's really amazing what a spirit of nostalgia this trip has created.
Really, yeah.
Well, first of all, there's no other trip where if you said...
got them together, say Moscow, anything else, you wouldn't get... Everyone except three people came.
I'll be darned.
And they were out of the country.
Right.
And they really spoke of it with a warmth and an affection.
Good, good, good.
Did you make remarks?
I made some remarks, yes.
All right.
Recounting things they had done there and the other half, seriously, of what you were trying to do.
Right.
And what...
good men for the country that you professed.
That'll trigger them into writing it again, too.
That's right.
I mean, that it was a moral act of expanding our frontiers and the frontier of our spirit.
Yeah.
Great.
Incidentally, I had an idea that I was going to get in touch with you earlier about, but I just called Bill Rogers about this plane over there, and
I told him it was all right.
They had sent in a request that they could drop the Belgian on the way back, which I think is a very good idea, apparently.
So it gets an international thing to this.
And then I had this thought, and he's looking into it, and he thinks it's a good idea.
I've been thinking we ought to find a way to go over to the State Department sometime, you know, and sort of,
like we did the Defense Department, and I said that it might be a good idea maybe Tuesday if I could just go over and express sympathy and our support of them and so forth.
And so we'll have that in mind.
He's going to do some thinking about it and check with some of the others.
He said that he had made a survey of all the Foreign Service people because the point I wanted to get across was that
that this is a volunteer service and anybody that was, you know, felt they couldn't take the risk should be, have no need to go.
You see what I mean?
He said they had surveyed them all and they had all, that they had been unanimous in saying that
we should not pay ransom in the event that they were caught or something you see what i mean so i think this is a good idea don't you to sort of show it'll show a little it's a good way to show support for i think it's all right it's nice it's a very nice thing how's the pow thing came off all right it came off all right the uh i've seen some of the movies uh right and some of the clips this morning
and again they made great statements coming off the plane just like the other group and they look so good I didn't see the other group yeah but they look good they made good statements excellent statements and tomorrow the V.C.
prisoners are coming out today it was the Hanoi prisoners about 108 of them and tomorrow 34 yeah 106 and tomorrow 34 V.C.
prisoners they're the ones that have the roughest time
Well, I think they may have learned a lesson, and they may have put them up to Hanoi and... Fed them up a little?
Yeah.
I think that's the reason they're releasing them up there.
Ah, yeah.
I'm not sure, but...
incidentally bill brought up the fact that the uh of the pow thing he said he thought it was handled just right no really he could you were exactly right i didn't bring it up but he said that uh because i was only in his other thing he said you know that was just trying to say well well i said you know what as you know we did some quite tough things but we didn't say anything about it and i said uh and that allowed us to be in public posture of so they could back off and he was always just right of course he
He obviously got a hell of a lot of credit on it.
You know, it gave him a chance to be out there every day.
But it did work out well.
Now this currency thing is working beautifully too.
Well, give me the dope on that.
I haven't heard from the Europeans yet because they're probably in a state of shock, but the Japanese Tanaka sent you a note of great gratitude.
He did?
He's sending a special emissary.
He's on the plane.
either now or within the next hour to come over here.
Good.
And I think it shows the Europeans also that there's a limit beyond which we can't be pushed.
It also shows them, let's face it, Henry, if we and the Japanese got together, it wouldn't be too pleasant for Europe.
That's exactly right.
That's what it shows them.
It's a way to restore... And incidentally, it was a very subtle way to get at the British.
to, you know, just send a sentence.
We learned through Braun that, you know, suppose we've got a wire like that, how would we feel?
Exactly.
No, I think... Did you talk to Cromer?
No, I sent him a copy.
I think they should make the next move.
Oh, yes.
We should just sit here.
Sit here.
We should explain anything, and I think we should sit and let them come to us now.
Right.
Just sit.
I agree.
I agree.
I agree.
And I think we are right, though, in not going, even though Arthur feels so strongly about it, on the option of,
of the whale wheel, which really basically is convertibility again, which puts the responsibility too much on us for, by golly, I'm not sure we can deliver anymore.
If they come back to us and then it appears as if they want it, I can see some advantage in it to bust the integration part.
I agree.
But if we had offered it yesterday, it would have looked as if we were trying to break up their system with a power play.
they they have now one of two choices either they're going to go ahead anyway in which case it gives us greater latitude at the summit right or they're going to come towards us in which case we've asserted our leadership right right but i think they're going to come towards us i don't think that brunt would dare to operate alone and i think the british given what they need from us in the nuclear field are going to take us on well the british naturally are
trying desperately to get along with the Europeans, but there's a limit that they've got to know that they can't do that without cutting the umbilical cord with us.
I think it's absolutely essential for the Europeans to know that the party is over, that they cannot pretend, on the one hand, that the alliance is indivisible in defense, that we have no right to conduct bilateral diplomacy, but they have a right to conduct unilateral economic policy and bilateral diplomacy of their own.
Right.
It's worked very well.
Good.
I'm going to Camp David and will be working there tomorrow at around 4 or 5 o'clock, but I'm available any time.
So don't hesitate to call if anything comes up.
You don't anticipate anything tomorrow anyway.
I'll be in the morning at the British Embassy.
They're sending somebody over on that nuclear treaty.
Yeah.
Because I thought we should have a common decision before Dobrynin comes back.
Right, right.
And also on this nuclear assistance.
Fine.
Well, you can call me.
But when you're there, I'd have a little heart-to-heart talk with Comer.
He's our friend.
And I'd say, now look here, what the hell's going on here?
Don't you think so?
I will have it.
I would not on the basis of saying...
I wouldn't try, I'd just say that we didn't want to, but we thought it was rather curious that we got this from Iran.
We would think that we, not that we were trying to limit them, but we thought they should at least inform us, maybe.
And to say that a currency issue will be settled on the basis of European integration.
That's one consideration.
That's not our principle consideration.
Right, right, right, right, right.
One other thing I wanted to do on a schedule thing briefly.
Apparently, Haldeman tells me that the State Department is giving a big dinner this spring for all the diplomats, and he feels, Haldeman does, that we ought to put our diplomatic white tie thing until the fall.
Well, I just found out about that State Department dinner when I received an invitation.
And I think that under those circumstances, perhaps you should put it into the fall.
No, there's nothing for us to double up.
No.
And they can inform the dean, the diplomat, you know, that we are going to have it in the fall, and that's that.
I think that's right.
And it'll be a good time to pick up a few crumbs.
Okay.
Mr. McGinnis, you were very nice.
Oh, well, I was glad to talk to her.
She's a very attractive and obviously intelligent girl.
She's a great fan.
It meant a lot to her.
Yeah.
Well, did she enjoy the dinner?
Very much.
Yeah, yeah.
Of course, she thinks most of the newsmen are too far left for her taste.
Interesting what you said about professors, isn't it?
Make sure she sat next to somebody she didn't tear to pieces.
Okay.
Good.
Bye.
Bye.