Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 37 › Conversation 037-170

Nixon phone call with Haig on Vietnam War and Foreign Policy

Tuesday, March 20, 1973 · 3:10 PM–3:19 PM ET · White House Telephone · 9 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Conversation037-170 on Tape 37StartTuesday, March 20, 1973 at 3:10 PMEndTuesday, March 20, 1973 at 3:19 PMRecording deviceWhite House TelephoneSourceNixon Library record for 037-170 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Alexander Haig discussed whether to take military action in response to North Vietnamese cease-fire violations. While Henry Kissinger advocated for a strong response to maintain credibility, both Nixon and Haig expressed skepticism, noting that current intelligence suggested the threat had tapered off and that public support for such action would be difficult to justify once U.S. troops and prisoners of war were fully withdrawn. The two agreed to delay any decision for 24 hours to further monitor the situation, with Nixon emphasizing that any military response required more concrete evidence than currently existed.

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Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Hello.
General Haig, Mr. President.
Yeah.
Hello.
Yes, Mr. President.
Hi, Al.
I wondered if you had any further thoughts on reviewing the intelligence side of things.
From what I see, I don't see anything changed from what you told me.
No.
It doesn't seem to, in fact, if anything, it seems to have tapered off considerably, but I don't know.
Maybe the first report for wrong, maybe the second are wrong.
What's your view?
Well, my view is that there is slightly less reason for quick action, but I think we ought to hold off on that decision another 24 hours.
The problem I have with it actually is this, that I don't know whether the action at this point
provocation is adequate to... You see what I mean?
I never have any damn doubt about action, but you just can't just get up and do something because of a whim, or what appears to be a whim.
No, I think we ought to watch it very carefully.
I know that they're intensely trying to look for any changes in status quo one way or the other.
You mean the intelligence people?
Yeah.
We just haven't gotten anything, and I don't think we really have enough to make a decision.
Yeah.
No, I haven't bothered Henry.
He's in Mexico, isn't he?
Yes, sir.
He's there, and he's watching the thing.
I talked to Scowcroft, and he said that Henry's inclination is to watch it, although he's still inclined to think we're going to have to do something.
I just finished 45 minutes with Ambassador Fong, who just came back from Saigon.
And I was quite encouraged by the discussion.
One, he said that they're very confident, the South Vietnamese.
Two, that the morale of the South Vietnamese military is high and strong.
And three, that he doesn't believe that they have any intentions of seriously upsetting this thing, but that he thinks they're going to just keep pressing in every direction to see what they can get away with.
Yeah.
I see.
The problem I have, Al, actually, is it gets down to the point that I don't want to be influenced in this by the sort of the bravado type of thing, which, you know, psychosis, which Henry goes through at times, you know.
I mean, having, you know, the idea that, well, we've said we might do something.
Now we've got to do something.
We don't have to do a goddamn thing, you know.
You understand what I mean?
So we mustn't do it simply because in order to prove what he has told to Brennan and others and so forth, we've got to demonstrate.
You see, if on the other hand there is an action, I mean, we've just got to have some pretty solid stuff.
But...
Well, I don't know.
Actually, I don't know.
From his sitting down there, I don't know whether his judgment is going to be all that good on it as an up-to-date matter.
No, I don't either, and that's one of the oddities of his current moment.
Yeah, it is, isn't it?
If he really feels that something must be done, then he should be back.
that I have no question about.
But I would say that what I would do, sir, is I just want this again.
There's nothing, certainly, then we'll wait 24 hours and... That's right.
We have time.
We have four or five more days, and it wouldn't make an awful lot of difference if it happened in the midst of the other thing.
Mm-hmm.
Yeah, the whole point is that there are other reasons, though, that we may have to take the good of it while we can.
If I really thought, look, here's the other point that we have to have in mind now.
So we say we do this in order to indicate that maybe we'd do something later.
Well, now, there's been enough written, and it's quite on the mark by even our friends like Analsop and others to the effect that, well,
after we get everybody out, and after we've withdrawn everything, then you damn near have to get congressional approval to do something.
Yeah.
You see that, don't you?
Yeah.
You see, because we have a ceasefire, right?
And for them just to up and say, now, because of this and that, you say, for what purpose are you doing it?
Well, you're, for the purpose of, you see, I think we have a, I think we've got a problem there that may not have occurred to Henry Ackett
It's always occurred to me, I mean, and of course we have, as you know, we've assured too that we would do things, but do you have any serious doubts in your own mind that we'd really, we would really have to go to the, in this case, let's face it, one of the reasons we were able to do what we were able to do is because they had the prisoners, and we had some troops there.
Now when they're all out, and all the prisoners are out, you're going to have one hell of a time, I mean, without going to the Congress, right?
Right.
I agree with that.
Hitting the north.
Now, in the event there's a massive reinstitution and so forth of military actions, that's something else again.
But I'm speaking now at the idea that, well, by doing something now, that indicates we might be trigger-happy later.
I don't think that argument is quite as strong as Henry is.
See, he's thinking...
as to how it used to be and not as to how it will be, I think.
Well, that's right, although there is something to be said for that logic.
I know if we do something about it.
My point is it was more believable before because we had people there, but at a time when we don't have anybody there, it's going to be damn tough.
Yes, absolutely.
That's the point.
I mean, they're smart enough to know that we will have to
get some sort of approval.
Well, in any event, I haven't decided.
We'll take a look at it.
Yes, sir.
Is that crucial in terms of timing because it's not going to be that clean a difference?
Well, it isn't that clean a difference because...
I think the whole thing will rest on our ability to justify through provable violations that are serious in character.
Well, the provable violations, what he's
basing everything on at the present time is the infiltration of equipment, correct?
That's right, sir.
No, on that?
Individual replacements.
What?
Long told me he didn't think, he thought these were replacements to replace other people that are going to go back home.
Well, they aren't even allowed that, I guess, under the thing, are they?
No, they're not, but it certainly makes the character of the... Yeah.
It doesn't increase the threat, does it?
No.
All right, well, we'll keep in touch.
But as I say, it is rather curious if Henry feels as strongly about it.
He's there rather than here, too.
Well, it's a nice insurance policy, and that's what he's thinking of.
You mean an insurance policy in the sense of warning them?
Yeah.
Yeah.
It's just that simple, I think.
But you're not convinced that it's worth doing yet?
No, I'm not.
If...
The indications are it's less of a problem.
Yeah, than it was last week.
That's right.
And one other problem, of course, from the standpoint of domestic reaction here, of course, none of them have been guessing what the hell we were thinking of hitting.
They thought we were going to hit the north, you know, the so-called Vail threat.
But the domestic reaction here, they've been writing this week, all week they've been writing that very intelligence that it isn't all that serious, you know?
That's right.
Curious, isn't it?
Right.
Quite frankly, sir, I think on the domestic side, if we were talking the two-day bet, I don't think it would cause an awful stir.
Because it was in-laws.
That's right.
That's right.
Well, okay.
We'll talk to you tomorrow.
Okay.

NARA Description

On March 20, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 3:10 pm to 3:19 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 037-170 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 37-170

Date: March 20, 1973
Time: 3:10 pm-3:19 pm
Location: White House Telephone
                                             - 118 -

                            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

The President talked with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

[See Conversation No. 884-20]

       North Vietnamese cease-fire violations
              -Intelligence evacuation
              -US reaction
                       -Haig’s view
                       -Henry A. Kissinger’s schedule
                              -Mexico
                       -Kissinger’s instructions to Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft
                              -Watchfulness
                       -Haig’s conversation with Tran Kim Phoung
                              -South Vietnamese Ambassador
                              -Situation in South Vietnam
                                      -Morale of the military
                                      -North Vietnamese intentions
                       -Kissinger
                              -Bravado
                              -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                       -Delay
                       -Congressional approval
                              -Joseph W. Alsop [?]
                              -Nguyen Van Thieu
                              -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                              -Troop withdrawal
                              -Resumption of war
                              -Rationale
                       -North Vietnamese infiltration
                              -Equipment
                              -Replacements
                              -Phoung’s view
                              -Nature of threat
                       -Warning to North Vietnam
                       -Target of US military response
                              -Domestic attitude
                                      -Media coverage
                                              - 119 -

                             NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                     -Laos

Also recorded on March 20, 1973

  • 037-169 2:31 PM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 2:31 pm and 3:10 pm.
  • 884-018 2:31 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 2:31 pm and 3:11 pm.
  • 884-025 2:31 PM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 2:31 pm and 3:11 pm.
  • 884-019 3:11 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:11 pm and 3:16 pm.
  • 884-020 3:16 PM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:16 pm and 3:19 pm.
  • 884-021 3:19 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:19 pm and 3:26 pm.
  • 884-022 3:19 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:19 pm and 3:26 pm.
  • 884-023 3:26 PM · 59 min — President Richard M. Nixon, George H. W. Bush, Linwood Holton, William T. Cahill, Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., unknown person(s), John D. Ehrlichman, and Rose Mary Woods met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:26 pm to 4:26 pm.

All 46 conversations from March 20, 1973 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 037-170, March 20, 1973. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/037-170 (accessed October 12, 2026).