On March 21, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 4:23 pm to 4:39 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 037-190 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Yes, sir.
Hi, Al.
Do you have any further thoughts with regard to our decision we may have to make today?
I just don't think it's justified.
You don't at this point?
At this point.
I'm waiting for...
I've been after Henry all day, but... Scowcroft hasn't said he expected a message any minute about an hour and a half ago, but I hasn't gotten it in yet, so...
see what it shows.
But let me say this.
I've been thinking about it, and hell, if there's a risk in the fact that some of the POW thing, if it's going to buy us a little insurance, I'll do it.
The problem I see with it, I've been doing a lot of cogitating about it since you and I talked, is that how really meaningful doing it now means, particularly
as to whether we would do it later, particularly when already questions are being asked now by the Congress.
What justification do you have to continue to vote on Cambodia, etc., after all of our people are out?
See what I mean?
On the legal side, we have that problem.
The problem is how we'll have to find our justifications, but it's not an easy one to answer, is it?
No, it's not.
But even...
that's not why i just don't see they have toned down a bit at least in terms of the the facts that we can determine i've noticed that and i've been reading in the last couple days and it's it's been maybe a bit 20 or so and right and it's less clear than it was and then they snapped back with it to get the pow's out a little earlier
I want to tell you what I did on that, though.
I don't know whether it's a degree or not, but that did not include the nine in Laos.
And I said that as far as we were concerned, we would get them out before the 28th.
In other words, on the 27th, because I don't think we ought to move those people out.
Do you agree?
Exactly right.
To live by the agreement as it was made.
The agreement is, and we expect them out of Laos then, too, don't we?
Isn't it?
Wasn't that part of the agreement, too?
Yes, it was, although, you know, they've come back and changed on it.
But that's true.
But I certainly don't think that we can justify withdrawing everybody until they're out of Laos, at least.
Those nine guys over there, they got a right, we got a right to.
One of them is just as important as that first guy that came out.
Well, that's right.
That's right.
So in other words, when Scowcroft raises this morning and they'd offer the we withdraw by the 25th also, well, I thought, oh, hang it on the Laos thing.
I put it on the basis that we couldn't be ready by that time, that we'd be ready before the 28th.
Right.
Sound about right to you?
Yes, I think that's right.
That's the way it was.
It's good to be considered in any event.
In any event, it did suggest a degree more cooperation.
The incident rates in the country.
I couldn't sense that much.
These numbers mean so little.
That is, they say, well, the major ones and the minor ones.
I guess the total is down a bit.
But do you think they are down a little?
They're down a little, and that probably doesn't mean a goddamn thing.
When you're watching these things and looking for a basis to do, it's hard to do.
So at the moment, you would say, well, I think we'd have to watch it a little longer.
And a few came out, you know, South Vietnamese made a strong statement, an accusation yesterday, and they overkilled the Fed.
I think we've gotten their attention.
They know that we're taking it seriously.
We've had a lot of good speculation in the American press.
which would convince in a way that they're on the verge of trouble.
Yeah, the American press, of course, anticipates something entirely different from what we're going to do.
In other words, thinking we'd hit the north again.
Well, whatever.
I think if this, so on that score, Al, you, as far as the reaction here is concerned, I don't think that that's going to make a lot of difference.
I mean, hitting the trail, the point is then it really gets down to the reaction there.
I don't know.
That's such a tough one to figure as to whether just up and cracking them now.
Anytime I think it will have a positive reaction, I think we should do it.
Not any question, but in this case, I'm not quite so sure.
Another thing, too, I don't know what we can follow it up with.
That's another thing that bothers me a bit.
Well, you have to be ready to follow it up, and that's the point.
That's the point.
Thank you.
they held up on the pws and they continued to cheat and that would be it oh no doubt no doubt it's going to be a little bit tough and where you get your criticism only is the fact that you did it with your w's being jeopardized by the act that should be the source of the criticism
I just don't see enough to go this way at this moment.
You don't see enough to make that risk at this moment?
No, because I don't think the results are going to be that good.
The results, not only militarily, are not significant.
No, sir.
But the point is whether psychologically the results are important, and I'm not so sure they're that important either.
I don't know.
If we get a backlash, it could be the worst thing we could do.
If you've got a backlash here at home, it could be the worst thing that we... Oh, my God, yes.
You see, that would tell Illinois, well, hell, Christ, look, there's just two days in the house, and look at the trouble there is.
That's right.
We can take that any time.
That's right.
So, therefore, just break it right and left.
That's right.
And I would throw a look to this thing as a one-two punch, where we have to have either a flagrant...
come back to our message to those people which we haven't like to go to hell and the tempo was still high we haven't gotten the response that's uh we've got some drop off there's some drop off in instance we've had the forthcoming release and withdrawal scenario as a matter of fact the point is when you look at my statement of last week uh even the even the lousy press
been sort of playing at that, well, there has been some drop-off and so forth, right?
Oh, yeah.
Well, of course, the bastard in the New York Times today described it as a major drop-off.
Yeah.
Which, you know, they said.
That isn't true.
Well, that doesn't hurt us, though.
It doesn't hurt us here if we don't believe it.
No, but it doesn't hurt us in a way because you're taking this seriously.
I think the warning was probably worthwhile.
I mean, you know, I guess I don't like to make warnings and not kick somebody, but nevertheless, I guess it was worthwhile since they haven't done anything to make me have to do it.
Is that the way you'd look at it?
Yes, sir.
I really think now that our best bet is to just continue to watch this thing and not foreclose doing it.
whenever we all conclude that this thing is intolerable.
But right now, it's still tolerable, I believe.
You've got to figure this.
I mean, I'm really looking down the road, and this is the real problem we're going to have with our friend, too, is that if this thing fires up again, and he'll be hollering for help and this and that, there's going to be damn little public sentiment in this country for that help, you know?
That's right.
That's why what he's got on the air and on the ground, he's got to use it damn well.
As a matter of fact, Abrams thinks they're in pretty damn good shape, doesn't he, considering everything?
They've got the men, they've got the equipment.
They've got an Air Force, haven't they?
A pretty good Air Force?
They've got all that they need in the first of the year, so they can handle anything.
And they should get stronger in the meantime, if they're doing it right.
Yeah.
Another thing, too, in the meantime, the Russians and the Chinese have one hell of a stake in not having this thing flare up.
Because we put it awful hard to the Russians, you know, I have an effect.
And we told them right in that past trip, my husband's in all these sloppy messages, slobbery messages.
And I said, now, look, it worked, but I said, if there's any flare up in Vietnam, forget the summit.
I just put it candidly, there's not going to be any.
that's going to have some, I think, some mitigating effect.
I mean, knowing that the bastards would like to screw us, but they may want that at least before they do it.
That's right.
And I don't think they want to risk another round of what happened in December.
No, neither do we.
That's the problem.
No, we don't either.
But they happen to expect what they see.
what they see, and they respect what happened then.
When you stop to think of it, I was just looking over the, and they always send me half a dozen of these POW, you know, letters and so forth.
They're responding to my note, and my God, I mean, as far as the bombing in December is concerned, we don't have to make that case.
They're making it, aren't they?
They're making it.
Isn't it amazing?
It really is something.
And you just read their notes, and it's something to say.
I mean, I'm telling you, these Cincinnati fighters, the ones that wanted us to do the bombing and the rest, they're really running up their lips now, aren't they?
Well, because unless their own criminal press would have to deal with the people, it's obvious.
They can't fight against them.
That's right.
That's right.
We'll see what Henry comes up with.
I don't know.
He's sitting down there in the aisle on the night or wherever it is.
And, you know, it's a little hard.
It's pretty easy to call it from out there.
I told him he was in an innocent foxhole.
Yeah, that's right.
But whatever it's worth, what does he feel?
I think I am specifically on this judgment, but my sensing is that he would watch it anyway.
And that's what I would do.
Mm-hmm.
It's just not quite hard enough yet.
And we've usually felt these things when they come.
Yeah.
In other words, the pressures are not that hard.
No, sir.
Yeah.
No, sir.
I think, actually, you know, you may.
Even though the CIA and the rest of the weather is part of it and the rest, it may be that the little shot across the barrel, the warning last week, had some effect.
Well, I know it got their attention now, Ralph.
that I would suspect they're going to be a little more cautious.
Just a little, yeah.
I don't think there's going to be any change in the cheating and all that goes with it.
Oh, no.
We never did think that, but we had to worry about it.
Listen, our side's going to cheat too, aren't they?
Well, that's right, and we have a defense already.
We certainly have.
And the defense is there, right?
That's right.
The big thing is...
Are we going to be able to keep the lid on this thing for a period of time if necessary?
And I don't think this fundamentally jeopardizes that ability.
Yeah.
You know, looking at Cambodia, what answer do you give if they say, well, now, what justification from a legal standpoint do you have for continuing to bomb Cambodia?
Because that government is under attack.
We've been asked by that government to support it.
And we made it very clear that if that bomb stopped, the enemy activity stopped.
So we could tie it to the ceasefire and say, well, there was an agreement for a ceasefire in Cambodia that is, well, at least a protocol of that effect and for withdrawal of forces.
It has not occurred until the agreement, as long as the agreement is not complied with, why we will continue to enforce it.
That's all.
That's right.
We've got to keep it on the agreement basis.
I guess so.
Okay, I'll thank you.
Bye, Mr. President.