Nixon phone call with Haig on Vietnam War and Military policy

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Hello.

General Haag.

Hello.

Hello, Mr. President.

Well, did we get home?

No, sir.

Ron and I were just at a charity celebrity tennis tournament here at Georgetown.

We just got licked.

You were lost, huh?

Yeah.

Are you where you can talk?

Yes, sir.

Yeah, fine.

uh i got this message from him you got a minute you could listen to it yes sir and uh or have you already seen it you haven't seen it yet i left the office that's right well it's a rather confused kind of a thing which led me to conclude that this is perhaps the basis the base is not for acting but uh because it was so confused but here it is

There's only one principal argument for conducting the strikes at this time, and that is to make it clear to the North Vietnamese that we may do something totally unexpected if pressed in defense of the agreement.

If the North Vietnamese believe we will not act after the POWs are out, that offensive by the end of the year is almost a certainty.

Now, I will just enter in a lard there that we're not acting now after they're out.

You see what I mean?

Yes, yes.

So that begs that question, I think.

If an offensive succeeds, all those who have fought every move the president has made will be vindicated, and the whole basis will be undermined.

The president's policy, I consider one of the key objectives of our foreign policy, is to get as much as time possible for the resumption of storage by the North.

Well, that's beating a dead horse.

We all know that.

On the other hand, our strikes would run the risk that they could be used as a pretext to stall an agreement, allow us to delay the release of POWs.

I do not think, and he puts in, I do not think it will make much military difference.

Of course not.

That's another point to be made later.

However, our experience indicates that the other side, if not looking for pretext, will not use them and has generally reacted differently to hard measures and our people are capitulate.

I doubt if they will seize the pretext in this case because they are anxious to get our troops out and want to see what they can get on the economic side.

And this very curious paragraph, obviously the Pentagon is on a campaign to thwart the strikes by indicating that the infiltration now does not amount to much.

It's a very closely balanced decision.

If the president feels he will be unable to act afterwards, I feel by a narrow margin we should do it now.

If he's willing to take similar actions in two to three weeks, I'd be in favor of waiting until there is a clear case and a memorandum.

But what that all adds up to is sort of a mixture, it seems to me, in the first place, that our acting now, while the POWs are there, does not indicate we would act later when they were out.

I don't think it might indicate, I suppose, that, well, if we act now, we're jeopardizing that, so we might do something right later.

The key point is that it doubts if it will make military difference.

My analysis of everything we've done against the North has been that unless it does make a significant military difference, it doesn't have a hell of a lot of effect on them.

In other words, the menu things didn't have a hell of a lot of effect on them.

May did, and the December things did, because they had one hell of an effect on them, and that's what mattered.

In other words, symbolic strikes here and there, they quiver a little, but that doesn't make much difference.

But when you get down to the point that if he feels he will not be unable to act afterwards, but if we could take this action in two to three weeks, I'd be in favor of waiting until there's a clear case.

Well, you're quite aware of the fact that a clear case, that just simply that they're increasing infiltration, so we start bombing them again.

It's a pretty tough case.

Yes.

See?

So there it is.

And on the basis of this, I decided that I...

I couldn't authorize a strike based on this kind of an analysis.

No, I think Henry's generally come very close to what we all think.

I don't think we're at that kind of a watershed that it's irrevocable if we don't act now, and I don't think we should feel pressured by that kind of a time schedule.

You don't?

No, sir.

I think what we have to be pressured by is

is success or failure we must judge this on success or failure and i don't think this is that we're at that point in time if the thing is going to go down the tubes without our acting then we're going to have to act whatever the price may be but i don't think we haven't been in that position yet but the point that i make is if acting now is a signal that would uh make them cautious

I suppose you could do it, but I'm inclined to think that December 18th was that signal.

You know what I mean?

It isn't that big a deal.

That's the problem that I see with it.

And the key point is I do not think it will make much military difference.

You don't, and I don't.

I don't either, and I think that's why the Pentagon has got cold feet as far as the military is concerned, not as far as the other side.

The other side probably, you know, the upper stairs is probably opposed in principle.

But I think the chairman's view would be this is just not that significant an act.

And as such, it's a marginal thing.

And it could cost you more than it gains.

Could.

That's right.

If we got a Donnybrook going at home and a lot of static going, which is not probable but possible.

it's possible it certainly would be some sniping because of the pw issue yeah but even so i don't think and they could then immediately claim some justification for monkey business which they were going to do anyhow on the ground that we were were acting without clear provocation after they had particularly after they have gotten out a story pretty well on their side with the help of course from

Well, some of the facts and, of course, the Times and others that boil that they have gone down.

You see what I mean?

Exactly.

Now, I think, in other words, that they may be setting us up, could be, from a propaganda standpoint, that if we did do a little thing like this, which is basically little militarily, they could say, what the hell, we're just trigger happy and we want to bomb them and any kind of provocation.

Well, that's right, and...

Henry's right when he says it's tightly balanced.

It's very tight in my view, but I've always felt that in the final analysis, we've had a pretty good feeling not only in the mind, but in the gut that it was the thing to do.

I don't have that in either case here.

That's the point.

We knew in the gut it was the right thing on May 8th.

We knew Cambodia was the right thing.

We knew that 18th of December was the right thing, but you can't have a gut feeling that it's the right thing just to...

Take basically something that's not particularly effective.

That's the whole point.

It isn't particularly effective.

And, you know, just to hit the trail again.

That's my concern, I guess.

Well, it's really mine.

I know it doesn't mean anything.

And I think, really, if they take action, they're going to really jeopardize the loss of everything.

And we're going to have to take counteraction.

There's just no question about it.

But I think it'll be understood by all at the time that that's a mistake.

This one's a little fuzzy.

Yeah.

The other thing about this, of course, is how we've got to really put the burden on Pew and the South Vietnamese that once this withdrawal is completed, damn it, the ball's on their side of the net and they've got airplanes.

They can hit this area, can't they?

Yes, they could...

could do a lot and I think they'd be willing to do it if they thought we'd back them up in the context of not charging them with a lot of violations and then maybe cutting off help.

What if they were bombing on the trail, you know, the infiltration route?

They could do it.

It wouldn't be very

It wouldn't mean an awful lot.

Neither would ours at this moment.

Let's face it, we've been bombing the goddamn trail for years.

No, that's the worst part of it.

That's the point of it.

That's what concerns me about it.

We've been doing it for years.

Now, two days of this, even though it's jammed, isn't going to make that much difference.

That's the thing that concerns me about it, that it doesn't have the military punch.

That's exactly right.

And a military punch, I think, is essential if it's going to give these people a...

A real concern.

Well, based on this, I've decided I don't think we should do it.

No.

No, I don't.

Under certain circumstances.

Well, I think we should keep our powers on and just keep watching this thing.

That's right.

Right now, I just don't think it's justified.

Right.

That's what we're going to do.

Okay.

Nixon phone call with Haig on Vietnam War and Military policy

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on March 22, 1973

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