← 038-010038-012 →

Conversation 038-011

TapeTape 38StartFriday, April 13, 1973 at 6:00 PMEndFriday, April 13, 1973 at 6:07 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss diplomatic appointments, administration strategy, and foreign policy matters during a telephone call. They review potential ambassadorial assignments for Moscow, Thailand, and Pakistan, while also coordinating the President's upcoming schedule and meetings. Furthermore, they deliberate on Vietnam strategy, including the necessity of a coordinated planning process, and assess ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the upcoming summit.

AmbassadorshipsDiplomatic appointmentsVietnam WarSoviet UnionUS Foreign PolicyWatergateLeonid Brezhnev
AudioNARA Description

On April 13, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez talked on the telephone from 6:00 pm to 6:07 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 038-011 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 38-11 (cont’d)

                                                                       Conversation No. 38-11

Date: April 13, 1973
Time: 6:00 pm - 6:07 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

     President’s meeting with Joseph J. Sisco
           -Sisco’s travel to Middle East
                 -Meeting with ambassadors
           -Conduct of diplomacy
                 -State Department’s role
                 -Blame for failure
           -Problems with Sisco [?]
                 -Moscow

     Ambassadorships
         -Soviet Union
               -State Department career appointment
               -Malcolm Toon
               -[David] Kenneth Rush
               -William J. Casey
               -U. Alexis Johnson
               -William J. Porter
               -Diplomacy
                     -White House role
               -Major appointment
         -Thailand
               -Henry Kearns
               -Kissinger’s conversation with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
         -Pakistan
               -Kearns

The President conferred with Manolo Sanchez at an unknown time between 6:00 pm and 6:07
pm.

[Begin conferral]
                                           -7-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                   (rev. January-2011)

                                                         Conversation No. 38-11 (cont’d)

     Instruction

[End conferral]

     Ambassadorships
         -Kearns
               -Pakistan
               -Thailand
         -Pakistan
               -William R. Kintner
                     -Thailand
                     -Cambodia
                     -Henry A. Byroade
               -Kearns

     President’s schedule
           -Meeting with Haig
           -Dentist
           -Kissinger’s schedule
                 -John D. Ehrlichman
                       -Watergate

     Vietnam
          -Need for plan
               -Consultation
               -National Security Council [NSC]
               -Congress
               -State Department
               -Defense Department
          -Overflights
          -Reply concerning meeting with Le Duc Tho

     Soviet Union
          -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                -Kissinger’s message
          -Negotiations with US
                -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                -Europe
                                                -8-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                     (rev. January-2011)

                                                           Conversation No. 38-11 (cont’d)

           -Brezhnev
                -Internal problems
                US diplomatic successes
           -Summit
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello, Mr. President.
Well, I hope we got Joe... Oh, that was my...
I thought that just about...
I mean, he'll play like a... Oh, beautiful.
And the reason why it was so important is because he's going tomorrow to the Middle East.
Good.
To a meeting of all the ambassadors there.
Good.
And what he's going to pick up.
So he'll know the game, what the game is.
The main thing is...
And this is the relationship we've got to have with all the people in the state is that, God damn it, we play games, and they've got to cooperate and not worry about who the hell is doing it.
We're all doing it.
I do it.
You do it.
They do it.
And God damn it, we all get the credit if we succeed.
We all get blamed.
I get blamed if we fail.
But I think we've got that point across.
I don't think you're going to have a problem with him anymore.
Not whatsoever.
None, whatever.
And what you said about, you know, telling him this is more important than Moscow.
You're right, of course, Moscow's nothing.
Now, on Moscow, I think we ought to give that to State as a career appointment.
That's fine.
And, uh, it'll, it'll, so, uh, tell, uh, the second, who's the guy, uh, the second man we've got over there now?
Toon?
Oh, God, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.
I mean, our man in the State Department.
Oh, Rush?
No, God, no, no.
Casey?
No, no.
You get
No, the career guy, the Alex Johnson job.
Oh, Porter.
Just tell Porter I want the man that they want, that they think is best qualified in the career service to become ambassador to Moscow.
Because it doesn't make any difference to us, does it, Henry?
No.
No, we want to do our business here.
We're going to do the business here, so tell him that.
The stronger he is, the better off we are.
Right.
So let's get the... And that'll give them...
They've all been, you know, screaming that they don't have any major appointments.
Let's give that one to them.
Right.
uh on i think that's absolutely right i think you you take care of that okay right now on thailand yeah i don't really think that kern's is up to what's needed there now after having heard haig and he thinks so too uh you know i i don't object to kern say in pakistan
Well, who are we thinking of for Pakistan, though?
The Kurds could do Pakistan very well.
He knows it infinitely well.
That would be fine.
And the Paks love him.
Just as the Thais do.
That would be fine.
And who are we thinking of for Pakistan, though?
We were thinking of either Kindna or... Well, Kindna could do Thailand, couldn't he?
Well, Kindna could do Cambodia.
Yeah.
Or Thailand.
Well, if we could put Kentner in Cambodia.
By road into Thailand.
By road into Thailand.
And now it's into Pakistan.
It's into Pakistan.
All right.
Well, go on that ploy, and you offer the tomorrow.
Will you do that?
Right, Mr. Presser.
Talk to all of them.
Fine.
Now, on the Haig thing, don't you think I really ought to see Haig tomorrow?
It can easily be arranged.
Oh, I don't mean it can be arranged, but should I see him, or do you think it's necessary?
It might be useful to see him for half an hour.
All right, fine.
I have to go to the dentist at 8 o'clock.
Let's see.
I'll be back by 2 p.m.
I'm meeting with Ehrlichman on Watergate business.
Oh, yeah.
10.
10.
So if we could do it— It's not 11?
I think it might be safer 11.30, if that's agreeable to you.
11.30?
Fine.
Fine.
Okay.
We'll make it 11.30.
It's 11.30 if he wants to come over.
Okay.
Fine.
One other thing I want to tell you.
In terms of what we do against
you know, in the Vietnamese area, what we have to do is to get a game planner because we will have to, in this case, I just can't go off and do it.
You know, I've got to consult with the Security Council and probably the goddamn congressional leaders, you see.
Well, they'll be out of town.
They may be out of town, but you've got to inform them.
But the Security Council, you can't have the state and defense pissing on the thing, see?
That's right.
That's right.
But we are not under any time pressure that you must do something next week.
Right.
One thing we should do next week, because that will wound them, is to fly.
I'm all for that, flying those overflights.
But I wish that should be this week.
I don't know why we are waiting.
Well, we can wait till Monday.
It takes that long.
All right, fine.
Good.
And then also, you should get a return reply, shouldn't you?
But you're meeting with Lee Docter and all the rest.
They haven't heard a goddamn thing.
The way that the Breeden is working is he's taking your message now, leaving tomorrow, right?
He's leaving Sunday.
Sunday.
And did he think that your message, your thing was a good thing or not?
You see, it's basically we're just maneuvering them and avoiding what they really want.
But at least you gave enough ground to make it a reasonable proposal.
I've given enough ground now successively.
Right.
But it is not what they want.
Right.
Well, look, let's face it.
We want Brezhnev in, Henry.
That's right.
So I think it's worth it.
We have to be careful with the Chinese and the Europeans.
I know.
I know.
I know.
And we're going pretty far vis-a-vis them.
Right.
Well...
all right bye but i think so we break it off with them uh break it off with the russians and we get a hardliner in so that's pretty good too well no no i don't i think she can probably handle both that's right but you uh you don't think that brechnev is in that much trouble do you no well i don't know but it isn't because of us if he's in trouble because of internal problems well partly internal problems and partly it because of us only in the sense
Mr. President, anyone keeping a reasonable scoreboard has to conclude that we did very well.
That you did very well and they got next to nothing.
Oh, yeah, but they're going to get a lot of things.
They're getting a hell of a lot of respectability in the world, let's face it.
That's right.
That's what they're getting.
And by God, they need it.
That's right.
That is true.
But that...
When will he be back?
He's going over and he's...
He's going back about the 25th.
I think the summit will go on, though, strangely enough.
Do you?
Oh, yes.
Practically certain.
Okay.
All right.
We'll see you tomorrow at 1130.
← 038-010038-012 →