Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 38 › Conversation 038-064
Nixon phone call with Petersen on Watergate and John Dean
Sunday, April 15, 1973 · 11:45 PM–11:53 PM ET · White House Telephone · 8 min
AI Summary
President Nixon consulted with Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen regarding the strategic timing for the resignations of John Dean, H.R. Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman amid the deepening Watergate investigation. Petersen advised the President to delay these resignations to avoid interfering with ongoing prosecutorial efforts and to ensure that potential testimony could be woven into a coherent legal narrative. The two also discussed the status of various witnesses, including Jeb Stuart Magruder, and the importance of coordinating their actions to maintain control over the evolving situation.
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Hello?
Peter's on the line, sir.
Yes, sir.
Hope it didn't wake you up.
No, not at all.
I wanted to tell you first, I have apparently, that's the President of Rotary International at noon tomorrow.
Would you make it 1.30?
Yes, sir.
Well, I'm not going to interfere with your lunch or anything.
Oh, fine.
Second, I met with Dean.
I got him in finally and heard his story.
And I said directly to him, now, when do you want to resign?
And he said, well, I'll resign.
But he said, I would prefer to wait until I have testified.
Now, I want to ask your judgment on that.
I can bring him in in the morning and tell him, look, I want your resignation.
But what do you want me to do?
I don't want to interfere with your process.
Mr. President, I don't think that we ought to tip our hat yet.
He's the first one who's really committed.
Oh, I see.
He came in a week ago Sunday.
Right.
Well, let me say this.
The main thing, Henry, we must not have any question now on this.
You know, I'm in charge of this thing.
You are.
And I am, above everything else.
And I'm following it every inch of the way.
And I don't want any question that I'm way ahead of the... You know, I want to stay one step ahead of the curve.
You know what I mean?
I understand.
So if you think on Dean...
I think we ought to hold the line.
Right.
And you let me know.
Yes, sir.
One day.
As soon as—then I'll call the men in that room.
You'll have to resign.
Yes, sir.
On Holland and Ehrlichman, I have informed both of them of the charges that have been, you know, generally made.
And I have said if they stand up—and they, of course—I didn't have to say it.
They said, well, of course we will.
We don't want to be an embarrassment.
They're good guys.
But my feeling with both of them is—
I mean, there's only a question, and we talked today of when.
I mean, when.
Oh, now that's weather also.
But I think you've got to hear Strawn, and I think you've got to hear Dean.
And then I suppose you would want to hear them.
Do you think we should move on them before, or do you want to think of that overnight?
We'd like to wait.
We'd like to wait.
Because like today, you were suggesting that we should call them all in and have them resign.
So I just want to be sure you didn't think I should do that.
Because I'm perfectly prepared to.
Well, you know, that's really your judgment.
I think ultimately that's going to have to be done.
Yeah, but your point is that as far as the case is concerned, you're telling me now that it's best to wait.
Is that the point?
And yes, and on Ehrlichman-Haldeman, I suppose until we hear their
testimony, which is that we want to put them off until we can fashion all the items into a pattern.
How soon would that be, for my own planning, about a week?
I don't think it's going to be less than a week, and I would say two weeks or more.
Well, you think it might be two weeks?
I would say so, yes, sir.
Take that long?
I'm afraid so, because... Well, by that time, my view is the damn thing will leak out.
We'll see.
Why don't you and I talk about that tomorrow?
We will.
And we'll look over the Haldeman-Ehrlichman thing to see what the facts are.
And maybe you could give me a little sheet of paper on both as to what you feel their vulnerabilities are so that I can—could you do that?
Sure, indeed, yes, sir.
I mean, just say, for these reasons, et cetera, and then I'll be in a position to—
act on them very you understand they will uh there's any any any problem with with of course not with dean and neither hold them early and they're perfectly prepared to do whatever i say at a moment's notice because they put the office first but the only thing i'm concerned about is in the prosecution of a case like this it may be that if you if you have
That move, it may have an effect on some of the others you're trying to get.
You're trying to get to testify.
I don't know, but...
Certainly true with Dean.
Certainly true with Dean.
Yes, sir.
He's in a mood to resign right now, but I'll see you.
I'll check him tomorrow.
Very good.
that you say we'll talk about tomorrow.
Do you want to think about it?
I want to think about it some more, yes, sir, because I think we're going to have to weave all of the facts with respect to the end to a pattern.
It's not going to come out neat and clean and vertical with respect to either one of them.
Because in both cases, they have a—basically in both of their cases, as I look at the thing, since it's basically the obstruction of justice case for the most part, and with the possibility of hold'em of knowledge, although
that you have to hear strong before you can decide that.
But that's a matter which is going to involve your hearing them to what they know, I suppose, as well as hearing the others.
Well, I think that's right.
And I think with respect to the obstruction of justice thing is concerned, it's easy for me to see how they fell into that, if you like.
Yeah.
Rather than being directly conspirators.
That's right.
That's right.
And there's a difference in that respect.
That's right.
There's a difference at least in moral culpability.
Sure.
Motive.
In terms of ultimate embarrassment, I think the...
The embarrassment is there, but in terms of, basically in terms of motive, which might be legal culpability, they might be off.
But in terms of embarrassment, they'd have to be out of the government.
Yes, sir.
I get your point.
And frankly, either one is enough.
I understand that totally.
Yes.
Because that was what was involved in the Adams case, as you recall.
He was not legally going to leave a damn thing.
Well, he might have been.
Might have been, I suppose, making the telephone call if they'd ever want him to try.
But because of the possibility, we had to move on him.
Well, in any event, glad to get your view on it.
But I wanted you to know that having talked to Dean and told him to wait, I want to make sure you know that I had told him to wait.
Because I had agreed with him that I would not wait
I would not know it until I heard from him, but let me say I'm going to wait until I hear from you then on Dean.
Is that fair enough?
Fine, yes, sir.
And you'll probably hear him on your Tuesday tomorrow.
Oh, you don't know yet?
We don't know yet, no.
It's not going to be that quick because I'm going to have Strawn, LaRue, and Brian.
Tomorrow?
Tomorrow.
Yep.
What about Magruder?
That's Monday and Tuesday.
What about Magruder?
You have to get him in there someplace, don't you?
Well, we've had him in, and we have to get his testimony in before the grand jury, and we're trying to work out with us whether or not he will— You know, come in and plead guilty.
Because it seems to me that your idea of getting him on and pleading guilty—
meeting the damn press and the urban committee to it is never very good otherwise you know something they're going to say they forced you to do it that's very important that you're going to don't you agree those negotiations are negotiations on the way with this council now and obviously uh they're very much afraid of sirica they're afraid sirca is going to clap you in jail immediately we have to see sirica too no sir it's going to see the point of this my goodness because the point is that sirica's got to realize he's getting bigger fish that's right
Yes, sir.
Right?
That's it, exactly.
Okay.
All right.
Good luck.
All right.
Thank you for calling, Mr. President.
NARA Description
On April 15, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry E. Petersen talked on the telephone from 11:45 pm to 11:53 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 038-064 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 38-64
Date: April 15, 1973
Time: 11:45 pm -11:53 pm
Location: White House Telephone
The President talked with Henry E. Petersen.
[A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared Richard Nixon’s Special
White House Counsel for Watergate Matters and submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives. This transcript can be found in Submission of Recorded
Presidential Conversations (SRPC), pages 772-779 (1-8). Please refer to the logging below.]
Watergate
-Henry E. Petersen’s schedule
-President’s conversation with John W. Dean, III
-Resignation
-Timing
-President’s conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman
-Accusations
-37-
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Conversation No. 38-64 (cont’d)
-Resignations
-Testimony by Gordon C. Strachan and Dean
-Timing
-Leaks
-Dean
-Effect of resignation
-Haldeman and Ehrlichman
-Obstruction of justice
-Motive
-Effect of government employment
-Comparison with Sherman Adams case
-President’s previous conversation with Dean
-Resignation
-Petersen’s schedule
-Strachan, Frederick C. LaRue and Paul L. O’Brien
-Jeb Stuart Magruder
-Magruder
-Plea
-Effect of Ervin Committee
-John J. SiricaAlso recorded on April 16, 1973
- 038-056 8:26 PM · 18 sec — H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, White House operator, and President Richard M. Nixon talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:26 pm and 9:15 pm.
- 038-057 9:17 PM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and John D. Ehrlichman talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:17 pm and 9:39 pm.
- 038-058 9:39 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry E. Petersen talked on the telephone from 9:39 pm to 9:41 pm.
- 038-059 10:16 PM · 19 sec — John D. Ehrlichman and White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:16 pm and 11:15 pm.
- 038-060 10:16 PM · 2 min — John D. Ehrlichman and L[ouis] Patrick Gray, III talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:16 pm and 11:15 pm.
- 038-061 10:16 PM · 14 sec — John D. Ehrlichman, White House operator, and President Richard M. Nixon talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:16 pm and 11:15 pm.
- 038-062 10:16 PM · 2 min — John D. Ehrlichman and L[ouis] Patrick Gray, III talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:16 pm and 11:15 pm.
- 038-063 10:16 PM · 24 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:16 pm and 11:15 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 038-064, April 16, 1973. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/038-064 (accessed October 5, 2026).