Conversation 039-037

TapeTape 39StartSunday, June 3, 1973 at 6:07 PMEndSunday, June 3, 1973 at 6:36 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Ziegler, Ronald L.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone

On June 3, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler talked on the telephone from 6:07 pm to 6:36 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 039-037 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 39-37 (cont’d)

                                                                       Conversation No. 39-37

Date: June 3, 1973
Time: 6:07 pm - 6:36 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Ronald L. Ziegler.

       Watergate
             -J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr.’s forthcoming meeting with Hugh Scott
                     -Ervin Committee hearings
             -Press relations
                     -Leaks to columnists
                     -Richard (“Dick”) Wilson
                     -John W. Dean, III
                             -Credibility
             -Spiro T. Agnew’s possible speech
                     -Patrick J. Buchanan
                     -Ervin Committee hearings
             -Dean story, June 3
             -President’s previous meeting with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
             -Ziegler’s contacts with Haldeman
             -Dean
                     -Statements concerning meetings with President
                     -Meetings with and calls from President
                             -Number and timing
                             -Subjects discussed
                                     -Press conference
                             -President’s call on Easter
                                     -Nature of remarks
                                     -Ziegler
                                     -Content
                             -Contacts with President
                                     -Personal nature
                                     -Attorney-client relationship
                                     -Meeting, April 16
                             -Immunity
                                     -President’s conversations with Henry E. Petersen
                             -32-

    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                     (rev. February-2011)

                                              Conversation No. 39-37 (cont’d)

       -Meetings with President
               -President’s orders
                       -Cover-up activities
               -March 21
                       -William O. Bittman’s demand
                       -Haldeman
                       -President’s reaction
                       -Possible clemency
-Ziegler’s and Buzhardt’s knowledge
-Haldeman’s findings
-Dean
       -Statement
               -Taping of telephone calls
               -White House sources
                       -Richard A. Moore and Leonard Garment
                              -Likelihood
       -Files
               -Copying
               -Access
                       -Haldeman’s statements
                       -Ziegler’s possible telephone call to Buzhardt
               -Copying
               -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s access
       -Statements
               -Effect
                       -Popular opinion
       -Credibility
               -Haldeman’s and John D. Ehrlichman’s forthcoming testimony
               -White House response
       -Ziegler’s meeting, June 3
               -Wilson’s column
               -Scott
               -Possible content of leaks to press
       -Files
               -Access
               -Copying
               -Contents
                       -Chronologies, memoranda of conversations [memcons]
                            -33-

    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                    (rev. February-2011)

                                             Conversation No. 39-37 (cont’d)

             -Access
             -Contents
                    -President’s meetings
                    -Compared with Ehrlichman, Haldeman and John N.
                     Mitchell
             -Access
                    -Tenure
                    -Haig
      -Statement
             -Timing
                    -Ervin Committee
             -White House response
                    -President’s meeting with Haldeman
                    -Meeting between President, Dean, and Haldeman, March
             -Meetings with President
                    -April 16
                            -National security
                    -Number
                            -Attorney-client relationship
                            -Garment
             -Telephone calls from President
             -Immunity
                    -President’s motives
             -Meetings with President
                    -President’s orders
                            -Possible testimony
      -Meeting with President, March 21
             -President’s reaction
                    -Justice Department
                            -Role
                    -Ehrlichman’s investigation
                    -Conversation with Petersen
-Haldeman and Ehrlichman
      -Forthcoming testimony
      -Haldeman’s recap
      -Reaction to White House staff members
             -Buzhardt and Garment
                               -34-

    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                       (rev. February-2011)

                                                  Conversation No. 39-37 (cont’d)

                       -Loyalty to President
                               -Haig, Ziegler
                       -John J. Wilson
                               -Anti-Semitism
       -White House treatment compared with Dean’s
               -Access to papers
                       -Buzhardt, Garment
-Access to papers
       -Procedures
       -Possible effect of release
       -Compared with Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters’s memoranda of
        conversation [memcons]
-White House response
       -Leaks to columnists
       -Press briefings
               -Ziegler’s previous conversation with Haig
       -Gerald L. Warren
       -Ziegler’s schedule
       -Personnel appointments, Vietnam
       -Ziegler’s role
       -Herbert G. Klein announcement
       -Changes in Ziegler’s role
               -Haig’s opinon
       -Melvin R. Laird, Warren
       -Klein announcement
               -Communications Office, Office of Press Secretary
                       -Ziegler’s role
       -Laird announcement
               -Haig’s assessment
-Dean
       -Statements
               -Motive
               -Content
               -White House response
                       -Chronologies
                               -Bipartisan Congressional leadership [?]
                       -Bryce N. Harlow and Laird
-White House response
                                               -35-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                     (rev. February-2011)

                                                              Conversation No. 39-37 (cont’d)

                      -Ziegler, Haig, Garment, and Buzhardt

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello?
Yes, sir.
Did you finish your meeting yet?
Yes, we sure did.
Yeah.
What did you finally decide?
Well, we have two things.
Bizaard is going to meet with Scott with a pretty good, you know, some suggestions as to what can be said and what he can generate being said from the Hill on the whole process thing.
Not attacking the press, but simply the process, how harmful it is, how charges are being made without rules of evidence and so forth.
Then we have some thoughts that we're going to plant tomorrow with columnist Dick Wilson and so forth on the distortion of due process and the basic dean credibility thing, which we think we can get a columnist to write.
In other words, what he has said at varying points of time, how that has changed as it relates to his search for immunity, which can be a pretty potent column, and it should come that way, we feel.
Then we're putting together a draft speech for the vice president, which Buchanan is going to be working on, which again goes to the process and the procedure and the
the rules of evidence and so forth.
And we feel that we're better off hitting it that way.
Generally, the consensus of the group is that the Dean thing today doesn't make—although it's a big story—it doesn't make much of a further dent.
I think that actually he's, I'm sort of surprised he's throwing virtually everything he's got now, Ron.
That's right.
I don't know what the hell he's doing.
I just had a good meeting with Bob, and you'd be interested in just three or four little things.
I didn't read the story deliberately, and I shouldn't.
But, you know, in the 35 meetings since the 1st of January, did you talk to Bob since he went over his logs?
just briefly, and I sent some phone stuff over to him in an envelope.
We got all that.
Yeah, I got it.
That he met 35 times since the first of January in which the cover-up was discussed.
Now, first, it's totally untrue.
There was only one time the cover-up was ever discussed.
That was March 21st.
That's right.
That's right.
Now, on the 35 meetings, first of all, it turns out that there were 21 meetings, some of which you'll
to three minutes, but 21 meetings and 14 phone calls.
There was never a phone call before.
I never talked to him on the phone or saw him until the 27th or 8th, whichever you or Bob has the right figure.
I don't know.
Bob says it's the 27th.
You thought it was the 28th, whatever the log shows.
But there were no phone calls, whatever, Ron, in January, February, until the end of February.
At that point,
I was meeting with him for the purpose of discussing the whole problem of, if you remember, the executive privileges and so on.
And then Bob goes over the meetings.
He finds that at least of those meetings, at least ten of them had to do with the preparation for the press conference.
Two press conferences.
I called him several times and met with him several times.
before the press conference.
In fact, you appear on one.
You came in after the press conference with him.
That's one of the meetings.
But the point is, this is a total goddamn lie.
But I know what you do about it.
I don't know.
Now, you take the silly thing about the Easter call, that I was kidding about the million dollars in order to protect for the so forth.
Now, you were there in the room.
You were under the call.
What did it last?
Two minutes?
Three minutes?
No more than five.
It was just a courtesy call, saying, how are you doing, and so forth, and wish you well.
I know it's a tough time, and so forth and so on.
But there was no discussion, whatever, of that situation, as you well remember, right?
Okay.
I think that, I don't know whether that kind of thing can be knocked down or not, or whether he should even try it or not.
He said that after January 1st, he says, that I began to call him personally about aspects of the cover-up.
That's totally untrue, absolutely totally untrue, you know.
I didn't see him until February the 28th.
I never saw him once.
Oh, and the other thing, the president increased the number of meetings with him to establish an attorney-client relationship.
Now, that's just horseshit, you know.
That's the last thing on my mind.
I wasn't thinking in terms of, you know, his being disloyal.
Huh?
That's right.
What the hell did I care about that?
That's right.
And that I warned him on April 16th when he left, on the strongest terms, not to disclose national security matters.
Just untrue.
Totally untrue.
That I gave immunity for the purpose of keeping Dean from, I mean, I opposed immunity for the purpose of keeping Dean from testifying.
That wasn't the purpose of that.
I told Peterson several times after I made that immunity, I said,
the decision on immunity is yours.
It's a way to get the truth.
But don't let it be an incentive to lie, and particularly not for a major figure.
Right.
And then the most damaging thing that he says, though, is this one.
I don't know whether you caught it.
He says, in some meetings I had with him, I gave him direct orders to carry out aspects of the cover-up.
I don't know what in the name of God he's talking about.
What do you think he could be talking about there?
I don't have the slightest idea.
because when we talked about this blackmail thing from Bittman, on the contrary, when Bob was there, thank God for the portion of the meeting, Bob said he's got his own notes.
The president said, you said first it's wrong, second it won't work, because we discussed how the hell you're going to, if you've got that kind of money, how are you going to do it?
And third, because basically you can't provide clemency
And that's what these people want.
In other words, I exploded the whole damn theory right in his face.
And rather than tell him to go out and get the money, we did the contrary.
But when he says that we do direct orders to carry out aspects of the cover-up, it's just a— See, we have all— I don't know how—but you see, I don't think you and Bazaar and the rest know what the hell the facts are, see?
Well, we don't know all the facts, but this is very helpful.
Well, these are just little things, things that Bob picked out, he said, that I knew about.
But I don't know that it's particularly helpful.
It's just the fact that there it is.
Now, the other thing that he has in here that's interesting, you know, he indicates something about taping of telephone calls and so forth.
I'm not too concerned about that.
I seriously doubt if he did.
You know what I mean?
Right.
And what the—it wouldn't make any difference.
The telephone calls were practically all on that.
But he—what about this thing that says two White House sources said that Dean told them the president was involved or something like that in cover-up?
Is that—who would that have been?
I suppose perhaps it could be Moore and Garment or somebody.
Oh, no, no, no.
No, I'm saying—
What I meant, I'm not accusing them because it was perfectly accurate.
Probably Dean did say that.
Or you think it's made up?
I don't know who would have done it, but I know it would not be Dick Moore or Len Garment.
Well, they're the only ones Dean talked to that Dean told them the president was involved in the cover-up or something like that.
I don't think Len Garment ever talked to Dean.
Oh, yes, yes, he did.
Not in those terms, I don't think.
Yeah.
What about the Xeroxing of his personal files?
Did he Xerox his files?
No, he's not permitted to.
No, Bob said that he did get in and get his.
Who, Dean?
Yeah.
Well, if he Xeroxed his files, it was before the procedure was set up.
Yeah.
I wondered if you would call Bazaar to see what the hell did happen on that.
Would you mind doing that?
I think I already know the answer to your question.
No, here the point is that the story says that he Xeroxed his personal files.
and that he had a chronology of his logs, his chronologies, and so forth and so on, and that log of his activities.
Now, basically, the question is, if he was able to Xerox his personal files and take them out, then Bizarre Dam, not Bizarre, but probably Al Haig has got to go in there and look at his files, you know, and see what the hell he has.
That's one of the things we were talking about today.
They have felt that they weren't able to have access to his files, and I think they do.
How can they not have access?
That's right.
They're my files.
Sure.
They're the president's files.
We have access to them.
We are not going to put them out.
That's right.
But I think particularly for Haig, he's the fellow that I would have to do it.
Sure.
But I'm not worried about his damn files.
No, I'm not either.
I think there's—
There's a hell of a lot of blow in this thing, Ron.
There's a hell of a lot of blow in it.
Do you know what I mean?
That's right.
I don't know.
What do you think?
I think so, too.
Of course it's good, but these are goddamn damaging stuff he's putting out here.
You don't agree?
Well, I think people who read the story in this town probably draw conclusions, but I'm not concerned about it in terms of the National.
because there's been so much already.
There's been so much, and people are getting tired of it, and they don't believe half of it.
And I think they're immune to it.
You know, it's just a question of when we knock him out of the box.
I think our main thing, I think the way we're approaching this on the process and the procedure and so forth.
Well, how about the credibility thing?
How would you take him on on credibility?
Well, I think that comes to the point where when Bob and John have things to say about it, they'll do it.
And as the hearings unfold, I think maybe we can, but I think there's some way his old
There's got to be a very carefully made-up statement which demolishes him on the credibility point.
That's all there is to it.
That's correct.
But it must not come from the White House.
Well, that's what we worked on today, and we have that for the column and also have that for Scott.
Why did you have such things about the 35 meetings and so forth and so on knocking all that crap down?
Well, we did not do that because we— You don't want to argue about that.
We didn't have that list.
But even having it now and having pulled it out, it was felt that by doing that now, we would tip Dean to what the testimony of Bob or John would be and allow him then to
To structure it.
See, he has said nothing under oath yet.
Now, there still may be a good argument to leak this exercise about what the meetings really were about, see?
In other words, to leak this procedure we just talked about.
But that's a pretty close call.
Well, that's right.
But you did discuss the idea that somebody ought to go and look at his files, huh?
Yes, we did.
That would be very interesting.
I'm convinced that he has not Xeroxed any of his personal files unless he did it before he was fired.
He has not done it since and has not had the capabilities to do it.
Well, he might have done it before.
He could have done it before.
There's no way for us to know that.
But we should know what those chronologies are, which he refers to in a story.
Well, its chronologists, I would assume, Rob, are simply memcons, aren't you?
Yeah, there couldn't be anything else.
Yeah.
And whatever they are, we don't care.
We just fight the hell out of them.
That's right.
But we should see what those are.
That's right.
And the fellows today are putting a list together of things they would, you know, information that they need along this line.
What do you mean information?
They would like to look at the chronology of logs, but they have felt that they have been unable to do that.
Well, let me tell you this.
I'm only interested in what's going to affect the president in this.
Right.
That's all.
So they just start with February the 27th.
Do you understand?
Yes.
And pick out my meetings and go down and pick them out.
The hell with what they did with Ehrlichman and Haldeman.
Right.
Mitchell and all the rest.
I don't give a shit on that stuff, you understand?
Yeah.
But, God, we ought to at least know what he has on that stuff.
That's right.
And also, we've got to remember that whatever he has, he may have written it after the fact, too, you know, because the son of a bitch was around here until, you know, hell, he was around here until Easter.
That's right.
Until the 30th of April, he had total access, remember?
And he was around here after that, too.
I'm sorry.
Yes, he was around until April 30th.
That's my time.
Until April 30th, he had total access.
So I'm glad they're thinking a little about that.
I think it's got to be done.
It's got to be done probably in the dead of night, huh?
No, I don't think so.
But the man I want to have do it is Haig.
Right.
I think that's the only—I mean, rather than having extra people get into it, I mean, Haig ought to just walk in and—
to bring this stuff out.
But on the whole story, as I say, it's quite a bunch of crap, isn't it?
That sure is.
I just can't quite understand why you'd throw it all right now rather than wait and do it before the urban committee and national television.
They'll do it again then.
Well, we may by that time.
you know, move in some way to spell this out.
To get our side out?
That's right.
Yeah.
Yeah, for example, I told Bob today that on this meeting on March 21 that he ought to find a way, if he would, to preempt the goddamn thing and to point out what actually, you know, was decided where I, you know—Bob said he'd do it.
But that's a pretty courageous guy.
Yeah.
Anyway, I only mention these things.
There are other apparel, according to Bob.
He says, oh, the story is shot through with inaccuracies and so forth.
I hope that the boys are ready with that in mind, haven't they?
Oh, sure.
See, we face a situation, though, that Bob can really pinpoint things.
precisely what the inaccuracies are.
Is he going to type that up for us so that we have— I don't know.
I don't think so.
But it's not that important.
But these are things that any sophisticated person would react to.
And I warned him on April 16th not to discuss national security.
Not true.
that I increased the number of meetings in an under-established attorney-client relationship.
Len Garment should figure out that that would be totally untrue.
He knows that I wouldn't have done that.
Sure.
I mean, that's just obvious that I began to call him personally about aspects of the cover-up on January 1st.
Not true.
I mean, September—it was February 28th before I ever saw the son of a bitch, and then not about that.
The Easter call you know is untrue.
The 35 meetings you know is untrue.
the immunity for the purpose of keeping him from testifying.
That wasn't the purpose.
That wasn't the purpose at all.
The purpose was to get the truth.
And no major person should be given immunity.
The only other factor that the one thing you wouldn't know that we—well, only we can—only the facts is that in some meetings that I gave him direct orders to carry out aspects of the cover-up.
Well, that is a goddamn lie.
Right.
But we'll have to see what he says when he gets on the stand.
Well, one point that should be made, Ron, now, a question would be raised after he talked to me in the 21st, why didn't I tell the Justice Department?
Well, obvious reason.
The obvious reason was Dean was the man who was talking to the Justice Department.
Right.
You know?
And Dean was not talking about his culpability.
But my point is, the reason that I didn't say the Justice—I would assume that Dean
as my counsel and so forth, was telling everything.
He was my contact.
I kept asking him, what about the Justice Department and the rest?
They were doing it.
So if that question ever arises with the boys over there, you can find it.
Dean was our representative in the Justice Department.
And it was only after ten days that I put Ehrlichman on the case that we got anybody else.
But if they say, why didn't the president, when Dean came in telling about this blackmail threat, immediately call the Justice Department?
God damn it, Dean.
was telling me something.
And he was on our team, for Christ's sake.
That's right.
He was the man responsible for doing it.
And I assumed he had.
That's right.
Everyone did.
Yeah.
Fortunately, I told Peterson about it later, too, and he got onto the case.
But anyway— Mr. President, just one observation, if I may.
Yeah.
Bob and John are the greatest two guys alive, and they're very strong men, and they're going to shoot all of this down, I know, and do a very effective job on it.
And, you know, I think the recap that Bob put together today was good.
My conversation with John supports it all.
But you're concerned about contacting them?
No, no, I'm not saying that.
All I'm saying is that somewhere in here, and not on
somewhere in here there seems to be a sense of distrust that is aimed or that is felt toward the people who are here in the White House.
I'm referring, I think, to Bizaard and to Lynn.
Men who are here, totally loyal to you.
I'm not naïve about this, I think.
I know people well enough that I know when they're not loyal.
totally dedicated to your interest and only your interest.
And I don't think that we can lose trust in them and their judgment.
And I know Bob and John are also loyal.
Totally dedicatedly loyal.
Honest men who are doing what they feel is right.
I know.
But we have to keep in mind here, from the interest of the president, the people that we have to really trust and depend on— I know.
Are the people we got.
I know.
Are the people that we have.
That means Hague and Buzard and— And Garment.
And if we lose trust in— Well, I have no loss of trust.
No, I understand that.
Well, it is.
It's just a fact of life that they both are pissed off at Garment, and I believe they're wrong about that.
I don't know why, either.
I don't know what it is.
I tell you, it's their lawyer who is anti-Semitic, figures that Garment wants to do a lot of things, and he's poisoned Garment with them.
I don't know why.
I don't think Garment's trying to get them, do you?
No, not at all.
In anything where, you know, they mentioned to me today that Glenn was saying that Dean was being treated equally.
The only reason Lynn or anyone has ever even suggested that, if not out with the press or anyone else, is from the standpoint of attempting to build up a good barrier or a good, solid rationale for not providing papers to the prosecutors.
That's right.
Do you see?
That's right.
And their strategy, or at least their thinking, and this is both bizarre to Garment,
If it appears that we are cutting Dean off or treating him differently, then we are treating John or Bob in that area.
This is the lawyer's rationale.
Then that would lead to a greater confrontation.
For their papers.
For their papers.
See?
So that should not be interpreted by Bob and John as something out to get them.
No, I understand.
You see?
Very good point.
Dean, when he's been around, I've been told by Buzzard and by Garment, is not even allowed to write anything down.
And he's under constant guard.
Neither is Bob.
That's right.
Neither is John.
Nobody.
But at least this is the opinion of the...
the guys who are serving as the lawyers here on this, is that the best rationale we can build for not providing the papers is not to suggest that we're attempting to cover up only a portion of them, do you see?
I agree.
I agree.
I agree.
We've got to cover all papers, including yours.
That's exactly right.
Exactly right.
because of the papers thing.
Of course, mine would have the effect of destroying these.
90% of the papers, actually, Bob raises them today.
Ron, 90% of the papers would help us, basically.
90% would help us.
But the other 10% would kill us.
That's the problem, you know.
As I told you, there's stuff in there that's
It's all right if it's in context, but it's like these goddamn Walters Memcons.
We cannot have presidential papers out.
We ain't going to let them out.
That's right.
We shouldn't.
Well, in any event, how do we leave this thing now, then?
They feel that we just ride the Dean's door.
This week, it's the Dean's door.
Well, and the way we deal with it is, as I said, on this column plan, you're going to
I hope you don't go out and take two hours with a goddamn press corps.
No, I'm not briefing.
Here's a strategy, quite frankly, which Al and I just talked about.
Jerry will brief tomorrow.
I won't brief.
One of the good reasons for me to go to Paris is to get the hell out of town for a while, quite frankly.
So I'm not on the podium.
The announcements on the new personnel and so forth will be made Wednesday.
Okay.
Correct.
That's the thought.
And then Vietnam Thursday.
And Vietnam Thursday.
And then we'll have some good stuff Friday, maybe something on the economy or something of that sort, and maybe a speech by you or something.
I'll probably be down in Orlando.
Right.
Now, under that strategy, I won't be out there two hours.
I won't even be out there an hour.
Jerry will be out there and just standing rigidly on your statement.
We would make the announcements—see, Herb
He just said that he's not going to comment on these stories that come out.
That's exactly right.
And now, did he really do that?
How many times did he say, Mr. Dean, I'm not going to comment?
Right?
That's right.
That's right.
Well, good for him.
And Herb is what?
Well, Herb plans to make the announcement that he's leaving
at the end of the first of July or something next week.
So we would then, as a part of the announcement on Wednesday, while I'm gone, indicate that the communications activities are going to be dovetailed into this office and interweave that part into the announcement.
You know, that'll confuse things.
Well, we'd simply say that you're going to be director of communications.
That's the best way to handle that, huh?
Well, we're not going to use those titles.
I'm going to say that those titles are going to be dovetailed under this office and under the additional responsibilities that would be called something else or something.
But still, we get another title.
That's a good idea.
Good idea.
But we're still kicking around how that could be done.
But also leaving it clear that I would brief from time to time, because Al feels this and I feel it too.
If we leave the impression that I'm just leaving the podium altogether, that's a concession.
No, no, no.
I think we put it on the basis of assuming additional responsibility.
That's right.
I want you to brief about twice a week, though.
That's about all.
And then let other people brief you.
If we get Laird, God damn it, he can brief us a week.
And Jerry can.
We'll get maybe another deputy-type guy in here.
and have the briefings go on that basis.
Exactly.
But you must not retreat from that position.
That's right.
But the basic shift from the podium of my time on the podium would relate to the statement of additional responsibilities.
That would be the rationale for it.
That's right.
And we'll work out something.
I think it's very important, though, that you are taking additional responsibility.
That's right.
What are we saying, scheduling or what?
No, what we would say is that with Herb Klein leaving and on Wednesday when the announcement is made, we'll say that the communications office is being merged under the office of the press secretary.
And in that capacity, Ziegler will, in his additional responsibilities, will assume the position of assistant or something of that sort.
while not giving up the press secretary title at that time.
That's right.
Which is the best of both worlds.
That's right.
And then later on we'll say in a week or so we'll announce any further changes in the communications apparatus.
Yeah, if we want.
We'll see.
But that leaves all of our options open, Sam.
But that won't even be so much the significant part of the announcement.
The significant part of the announcement, of course, is the Laird.
If we got him.
Well, Hank feels sure we got him.
What is your feeling as to why Dean's crowd threw so much this week, right now, you know, in this?
I mean, because they virtually put everything out they got now, you know.
You know what I mean?
When I say everything they got, they haven't got anything.
But I mean...
Everything he wants to testify to is here.
I'd like to shift attention and also to strive further for the point of immunity to bargain.
That's right.
Yeah.
That's right.
I don't—I'd rather wonder why he would throw so much though right now.
I mean, he's been putting it out in dibs and dabs, you know.
I think a couple reasons, maybe one of desperation, one of losing their perspective to a degree.
It's really difficult to pinpoint their motives altogether.
Well, he's saying a lot of different things.
We're pulling together— Is he saying different things?
Yes, we're pulling together chronology of the different statements he's made in light
the further chronology in light of what he said, which we're going to provide to the leaders next week.
You know, in a private way, so they can— Do it privately, not with you there, yeah.
No, no.
This would be the private type contact, you see.
And this is where, when we get that material together, this is where Harlow and Laird can operate so effectively.
Yeah.
You see?
Well, one thing we have to remember is to keep it ending in perspective.
It's going to be a
goddamn mean pissing match.
It's tough.
It's going to be a tough, mean pissing match.
But you're going to have tough men around you, you see.
And we've got to fight them like hell.
Sure.
And it's obvious that you and Hagel will be strong, and I'm sure that Len in his own way and Bazaard, of course, are strong.
That's right.
That's right.
Yes, sir.
But they've got to understand that they're dealing here with a
just a whole hell of a lot of exaggeration and fabrication and distortion.
Right.
And they do.
Did they see that even before I mentioned things?
Oh, sure.
Yes, sir.
Okay.
Yes, sir.
All right.
Thank you.
Okay.