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Conversation 039-087

TapeTape 39StartMonday, June 4, 1973 at 11:16 PMEndMonday, June 4, 1973 at 11:22 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger coordinated their messaging strategy for upcoming diplomatic briefings, including a June 5 press briefing and a June 7 meeting with bipartisan Congressional leaders. The two discussed the significant diplomatic implications of a prompt, joint invitation from Mao Zedong and Chou En-lai regarding a potential visit to the United States. Furthermore, they reviewed the status of Vietnam peace negotiations in Paris and expressed optimism that public sentiment regarding the Watergate scandal was beginning to shift in their favor.

China-United States relationsParis Peace AccordsWatergate scandalPublic relationsCongressional relations
AudioNARA Description

On June 4, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 11:16 pm to 11:22 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 039-087 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 39-87

Date: June 4, 1973
Time: 11:16 pm - 11:22 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Kissinger’s location
              -British embassy

       Kissinger’s forthcoming press briefing, June 5
              -Georges J. R. Pompidou
              -Paris negotiations
              -President’s briefing of bipartisan Congressional leaders, June 7
                                       -66-

            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                              (rev. February-2011)

                                                         Conversation No. 39-87 (cont’d)

People’s Republic of China [PRC]
       -Mao Tse-tung’s invitation
               -Implication
                       -Continuing importance of President
       -Chou En-lai’s possible visit to US
               -Kissinger’s possible message to ambassador
                       -United Nations [UN]
               -Kissinger’s previous message
               -Compared with President’s visit to PRC
               -Kissinger’s previous invitation
                       -UN
                       -Washington, DC
               -Possible dinner
                       -Contrasted with Head of State dinner
               -Response
                       -Past responses
       -Joint invitation from Mao and Chou
               -Mao’s wife [Chiang Ching-Kuo]
                       -Role in Cultural Revolution
                       -Role in Politburo
               -Timing of response
       -Message on Cambodia
               -Disclosure to bipartisan Congressional leaders

President’s forthcoming bipartisan Congressional leadership meeting, June 7
       -President’s handling
       -Timing
                -Paris peace talks
                        -Vietnam settlement
                                -Possible announcement

George R. S. Baring [Earl of Cromer]
      -Toast for President
              -Kissinger as guest of honor
                     -Herman E. Talmadge
                     -Russell B. Long
                                              -67-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                      (rev. February-2011)

                                                               Conversation No. 39-87 (cont’d)

       Talmadge
             -President’s assessment

       Kissinger’s conversations, June 2-3
              -Danny Kaye
              -Simcha Dinitz
              -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
              -Dinner

       Watergate
             -Popular opinion
             -Press coverage [?]
             -Effect on US foreign relations
                     -PRC’s response to President’s message
                            -Timing
                     -President’s meeting with Pompidou
                     -Leonid I. Brezhnev’s forthcoming visit

       Kissinger’s schedule
              -Return from Paris
              -Brezhnev’s visit
                      -Preparations
              -Return from Paris
                      -Timing
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello.
Hello, Mr. President.
Hi, Henry.
Are you out to dinner?
Yes, I'm at the British Embassy.
Oh, boy.
I want to tell you that tomorrow I thought you should do a rather brief thing on Pompidou and, of course, just raise the curtain a little on the Paris thing.
Not much, you know?
Right.
And then— Because that is set up so that I can brief on Thursday morning with a bipartisan group, right?
Right.
Don't you agree?
Absolutely.
Right.
The other thing is, with regard to now, you know, that is quite significant, actually.
Oh, I think that's of enormous significance, Mr. President.
The other thing I was going to say, though, that... Because it means they think they're going to deal with you for the foreseeable future.
The other thing is, do you think that...
that we should get in.
Well, we can't do it before you leave, but if you could get a message to the ambassador here that we think it's very important for Xi Jinping to come to the U.N. Or do you want to wait until August to do that?
I've done that, Mr. President.
You have?
I did that.
I see Liberty doing that in response.
Yeah, you see, it's going to look rather strange if I go running to China.
No, I've already done that.
I said I had already extended an invitation at your suggestion a few months ago.
I repeated it and I said we can do it in one of two ways.
Either to go to the U.N.,
Well, better yet, just come to Washington on a cruise.
Now, what he should do is to come to the U.N. and then drop down here, and we'll give him a nice dinner, you know, without the head of state thing.
But it'll be, you know, everything except the drill.
Right.
Well, I told him he could handle it either way.
And he's going to forward that to them, huh?
And he said, well, he didn't turn it down.
Uh-huh.
You know, in the past they said they could never do it as long as the PRSB— Yeah, I know.
Yeah.
He said, well, he's very busy, and look at his calendar.
Well, I'm pure of the Mao thing, you see.
The Mao thing has to be significant, because if it came from show and lie, that'd be one thing, but coming from Mao— From both.
It was a joint invitation.
Right.
And I don't know whether you noticed, Mr. President, when he came that he said to you, Mr. and Mrs. Mao.
Yeah, yeah, I know.
Well, that was very significant considering her role in the Cultural Revolution.
Yeah, and as a member of the Central Committee.
Yes, and of the Politburo.
Politburo, I meant, yeah.
So I thought it was an extremely significant event.
And also that they answered you within three days.
I mean, you only saw him last Wednesday.
Right.
Right.
And they also gave us a rather good message on Cambodia.
Oh, did they?
Yes, but we mustn't refer to that in any sense.
Oh, no, no, no, no, because they got me caught at it, I know.
And also, we must be very careful what we say to the bipartisan leaders.
I'll send you some... Oh, I'm not going to say a word to the bipartisan leaders, and I'm going to let you talk about that.
No, I mean on Thursday.
On Thursday?
Oh, yes, I'll be very careful.
Give me just some talking points, and I'll just fudge that, believe me.
Actually, the way it's working out, Mr. President, is that in terms of timing, you're seeing them at 8, at 8.30?
Right.
Well, that will work out fine.
That will be just the time that the meeting in Paris breaks up, where we will probably be able to announce that we've concluded an agreement.
Right.
Then the actual text will be released later in the afternoon.
So I can tell the leaders a little of the dance.
Just give them a slight feel for it.
Right.
But you don't have to give the full details, which is better.
Right, that's right.
You can give them enough of a sense of it.
I'll say there's going to be an announcement in Paris.
I just want to give you a feel of it.
Yes, exactly.
Right.
But at any rate, it gives you the advance announcement.
Good.
Okay, how's Cromer?
Fine, and he made a very good toast for you.
Yeah.
He counted on you.
I was against him on it, and he used that as a peroration on you as a mentality.
And Senator Talmadge is here, and Long didn't need it.
It's all right.
It's good for Talmadge to hear it.
He's a good man.
And it really was very helpful.
Over the weekend, I worked on Danny Kaye and on the Israeli ambassador, and Haig tells me that they really came through for us at a— Yeah, at a dinner, yes?
Yeah.
Yep.
Okay, well— I think actually the mood is turning.
It could be.
I think it may be, actually.
You know, all this crap over the weekend, they overdid it.
That's what I think, Mr. President.
Right.
People are getting very, a little bit disturbed about, you know, these sort of...
The president, the Chinese, didn't have to come back to you in three days.
No.
That was a tremendous... Well, Pompidou didn't have to agree with us either.
And Pompidou didn't have to agree with us.
Right.
So I think after the president visits, we'll be doing positive things.
Right.
Well, we'll be doing it during the visit.
But I meant during.
Right.
As soon as he gets here.
Right.
And then from the moment you get back from Paris, let's start building that damn visit up.
Absolutely.
Okay.
You'll be back Friday?
I'll be back Friday night or Saturday.
All right.
Finally.
Bye.
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