Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 43 › Conversation 043-027

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

Monday, February 5, 1973 · 7:57 PM–8:09 PM ET · White House Telephone · 11 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation043-027 on Tape 43StartMonday, February 5, 1973 at 7:57 PMEndMonday, February 5, 1973 at 8:09 PMRecording deviceWhite House TelephoneSourceNixon Library record for 043-027 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger coordinated logistics for upcoming travel schedules, including Vice President Agnew's itinerary and Kissinger's planned return from Asia. They discussed the Vietnam peace process, specifically authorizing Ronald Ziegler to announce negotiations for a ceasefire in Paris, and agreed that Kissinger should visit Laos to leverage a ceasefire there. Additionally, they deliberated on diplomatic strategy regarding King Hussein of Jordan and how to manage a potential secret meeting with Egyptian representatives without triggering excessive interference from the State Department.

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Hello.
Mr. President.
Henry, what did you find on Agnew today?
I just, I've been quite busy and wasn't able to check with anybody.
He's following the procedure that you and Bob and I discussed.
That is to say, he'll come back via Hawaii.
He's not going to sink back.
Right.
But I'll probably go to California.
He'll be there when?
On the 10th or the 9th?
On the 10th.
Well, that's all right.
That's Saturday, and I'll see him.
I'll just see him and I just won't bother with the cabinet thing with him.
I don't think it's...
I don't think it's necessary.
I mean, you have the best excuse in the world having offered it to him.
You did offer him that in the message, didn't you?
Yeah, that was the reason we gave him the bag.
Let me just check it.
Right, we did do that.
Right.
And so he's had that offer.
Right.
And, well, he had to go to California.
Right.
And then what I will plan, then, is to stay there until you return on the 19th is what?
What day?
Monday?
Monday.
And that'll be the 19th, or it could slip to the 20th.
Is that right?
Well, no.
It will be late on the 19th that I'll be back.
Back in the afternoon of the 19th, late afternoon.
There's no, as far as I'm concerned, it's all right.
Is there no possibility that your Chinese thing might want to slip a bit?
No, unless you want me to.
But if you wanted to stay an extra day, you know, I could easily... Let me do some thinking.
Stay an extra day there with you.
and not go back till the 21st or 22nd yeah i was thinking of that but i was i was thinking too of uh even getting back today like but uh well
You've told the Chinese you have to be back on the 19th, right?
Right.
But I was going to...
The Japanese have made an urgent request for me to stop off, and I was going to do that.
But that would just take a couple of hours.
It would still get me...
I would get...
It would be perfectly logical, Mr. President, I'd come in
about 7 o'clock in the evening in San Clemente, so that I would be reporting to you.
I mean, formally, we can put out our report to you that evening, the morning of the 20th.
So there'd be no need to leave.
And it's entirely up to you, of course.
Well, no problem.
We ought to, when you get back.
21st or 22nd, which certainly, for selfish reasons, I'd welcome to get a little rest out there.
Right, right, right.
Then your plan would be to get me in by the 19th at 7 o'clock, right?
Give or take an hour, yes.
And that's Monday fine.
That's Monday evening.
If you could end Monday evening.
Okay, that sounds fine.
And I think it'll work out.
And Agnew is all, he's doing all right in the rest of his journey.
Agnew actually has done well.
Good.
He's been quiet.
He hasn't got much publicity.
I mean, he hasn't sought much publicity.
That's good.
Fine, fine.
What else has happened today on all fronts?
Anything new on the ceasefire and everything?
Everything has gone quite well.
The North Vietnamese have now agreed to Paris on the 26th, and we are ready to make that announcement tomorrow.
Do you have any preference whether we should make it or the state should make it?
Well, what do you think is best?
I mean, it's whatever's best for us.
Well, it's always an advantage to show what has control.
Let's say we announce it, have Ziegler announce it.
Okay, I'll have Ziegler announce it.
I think it's best, Henry.
I mean, after all, this is not just something we've done all the way through, and we just announce it.
Right, and we just announce the next step.
And we can do it in a fairly low-key way, but it just shows that the ball keeps moving.
Right.
Otherwise, Cambodia is still quiet.
The Laotians are a little bit jumpy, which always happens as settlement approaches.
It may be necessary on the way into Hanoi.
I could stop there on Friday night rather than spend two nights in Bangkok.
It's on the way.
Godly urges it strongly.
I want to check what Sullivan thinks of it.
You want to take him with you?
Oh, yes, you are.
Yeah.
Let me say, I lean to it.
I think it has...
I lean to it.
Frankly, I just lean to it because... And you tell Sullivan I lean to it, and he'll lean to it.
The main point is that anything that will... To shore up our allies here... Basically, we've got to realize the other side is weak here now, and if we can shore our guys up, they may last a hell of a lot longer than anybody thinks.
And it's a reasonable thing to do because we are on the way...
In Laos, there's still a war going on.
And then Vietnam, there isn't.
And we've just had the vice president in Vietnam.
The only reason we didn't schedule it to begin with was so that Chu's feelings wouldn't get too hurt.
But then you're going to see Chu, and we're not going to see Savannah.
That's right.
When you stop there, they won't still have had a ceasefire.
Well, actually, right now, the major obstacle to a ceasefire, strangely enough, is our guys.
Well, why don't you tell them that you'll stop there if they have a ceasefire?
Well, I don't think they can move that fast, but I think I can certainly beat them towards a ceasefire.
That's my point.
Use the fact that you're stopping for leverage, damn it.
Well, I think we can get them into a ceasefire.
if I stopped there within a couple of days anyway.
That would be a good thing, you see.
That's right.
And I think it's probably a useful thing to do.
That's what I would strongly urge you.
I'll send him a message saying I'm willing to come.
Good.
Now, on Hussein, I've sent a book over to you.
I think the major thing now...
is to just listen to them and then wait to see what we get from the Egyptians and then wait to see what we get from Golda Meir before you make any final commitment.
The peace settlement we have put in the briefing paper.
Some things you can offer them in the economic field, which will please them.
Well, okay.
That's about all we can say to them, I guess.
Well, the key is Egypt at this point.
He doesn't have a very concrete proposal, and he can't make a separate settlement anyway.
Right.
But he's by far the most reasonable of the Arabs.
Oh, yes, I know.
Just hope he survives.
Exactly.
Exactly.
Now, the Egyptians have said that they may, in order to come over here, they may want an official invitation.
And then...
spin off from that to see me privately.
And of course, we'll get stayed into the act in the worst possible way, but if worst comes to worst, we can agree to it and have a day's talk at State and then have the guy disappear out of New York.
Huh.
Yeah.
I think you could do that.
We'll try to dismiss them, but I...
If they want it official, let it be that.
I mean, let State garble around about it.
That's right.
And you mean who would talk to the same man would talk to the people at State?
That's right.
And then how would he get to see you then?
Well, what he would do is say he'd want two days in New York quietly on personal business and just go up to New York and then we'd bring him back down here.
Where would you see him, in New York then?
I could either see him in New York or bring him back to Camp David.
Well, if he goes to State, I'd see him in New York.
Right.
See, if he's going to go to State openly, I'd go up to New York and see him.
Don't you think so?
Because if you pull him out of State to Camp David, that'll just send everybody right up the wall.
Well, I think it's the fact of my seeing him that's going to drive people up the wall.
Well, if you're in New York...
But if you're in New York... Well, I know, but...
I see your point, yeah.
It may be hard to pull off Camp David now because that's been an official invitation.
I mean, that they already know.
But we could discuss it with the people who are arranging the meeting.
Yeah, yeah.
You mean another, you think that you've got a problem in seeing him at all at Camp David now because of the state thing, huh?
No, I have a problem.
So far it hasn't surfaced in the state yet.
I won't have trouble seeing him in Camp David.
I don't think state...
I don't think they ought to have... Basically, the official thing really concerns me.
Yet if you see him secretly at Camp David, that's going to surface just as sure as hell.
Oh, no, that's going to...
In either case, it's going to surface.
In either case, it has to be announced.
The only point is one spins off the official visit and has the advantage that it keeps some of the heat on state for having him here.
the other at least keep state out of it until we know what we're doing.
There's no chance of keeping it secret when you're dealing with Egyptians.
I'm inclined to let him go over and see state under those circumstances and just try to control it as well as we can and then see him.
But I think under those circumstances, you used to see him in New York and not at Camp David, though.
I kind of like that a little better.
Except that you invited him to Camp David.
That's the problem, Mr. President.
It may be tough to do now.
It's not easy, is it?
Well, I don't think State or anyone else cares whether I see him in Camp David or some other place.
I see.
It's just the fact of seeing him, yeah.
Yeah.
Okay, fine.
I think we can work it out.
Right.
Well, those are the major things that have happened today.
Okay.
Right.

NARA Description

On February 5, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 7:57 pm to 8:09 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 043-027 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 43-27

Date: February 5, 1973
Time: 7:57 pm - 8:09 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Vice President Spiro T. Agnew’s schedule
            -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman, the President, Kissinger
            -Hawaii
                  -Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet [CINPAC]
            -The President’s schedule
                  -California
                        -Agnew
            -Cabinet
            -California

       The President’s schedule
            -California
            -Kissinger’s schedule
                  -Return from Asian trip
                  -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                  -Japan
                  -San Clemente
                                      -16-

           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                                     Conversation No. 43-27 (cont’d)

                 -Report to the President

Agnew
    -Kissinger’s view

Vietnam settlement
     -Ceasefire
     -North Vietnam
     -Announcement of Paris negotiations
           -State Department
           -Ronald L. Ziegler
     -Cambodia
     -Laos
     -Kissinger’s schedule
           -Hanoi
           -Laos
           -Bangkok
           -Laos
                 -G. McMurtrie Godley
           -William H. Sullivan
     -Laos
           -The President’s views
     -The President’s view
     -Nguyen Van Thieu
           -Possible meeting with the President
                 -Souvanna Phouma
     -Laos
           -Cease-fire

Middle East
     -[Hussein, King of Jordan] Hussein ibn Talal
           -Briefing book
           -Egypt
           -Golda Meir
           -Possible American offers to Jordanians
                 -Economic assistant
           -Egypt
                 -Kissinger’s view
           -Proposal
           -Kissinger’s view
                                             -17-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                                         Conversation No. 43-27 (cont’d)

             -Egypt
                  -Possible meeting with Kissinger
                        -Invitation
                  -State Department
                  -New York
                        -The President’s view
                        -State Department
                        -Camp David
                  -Discussion of secrecy
                  -State Department involvement
                  -Possible meeting with Kissinger
                        -New York
                              -Camp David
                        -State Department

Also recorded on February 6, 1973

  • 043-028 8:12 PM · 19 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 8:12 pm.
  • 043-029 8:17 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 8:17 pm.
  • 043-214 8:17 PM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:17 pm and 11:59 pm.
  • 848-004 9:03 PM · 30 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:03 pm to 9:33 pm.
  • 850-001 8:32 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:32 am and 9:08 am.
  • 850-002 8:32 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:32 am and 9:08 am.
  • 850-003 8:32 AM · 42 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:32 am and 9:08 am.
  • 850-004 9:08 AM · 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Rose Mary Woods met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:08 am to 9:16 am.

All 39 conversations from February 6, 1973 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 043-027, February 6, 1973. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/043-027 (accessed October 1, 2026).