On February 28, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird, Richard M. Helms, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, John N. Irwin, II, Henry A. Kissinger, George H. W. Bush, U. Alexis Johnson, Frank J. Shakespeare, Joseph J. Sisco, Alfred L. Atherton, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., John H. Holdridge, Harold H. Saunders, Col. Richard T. Kennedy, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 10:00 am and 12:35 pm. The Cabinet Room taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 048-004 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Teksting av Nicolai Winther
It's getting interesting to note that Ron Leos, I'm trying to surprise you, is not yet.
He's been signed in several weeks.
Is it a bullet?
What's the reason for it?
Is it very serious?
We've got time in this for us.
He said the last time I addressed him, I proved what we were doing.
Of course, they're playing that.
They're working on that thing both ways.
I don't know if they have any...
Of course, you've got half of the guys saying that today the big picture is not so or nothing.
You know, you've got some people who are going on that route.
They're staying by that January 1, 1972 date.
And so, they're trying to live in the best of two different worlds.
The caucus is for January 1, 1973.
And some of the gun senators, I guess, must have come out for January 1, 1972.
And of course, Montgomery said, and he'll do it the next day, for sure.
We all understand that game, but that doesn't work.
Except I think it's quite interesting that the attack is made, and they seem to be somewhat confused as to what line to take.
And I have asked...
Jackson, you know, you've got the 73 group, the 72 group, the Get Out Now group, and the people there.
Why the hell are you there?
Jackson takes a pretty good line, too.
He takes that POV line that you don't want to make any commitments about.
People support us on that.
People support us on that.
I think there are two things that we've got to...
We have to deal with it right away.
One is the, I think the thing is building up and they may agree on it.
Some actions in connection with good, they can't agree on that.
They come with others.
And I think that the talk that you're saying...
Akon spoke to me this morning.
So they will do what they did as far as launching the board here.
They will try to include Parisians in some of the legislation.
That we will not support.
They already said they aren't going to support it.
But they will...
They won't be happy.
They're going to be happy.
What I mean is this is a subject matter which they can agree.
That's right.
On the other, I don't think they can.
I think that's one thing.
The other is, the question I want to ask Tom, because I think his answer will affect our political judgment.
When will the thought be that we have to get out of this?
Will they have to get out completely or just in part?
In other words, if you're convinced that as of a certain time, because of what's not for publication, just for our own consideration, they have to get out, then we can decide to use dilatory tactics and so forth on all these resolutions.
On the other hand, we don't want to do that if it turns out that we want it, it turns out that we need to go to 50 and stay in there, you know, half of them stay in there.
Or, we don't want to, we don't want to... We get our hands dry.
That's right.
Well, I think that the...
Put the question another way.
Will there come a time because of the weather when there will be no combat activities in that area?
Because that's what comes.
Yes, it will die out with minor patrol actions as they withdraw back into southeast Asia.
And at that time we won't have to have a lot of sorties bombing in that area?
Shorties will always drop off him.
Simply because the truck traffic will drop way down.
It seems to me that if we delay these acts by the Congress up to that point, that he will be off.
He won't be under any pressure.
We're under pressure now because the publicity, the television programs, I must say, are terrible.
What are you going to try to do, Bill?
Are you going to be proud of him?
I think that we've got a chance of repeating those amendments on the basis that this is not the place to retire that kind of legislation.
We have to try to defeat them, because we have to call that out and get action out of it.
The resolution is separate, and we can keep them bottled up, but I don't think we can keep those men bottled up.
Forward, this way.
But I think we can defeat them.
I'm going to see it now.
I heard some talk that there are rovers going around in the house.
There are thoughts of limiting air support to fixed-wing aircraft.
That would get off the ground.
I argue that it's an important relationship.
Yeah, I think you can tell me if you were on the ground, an American soldier in that area,
And your life depended on it.
Would you want the president to make a distinction between fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters?
He had to say, you know, the city has to stop somewhere, but I said you can't stop there.
There'd be other places to go, but not that one.
He can't say anything about the president.
Mr. President, gentlemen, this morning I'm going to concentrate on the two main operations that are being conducted, Tom Thang 71 and Lampon 719.
But before I do that, I would like to just give you some background on some of the associated operations that are taking place today in South Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos, which complements the overall efforts that we have on the way to...
Reduce the tall beef meat capability and thereby facilitate our beef presentation program and our withdrawals.
First, starting all the way south, we have the U.N. forest operation, which hasn't gained too much publicity, but nevertheless, this is most successful.
This has been a traditional operation.
hold for the V-Kong.
We have the South Vietnamese and methodically dug them out, replaced them with the PL forces.
They killed over 1,600 V-Kong in here.
And since 1 February, we've had 330 defectors that you heard, that attacked themselves in this very important area right in here.
In addition to that, operations are being conducted in the parent beach and along the Mekong River.
The South Beach Beach Navy has about 780 men operating small boats up and down the Mekong to open up the waterways to Phnom Penh.
And in addition to that, they're patrolling the banks of the Mekong to secure the convoys that go up into that area.
So, in this area, the South Vietnamese are conducting some very successful operations, which will complement the overall security.
Now, perhaps the most major importance is the Operation Commando Hunt, which is the interdiction effort that we have been conducting,
...against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, as you see, starts up in the northeast and comes through the three passes, Mijia, Abangarang, and this road area here just north of the DMZ.
and feeds into various parts of the south-east as you see that.
The commando hunt operation has been going extremely well.
We started out in October by concentrating on interdicting these key highways that come out through these passages here.
and operating against a certain vulnerable position.
On the 12th of January, we shifted the tank somewhat, because that's when the North Vietnamese began to run the trucks, and the roads began to dry out.
So the targets then became not only these inundation points, but also trucks and bivouac areas, storage points, troops, everything that was moving, everything that could be set up as a target.
We think that we have destroyed over 3,000 trucks, that about 25% of the trucks observed by the gunships, which are the AC-130s and AC-19s, have been destroyed.
And this picture that you saw in the paper this morning was the result of an attack by these gunships.
But we have been putting about 90% of the D-52 effort and approximately 72% of the tank layer effort in that only Ho Chi Minh Trail complex.
In addition to that, we have had, as you see, some naval forces off the coast here, simply to build up the posture in terms of deception, and they have been practicing communication deception just to force the North Vietnamese to continue to pay attention to this coastline and not be free
Absolutely, to send everything they have down into this area.
If I may, I would like to also point out that the complementary operation, which Mr. Howell mentioned, namely the desert rat operation with the allowing rain, which complements the operation taking place in this red area.
Let me go down to this area here in Cambodia, which is called Compane 71, or we call it the Chuck Fanny Operation.
And it is conducted between the confines of Highway 1,
The Mekong River here, Highway 13 coming down from Crockett to Smoot, and the southeastbound Cambodian border.
This operation is being conducted by eight task forces, which are consisting of about 17,000 southeast-east.
The enemy has in this area three divisions.
These three divisions have been there ever since the Cambodian cross-border operation was conducted last May and last June.
They've built 7th and 9th divisions.
By and large, they have one regiment up here in the Snoo area, and then three regiments to the west of Highway 75, which connects here with Highway 7.
There are three weapons here, three weapons there, and two in this general area.
And the results so far have been, I think, extremely satisfactory.
We estimate, the intelligence people estimate, that we have destroyed 14% of the 5th Division, 8% of the 7th Division, and 18% of the 9th Division.
The operations have been conducted along Highway 7.
In addition to that, they've moved all the way up Highway 75 to the river, to Geelong.
They're now moving along the road right here on the bank of the river, and they're turning back into this area again.
There was one very sharp fight in this particular area of the town of Dombey yesterday, where the South Beach communities gave the enemy a very good drubbing.
A day before yesterday, at this point, we had telling us that there was a division headquarters.
We laid a B-52 strike in there, and subsequently the ground troops went in and drowned 20 enemy troops.
That was the next division headquarters.
This operation is going to continue until 1 July, and it will tend to be a methodical squeezing out of the overall area.
And in that sense, it's gone very well.
The casualty ratio has been almost, well, exactly, we've had 198 to 1804.
And it was continued, as I say, on to 1 July.
And the operation in which everyone is most interested in, we call it Lamson 719, which is being conducted here in the general area just south of the DMZ, and into Laos, the stride of the OT-Med Trail.
And I'll describe that in more detail.
We estimate that we have destroyed 14% of the 5th division, 8% of the 7th division and 18% of the 9th division.
The operations have been conducted along Highway 7.
In addition to that, they've moved all the way up Highway 75 to the river, to Geelong.
They're now moving along the road right here on the bank of the river, and are turning back into this area again.
There was one very sharp fight in this particular area of the town of Dombey yesterday, where the South Beach communities gave the enemy a very good drubbing.
A day before yesterday, at this point, we had telling us that there was a division headquarters.
We laid a B-52 strike in there, and subsequently the ground troops went in and drowned 20 enemies healed.
That was the last division headquarters.
This operation is going to continue until 1 July, and it will tend to be a methodical squeezing out of the overall area.
And in that sense, it's gone very well.
The carriage ratio has been almost, well, exactly, we've had 198 to 1804.
And it will continue, as I say, on to 1 July.
And the operation in which everyone is most interested in, we call Lansan 719, which is being conducted here in the general area just south of the DMZ, and into Laos, the stride of the OT Met Trail.
And I'll describe that in more detail.
I just need to orient you now.
Here is the GMC.
Here is the border between South Vietnam and Laos.
And of course, this is the border here between North Vietnam and Laos.
And this shows the passes that I mentioned.
The GMS pass, the F-1 pass, and this network of roads that comes out right where the GMC contacts the Laotian border.
This operation had as its concept the following.
Highway 9 extends right into Dawgaw, goes east and west, all the way into Thailand.
So the idea was to secure Highway 9 up to the border with U.S. forces, to build up Khe Sanh, which is right there as an airhead to supply the South Vietnamese forces once they got in, and simultaneously to move forces along on the flanks to the north and to the south of this main Highway 9.
As you know, the operation commenced on 8 February when the South Vietnamese drove down Highway 9 here.
Now, perpendicular to Highway 9 is Highway 92, which is this black line coming down through here, and it has already been severed, and no more traffic is passing on 92, and no more traffic is passing on Highway 9, and I'm going to discuss the logistics of this in just over here on this other chart.
I'll leave that for a minute.
Since the 8th of February, as you know, there's been several sharp clashes in this area.
By and large, the Argon Fritz Division, which is their crime division, has been assigned the responsibility for the area south of Highway 9, and the Rangers and the Airborne Forces have been assigned and working in the area north of Highway 9.
This is where most of the very severe fighting has been taking place, although there have been clashes down in this area where more than 100 of the enemy were killed.
So the general concept, of course, is to move across
and to disrupt and spark out this entire complex of the OGMN trail, destroying the enemy as much as possible, and at the same time, of course, picking up supplies when they were needed.
In the area.
Just to give you an idea of what's been done so far, have been 144,000 rounds of ammunition, 127 vehicles, 20 tanks.
134,000 gallons of fuel, 701,000 pounds of rice, and 75,000 pounds of other types of gear that have been found in storage by the ground forces in this general area.
Now we have, of course, difficulty in getting a count of the kill, because we have frequently found
Several graves and tunnels were fired at, which were the result of air action.
In other words, as the ground forces moved forward, they uncovered the effects of this tactical air action.
Now...
General Abrams and the South Vietnamese have been working on a plan to beef up this effort, because we initially put 10,000 South Vietnamese in there.
They will oppose at the outset, according to intelligence estimates, by about 14,000.
There were some 22 manoeuvre battalions.
We estimated that in what we call base area 604, there were about 7, and then base area 611, which comes down along this highway 922, there were about 11 manoeuvre battalions, and then they had 4 battalions in here that they could take either way.
Some of them at that time, as Mr. Hale described,
They have brought in additional forces, and today, in the overall area here, we estimate they have about 28,000.
So, based on that problem, we have the general administration, I should say, working with the general administration, his office is down there, and the...
General Lamb and General Sullivan have come up with a plan which does not change the concept at all, but it does redefine forces and deep up the weak spots.
And this plan will work as follows.
It's already being taken to get it underway now.
The plan in this is replacing the airborne forces, which are the ones that have been in the heavy planes up to the north, with the marines, with six battalions of marines.
The marines have more standing power and more firepower and can hold this hot spot that's right in this general area here.
At the same time, we will bring up from the south, which has been there all the time, the Marine Brigade, which has been held in strategic reserve, and it will be put up closer to the axis, instead of being kept down to the south.
This will take place in the next couple of days.
Also, where we had blocking forces here on the DMZ by the 5th Mechanized Hill and the 2nd Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division of the South Beacon East Hill, this regiment is going to be moved down here and put in readiness.
or left into this general area at the propitious time.
And this action here, this area here, will be taken over by the U.S. forces, which they can handle all right.
In addition to that, there will be the first regiment of the 1st Division here, and the 3rd Regiment of the 1st Division here going along this ridge,
This first regiment will go astride highway 94, which is the key highway which they must use now that 92 has been blocked.
And so this regiment will move along right down this road.
And the idea is to continue this movement to the west.
Now this morning I got a message from General Edwards, just giving me a general wrap-up, which I've asked him to do every Friday so I can pass it on to the President.
And he makes a barring observation.
One is that the...
Leadership of the RN Ambulance needs improving a bit, you know.
They have had two sharp fights, you know.
One, the 39th Battalion.
The other, the 5th Support Base 31, which is being reported in the press at the moment.
But nevertheless, in each case, the losses on the other side had been much greater than those that had been suffered by the southeast of east.
But he thinks when these marines join him and replace the F1, which are relatively lightly armed, that this area here will be significantly strengthened.
He turns and then talks about the commander of the 1st Army Division, General Poole, who he says is just outstanding.
That he is aggressive, he has control of the situation, and he's moving ahead with vigor along this line.
He pointed out, I know General, I mean, Mr. Kirchner will be interested in General Hill's statement about this, where he said that...
He had a battalion on this road, 914.
He pulled it out and then laid on one hour before the...
The tank that he knew was coming against him, that was laying on B-52s, he went back in there and found 159 bodies along 914 now.
And so he's just using that to pull him back tanking.
When he thinks that he's just about to get attacked, he'll move out and call in the B-52s and move back in.
And so, during the forthcoming days and weeks, I think you will see more hard fighting, but more progress along this line.
And there's no question in my mind about the fact that this is having a serious impact, a very serious impact, on the evidence that the 12 Vietnamese are making to bring their forces down in this direction.
This orange line shows the phase 3 of the operation, which has been in effect from the outset, namely that when the southeast needs withdrawal, they will come out back down Highway 9, and then down Highway 922, which is the main highway leading through base area 611, which is one of the largest base areas in the area.
south of North Beach Beach now, and it's the base area of course that they used when they made the heavy attack on Hue near Kent in 1968.
Ma'am, if I may sir, I'd like to turn over here and talk a little bit about logistics, because that's the prime subject, and I have some comments generally on that.
There's a blue line here at Highway 9,
This is highway 925, which goes on down towards Khe Sanh.
And this is highway 92, which crosses highway 9 at 90 degrees and comes on down into this point.
Now, this is a pipeline, which you have...
I know they've read something about it.
It comes all the way down to this point.
I might just digress for a moment.
It says it's a pipeline.
It's a four-inch line.
It will pump about 1,500 gallons a minute.
It has quick detachable joints so that if it's bombed, they can quickly insert replacements.
It has boosted pumps on trucks so they can drive these trucks up and down this line and plug them in to boost the pressure.
And it also has spurs on it.
In other words, it's not just a simple line, it has little spurs coming out to various places.
For instance, one of the very important places here where they fuel, we know this is a fuel depot right here where it crosses 914, which is the home at route 92 coming out of the Schiphol area down here.
And we know when we get there we're probably going to find other activity because they must have to refuel right at that point.
This pipeline now has been cut in many places.
It's been cut by ground troops, it's been cut by the Chief of Department of Air,
It's been on fire in several places, both north and south of Highway 9.
This means that they are going to have to truck the fuel down now, rather than send it down by pipeline, and this will absorb more of their transportation capacity.
Tom, you might point out too that they've been trucking the fuel at the end of that pipeline down in Cambodia and other areas at the end of the pipeline.
Yes, sir.
This is the end of the pipeline, and this secretary there says that from now on they must truck it down.
Now they've got to truck it from up in here someplace.
And I think that will have a significant effect.
Now, I'd like to talk a little bit about this flow of trucks, because we discussed this last evening with General Flay, who is responsible for targeting all the various roads, and for analyzing the sensors that are positioned along these roads.
Perhaps I should say to Ambassador Bush that
These red lines mark the location of the electronic sensors, which will indicate when a truck or tank or a large vehicle passes by.
And these are read out back in the central base, and then we count the number of times that a vehicle has gone by and moved to the south.
and the number of times the vehicle has gone by moving to the north.
And it's from these sensors that we get the information as to the quantity of traffic on a particular road.
Now, turning back to 914, which is a key R.E.
in question here, and talking to, let's give it another idea,
And there's a bypass going around called 914C.
I talked to General Clay about this.
He said that they are fairly confident that they know that 914C, which is a bypass, is not trouble in a practical way.
And they have been concentrating on 914C.
I'm going down here now.
He also points out that he now has instructions to stay clear of the southern part of this road because there are friendly troops on the road.
So it's no longer as he's bombing a 9-foot team south of this divine at this point right here.
because of the presence of friendly troops.
And this is the road that I told you on this other chart, that the 1st Regiment is going to drive up, must drive, 914.
And apparently, that is apparently a bomb-free area because of this operation that I described to you.
In looking at the northern part of this road, which goes all the way up against this whole area, I think it's interesting to...
Note the traffic that has taken place on that road.
So far as 914 is concerned, you can see from 18 to 24 February, it's dropped off significantly.
It's down now about to one-fourth.
of what it was, it dropped off in the last 24 or 48 hours to about one-fourth of what it was a couple of days ago.
And same thing for this highway 99, which leads down here, and the traffic on 922, which goes on into South Vietnam, has been relatively light.
The alternative to coming down this direction is highway 23, which Mr. Helms has already discussed.
Trunk tracking down that road has never exceeded over 9 a day, and we've had interdictions, road cuts, and so we don't feel that this road is actually taken over yet.
Furthermore, as you get further south on this road, there is no road under enemy control which will permit them to shift back over to the extension of this road leading to the south.
And so, from the intercept we have, and from the position of the troops, from the sensor reads and so on, I think that the operation in General Hill is beginning to show up in the movement of the vehicles to the south.
Farther south here, there were 14 vehicles destroyed last evening by the gunships, and there will be some traffic south, because what they really do, they don't start and drive all the way down to Cambodia.
They have in between these bin frames, they have assigned a group of trucks, and they shuttle back and forth.
On the census, we normally get just about the same numbers going north each night as the numbers going south, like the point I just made.
You know, we've got some areas there where they can put some things through on the ground without using trucks, and then they pick up the trucks lower down because of the kind of a loop they're using in there, too.
Yes, sir.
I think that's a good point, because that shows why they have such a large number of porters and support forces, or whatever you want to call them, because they do manhandle this material all the time in between these so-called vented trams.
Also, general agents know that the interview, that the traffic which has been shown up on their sensors along this road here in the last week or so, a lot of it is a troop supply.
In other words, it's just, they have a regiment down in here, and a lot of this supply, this trucking that's been going back and forth, is not only in the case they have to force the supplies through, but also they have to supply their own forces.
right in this area, because he does expect some action as they move on down here.
So I would just summarize by saying that on balance, we feel we've had a very significant effect on the Kingdome Deplicit Supply South, that we know some hard fighting ahead for the San Luis Obispo.
We know that they're going to suffer losses,
We have not yet been able to determine the overall effect of the air attacks on the enemy forces.
For instance, we did know that in this first operation with the third rank battalion, where there was a pullback, and we lost 150 men.
100 assault from the south-east base, lost 100 assault, plus several wounded to the point where they moved that 39th battalion back into the south-east now to refurbish it.
But nevertheless, the four different attack aircraft counted 639 of the enemy in the area.
And so this is not just a one-sided proposition.
They're being very heavily punished.
On that point, somebody said that we had some pictures that we take of the gunships showing that.
It occurred to me that if we do have the pictures, that we ought to at least publish them in Saigon, because even if we win a battle in terms of casualties, we lose it in terms of public opinion.
I think that's a good idea.
Both pictures are available on site.
We get them to the police services, and of course they say, we don't want any of your Defense Department pictures.
We want to take them ourselves.
How about you?
We don't care.
What I mean, we lose 125, they lose 600, and they retreat, and we retreat, and everybody says that South Vietnamese lost the battle.
Apparently we do have pictures which are pretty dramatic.
Right.
And they go to the press and say that.
And they did you?
Yes.
That's not cool.
Try it again.
Now, just in broad terms, I'd like to give you a feel for the...
Overall threat.
We estimate that south of 90 degrees, which is of course well marked on this chart.
Here it is.
I'm showing.
And that first enemy has about 8,000 troops along the D.S.G.
and 11,000 people down there.
Secondly, they could, by completely trimming what's left, bring their maybe 80,000 more down.
But that combined with the 28,000 that I mentioned that we had in this area makes up the 44,000 total that we think that are in this entire area.
In other words, if they wanted to take all of that troops out of the North Vietnam, and at the same time...
They cannot afford to leave this area north of DMZ.
Then they could, by stripping everything they have south of 19 degrees, maybe must have another 8,000.
Tom, do I understand you correctly that just north of the DMZ, there are 8,000, and somewhat north of that, there's another 8,000, and that's all they have in that area, 16,000?
That's all they have south of 19 degrees altitude.
Combat troops?
Combat troops.
I'm talking about organized combat forces.
And they have, of course, stripped this area in here in order to raise this number from about 14,000, which it was initially, to somewhere in the vicinity of 28,000.
And then south, there's horses, too, in New York and in south Vietnam.
But I think the point is that they deem this so important that they have wanted to practically strip their countries
To get their forces in here.
And I think that the losses that are being inflicted on them from the beam institutes and the tactical air, as well as the ground action, which will be sometime before we get a field war in terms of the total numbers, puts a terrific blame on them with respect to trying to replace and repurpose those forces.
Any time you destroy the forces in this area, then there is just that less threat to our own forces than the South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam province.
So all of this is a package that contributes to the overall objective we have.
The Secretary of Defense has said many times that the S.E.B.
is not going to win every battle they arm.
And it's going to be some of the toughest fighting that they've had is going to be right in this area.
And they recognized this when they went in.
And they are willing to accept this risk in order to get the long-range benefits that will accrue from this operation.
Is there any way we can keep our men off television right after battle?
You know, you would never appear to have won a war if we had our people.
It was right after they returned from battle.
They were all scared as hell.
They all remember the casualties, the friends being killed and everything.
And, God, you look at the television tonight, and it's just, you know, it's horrifying.
Everyone is so, if you explain to our buddies who have been killed...
This is the worst of what he's had, and so forth.
You know, we can wait a few days until they calm down a little.
Is there any way to... Well, we have the...
There's so darn many reporters out there on the...
We had rules in World War II that they couldn't do that until they got permission.
Well, I watch the films that are on all the networks each night.
I mean, I can't keep track of where the interviews are taking place.
Almost all of the interviews, bad interviews, we've had are at the base camps where we had, you know, 100, 150, 150 people.
In North Vietnam.
I mean, in South Vietnam.
Yeah, they're in South Vietnam, and they're in the...
Base camp areas, I don't know what we can do to keep those people busy around the base camp areas.
Abrams is going to try to take them out now once in a while on tours around.
That's much better to get them out of that base camp area.
Because they, these, but you've got so darn many of them that you can't, we can set up a pool arrangement.
Can't the skipper or the unit host tell them beforehand, look at, let's not be... Well, you can't keep these guys away from, you'd have to keep the units away from the recreational facilities.
Most of them are interviewed, you know, as they're, the guys wait over there and...
They're over at the pool hall, you know.
Did you notice where they're taking the pictures?
At the pool hall or just outside of the last night where they were getting ready to go over for a beer.
Well, they might have a couple of beers or something like that.
But the point is, I think they've got just as many as with the testers by that way.
Yeah, but they don't put them on.
The problem is, of course...
They've been in a battle, as you mentioned.
We've all been.
Sure.
Being in a battle, you venture home a lot more.
I mean, particularly if you've seen a lot of the pictures, and particularly if you're led by a clever reporter, you want to remember, too, that if you're looking at your press card, the first press card that you find out is the information that this, you know, or the correspondence is such a difficult place to have to be on.
You can find the kind of youth and the well-educated kind of people, young people, exposed to American education, and that are now on the press corps out there, with their, of course, also mending for the line of their editors, the CES line, and the NBC line, and to a certain extent ABC, depending upon
The other side of this of course is
Well, they've always come out and said to me that these guys don't want to travel.
No.
The other point is this, that we just have to realize that wars, of our civil war, and our soldiers after Antietam,
The loss of Antietam, of course, was a war.
It was a battle.
But it was a great turning point of the war.
What did he do?
Even Gettysburg was.
Gettysburg at the time was not known as a victory old sherry.
They charged across that hill.
They mowed down Pickett's people and the rest of them.
They didn't follow up.
And so people, after some, what was it?
Let me realize.
I'll do so later.
We're in a difficult, more difficult situation than it is in the press.
The press is not leading very strongly against the war, most of them are.
Second, whose editors are?
Third?
Therefore, with that appeal, that's the way to really report it.
And they're going to do it that way.
The interest in the facts, of course, is quite limited.
I know Isolent knows about how their money was put out.
They did it in our direction earlier this week.
They put out the pictures in regard to these things.
Those are goddamn accurate pictures.
Everybody knows that we don't have enough pictures.
We never have them.
And they don't use them.
Because it might help.
You're just cold as that.
Now what you do, you know, you don't know enough more about the press and all the rest.
What you do know about it is you keep a sense of perspective.
Now this will pass.
Maybe it's not going to be very difficult, but it's going to be difficult for about two months until the...
The action is finally broken off.
The final analysis, the real question here, is whether it works.
We forget too soon that in the 60 days we were in Cambodia, goddammit, we were losing out every day.
Not as much as here.
They wouldn't report the caches and so forth.
We had to go out and practically bludgeon them to it.
And the reason was that all of them, 90% of them, predicted it would fail.
And so it succeeded.
And so it is here.
It's somewhat the same kind of thing.
It's terribly different.
The important thing, and I think what Theano's briefly pointed out, the important thing here is for all of us to realize, as we look at it in perspective, this is a hard battle, as we expect it to be.
The important thing is one question I'm interested in, and I'm more interested in.
How are they fighting?
How are they living?
I understand they're fighting extremely well in the jump plantation area where the odds are much more in their favor.
They're fighting reasonably well in this area.
Their leadership perhaps is at least in one part.
And the airborne is not as effective as you might like, but the leadership of the 1st Division is good, but they're fighting well.
And as far as your prospectus is concerned, we believe we are, with our air power, has the staying power to stay and continue to disrupt this area for a period of, shall we say, a few weeks, or whatever the case may be.
If that occurs,
And if they have a wash, and that's all it really amounts to, you realize that by Tuesday they will have been in there by three weeks.
Having been in there for three weeks, I don't care where they've been, they're striding or cutting across at least three roads at various times and trails.
They've been in there for three weeks.
That means there's a hell of a lot of Americans that aren't going to get killed because they were there.
It also means that Ireland and South Vietnam will have a much better chance to survive next year because they were there.
That's what it's all about.
We've got to keep this perspective.
You're not going to win it in the day-to-day battles with the French.
We're going to be flush on that.
No way.
All we've got to do is try.
And I think that's where you use your big guns.
It means to Mel, Bill, and others when they have an opportunity.
We've just got to sort of stand up there, as we all have done, and I think it's a great way to present the case.
It seems to me that Abrams gives a very, I read his briefing,
He was a totally honest man.
He gave the bad amongst the good.
He said, here's where it's going.
And anybody that's made it, he's terribly believable.
But even his brief, he had a hell of a time getting through that small press because...
Because, so here's General A from saying this and that, and they show one picture of a disgruntled GI who's had a couple of beers and said, Jesus Christ, this is the worst thing I've ever heard.
No, really, that's what the people remember.
But, let me come back to this fundamental point.
What we have to do is to remember.
The question about comes out, and that's the question.
Militarily, will it work?
And the point now is militarily, not only militarily.
Do we think there's a good chance, based on their proposition?
We weren't sure how they'd fight.
And they fought pretty well, right?
The second fight is, the military, we're going to do everything we can, we want to care for them, to see if it does work.
That's about all we can do.
Is that a fair summary of the proposition?
Yes, sir.
We've got to keep the North Vietnamese from coming along and testing off our forces.
That's the very thing.
Cutting off.
He's talking about it.
Right, right down.
We have a plan to do that.
They'll make that.
Well, they'll bring, they'll bring, we think they'll try to bring hostilities down, but of course we have the, we'll be watching that.
Still trying.
That's in South Vietnam actually.
Yes, that is in South Vietnam.
That would be moving across the dam, so that it would erupt.
They come around, right down from this corner, down in this direction, southeast.
But this is being watched there again.
But I think they might attempt to... Mr. President, I'd like to speak.
I totally agree.
We can't control the press, and we can't protect those who are against us.
And I think we've done quite well.
Like the governors, for example, even ones who were opposed to each other, they, after the briefing, said that they thought maybe they'd been wrong, even the sergeant from Massachusetts.
So I think we're doing pretty well in that sphere.
But the thing I was directing my comments to is that, to the young people and all over the country, we want to try to keep quiet for the next couple of months.
And these...
statements on television have a hell of an impact on you.
And what I was wondering about was whether, rather than issuing any orders or anything of that kind, whether you can't get the leaders of the squadrons themselves, by their own choice, to say, you know, we're fighting this war in two places.
We're fighting it on the battlefield, and we're fighting it back at home.
And let's not get on television so soon.
I mean, if you want to get on television, let's do it at the right time, in the right way.
Oh, so what I'm saying is not to do it by way of an order.
Alan, he said, skip with the squadron and say that.
Don't be interviewed.
Let's plan how we're going to be interviewed.
Do it in a sensible way.
It's part of the war.
You know, if you get, and there's probably not too many, you know, too many squad leaders or whatever you have out there, maybe they'd be willing to undertake it themselves.
It's individual.
Bill, that might make a bigger story.
Not if they do it by themselves.
You have to.
I want you to know that we're trying to do this.
This idea that we don't look at this.
The idea that we're not trying to get people out there on the TV.
We are trying to do this.
We worked very hard on getting some people out there and making a real thing out of this young man who stayed behind in that helicopter.
And that was all programmed very hard.
It was a hard sell to get that on.
It took us 24 hours to get the first network to carry that.
And there was a hell of a lot of work put into that.
And we don't want people to know how much and how hard we had to work, but that was planned right out of here.
And you just got to keep at it all the time, because they don't want those favorable stories.
I'm convinced that they don't want the favorable stories from these young men out there right now.
And we have to understand.
We're working for CBS, right?
You want to go to the top, we're going to put out something.
You're not going to lock me.
You're going to kill me.
You're going to pimp for the top guy.
That's the way it is.
CBS is that way.
NBC is that way.
And half of ABC.
So the networks are impossible, right?
And that's all that matters.
All the news speakers are impossible.
You know, and ain't that been so good of a... You know, I'm not sure it's like... No, no, no.
We'll continue to write.
I do write.
I think that...
I think the Vice President raises the point that this has got to be done.
It's very sudden, but it is true that it's been going on for two years.
It's pretty hard to tell a young helicopter pilot, look here comes a smart bastard from the press, and how you have to handle him.
We've got enough people around in this government to be smart with our eyes.
And they were in there picturing these guys hanging posts off the other day, and these guys, helicopter pilots, were having a little relaxation, having a couple of beers.
They've only been out there fighting like hell.
They were just having a pretty good time, like you would have done in a wardrobe of that great luxury carrier.
He wasn't that old and too bad, though.
He was a
Pretty good fighter, but the other ones, the ones that ran out, the minute they step out, they're scared as hell, and they just think their friend's killed.
Well, Bill, let me assure you, we recognize the problem.
We've talked about it several times.
We do what we can without the...
The major way to handle the problem is what's already been suggested.
You cannot, you cannot believe these people are talking to us because they're looking for the story.
CBS gave us hell for an hour.
CBS gave us hell for an hour, and depending on who was transmanaged, they're going to repeat the program again for six days on Saturday.
They've got a bias here.
A bias of CBS, while NBC is generally the worst, as far as administration, CBS on the war is about ten degrees worse than NBC.
That's because of the bias of the tongue.
Look, a newspaper man, with everything else,
Kill his grandmother, or for that matter, his mother, for a good story.
So give him a good story, and then he'll get off to bad stories.
That's about all you can do.
I don't mean by that.
You can't have the Pentagon doing it.
You can't have Abrams doing it.
Let him go flying around down there in Laos.
I've been in Laos.
It's a horrible place.
Let him go look at the damn place.
That's what you ought to do.
There's more down there.
I think that's why your plan now is to go down there.
That gives them another story to write.
If it's good, they won't use it.
But it's a little bit better than having it there.
Keep busy.
If you get 150 helicopters out there, you'll probably have 150 press running along.
No, we can't do that.
Oh, why not?
Then we've got other things to do with the helicopters.
We have to go on to the Mideast now.
Yes, sir.
I have to go out there and meet again.
Of course, we will.
Fred, I just want to make one comment on this.
Oh, yeah.
We'll take another five, just so you know.
Time sensitivity is very important, right?
Very hard.
As Dave said yesterday, we've got the catalyst, the gate, and we've got to push it through pretty soon.
Or to put a fair phrase in the statement, if you want to make this a planned decision, cut bait.
The only problem is that it causes a lot of political problems if this gets up in the Security Council.
The debate has to rage up there because it limits the options that we have.
I think the Secretary of State has to do it because that will be all out in public, and that public arena is not the best place to carry on this problem.
Well, let's go on and take a look into it.
Why don't you make a brief summary of the item, get the feel of where we are, so that you can all have in mind that we have a problem of ours, as is already indicated in the arms for us and so forth.
We also have a problem of ours.
But these things would be separating out the two-track thing.
I think these are things which we all know about in general, but I'm sure that people know about the two-track, the association, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh,
Well, let me kind of dispose of the two peripheral tracks.
On the four power talks, George will have his hand full in concentrating on the question of supplementary guarantees over the coming weeks.
We've been able to manage this very well, Mr. President, because we have had really a pretty genuine negotiating process going on between the parties.
to the extent to which there may be any fogging down in connection with the central process of negotiation between the parties, why this will enhance the difficulties that Georgia will confront in New York, because there will be considerable pressures from the British, the French, and the Russians to begin to spell out a lot of the blueprints, and to really move in the direction of imposing a solution.
Secondly, on the Suez Canal proposal, Mr. President, in the very short run, I don't think this will move until the Egyptians really have had a good look at whatever the Israelis decide to reply to the Yaring initiative.
Which means that Sadat made this proposal
for a separate opening of the canal apart from the overfall settlement, because he's somewhat desperate to show some practical progress in the short range.
And in fact, the intelligence indicates that he made this proposal really contrary to some of the advice that he received from some of his senior associates.
But I think we need to look at that possibility.
Both sides want us to play a middleman role, and I think we have to look at that possibility as an ongoing matter after we see what occurs in the principal track, namely the negotiations between Egypt and Israel under the auspices of Yari.
But at the moment, Mr. President, we don't think that's something we should...
I just want to say, on that one, we don't think that it's imminent in the sense that we have to do it this week, and that's probably not at all just a fit.
It's something we may want to consider next week, but that's not what faces us today.
On the principal course, Mr. President, in the negotiations between the parties, our view was that for about the first four or six weeks,
The propositions put forward by the Israelis were serious, concrete, not polemical.
Whereas the UAR paper seemed to be in the opposite direction, rather polemical, and did not address themselves to the core questions.
The new phase, as you know, is that the Egyptians have now been concrete.
They have said categorically, we will join in a peace agreement with the Israelis, and they have spelled out these
in a way in which we're sure they're satisfactory.
And Golda said before, the Christians put this forward, that if you are able to get this commitment of a peace agreement, he told this to Walling, she told this to Walling Barber ten days ago, if you're able to get this spell out, then I will face up to the differences between the United States and Israel on the key question of territories.
Now, Yaring picked up the ball, and I think it's important, Mr. President, for me to make one point.
Yaring has not proposed to the Israelis total Israeli withdrawal from all of the territories, because we're seeing a smokescreen the rest of the time, publicly.
What Yaring has proposed, Mr. President, in specific terms, is this.
In return for these commitments from the Egyptians that I've described, with New Israel,
Withdraw to the international border, provided you are satisfied with respect and militarization, and you are satisfied with the security arrangements in and around Sharm el-Sheikh.
That's the concrete, specific question that he posed within the context of the Egyptian Israeli aspect of it.
Now the signs are, as you know, that the Israeli response will not really direct itself to the question of the border.
We think the reply will run something along these lines, and it will probably come in the next 24 hours.
The Israelis will welcome the new Egyptian rule.
They will reiterate what they have said over the last three years, namely that they are willing to negotiate on the so-called question of secure and recognized borders.
They will then say the 67 borders are barred, as a general statement, and we're ready to negotiate.
Which, of course, is an evasion of the concrete question which Yari has put,
We know that the cabinet, Mr. President, is divided.
We've known this for a long time.
The only thing they really were able to agree on was this negative statement as to what they were against.
They have not been able to define the border.
And if this is the reply, undoubtedly, you are able to believe that it is not responsive.
And in our judgment...
The concern over the extension of CESAR on the 7th of March.
The concern about whether these negotiations can be continued.
The more important from our point of view, the thing that has worried us all along, Mr. President,
and give the Russians the handle for further inroads, because from our point of view, only political settlement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides is going to check the advance of the Soviet commissary.
I think that, in a nutshell, was all I had to say.
Let me say a few words on that, which was, as Joe says, we're really in a critical juncture now.
Egypt, without going into details, Egypt has accepted
in every particular with very minor exceptions.
All the things that Israel said it wants.
If in 1967 we could have gotten from Egypt what they are now willing to give, Israel would have been delighted with it.
Now, Israel is in the position where it is finally facing a hard decision.
It is unwilling to make a decision of any kind.
I had a meeting with Ambassador Rabin the day before yesterday, and pointed out that if they say what we think they're going to say, it is totally unacceptable, and it's clearly an attempt to evade their responsibility.
What they're going to say is, yes, this was a nice response from Egypt, yes, it's positive, yes,
No, we're not willing to return to the international, but we're willing to negotiate.
I've said to that sort of opinion, that is an occasion.
You have to now say what your position is.
It's not enough to say you're willing to negotiate, that's what you're doing.
We now have the parties in the position that we've been trying to get them in for three years.
And you've always said that if Egypt is willing to sign a contractual agreement, to say it is, you have the right to exist, to sign an agreement with you, to make provision for your security, that you then would lay your cards on the table.
You have to do that now.
You just can't say, well, we're sometimes willing to lay our cards on the table.
And if that is their response,
The United States is in one hell of a position.
What's that?
I don't know.
But what I've got to ask is what does he say?
It's not that they, what they want is to have the arms agreement.
So we've done that.
What else do they want?
They don't want the Russians, they don't want to face the decision.
Now what we've said, they said, don't push us.
I said, look, we aren't pushing you.
We aren't telling you what your position should be.
That's up to you.
But you have to take a position
You said you've been willing to take a position once you have these assurances.
You have them now.
It surprised you.
This is an area that did not think that Egypt would do this.
Egypt has done it now.
Now, the thing that's troubling the cabinet in Israel is that they can't decide, they can't take a hard decision.
They know anything short of the international border doesn't make sense, because the Sinai can't, they really have never suggested to be divided.
And one other thing before we end this, because I know you have a concern.
The position that we are now, that we think they should take, is the position that they told us, as a government, that they were prepared to take in 1967.
We have a full account of the meeting between Iban and Ross,
And he then told them that once Egypt did these things, that Israel was fully prepared to go back to the international border as long as they had security arrangements on Sharm el-Sheikh.
Next, on the record, that's why we supported the Security Council resolution.
And the difficulty now is that we will have a major blow-off of the whole negotiating process if Israel doesn't at least
play their cards, put them on the table.
Now, if they put their cards on the table in whatever form, at least it's then a negotiating position, and you have two sides.
You've got Egypt saying one thing and Israel saying another, but what Israel is attempting to do, according to the advancing permission we have, is not to take a position.
Now that is totally an unacceptable policy for them to pursue, and they know it.
And we say, what do you think the next step is if you do this?
They say, well, we'll have to go to the Security Council.
How does that help them any?
They'll be forced to disclose their hand there.
We can't support them if they refuse to say what the position is.
Rabin said, well, our position is we want to return to the 1967 border.
I said, that's not a position.
Then say what you want to do.
What will you do?
Egypt has told you what it will do, what will you do?
Now that's where we stand, and we don't know what the... We have other things that we're thinking about.
I didn't quite get the second track.
You say that's not the matter that's presently... Well, we don't want to talk about it.
It's not talkable.
We can't talk about it with Egypt at the moment, because they would think then we're...
Israel makes a forthright proposal of any kind so that they present to
Then we could use the other suggestion as a possibility for getting an extension of the C-square.
Maybe, in other words, we have some plans that we've been working on that we think might work.
Let me be more specific.
A paper that we got, that I came up with in a group all over here today,
Might it at least be a step?
Is that a possibility?
Can that be separated now?
Can after Israel answers?
If Israel doesn't give an answer, then the other side of the question.
If we have a negotiating position from Israel, whatever it is, if they say, look, we want to return to the 67 borders, but we will do the following, and then we can say, well, this is going to have to be negotiated now.
It's going to take us...
six months or nine months to negotiate this.
Then we can move to this other proposal, go back to the Egyptians and say, look it, let's try to work an auto-opening of the Suez, and if we do that and get some agreement on that, we get an extension of nine months or a year on the ceasefire, and we'll use this as an interim measure to provide a method of working out a final agreement.
But in the absence of that, if Israel does what I'm afraid they're going to do,
Hey, I don't have any support.
Why do we provide the arms center?
Well, I don't think we should until we have.
Well, we can week you into work tomorrow night, Mr. President.
You can't.
We have to be, we have to be, look if you know, I've taken a very strong position, I've taken a very strong position with Mrs. Meyer and so forth, and we understand that they have to, in regard to the Soviet, they've taken a strong position, they've got a good message around over there, and that has to be part of the deal with the Soviets.
But there's one thing that is in the back here that you have to have in mind, and it must be clearly understood.
I said this to everybody, and I hope you understand.
It is not, of course, it does not go unnoticed.
In fact, it seems that we have another campaign coming up.
All of the Democratic candidates, even including our good friend Scoop Jackson, who was such great assistance on APM.
And here, of course, we're going completely on the same pale with these 40 years of war.
Now, let's just understand what the position is here.
We will support it.
We'll provide the arms, we'll provide a long-range agreement, we'll guarantee agreement, we'll do this or anything else, but we don't say, and we've also indicated that as far as their borders are concerned and the rest, we don't say they go back to the borders before.
They must be secure borders.
I've said that.
Defensible borders.
That's what we've always talked about.
If there was any thought on the part of any Israeli leaders, that they can simply first have their arms at which the Congress is from, and at...
And where, and then refused, refusing to discuss with the idea that American political parties are not going to have one damn bit of effect.
I think that's what we've got to understand.
And I speak as one who has no confidence at all in Soviet intentions in the Middle East.
No confidence at all about the Egyptians.
I have a little respect for the King of Jordan.
I think Israel is worth saving.
I think we should try to save them correctly.
On the other hand, I would like to tell you that there is not going to be any American political pressure brought to bear on this score because the elections come under the helmet.
So that is, we just simply can't have that.
And now, having said that, and if Diane understands that,
We have to do is not approach this very important.
We're dictating anything.
We're trying to oppose anything.
We're trying to pick up the debt or any of that sort of thing.
We can, on the one hand, simply because the Congress simply go all out for it, which they have, and give it a biometric development, because we have indicated we're not supportive.
We cannot be in a position where we do that, and then Israel says, we won't talk.
Not just talk, negotiate.
That's what it means.
That's what it means.
We have, because of these negotiations, we've got it.
for Israel, everything that history has said it wanted.
And the Prime Minister said, if these things are achieved, we will make the hard decisions.
We will say what we will do.
That's where they are, and that's what they are unable to do.
In addition, we have a solemn place of their government, of what their position was,
Try at the time we supported the resolution.
It's a matter of writing.
That's why we voted for the resolution.
We also told the Arabs that's why we were voting for the resolution.
We had the assurance of Israel.
So the Arabs now say, well, we've done everything that you've asked us to do.
Now what is Israel prepared to do?
I know this, I think this subject is wrong.
March 6th is arriving in a week.
Approximately in a couple of days.
Now, March 6th, I had noticed at the time, the 3D news center has been arrested.
At that time, the ceasefire might be broken.
Basically, they put you in a bar or an ER, you know, get what they want, or something like that, for the ceasefire to be broken.
But, well, I wish I started there as much as I did.
It's possible.
My judgment is that they probably don't want to.
I don't think they will resume, but there won't be an extension of the ceasefire.
I would doubt myself that either side will start the shooting, because you never know.
You never know.
They could be quite crazy.
The other way, the more likely way, is going to come.
It's not that the Arabs will start, nobody will know.
The Arabs have threatened and so forth and so on, that Israel strikes.
I think one thing we have to well understand, and I think tonight, that the attitude of Congress, yes, I know what it will be, particularly in the Senate, and it will be a strong support.
We will have to understand that this is a bargaining point with Israel.
All the way.
We lean in their direction.
There's no question.
We'll maintain the balance in their favor.
We'll keep the Russians out.
We will not press them.
But if they start anything, then there's no more support.
My God, that's got to be understood.
Mr. President, I made just a political report.
Unfortunately, we have no stroke of the air.
We can't keep that from starting Sunday.
I'd just like to make a political comment here, if I could.
I agree with Bill.
I agree with you.
Even though the Arabs have done everything we've asked them to do,
Our maneuvering room, publicly, is much less than it is privately.
And when it gets into the public arena, I think that we're in worse shape.
And that's why I think this period of time, this next two or three days, is so important to keep it out of that public arena there.
People don't do things unless there is something you can either deny them or give them.
Is there anything left to deny or give Israel what they want?
Or do they think they're going to get the support of 500 million, 100 million, regardless of what happens?
No, Mr. President, on the arms side, we are committed to certain deliveries coming through June.
But the main decision from July 1st on for the next year and a half
You have not made, and I think our general feeling around this table would be to withhold making that particular decision.
Because they know the time is approaching.
There are certainly time problems and so on.
Well, they know also, they know also that I will lead toward a very generous sum, provided that there is some, some quid pro quo for this type.
But I'll tell you, you just can't continue to say, all right, if Israel has everything it wants,
And then be in a position where Israel, and they won't have some of the numbers.
They do nothing.
That's our real problem.
We're talking just here about this highly confidential information that we just realized.
If Mel, sir, gets in the public arena, you'll see about that.
There's a number of speeches being made up there on the Senate floor on that.
President, one point on that, sir.
The New York Times, Charlie O. has been...
very understanding lately, and felt that Israel was dragging its feet.
So this could affect our political situation.
No, George, they've been consistently supportive on it.
I don't think we have to, and we don't have to be apologetic in the slightest degree about the position that I've announced here.
In fact, Israel, when we talked to Bastard, his associates, he's quite embarrassed.
He doesn't have a position.
My point, sir, was if you decide to have a little stick on it, it seems to me that we might get less political flak and more support just because of this one factor in that major newsmaking.
And I don't know if you can do it, but I hear me.
Well, I would like to suggest that we not take any action to withhold or change our decision.
I just indicated at the moment, I mean, but this...
I don't want any dresses, we don't want any gloves, and that sort of thing.
I think they're, I'm just suggesting the other side of the coin.
There must not be any assumption among those of us here that I, who have been the best friend, the most reliable friend that anyone has had in this chair for a hell of a long time, because we've been willing to step down to the counter.
That, that, that, that's just what happened.
We go in and help them.
We sure as hell will not.
That's what we have to understand.
Because otherwise you create a situation where they are competing with the customer.
That doesn't say a thing about, unfortunately, I would say exactly the same thing about the Egyptians.
We have a stroke with them.
They've been behaving pretty well.
They go in there every day and they come up with the news.
New set of requests, new wrinkles developed.
Yesterday was no exception.