Conversation 051-004

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This morning at the cake, uh, it was very, uh, the purpose was really to, uh,

to get it out so that we know that it's not a problem.

It's a sticky problem.

It's not going to be China.

It's not going to be nations.

We all know what it has been.

We all know what it is.

And it's the same answer that becomes less viable.

This is the question we therefore consider today.

It's not simply one of what we ought to do.

Also, it's a question of knowing, and we have to discuss it, and that's why this meeting is going to be in the very original conference that we're going to be in.

Particularly this one, so we've got to consider what our options may be in case George gets up there and they find we don't have votes.

I don't think that's going to happen this year.

That's my sense of the word here.

Bill, I'm sorry.

But that's the reason why we had this whole problem.

It's just to see where you've all heard about this new kind of business, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

It's complicated and so forth.

But I think this discussion would be well-rounded.

I'm going to give us a rundown as to the various things that came up in this working group.

And then Bill will be able to speak to it in a few seconds.

I think he's up here in charge.

He's building.

He's probably going to get himself talked about this Sunday.

and it is the first of its kind to be used in the operation system of Taiwan, and able to be started in the US.

President Iran will be the one to do that.

But this is good, and also good.

to other issues with respect to China's defense presence and the legislation in Taiwan.

Taiwan, on the contrary, I think that we've just had an opportunity to deal with here.

First, on the issue of U.N., on the U.N. reference, when I asked the question, Mr. President, we have first the policy issue of whether we want to stick to our present course, and secondly, the tactical issue of if we do not want to stick to our present course, what our choices are.

This is mainly a policy issue, as Bill's paper pointed out, and as you just pointed out,

We first said that we will be in a place of almost certainty this year, and if not this year, next year.

Two grounds, one that we may have a majority for this report, and the other one,

The majority of the important question in this case, the unmasking resolution between these fellows, Taiwan and the South Caucasus Channel, would best find a majority vote, and it's already half the majority.

At the last session of the General Assembly, it was repeated only because we had pre-mailed many consultant questions.

So our specific and aggressive policy would really have the paradoxical consequence of ensuring the entry of the ERC either this year or next year over our opposition.

So the decision would be

that we would do not buy it, rather that we would repay it.

This would be implied, as I understand it, by the judge, and not only the state.

It would be implied by taking the present policy then.

The tactical measures, if we do change our policy, if we decide to change our policy, how we, in what direction should we change it?

Yes.

Two formulae, and one issue.

The formula that we have, I used to go for dual representation.

There is a voting resolution which calls for UN membership for both Peking and Taipei or to go for dual representation on the basis of universality, that is, in which we say that we are in favour of the admission of all functioning governments into the United Nations and, as part of this, favour the admission of Peking and Taipei.

The course of this will be determined by our attitude towards the important questions

If we insist that the issue of representation is an important question, if we go to dual representation ourselves, then probably dual representation will decrease the outstanding resolution.

But the important question could be dual representation, otherwise we could not get a two-thirds vote for either of these two formulas, dual representation.

So if we want the dual representation to prevail, we would tend to give up also the position that we consider this an important question.

Now, we have to be kept in mind, though, of course, as I said, that the dual representation wouldn't have picked up the important question, even if dual representation, either of which the formulation prevails, the Chinese in all probability will not have it.

and the end result may still be, at the end of one, two, or three years, a dual representation not having succeeded in getting communist China in, which is the interest of many countries, that they will then go for a modified version of the Albanian Resolution.

Um, therefore, with respect to the important question resolution, we have really three options.

We can abandon it and put forward only the dual representation resolutions.

We can keep it, putting forward both the dual representation and an important question resolution, which has the practical consequence of defeating the updating resolution with the dual representation one.

The dual representation one is the important question resolution.

I can't hear you.

In that case, the dual representation would win.

Now, Communist China probably still would not come in, but we would have made it clear that it would fail to come in only because it wants to impose its terms on the United Nations.

And we would have an edge, at least in this session, against the expulsion of Communists, of, uh, of Taipei.

Now, uh,

The difference between the two dual representation formula whether we should send it over dual representation of speaking at A or whether we should put it over the universality idea is that by going over the universality principle we would not be

This is the advance in Taiwan that we would be adopting in general principle to which all others, which we make generally applicable.

Probably, although I haven't seen the figures yet, there's a few more votes, because more people might, more countries might be prepared to vote for him.

In a good tally, it would be prepared to vote for George Washington.

It has some major difficulties.

It will make some problems.

It will make a major problem with South Korea, which was not always there, Mr. President.

We claim for North Korean feelings and some problems with South Vietnam and some taxable problems with the best Germans who have agreed in principle with the membership of these Germans and who would like to make this result from their negotiations rather than from our approaches.

It is some sort of...

There is a good case to be made that we could pretend to have considered extending Ernstine's disadvantage, but this would be the price we would pay for the use of Sally, for going beyond Sally's view.

So then did you decide to change our present standards?

The choice is some form of dual representation, and the dual representation formula then?

they decide to think on the basis of some of these considerations.

One other issue that will come up, which is going to be triggered by what we do in the General Assembly, but it's somewhat in the center of it, is China's Security Council see the damage to the dual representation resolution.

There were almost certainly seven smoking banners that were in many meetings and detentions of the Security Council, and it never could result.

And we may be able to hope to see the tight end until such time as beating shows up to claim.

But if, as I understand it, if it is ruled that this is a procedural issue, we cannot use the veto.

And in that case, it is more than likely that the Secretary of Security can be found in the Security Council to seek him, and that process would be accelerated.

But then I think we can hold off until he's done his job.

If that's not until communist China plans it, I think we can hold off.

But the big thing is that it will be very difficult to prevent.

Now these are the principal issues, tell us about them.

These are the principal issues with respect to the policy of the record.

a kick in the tail from the majority of the people who still just happen to be anti-communists in this country.

It's old-fashioned, of course, but it still happens to be true.

To my great surprise, at least it happens to be true on this scene.

See, we stole the case too well.

There it is, my picture.

So we've got a very serious domestic problem here.

We've got to position this in a way, not that we, that the United States changes its position to now open arms, come on in and talk to the United States.

I want to remember we have a lot of Americans who think that's a hell of a bad idea down here in the state too.

Your fate is two to one against us now.

Two to one.

Texas, against the invasion of red China and the U.N. Today, California is three to two, which is about the country.

New York is E, out in the heartland.

Mr. President, that really points out the problem, because if we continue our present policy, after Gary was the second president, we'll get the worst of both worlds.

We'll have communist strategy,

Taiwan expelled and our policy will have been a total failure.

I'm totally aware of the fact that we have a situation here.

I know what we have to do.

What I mean is,

It's very important that we do this two factors in one.

One, to get the old man to play the game as well as we can when they require a personal industry to go out and tell it.

And I believe that we can inspect it to position it in terms of American vision.

So we sell it as well as we can.

I mean, not that, as a matter of fact, we gotta sell it more in terms of

We just don't have votes.

We have to elect the U.S. to take the rap.

If we're successful, then what we would hope is that it's also true we're successful.

It's also true that we're not going to try to go back in there.

They won't come in.

So we will have two or three or four or whatever number of years of investment.

What I would like to think, though, is in terms of positioning, in a way, this is a current thing, and I'm not sure we were talking about this in a certain way.

I think it's, I'm thinking of the American public opinion also, and that's definitely handle, I'm sure, on this thing.

It's done personally.

It's gone through the trailer.

It will come out.

But in terms of the American public opinion,

I think that the argument has got to be made in a way that we don't get caught in a crack where it appears that we welcome China to open arms.

I think that some degree of really, frankly, throwing off the United Nations is what I mean.

Well, our friends in the United Nations deal this way, and after all, we're only one member, and it's not the other thing, and that's what it's going to have to be.

I don't think this is all set up publicly, but let it sort of move in that direction.

I'm not even going to think that from a domestic political situation, if there are any points in the world for us to get out and say, well, we find it seems a lot like red China ought to be in the United Nations.

that I think will be very bad.

Very bad for Taiwan, but more important, very bad in the United States.

There will come a time when that can be said, but the people aren't quite ready for it.

I think at this time, it may have to be positioned more in terms

Well, I realize we have to, privately have to leave.

Privately we must not, in the British press, we must not push this into this.

I understand that.

Speaking about the public position, and the public position is, well, we've been talking about how we can present it publicly in a way that doesn't make, doesn't make, like I said, it's a little hard to turn people around that quickly.

And here we've been against the government of China.

They're still up there in Korea.

They're supporting the North and the East and all that.

And it's a little hard to believe it.

So we should give a big thought to that.

There's some thought to how we handle the American public opinion.

Leaving out all these other things I said.

I want to probably leave that to the rest of them.

The American public opinion is quite destructive here also.

This is how we have it.

I think this is the point, Bill.

This same poll showed the UN trade will be good.

Everybody knows that.

Now, if this thing is done, and I'm gonna argue the other side of that, if it's done in such a way that it appears that, well, here's a very big United States.

and here to always hold on to the nation, the United Nations.

They invited me home this time.

That may produce some more, so I'm a little, I would be concerned about our being pushed too much in that direction, having argued that subject.

So, it does say that there's a lot of subtle history, but we don't want to hurt the United Nations anymore, and it wouldn't be hurt more if it appeared that the United Nations

have frankly forced us off of a position that we didn't believe in, but we could no longer sustain it if we didn't have the votes.

And second, on the other hand, we have a problem of convincing our own people that there's a good, strong reason to change our position with regard to the fundamental issue, because we can talk about universality,

The important question, all the rest of it, to the average guy is, are we for or against the Constitution of China?

That is the one thing that I believe in.

I think it can be played over.

I think we've got to be sure it's not a word.

I think it helps.

I think there's a particular reason to change our policy, so that we can go back to the nation and then get money.

Well, what I'm saying is in order to even prevail under the rough situation, we've got to stand and we've got to fight for the retention of the seat of Taiwan.

Now, if we lose either way,

We'll stay where we are.

So the only reason to change is to save the secret Taiwan and to get support from other nations.

Now we think that the representation idea will get a good deal of support.

We think we can prevail.

We'll have to accept, yes.

I think that the fact that there were so many extensions on the California Constitution last time shows that there were 25 extensions.

And a lot of those were where nations have felt that

China should not be expelled from the government of China, but that communist China should come in.

So they, a good many of those 25 would vote for the Chiefs to vote for Communist China.

So we'll have to check that out, though, and find out how we are.

Well, we can't do it now, but we've got to.

We've got to.

And it looks like you can't say the thing that way.

Why do you have to make a big public issue out of that here in the United States?

You don't just do it quietly.

Well, if you make a public issue, you're fighting the state of the state.

That would be a good way.

You can't.

The real question is to fight the war and go on the universal.

I mean, I can see that.

But there, of course, there are two problems.

What about North Korea?

Well, that can be handled because they're fighting.

The United Nations are still technically at war.

They still hate the Germans.

The Germans are still a problem.

That's right.

The Germans, they don't want their problem.

They're working it out, so we don't want to bother with them.

And as far as Arkansas, we have Trump.

You know, Trump has spoken.

You can never let South Vietnam in.

That's right.

A couple of other things.

I go to Universal.

The other, again, one of the communists in the law department said the United Nations.

Yeah.

You stay with the China question.

Well, he does.

Well, he said, you've got to get your position.

Yeah.

What is it?

That's the other reason that the universality thing does have some feeling.

I think it's just talking theoretical terms.

There's a lot to be gained as well as something to be lost.

But the Germans have already announced that they're going to do it.

It's one of the provisions of the treaty and they're thinking about it.

supporting the mission of East Germany.

So that's got nothing to do with it.

The problem would be that they want to give that away themselves.

They don't want that to go unnegotiated.

Yeah, but that isn't good.

The substance of it is they already announced they're going to support East Germany's mission.

I think the horizon universality is what you're talking about.

That's a wonderful question, Jim.

Well, we can handle it.

I just raised a little bit of a question about how does the block help?

It's going to be something we have to consider in the way we position this thing.

Another thing, when it gets down to it, the military, let's suppose that we find that it's closer, we don't have a problem.

And the best thing to do is not draw lines.

Just get rolled and undo and take the rap.

That's really good for that.

We may not get the votes.

It's a tragedy.

Yes, sir.

Well, we have to find out if we can pursue it.

We have to look at where we're going to change our policy.

How about how we pull it up?

Correct.

To do a representation.

Correct.

How we do it.

you would start, you're pointing that you would start quietly checking on that now.

We tell people we're seriously thinking about this science and how it makes a lot of sense.

John, politically I think that the thing that's going to be done, whether we sell it or not, if Congress does not admit it, then we can say our policy was successful.

We kept Chinese government out of the United Nations.

If we pursue this policy, if we're- President, were you really saying that they'll- if they're the ones who have the options, whether they come in or not?

Sure.

This is a little, uh, to the degree that we present this beforehand to the American people as a means of keeping them out.

Yeah.

Then, then, abroad, it appears to be a beginning.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Everybody's an eye on it.

You must say that.

Yeah.

But in fact, that's what the result is.

Yeah, that's what we're considering, isn't it?

Well, maybe.

It'll be quite hard.

It's not an easy thing.

No, but the fight to keep time off now is probably good stuff.

That's the rest of it.

That's what I'm saying, sir.

And on the other hand, I'm sorry, the old man's had a very, very, very long list.

He hasn't stayed.

But I did just so they could wait.

And he's a pretty great host of calls.

He's done a lot of stuff.

A lot of us, but I had four bills.

Of course,

We can't keep this a plan.

We have a problem.

Part of how we do it, I think, is whether we should share our speeches or alternate it or whatever.

I think that doesn't count.

I don't know.

We have a speech plan because it highlights the problem.

You can read it and you can see what could be said.

And I think it's useful for the president's consideration, right?

Right, as to the point, but I don't think it's a big winner for the president.

No, no, no.

I do have a few thoughts, too.

Mr. President, I'd like to hear rather radical observations.

Radical?

Radical in the sense that they're not being flexible and honest and discussing.

I described it like this the last time.

Whatever we need on this back sink, I think on this back wall.

First, I think that I want to see my back sink.

Preface these remarks by saying that I have no knowledge of the whole of these mentions, so put it into consideration.

It's not in the thinking at all.

I'm not sure we've considered the point of whether a defeat in the United Nations is something that we should shy from or regard as bad news for the United States, not politically, but in our national interests.

I'm dismal.

I suppose we are defeated in the United Nations.

I suppose Taiwan is replaced by the People's Republic of China.

It really doesn't affect our national security, what we have to do from then on in.

Looking down the road some years, I looked at the United Nations with both Taiwan and Beijing in.

I can see only a very tall podium for espousing interests that are basically not going to be compatible with our general ideas to develop the world.

And if pig chain comes in with our systems or even with our testing, to some extent the utterances that come through the United Nations from pig chain have an additional dignity in the world community.

I've come to the viewpoint that this is a very volatile and sensitive situation because of the intellectual community in this country.

But I've come to the conclusion that it may well be that the United Nations is not in the best interest of the United States with it down the road.

And I understand all the scriptures that that kind of utterance has attached to it, the emotions around it and the like.

I don't see how I'm playing a game with regards to big things in Russia, that we gain anything.

And I sort of feel as though taking our loss in the United Nations, standing for what we really believe may be, in the long run, more supportive to your flexibility and the flexibility of your future presence down the road than always

looking to the expedient, which is what you're doing in a sense.

You're saying, well, we can't stop it.

We might as well get on the train.

In world relations, I'm not so sure getting on the train is a good idea, even if you can't stop it.

So it's just a sense that maybe we're trying to adjust to what we consider an inexorable force.

And I think we ought to consider what happens if we don't go along.

Suppose we sustain a public defeat.

We retain our credibility in Asia that we stood behind our front feet.

Nothing inhibits our military ability to continue our treaty with those who do not want it.

And we certainly have not even impliedly reinforced or contributed to the prestige of a country that so far may show a little disposition to move in the directions we are interested in.