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All right.

I thought it would be well-adjusted .

of about 13,000 signals has effectively shut down the railroad system.

Shutting down of the railroad system, as we all can see by common sense, turns out right.

Very rapidly shuts down other things, such as automobile assemblies, masks, and so on.

So it builds up quickly to a very serious problem for the country.

It's a serious enough problem, just at any time,

is particularly important right now because the economy is without a doubt expanding and expanding pretty nicely, particularly from our standpoint.

And something like this just sets it back.

And I think the estimates are that if the strike goes for, say, two days,

This being the second day, it will have been a bad news to a lot of people, but it won't disrupt things very much.

On the other hand, if it gets into a third day or a fourth day, it will be very disruptive and can set us back badly.

Secretary, the President's proposal, Secretary, put before the Senate yesterday, before the House today, is an extension.

No strike period until July 1st.

There's no change in race.

The union is asking for...

which amounts to 12% per year in the railroad industry.

There's no work rule for anything like that at all.

The amount that is being settled for in the railroad industry this year is just...

while in view of the fact especially of this terrible condition in the industry.

The industry is broke to begin with and these very high wage increases that are going in there.

But the enraging of that and raising more is just outrageous, I think, in a way.

How this will move in the Senate and the House first remains to be seen, I gather, in the Senate.

There is some move to extend the no strike period until October 1st and to put into effect the wage increases that the emergency board had recommended that would carry up to that point.

That is something that we considered as a possibility and as a matter of fact tried to get the union to agree to do on a voluntary basis at the last minute when it was clear that a general settlement couldn't be reached.

From the standpoint of Congress unions, well, if you're going to do it, you're going to do it.

It does have the effect of here is a union that's really out of line, and they go to the Congress and the Congress gives them something.

Now, the last time around, Congress gave a regulation in Greece that didn't put in any work rule changes.

to remember for us.

And I remember Jerry saying some very vigorous words on that house floor.

That's a bad president.

But nevertheless, if that takes place, that won't be...

basically to the bargaining situation.

I say that the important thing is to get people back to work by the end of the day if possible.

And I gather that it's likely to be more in the House than it is in the Senate.

The security has picked up.

Pretty well I see the fact that the President long ago proposed a basic revision in the system for handling these things, and that neither House nor Congress has held definitive hearings on that proposal.

So there has been an unwillingness to deal with basic problems and that's really beginning to get through.

And that is something that, to me, we should bang on and bang on hard and make it as visible as we can and also try to get some action on it because this goes on and on.

Looking at it just a little bit ahead, just within our own cabin here, we have the signal of this union.

We have the United Transportation Union, London Union, which is still

outstanding in this kind of environment.

We have a fireplace, the old old fireplace here, which is just about settled, that can go like that any time.

These other things as well, and it's like, we have a shop there.

All these things are now cooking.

Once they get settled,

They will all be settled until into 1973.

It will be the first year in a long time.

Next year will be when we'll have arrested from these constant rail crises.

At least that's the way we're trying to

set it up so at least there's not much in the picture that there'll be a breathing period which the industry doesn't need to kind of focus in on solving their basic problems instead of always spending their time fooling around with these seem almost like synthetic crises and they'd be laughable if they weren't so serious but that's where we stand Mr. President I think if we can get

This settlement for a time today is over.

Well, it won't be too damaging, but the gas couldn't go further than that, and it would be a real problem in our hands.

Can I ask you a question?

Sure, George.

On the money end of it now, what's our position?

Because we may try to push this through the House real fast.

I would say myself that if you have a choice between a prolonged strike

while there's a lot of things going on and so on.

And putting into effect the emergency board recommendations and an extension of the time so it doesn't go beyond the emergency board recommendations.

You see the railroads have offered those recommendations.

Those are on the table.

The union can pick that up any time they want.

So while it doesn't seem to be all that desirable for the Congress to do it, they won't be breaking the established pattern.

So I would say that's important to do that to have the strength to last forever, although it

If the straight extension can be gotten, we think that's preferable, and it keeps the Congress more out of the bargaining process, which I think is a disdain for the Congress to get into.

Mr. President, in my comment on the situations, George has given most of the details.

The Labor Committee will meet again this morning at 9.

My best guess is that they will report out something along the lines of,

One of the questions that's being discussed now with Crowdy is talking, for example, about offering the administration's bill on transportation legislation as an amendment on the floor.

I have a sponsor, Reverend Hunt, that's a very strong favor.

We've got a problem here as to whether or not we

Whether that would touch off a rather long debate and keep things going through.

Although it would be nice to get them on record and vote us to do that.

Another possibility might be, instead of that, would be to offer some kind of a provision that would instruct the Labor Committee to report this legislation by such and such a date.

I think that might be a possibility.

The only thing I had was supposed to work the other days about five times during the session.

Both Mike Mansfield and Bob Byrne got up to heart on the fact that they had promised all the Democrat members of the Senate who left town and said there would be no roll call votes until Wednesday.

And that whatever we did,

Could I have a roll call vote on this thing with that?

Which means that if there's some questions to vote with, we've got to know who's asking.

We may have something on this roll call.

I personally have gone through this so many times since we were back on Congress today.

I get tired of Congress.

I'd like to hang a sign outside the central door of the Senate, an act of legal relations for it,

Every time we do something, we simply make an extension.

We dabble into something where it's the case, and just simply put, ask it.

Without a roll call, I mean, it's caught, it's caught against anything that tangles with the existing, existing, uh, arrangements.

But, I think it's at this point, we have to do the necessary action to try to investigate it.

Again, again, he said, you must not have a rope caught in the bottom.

We must have a rope.

You promised not to have a rope caught in the bottom.

On the outside, Mr. President, Harley Sagers languished in his trip from West Virginia down to Washington and barely got here by 1.30 in the air box.

And he was in no hurry to do anything.

And he used the alibi that he had affection on the committee to the consideration of the bill that was set up on the basis that they didn't have a printed copy.

And that's a lot of you know what.

And they are obviously dragging their feet.

And Harley Staggers is probably one of the prime

movers in this regard.

I, for one, was critical yesterday.

We tried to get some of our people on the floor of the House to be critical of the failure of their action.

And I think we'll probably have to accept that the committee reports and will probably be as talked about.

But I think we ought to publicize their failure, basically, and their delay in this particular instance.

We might get it up today and pass it.

We've agreed, I think, on the whole vote today because of a Philadelphia election or something.

How are they going to avoid a vote on your rule?

They can't.

And that would have to vote on the rule, so I'll apply that to pass it.

But they didn't officially announce it unless we were told last week on the rules.

Carl told me last night that he was afraid that this photo was the first thing I'd ever visit, that they'd come down and call me, and say, that's what we're going to try to do.

That's what we're going to try to do.

The way the schools committee reports it out this morning, you could get it on, or we could get it on the floor by suspension.

I don't think we can get it there.

We have to watch the floor of the committee before it's their meeting.

It's more likely we finish tomorrow.

Well, we can't do any more about it now, except to say that you were right about the

Incorporating our bill, you shouldn't have that delay.

No challenges being set in practice.

If you could, if you could do a supplemental amendment asking the labor, starting the labor committee to report off the bill, not bad.

Unless that's going to be delayed too.

The important thing is to get this done, get it done as distracted as possible.

And that should make the record with regard to the fact that if we had our overall transportation legislation considered in the past, that we would not have this crisis.

That record must be made, must be made strongly at every opportunity.

to get them over the head with it.

The second part is to get them on the delay on this.

I didn't get them on the delay.

I mean, this business is about being away Tuesday and so forth and so on.

Because, well, they got to Philadelphia.

I mean, they promised senators.

What in the hell is this?

When does it work?

You know, about every Wednesday or Thursday.

It's a really, I don't know.

The whole point is that the Senate sits there

and they go along in their leisurely way, and they don't do a damn thing, except on Wednesdays and Thursdays.

The rest of the time, they gallivant around.

There's a million young guys running for president, they have to.

The point is that I think that, and I know some Republicans like to take their time off too, but it's time to read a book that has to go on this.

Right at the present time, one day delay can mean

Actually, billions of dollars in P&P.

That's just what it means.

Some of the Chrysler plants started closing up yesterday.

Automobile plants are going to go back.

Seagate plants are going to go down.

Jobs are going to be put out.

Aliens and people are going to be put out of work because of this strike.

Now, put it to them.

I think they have to be very, very hard and highly...

I've got no, uh, no question about it.

When you finished the leaders meeting today, I cracked them and got ahead of them, but it cannot be unless very, very strong, strong language is there.

And that's what we, uh, uh, Daryl, uh, irresponsible and failing to build up, to bring up the bill in the second, I mean, the, the, the, the, the, the, the overall bill in the second at the present time.

Delaying a day means a day's work and people out of work.

Or it is the workers in this country and the responsibility is on the hands of the Democratic leadership.

I slap it to them hard.

You can both do that.

I mean, it's a good item, but it has to be.

The responsibility has to be to do with it.

It's all this nonsense about just say this is

Believe me, you're a case of the Senate.

I hit it, you hit that.

And he can't.

I'm not allowed to admit it, but you can.

You're a case of the Senate, this business of voting on Wednesdays and Thursdays and taking the rest of the week off.

And it's time for these people to do the people's business.

The go on to the

Now to the European situation.

I think we will start with Mel Laird on the military side.

Mr. President, just before we do that, could I say one word on the Senate side?

With all due reference to what you said, I think we should have had some...

action on the proposal long before this time was made.

But with the make-up of the Labor Committee, their actions and the possibility of taking action on this bill or anything else to finally settle the strike is going to be very difficult to do.

In regard to the calendar and so on, was the International Quadrilateral Union delegation in Japan there now?

There was an agreement made last week that there would not be a vote.

Well, that's a hell of a note.

Isn't that nice?

Going over to Japan, I know it was over in Scott and a few other places.

But what in the name of God are we going to do?

So we've got our rails tightened because a hell of a dozen guys are over screwing around in Japan and we're not doing anything?

The hell with it.

Get a car.

All right.

No, that's fine.

The shop's over there in the restaurant.

But this kind of agreement, Peter, this is not this kind of...

I know of this, and I know the gentleman in business, but I remember many times when the shoe was on the other foot, our Democratic friends put it right to us, and we've got to put it to them.

And unless you do, you're not going to be able to grow up and be men around here.

But I like to guess there's at least seven in Wisconsin who strike.

What's that?

The point I'm making is this isn't the Senate.

Well, the Senate is responsible for the land.

The point is, if this strike goes on for three days, that's going to cost three or four billion dollars.

We're not playing on the Senate.

If you don't, the idea is, well, the Senate will go on, so we won't go on Wednesday.

They're going to vote on Wednesday.

They're busy Wednesday.

We've been on strike for three years.

Huh?

We know, we know that we have to have people.

People have got to run off.

The smoke doesn't have to be there to consider itself as an emergency.

But if Mike said he's going to have to stand still, there's no controversy.

And of course, I didn't have a full roll call.

And Jack Javis wants to...

bringing a bill with an increase in it, and if the committee goes with it, bring the bill in.

I think we'll be, I'm intruding myself on this, and both Mike and Bob said, we'll vote for that bill to get something in here as long as we don't have to have a roll call.

We promised all these people not to have a roll call.

But I think we can get a voice of both.

It's a roll call, right?

That's right.

It would be interesting for Jim to send it to you.

I don't think he would.

The whole point that I make is this.

We all understand the gentlemanly rules of the game.

And they should apply both ways.

But when there's an emergency involving jobs,

Or, and it's really true, this is, these men are going to be out of work.

They're going to be in the automobile plants, the steel plants.

There are repercussions all over the country.

And you can give it, listen, go back and try to tell the people of the country that you wait four or five or six days.

You might wait that long.

And that's the way it works.

He didn't say that to me yesterday in specific reference to this.

That was simply the implied, if not correct understanding.

I was thirsty when the program was laid out.

I think they always have a reservation there about emergencies, etc.

And there's never any agreement on rules or conference reports.

So I don't think that this thing has rules.

You'll get it done now.

Rules.

Yeah, I think so.

Rules.

That's how you get three hours of the Emergency Employment Act, so they wouldn't have a vote today.

They only asked for two, and that was the understanding when we did a three-question call, but he didn't say there wouldn't be a vote.

He said he just wanted to vote until his local election comes.

I told several of our people, Joe McDade and others yesterday, that they ought to be here.

regardless of their election, because there certainly would be a vote on the rule, and you couldn't foreclose the possibility of a vote on the bill that's under these emergency services.

People need to get the vote as fast as you can and put the responsibility where it belongs.

And this is one of the times when there will be gentlemen, but remember that responsibility, we don't have the control of the leadership.

It's not ours, it's our people's.

Now we will take the military son-in-law person who represents the entire military manpower.

picture is in great turmoil in the United States Senate.

At the present time, there will be two amendments up this week for consideration, along with some 33 amendments to the Selective Service Act, which are, of course, the first one to be voted on is the command field amendment, which comes up on Wednesday, reducing the NATO force structure by one hand.

The timing of this amendment is bad for several reasons, and Alex will touch on those, but I'd just like to briefly touch on this first.

This year, for the first time in 15 years, the NATO allies have moved to set up a special infrastructure account and are making an effort to increase their contribution by a billion dollars over the next five years.

This is a very important step, something that the British people kind of do arrange, but it is a movement in the right direction.

And I believe that an action as severe as this

very, very adverse effects on the entire alliance in the spirit of NATO, which is improving and moving in this direction.

The second point that I'd like to make is that the Defense Planning Committee of NATO meets this next week along with its planning group.

They will be discussing at that time an approach to the Warsaw Pact, increasing to the Soviet Union.

as a response to the NATO initiative.

The Soviets had a response to that initiative in our last NATO Council communique, and it looks like there can be some movement towards the negotiation.

The important thing here is that the entire program of the present, based upon strong partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate,

of maintaining our strength.

Maintaining our partnership and showing willingness to negotiate.

This is the time to show it.

This is an event that really has a very adverse effect on the entire Nixon doctrine as it's applied to Europe.

I think also we should be making a point that the situation in the Middle East today is such that a reduction in area which will affect our six police because 50,000 of personnel

And 300,000 people who are there at the present time are associated with the sixth fleet.

And the entire air power, some 70,000 that are made up of the air power, are also assigned to the Middle East responsibilities.

And this is not the time for us to back away from those responsibilities and reduce our manpower in that area of the world.

I'd like to refer to the next amendment that comes up because this amendment on NATO is rather a .

We have to have the next vote .

I'm sure that if the demand is to be the vote, we can get it knocked out, even if it should pass, it would be knocked out in Congress because the contraries are unanimous against the amendment.

But we want it to be the fourth Senate.

But the problem that we have with the next boat is that of course is the one year extension draft.

We need a two year extension draft.

And you cannot program your force structure any other way than with a two-year extension.

We've already reduced our military manpower and programmed a reduction since this administration has been in office.

And we are moving towards zero draft calls.

But any projection you make requires at least 20 months.

of extension as far as the draft is concerned, and it is absolutely ridiculous for Republicans, it seems to me, to be in a position where they program a draft extension for debate at the time the political conventions are going on in the United States.

And any Republican that gets into that sort of a situation

They have to have that extension debate next week, next year, in the summertime period.

I just don't think it makes any sense at all.

That was a very close vote in the House, and this is one that we had trouble with as far as the conference is concerned, because we only won by two votes in the House of Representatives.

So we can't lose this in the United States Senate, because we're in a weaker position in the conference on this than we are on some of the other amendments.

are the 35 amendments or 33 amendments involved in this bill.

And I'm not gonna talk about each one of them today.

But these two that are up this week are indeed very important.

Our draft calls have been substantially reduced.

In fiscal year 1972, we'll be drafting a little over 100,000.

And as we move towards the zero draft calls, we will require this for the next 20 months.

And there's no other way to look at it.

The Gates Commission projections are just not based.

upon the attitude of young people in the United States today.

All those surveys were made in 1964, and the attitude towards military service is much different than it was in 1964 among our young people today.

And it isn't just a question of pay.

It isn't just a question of housing.

We've got to change this attitude today, and this will take some time.

And it will also take further pacing down as far as the war at the atomic service present.

I could go on for some length,

and probably the same.

And I say something to him, I say, it might be a little bit of a consolation.

It just happens that in any conference that we're looking at, maybe you have some friendly, friendly gentlemen on the House side that will be there for a long, long time, staying for the two-year draft.

And that's the contrary, and I understand.

Mr. President, could I ask a question about, supposing the present draft law expires, what happens and what transpires in a period where there's no basic law?

We could continue to go on with the draft using people that had deferments.

We could use, it would be an unfair system to use

And it would, the only people that would be taken were those that were in the pool at the time and had received a deferment.

And they would be the people of poor agriculture deferments, student deferments, divinity students, other people that are in regular draft pool, but had received deferments.

We could draft until we had 10,000 call in July.

the people that we would call would have to come out of that pool.

Now, the thing about it is it would be an unfair type of call in July.

I don't think that anybody would be blamed but the administration, though, for these people that are called up.

They won't blame the Congress for not extending the draft.

And it would be a very bad kind of a call to have because you'd have all sorts of

unfair situations, and it would really throw off the whole lottery system or selection system, which is working out very well, and we've got it in the right place.

And I think it would be not a good idea, Jerry, but it could be done.

If we went down to the bottom of that, we could probably get 72,000 out of that pool.

But that would be stretching it to...

And that would be after we've given them the medical exams, physical exams, administrative services.

You could probably get around $70,000, but you'd be, it would really be a disastrous kind of call.

Alex, we'd like to go to you now on the foreign policy implications.

I'll say just a few words today, President.

The mill has touched on the high points of it.

Incidentally, Alex, as you know, has lived through this.

He's a top professional in the ports of the South Asia, Vietnam, and this place in the South.

Some people forget that many years ago he was in the Czechoslovakia.

So I'm understanding here at the end of the day.

So go ahead.

President.

Much of this discussion with regard to the presence of our troops in Europe, I think, tends to revolve around our doing a favor to the Europeans by capturing our forces there.

It's true, it contributes to European interests, but I think it's important for us to keep in mind that we fought two wars over Western Europe, and we have had an all-time good two years in NATO based upon the premise that

Western Europe is also important to the United States.

And during this period, we've been trying to build a relationship, a mutuality with them based upon our mutual interest.

We've been trying to deal with the problem of forces in Europe on a mutual basis, encouraging the Europeans to go in directions that we think they should go, urging the Europeans

assault with all the members of the NATO before making changes in their forces.

And if we were now to move unilaterally, this could have a very profound effect on what we've been trying to do in building up this mutuality.

What the effects would be is difficult to say, except that they clearly would be bad.

Our force strength in Europe

is built upon an agreement in NATO upon what we need in the way of conventional forces there, including the U.S. forces.

And a withdrawal of U.S. forces would mean that our conventional capabilities would be lowered by that much.

And to that degree, we would rely further on nuclear weapons and massive retaliation at a time when massive retaliation becomes less and less credible.

And the Europeans would certainly be concerned if we make the unilateral move of this kind

as to whether there would be subsequent moves, and whether or not they could continue to rely upon hard-hung decision-making to try to interrupt the reactor.

The one point that you described very effectively that I...

There is a theory called the trip wire.

which is very strongly advocated by, or the tripwire or the flag, that's whatever they have, all you need is a couple of battalions or hospital corps or what have you over there, or maybe for that matter a division or two, but it's a tripwire, and then once the tripwire goes, that's it.

That theory, interestingly enough, was a completely, could have been a completely credible policy

But the United States up until about 1965, when the United States had a very significant three years period on it.

Because at that point, if there, if you have a treaty, which we do have, and if you have a token American force, which we would have,

And if you have enormous superiority, which you would have, that would mean that if there is any kind of an attack or a threat, which is more likely in case you're a diplomatic maneuver, it would be very credible for the United States to say, look, get out.

Don't cut off the access.

Don't move in here.

Don't do that or the other.

Because if you do, look what we've got.

What has happened in starting, well, that's the human missile crisis.

There has been a dramatic shift in the balance of power in nuclear lines.

Today, it's roughly equal.

We don't need to say we're not inferior.

Maybe we can balance it out anyway.

We have what we need.

They have what they need.

But it's roughly equal.

Where it is roughly equal, the tripwire is not credible for us or for the Soviet Union.

due to the fact that no leader of the Soviet Union and no leader of the United States, for example, let's say Berlin, West Berlin, on the one side, or East Berlin, on the other side, is going to, by an action, risk 70 million of his own people.

And that's why the cold trip where everything goes.

So what we can come back to now, what we can come back to is that now,

In the United States commitment, the commitment which has kept the peace for 25 years, not only in terms of a Soviet thing, but also in terms of keeping the Europeans from getting at each other's throats.

Because remember, deep down, the British and the French still care for the Germans, and so do the Scandinavian countries, and so do the rest.

And so we have a whole group of Germans involved in this, too.

But the point is,

basically parity now being reached.

A conventional force is essential for the U.S. treaty commitment to be credible.

That is why to the Europeans, the conventional force of some significance

and also European conventional forces, grassroots and fattened people are balanced, is what first deterred the Soviet, and also gives assurance to the Europeans, and keeps Europe together, and keeps it from flying off in all directions, and keeps the iniquities rolling, with the Germans, the French, the British, etc., now moving economically in the rest, towards some degree of cooperation.

It's hard for us, for anybody here in this room, even to dream the fact that Western Europe, which caused 10 million deaths in World War I, no, 20 million probably, if you think about it, and perhaps 10 to 15 million in World War II, again be a possible place in conflict.

And maybe the conflict that comes will come in a very different way, but the heart of Europe is still

There is a significant problem.

You talk about NATO, and I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I do.

It's quite relevant.

It's quite relevant that we talked about it with security personnel.

When you go back to when NATO began, those of us who were here in 1947, Norris, you and I were here, and Jerry Ford, Les Harris, and the rest.

Remember, we all had three reasons.

that they were getting.

One, the threat from the east.

We had to do this because the Russians were there with their great protection forces.

Now as a matter of fact, with the immense nuclear superiority the United States had then, hit the United States and said, look, we've got a treaty with Europe, and if you move, we're going to ban you.

It had been quite critical when the Russians were in the move.

They didn't have a nuclear strength.

Nevertheless, we kept it there for a reason.

The second reason, of course, and this was more fun,

is that Europe was economically and militarily on its back.

So the United States had to be there in order to have any kind of continuity that strengthened Europe.

The third reason was a home for the Germans.

Here are the Germans, the ablest people in Europe, the most dynamic, and the most frustrated.

Now, the first two reasons

I think we could all say have changed, or at least we could admit that they've changed.

I'm not sure, because we could argue that Greece, the threat from the east is not as great as it was when it was old.

It's still very significant.

Europe is strong enough economically and militarily, it should be strong enough economically, it should be strong enough therefore militarily to handle its own affairs.

Fundamentally, the hardest thing is to build a German common.

And here, says the German, what's it going to do?

No nuclear weapons.

No capability, therefore, of defending itself.

And the Germans,

If they are left there, not with a home and a strong, united NATO with a credible defense, the Germans then would be quite easy piggies for our friends on the other side, where there's already the enormous draw.

Let me come back to the point that I made, and so Alex can pick it up.

The arguments can all be made about how the situation has changed and has changed.

that the Europeans should do more than they should.

The one thing that we should remember is that as far as the so-called tripwire theory is concerned,

It has no credibility in what happens.

It has no credibility due to the fact that the nuclear balance is now shifted and will never change again.

This nuclear and the major power is lacking an enormous breakthrough.

Now, I don't know if you would agree with this, is ever going to have a great superiority over the other.

That's the real problem.

Yes, Mr. President, it's the maintenance of that credibility that's important in our negotiations on Berlin, for example.

If we reduce our credibility, we have little hope of reviving anything more satisfactory.

And it's important to our negotiations.

It's important to our negotiations.

which is down the road, the European Security Conference, and eventually there will be one.

Eventually.

We don't know when, not in the near future, but we all assume that something will happen.

And it's all part of that.

You all know that the President had a speech last Thursday.

Ambassador Bean went in to see Romito yesterday.

The question was about whether or not the Soviets were serious in wanting to move ahead with the negotiation of force reduction that would involve not just Soviets, but troops on both sides, the whole Eastern Europe.

And Gromyko's answer was permanent.

that they're prepared to do so.

And they're prepared to do so outside, as the President said, outside of the Conference on European Security.

They're prepared to do so bilaterally, bilaterally between NATO and Warsaw, presumably, while we didn't get into

But he confirmed that they were wanting to do so outside of accomplishing European security.

He was a power accomplice on European security.

That's very significant.

And before taking up the whole complex of issues, the whole complex of this particular issue, when that started out, he seen it as, like most of those statements, their ambiguities, of course, and this is what a lot of our view, well.

And so we made a statement last night on this, just simply summarizing the facts.

I haven't seen the New York Times this morning.

The Chal Roberts Post has a summary of this for those of you that are interested.

The next step, of course, we will be talking to our in-the-natal counsel on this for the course of this week.

Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird will be taking this up at the Lisman meeting next month in the early part of June.

So, now of all times, we've got the Soviets moving towards talking about a mutual redemption.

It's an argument, clearly not the time to do anything unilaterally.

Just a couple of quick facts about this question of costs, what the Europeans are doing.

First, the total cost of all our forces that are maintained in Europe, this includes six of them in the Middle East, is about $3 billion a year.

The balance of payments cost is $1.7 billion.

When you include the offset, it comes down to around $500 million.

If you would include European purchases of military hardware here, there's hard discussions whether you should just bring it down to around $500 million.

As far as the budgetary costs are concerned, those costs are not any greater for maintaining these forces in Europe than they would be here in the United States.

In fact, you can make an argument that it might be a little bit less to cost more for the report

It costs much more to keep goods here and have the capability of moving them back to Europe, the airlift and the seat lifts that you need for that, than it does to keep them in Europe.

So it's not a question of budgetary costs involved in this.

Now, the figure of $14 billion, correct me on this, but the figure of $14 billion that's often used is the cost of all our goods in Europe

plus all the forces here in the United States that are earmarked for movement to Europe, in case of hostilities.

Right, and it includes all the base structures.

All the base structures, all your reserve manuals, every troop that would be committed to a NATO concentration, including your Navy and Air Force.

That is a nice structure.

And that expense we would have in any event.

Now, as far as what the Europeans are doing,

In gross terms, Europeans are putting about $24 billion into their defense.

And about 90% of all the manpower in the European theater, or NATO, is European.

Only about 10% of manpower is ours.

Another important point that Mel mentioned is that this figure of $300,000 in these costs

the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

And of course, given the situation in the Middle East at present time, our posture there very heavily depends upon the Sixth Fleet.

As well as the backup that we have in Europe, our whole cluster in Western Europe, and our force there is a part of the general structure that we like to guide when we find an interrupter for war in the Middle East, because that is the reason I was talking to the Senator the other day.

He said, well, we've got these negotiations going on and all this, and we have a team that they are in Miami.

Bill is just having a good trip out there with the Rogers, but he recognizes that he came back, and there's still a lot of problems.

And so we've got a ceasefire.

We have an uneasy truce.

And we are urging both sides, friendly persuasion, to talk down the road sometime.

They will.

Maybe they aren't going to talk about the whole problem.

Maybe they'll fight off a suit edge or something.

I don't know what's happening, but we're very keen.

Nobody can predict when something will happen to somebody, but that's our policy.

No?

absolutely essential to the success of that policy, something that we all forget, maintaining the balance of power in that area.

If the, if for example, and I'm speaking of the balance of power, not in terms of something Israeli versus Israeli,

Israel now, for three years, four years, five years, can put anybody in the whole area, or all, not as easy as they did before, but they can.

On the other hand, the balance of power means, the balance of power of what is better, what is in the wings where Israel is concerned, what is in the wings with regard to the UAR.

Here's what's so different from the U.S. club, and here's what the United States would want, to explain.

And sixthly, maintaining that balance of power, that balance is, of course, actually essential to maintaining these uneasy troops.

Let's put it another way.

In the event, it's down to the sole business of credibility in terms of U.S. power.

In the event that we had a

very significant weakening of the six-league squadron.

We would not have been able to have done what we did in the Jordanians or anything, which avoided, frankly, possibly avoided a war, because if we hadn't been able to move the fleet in, and of course we was really there to go up heights, but here came the Syrians moving down on the Jordanians, with the Soviet Union sort of running back, waiting six-league moves.

So something happened.

Now, for the United States to play that kind of a diplomatic game with its strength, in other words, what Mellis called our peace forces, basically the six-league, never was a better example of a peace force than the six-league majority.

For us to play it, we've got to have it.

But looking to the continuation of this unobtrusive amaze is absolutely essential of the balance being maintained in two directions.

One, that the Israelis have a balance so that they never feel, or do not feel, that their enemies have more than they have and will be able to deliver a load of land into the portals.

That's on the one side.

But second, that the United States has a significant balance there.

And what we maintain is that it continues to do better.

That's a very good statement.

That's the way we look at it.

And we can implement that, too.

And so we did it.

And there are many practices we went through.

Presidents considerably moved to another chair here at the time.

It was very important.

And the amazing structure there.

We increased it as a matter of fact by .

Mr. President, what's the significance of the statement?

That seems incredible to me.

As I see it, he made it at the timing that he made it.

It was really a follow-up of his March 30th statement before the Party Congress.

He merely enlarged on that statement in George's speech because that statement that he made on March 30th was really the first indication of a response to the NATO Council statement of last December.

We've been, for three years, we have been pushing, we, ourselves, the United States, and the NATO, have been trying to, pushing on the discussions of what we call NPMR, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions.

And this March 30th speech of the president was the first breakthrough in the United States we had.

And this Georgia speech last Thursday was, as Mel says, it was an enlargement on that.

Now, why?

and don't ask me why so many stupid things.

I understand that there are some who,

and then he'd give us a little credit for that speech.

We could take shots open.

All right, well, I think it may be helpful now, but we have to be careful about what it means, too, because it could be an effort to stampede us into this thing, and I think we want to be very careful about how we interpret it.

It may help us candidate up in the Congress, so we can look at it squarely on that basis.

I mean, first of all, the idea, I noticed something, where I think Mike's isn't, if you pull that just to the right side.

We've got to go to some place, but I'm afraid we haven't happened at the moment.

But what I think is, what I think, I think Mel is, as usual, somebody to see.

what's going on.

To me, the service is probably good, sick, or something.

It isn't just, I don't think the freshman speech was really directed toward what's going on in the stand.

They actually follow this and so forth.

It's like, you know, despite the suicide agent's overriding suggestion, it was really the Congress that brought all this about.

He didn't read what he had to say, but just the whole Congress

But nevertheless, but it's also quite likely.

You see, the direction of that speech moved in this direction with the NATO meeting coming up in a couple of weeks.

It could well have been sort of directed toward that, but it was directed toward anything.

The idea being that, that we, that,

We get the impression that, well, if they're going to go down, why don't we?

Now, the whole point about the Russians, let me just digress for a moment.

I know many people, almost half the Senate, 45% of the House, 40% of the House,

that if only we would unilaterally either not go forward with the ADM or put it on ice or in extros, the case might be, then that would be a gesture that they, and the Soviets, would not go forward with their, well, the, their intercontinental ballistic missiles and so forth.

There is yet to be

Yet to be, in all of our record for the Soviet, any instance where any action on the part of the United States, which has been in the line of reducing or failing to go forward with the system, has been followed by reciprocal action on their part, reducing a buildup that they were in.

the reaction has been the opposite.

So as far as what, like for example, as far as Soviet's concerned, you know they've had a very significant build up in their ICBMs.

On the other hand, the fact that the, at the very time of the SALT talks, the fact that there's any kind of discussion at all, that is only because we have a kiss there.

Basically,

if we would like to reduce their off, stop their offensive buildup, because we're not building any offensive weapons.

And they would like to stop our defensive buildup.

So, that's the way it works.

Now, here with this one, I think that really, I do not, I mean, putting it all in this disparate context, I think we could say, and I think Alex should agree, I think we could say that the Soviet, at this time,

very well may want.

Previous years, they may have used, well, let's reduce our forces and so forth for the purpose simply of disintegrating here at the alliance.

But in the present time, they may well want to reduce the burden that they have with their danger to the west because if they look, if they see from the east,

It may be that there are other reasons that they want to.

They may also have not budget problems as we see them, but they do have a problem with regard to their flat economy over the last four to five years.

But whatever the reason may be, all based on the track record, there has never been an instance where the Soviet actually asked to either reduce

his fourth levels, or reduce the weapons system, or not go forward with the weapons system, lacking a direct reciprocal deal, that's where you're gonna get challenges.

And so, in our case here, I think we should take the Brezhnev speech on face value.

I think there may be, we don't know what Henry has done, but he has come out and his speech to the part of Congress, if we can use the term, at least was,

While it was not conciliatory if you read what it was really saying in terms of some of the demands and so forth, it was one that was the least inflammatory by far of any speech ever made by a Soviet leader.

including the Khrushchev's Peaceful Competition.

Now, what does that mean?

What it may mean to us, and only time will tell, is that the Soviet, for reasons that have nothing to do with their believing that we, in good faith, want to do this or that, or that the Europeans no longer threaten to do this or that, they aren't worried about that.

They don't think that we do.

Maybe that the Soviet

because of their internal problems on their economy, because of the problems they have in Eastern Europe, which are quite significant.

We don't know how much, if you remember the German riots and so forth and so on over a period of time.

And because of their problems in the East, easily the Chinese, they may look at their situation in the West and say, this is a time when we can, on a reciprocal basis, perhaps reduce the level of danger.

reduce the level of forces, reduce the cost to us.

Yet, for their reasons, they want to do that, and we want to for our reasons, then we're in a very, it seems to me, strategic position at this point.

But we must not assume, I mean, the greatest danger would be to assume that

The way to get them to reciprocate would be for us to prove our good faith by going first.

The moment we do that, then forget it.

We have no basis for negotiation.

In addition to the masculine, there are about three or four substitutes floating around, which may be as harmful as the masculine.

I'm not a talisman these days, but I read about it in some papers.

And I'm worried we're going to be a moment of God.

I understand.

I assume we're opposed to any substitutes.

Is that right, Bill?

Yeah.

One says they don't cut $300 million more.

We reduce it by $75,000.

There are three or four, Archibald.

Probably the one that's making it most difficult is the new divide.

And then yesterday, which is co-sponsored by the janitors, Humphrey and Steele.

It says that the Congress renews its support for the North Atlantic Line to be a part of the policy of the United States with full partnership in the sense of Europe.

And then the President...

framework to achieve digital and balanced force reduction in Central Europe and the U.S. force outside forces.

The President requested in addition to regular consultations to negotiate with NATO on the reduction of U.S. force levels and financial arrangements, which remain in Europe consistent with the balanced pain situation in the United States.

And then there's a report to the Congress on September 29, 1971, every six months, reacting on the progress of such a movement.

That, of course, is...

Well, I understand, I understand it's temporary, but let's say that the, I mean, many of you fellow students will express concern.

Let's just see where we are and where we've been and where we are.

And let's prepare this administration as previously.

This is not something that's partisan.

In fact, the situation has changed.

We've changed.

We helped change.

Basically, at the present time, we are consulting.

We have been, as a matter of fact, long before the Congress even knew NATO was there.

They knew exactly what the NATO conference was.

We've been consulting and consulting, as Mel will tell you, and he and Roger,

Then, going back over the past two years, talking about NATO's responsibility to do more, you may remember that in the campaign and the speeches since then, I have indicated that now that the Europeans have the money and the Japanese others throughout the world, that the United States cannot and should not contend to carry the

not only the burden of the man, but the money and the forces and so forth and so on, the so-called next stock.

Now, let's look around the world.

Our forces are down in Japan.

They were reduced in Korea.

We turned Otamato back, and we reduced it in the Philippines, and we reduced it in Thailand.

Let's leave out the situation regarding Vietnam.

That's the second problem.

These are all in the Asian areas, essentially, as far as Europe is concerned.

What we are doing there is we have already prevailed upon the Europeans to take a far greater responsibility in terms of their own defense, upgrading their forces and so forth, which is very important in terms of getting a good bargaining position for the usual balanced force retention.

Now, let's look at Soviet things.

I guess it's rather interesting to me that the Senate has finally discovered that for the past two years, ever since we've been in, we've been talking to facilities and offices.

We've been talking to the State Department channels, through other channels and so forth.

We are ready.

The Europeans certainly are going to be there.

You can be sure that every possible effort is going to be made, why?

in conjunction with our NATO allies to get them to some more of a burden for their own defense.

And second, every possible effort, having done that with our NATO allies, is being made to, from that position of strength, to develop the modalities of

a possible negotiation with the Soviets.

And it will come.

I'm convinced it's going to come.

The question is, is it in the national interest?

to have on our part, on the part of our government, where we are willing to work with many of the secrets.

We won't cut any of the secrets.

We don't have a NATO conference at all, which leaves out very little of the secrets.

We talk with the Russians.

But on the other hand, is it really in our interest to come back every six months and send a report to the United States?

The Soviet says nothing.

You report about how I failed to do this to tell you what we've done.

Is that really in our interest?

In other words, the real question, do you want it done, or do you want to have it tossed about?

Henry, you want to say something?

Actually, the side amendment asked us to do that.

And independently, it's not going to be about to negotiate with the Europeans to reduce our forces and then to report every six months about it.

Anyone who has worked with the Europeans knows that the most important way we can get them to do more and maintain our relationship is to give them some sense of stability.

If they are told that it is the public of the United States to reduce its forces of negotiation and violence and to report back to the Congress every six months on unilateral reduction, which is the second part of this,

Any possibility for a stable natal public is down the drain and therefore the difference between that and Mansfield is really only the difference in numbers.

It's that they don't give a number if they give them a diet one.

And the additional disadvantage is that there's constant turmoil because we are under the gun every six months to report about unilateral reductions.

What we have been trying to do in this administration is to get away with talking to the Europeans.

When you were over there, you said, we don't want these forces there just for political and symbolic reasons.

We want them to make sense.

We've got them to address the question of what makes sense, and we've got them to put more money into it.

If now we have a charter, not what makes sense, but how can we reduce unilaterally,

I think that all policy in Australia should be in severe jeopardy.

That is a part of a dignified resolution that's going to give us even more trouble than the one of reporting every six months about the negotiations with the Russians, which is also reported out and on.

Well, the point that I just want to make is this.

I know it's not your fault.

This administration is the first one, the first one since they were set up.

The first one, since the United States began to assume these major commitments, that is, reducing American presence and negotiating on a negotiated basis around the world.

Now, let's take Korea, for now, if I can use that example.

Give it a chance.

or the Congress had passed a resolution saying the United States should do what we have done.

You know, we've taken out about a third of our forces.

It would have probably brought down the Korean government.

We had it all the time, and it was.

But we negotiated it.

We worked it out.

We brought it down, and we have a plan.

We're going to go down more, right, now?

Take the Philippines, same thing.

The Philippines, you think they'll do it?

That place, we always thought was great.

That's a little bit of a hotbed, too.

Thailand, all the rest.

The policy of this administration is on a negotiated basis to get others to do more, to assume more of the burden financially, and in manpower particularly, for their own defense.

We are carrying out that policy as fast as we can.

We're negotiating all over the world on it.

We're negotiating with NATO toward that objective.

But behold, the negotiation with NATO is the most difficult one because it involves an interplay

of the Germans, not the French, of course, the Germans, the British, the Nordic countries, and so forth.

And it also involved, of course, our direct relations with the Soviets, which, of course, Korea did not tie into.

I think that the real battle here

I think we could get to a vote on the Mansfield Amendment.

I think these things are moving now so that we could win it.

A lot of these Democrats who would be with us if we could get to a vote on the Mansfield Amendment are obviously going to do everything they can to try to adopt a substitute prior to that.

No, I think we ought to get very in view of what you said, Mel, and what would happen in Congress.

For example, is that the court requirement?

And I'll vote against Matthias, Mel, I don't know, to make that clear, but I'm just trying to phrase where we come out.

I think the present time that would be interpreted as the future of the Mansfield Amendment, to have Matthias as a substitute adopted with the kind of back against God and what Humphrey and Musset said, we want to put ourselves in a position

Do you want to put yourself in a position, Mr. President, within the Senate, that the jobs and the lives substitute of having to be interpreted as a defeat for the administration?

Seems to me that it could be a victory for the administration, and then in Congress take it out.

I'll take out the reporting for you.

No, it would because it were acceptable to the interpretation.

I think we have to put on it in terms of the,

the Matthias Amendment, apart from a defeat or victory from the administration, would raise havoc in our relations with the Europeans and would be, in my opinion, would be furiously detrimental to our long-range objective of getting mutual force reduction from the Russians.

Now, that's what the Senate wants later through the Matthias Amendment, but it's cold turkey.

As far as we're concerned, we have to be against it.

I can understand individual senators reaching different conclusions, but we can't bop.

We can talk about this, sir.

If you get down to the tactics of what is a defeat and what is a victory for these administrations, I agree.

Well, we've got Mathias and that is Mansfield.

If you look at Mathias, what it does in terms of our overall bargaining position,

Our bargaining position within NATO, our bargaining position used to be the Soviet.

And however we interpret it here in the day-to-day battle of the conference and all the rest, the Mathias and I would have a very different battle effect in our relations within NATO and also looking down the road in the bigger game, the bigger game further down the road of dealing with the Soviet.

Mr. President, is there anything in Egypt that we should know about what we're doing in favor of this internal situation in Egypt likely to put another accident in place?

It's a little early to say.

He's strengthening his position, and it appears that he's going to get away with strengthening his position.

And to the degree that he can, I think that's helpful in these situations.

But they'll have to wait a few more days to see whether or not he's able to pull it off.

He seems to be pulling it off.

And that is all for us.

We would never say publicly, but that itself for us is, as Alex has suggested, is, when I say for us, or what we think are our interests, is a plus, because Sadat has removed people that are pretty much, as we say, the more activist.

The more activist, those that are more identified.

So consequently, that would allow him to move.

It would hold in a way that is more, you know, with our interests.

Now having said that, we've got to remember that taking out Soviet influence out of the old situation, you still have Sadat.

versus the Israelis, that's another problem.

But I wouldn't want to leave the impression that as a result of this move, that now we're going to find Saddam moving much further than he's already moved, and his attitude towards Israel is because of him.

He was probably subjected to coups.

Sadat there.

Sadat has already moved quite away from Nasser's extremes.

He'll accept Israel, he'll do this and that, you know, and so forth.

He'll allow them to go to peace.

Once an Egyptian leader in the way of Nasser

And also with the very substantial Soviet influence around him, a leader can only go so far without eventually getting his own neck cut.

It's a very good question of how skilled he is, so that's why you're next to him.

It's a good move.

If he can handle it well, let's go with it.

But I guess it's one that we should assume is going to change it and go back over time.

That's perfect.

Can I ask Alex one question?

To do with your statement a little while ago, the argument constantly used with the bounty payment had so much to do with the withdrawal of the troops over there.

Is it very accurate to say that the figure of $900 million that you mentioned was being summed up in the ballpark?

As far as the troops are concerned, yes.

As far as the troops are concerned, I mean, there was a $2 billion, $2 billion, $4 billion, down to a $2 billion, which would be summed up in the ballpark.

It's in that ballpark.

Let me say that before we go on, I think we should go on out of Pete Peterson to get out of the balance of things and all the other things.

I couldn't be, Bob, to you and Peter and all the senators here in the Congress, more sympathetic to the problems you've got.

I know what the people want.

They want to get people the hell out of Europe, and they'd like to get them out of the world generally.

But as far as the people of the country are concerned, there's a strong feeling in that direction, and it's awfully hard to buck that kind of a tie

The point that I make is, that's what we're up to.

But we have to do it.

We have to do it in a way that serves our interests.

What do we really want?

Let me put it another way.

You know what we really want in Europe?

The world speaks, right?

That's what NATO is all about, why we set it up.

We didn't set it up to want to fight Russia.

We set it up because we wanted to stable Europe and not to have that place that's caused two horrible wars.

In 50 years we'll have another one, right?

In 22 years, we'll have another one.

That's right.

Every 25 years, wham, Europe is in between and we're in, too.

Now, what do we want?

Peace.

Now, the purpose.

Let's look at basically the purpose of the Mansfield Act.

and anyone who slices the way, the real purpose of Mathias' methods.

It's a very laudable one, and I agree with you.

Insofar as it goes, and it is true that as we Americans have been carrying the big burdens of balance of payments and so forth, let's cut our costs.

All right, now we've already heard arguments for the effect, well maybe they aren't going to cut much costs, because as Mel points out in his sentence,

All right, let's accept that, though.

Let's say, I mean, because most people say, oh, I don't believe that.

You get home three times a day.

It's not a kind of invention anyway.

There's a lot of American boys home rather than out there.

You know, people like that.

So here, the fellow says, well, gee whiz, I'm going to be on record as for cutting American men abroad and cutting the cost of the American burden abroad.

And that's a very popular cause.

That's one side of it.

The other side of it is, assuming we serve the goal of reducing American menopause, and the demand for the draft, and the cost of dollars, which is the biggest one at the moment in our mind, what does it do to our greater goal of peace?

And the answer is that it does nothing to hurt us.

Nothing to hurt us, for this reason.

At the present time, in these delicate situations, we are in the Soviet and Eastern Europe.

But to realize that a reduction of American forces will result in no increase in European forces,

They can go to that consultation and all the rest they want.

But we have our political situation.

You should talk to European leaders about theirs.

All of you who are NATO parliamentarians have been over there, you know.

So to me, the reduction of American forces, the reduction certainly of European forces, the possible disintegration of NATO, certainly a great exacerbation of the German problem.

And that can only

tend to create enormous instability in Europe.

That, of course, increases the risk of war.

But beyond that, looking at the Soviet problem, any one of these emissions can only be detrimental because, and will only result in increasing the danger of, the risks of these, due to the fact that as NATO moves to

Through our initiative, we will set it off.

As NATO becomes vicious, without reciprocal action on their part, the dangers of European district integration are moving toward Europe, or even eventually a situation that could lead to conflicts enormously increasing.

So on the one side you've got to balance our desire, which is very understandable, reduce American costs, bring Americans home, against our desire to maintain the stability which has kept peace for 25 years in this area, which can keep it for another 25 years, and which at this time may lead to a negotiation that could have a historic impact.

Now, it's my own judgment.

Otherwise, I'd be out flat-footed.

It'd be nice if he went for him, you know, say the Senate, he would vote for all this, and that's what we're for.

But I really convince you that the passage of Mansfield, without question, and Mathias, because regardless of how he made it here, it would be interpreted in Moscow, and it would be interpreted in Bonn as being devastating.

That's the real question.

ideal that we've got to, we've got to be supposed to.

So we're not going simply because we want to win a tactical victory.

I don't care.

Hell, I'd have to be for something minus four.

I mean, he's a decent guy and all the rest of it.

The point is that we have got the thing where we sit here, where I sit.

I've got the thing, not just for the cross, but I've got the thing, the long-range effect on peace in Europe and our relations with the Soviets.

And I can tell you this will be enormously detrimental.

Mr. President, I'm not suggesting that you should

But I do think that being realistic and practical, and I don't want to make Norris think you want to get into this too, and Peter and others, I think it's a practical matter if the forces behind Manning's people see that they're going to lose, they'll drive back, they're going to get behind this one.

The real question, I think, if what Mel says is right, and I agree with him, in confidence, you're not going to have anything.

That's it.

Like a law amendment, what's the darn fire that it just became a ridiculous?

I'm only suggesting that you do not set up a confrontation with respect to the bias amendment that has been put on the same basis as Nancy's.

This morning, before I came here, I was on a CBS program that's written here as a debate.

They asked me about Matthias.

And I said, well, the words keep changing from day to day.

I don't know what we're going to end up holding on to with respect to Matthias.

Now, I think right now, it would be interpreted as impressed as defeat of the man's field of men's.

Let's leave it at that.

It's something else, you know, with our own PR to do that.

Maybe I'm wrong.

Clark, do you want to say any more before we go on?

Peterson's going to get him on.

Yes, just 30 seconds, Mr. President, if I might.

I think much of this conversation demonstrates the validity and the absolute necessity of a proposal as comprehensive as Mathias is being referred to the appropriate committees of the Senate and House.

And they're very, very carefully considered.

It doesn't seem to me, with all due respect to the distinguished 100 in the United States Senate, that a proposal of this complexity, the language of which is, as you pointed out, Bob, is changing all the time.

And we'll look upon it in one hour tomorrow morning with any due regard to the long-range prospects of peace for the United States.

And I would just think that something like this has just got to be considered at length in the committee if that hasn't been done.

I would think that would be a forcible argument.

among thoughtful legislators, an application to the, an application, well, that's what we say, Bob, with application to Matthias and any other substitute proposal.

Thank you, Mr. Underlaw.

I would agree with Bob that something should have passed, Mr. President, and I would like to explore it.

That's why I put in my new substitute.

That's a congressman.

so that it wouldn't be binding on the administration.

I gather that the bias is not a sense of coexistence in actual violence.

We ought to do some directive then.

It's a directive or something.

It's a directive as far as the reporting is concerned, as far as the administration is concerned.

It also sets the course of action in the administration.

I'm sure we're going to report against the bias, and that would be one of the points I'm making here.

Something's going to happen.

And somehow or other, it strikes me that what we ought to do is try to get it watered down to a spot where we can use it as an upset of the masculine amendment, which expresses the sentiment that we shouldn't find it, and so I can find it.

The budget is the same as the public's.

I could go along with a pure sense of the Congress.

If the clients told me that we could reduce the fee to the crop, I couldn't possibly vote for the clients.

because despite what Dr. Gisbert says about mother in the Pexington, I couldn't vote for it with the last paragraph.

One, because I don't like Congress' direction of the president to report to him on the 76 months as a specter of the presidential dignity here.

But more important,

I think it's a ridiculous and dangerous precedent to ask the administration to report publicly to Congress on anything that involves negotiations with other countries in the general situation as well.

So, with that last reason, I couldn't vote for it, but I do agree that

that we'll get a lot of different people that will think it's a responsibility for life.

But on the other hand, we don't want to get past it.

It's rather a bad thing.

I'm not concerned about the result of my experience.

I don't think that's...

I don't see how you can... Well, let me say this.

I have got a lot to say to the executive chief and everything.

Would not be detrimental.

I agree.

Mr. President, it's going to be in the direction of time with all of these amendments.

There are 33 that they're pretty tough amendments.

When you get to the Southeast Asian amendments, they're awfully tough.

The strategy amendments, it's going to be a tough one.

It's going to be pretty important to keep people's feet to the fire for a while.

We can lose the ball game so many different ways here in the next 10 days or so.

Humphrey's got one that all the troops drafted under this extension will be sent to Vietnam.

Yeah, well, that's one of the 32 we've got.

I think there'll probably be 32 called out.

There are more men than that introduced, but it looks like they're probably the 32 that we've programmed.

They're all coming to us.

Mm-hmm.

And the Selected Service Act, if we have to go through the Selected Service Act next year again, I just think we're making an awful lot of bad political mistakes.

So I want you to trust my political judgment you've had up there in the House.

And Peter, I think it's a mistake, and I hope you'll help us get it going and go through that fight again next year.

I know there we are, but I don't want you to be there for too many months because the crowd that you had for too many months is a very unfair draft situation.

But we'll have to go on with that.

I know you want to get this picture, this financial picture in Peterson.

And I'm going to go right ahead of you, excuse me, I'm going to go over and talk to 150 state legislatures that are here, including the ones that are here, but it's a secure state.

People are here, I'm going to support revenue sharing.

This will give you a picture of this problem.

Peter Peterson has a marvelous ability to make complicated things sound even more complicated.

But he makes you think you understand.

And so that way he has a breathing which

We're going to work out a briefing on going far beyond this, which she has presented to this council and a few of us, which we're going to present to the Congress on a bipartisan basis on smaller groups.

And on that one, I think perhaps the most, it could probably turn out to be the most important single briefing

so far as he has analyzed, in his decision to be an owner, the international economic policy, his analyze, looking down in the next 10 to 15 years, what position the United States will be, what are we going to make out of these, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera?

What is our trade position is to be the Japanese, the Europeans, let alone the Soviet Union, and so forth and so on.

It's a subject all of you would be concerned about.

This is the first major study that's been made.

It's a fascinating one.

We won't be ready for two or three weeks on it, but we will.

You go ahead.

Thank you.

Mr. President, gentlemen, inflecting something is

complicated and deadly as balance of payments in this hour of the morning is a terrible thing to do.

But I've got some help here and I hope we make it as painless as possible.

I think the way that it's been helpful to me to look at balance of payments is on both a long-term and short-term basis.

And the problems are very different depending on which way you look at them.

Looking long-term, we have something called the current account balance, which includes these items here.

And you'll notice, in general, we have a positive balance, though it's obviously considerably less than it was five years ago.

Now, the great risk is, as the President just indicated, and I am complicating a complicated matter even further.

Let me take you through that $2 billion number, because I think until you understand the elements, it's going to be hard to understand what's going underneath those averages.

See, this is worldwide now.

This is the U.S. balance of payments there.

U.S.

Now, you remember the total number was about $2 billion plus.

Let's see what makes that up, because there's some very different trends here.

Let's start at the bottom.

We've got a negative number of $3.4 billion in the military.

The discussion you heard this morning, I think, has been ample to cover that, which suggests that somewhere between a half billion and a billion is a matter of fact, due to the European situation, depending on how you want to count it.

There's about $2 billion in the Far East.

And that's what I was going to say, you're off at the first one.

Hang on a minute, huh?

And these are his three favorite presents, so to speak, in any and all of them.

I watched him right now.

I can't believe it.

He was right where he was on a hunting trip, and he was probably going to be inaugurated as president.

I don't see it.

Yeah, he's around here.

Over in one of those chairs.

Yeah, there's another one.

Over in one of those chairs where he sat on the end of the extension.

Two years ago.

And this is Pam Perlmutter.

I don't know how much of it is on the stage that he made, but he writes.

What does he do on television?

He didn't write it all himself.

When he takes a draft and rewrites it, sometimes he starts to scratch himself.

But most of the time, I'll have his draft covered, because he forewarned us with the questions we were going to ask.

So he sits there with a blank sheet of presentation.

He had everything in the right before.

Just any questions.

And then he doesn't want to sit in a room by himself.

He doesn't want to just listen to himself.

After that, you can pick up the average when two or a person can concentrate maybe seven or eight minutes.

Now, she's got 20, 23 minutes to just breathe.

Well, it's great.

I'm sorry I can't show you over here.

She's like, get out of the way, sir.

It's all the same.