Conversation 062-002

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And then I'd like to ask Al and Bill to comment on their views.

Bill, have you just come back?

The purpose for me to do the analysis...

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I'm not sure that it exactly represents the views of foreign ministers.

For example, I'm not sure that...

I detected any unwillingness on the part of the West Germans to have mother-in-law negotiations.

We thought that that was going to be their position before we got there, but I didn't detect that.

In fact, I detected a willingness on their part to sort of state a willingness to...

They had negotiations as long as it wasn't in the framework of the European Security Conference.

In the case of France, Schumann really didn't say much in the NATO meeting himself, because they don't talk about this item, because they've never been involved in a military part of the alliance.

I think he probably did express those views.

and that we would be expected at this time to reduce our forces.

Now, that's a little gratuitous for them, and it annoys the others, because it doesn't take part.

By and large, it was intended to be anything that was in opposition to us.

I think they were trying to be helpful, and they introduced it.

How did you like the decision?

Well, it's comments about how others should do more.

So they were hoping that you'd like that comment.

Everything wasn't much division among the members of NATO this time.

I expected there would be, but I think this was one of the most successful meetings in terms of general climate.

I think even the Canadians were quite conscious of our views, and they made the suggestion that we have a representative appointed right away, and our delegation to the position was too soon.

We would prefer to have it flexible, but probably after the ministerial meeting.

And so we left everything flexible.

We haven't fixed the days of the deputy foreign minister's meeting.

We've said that the ministers, the meeting foreign ministers, could agree on a representative or representatives to deal with the fact that...

when appropriate, so that we could do it before and after.

Actually, what we had in mind was to be accurate.

So what we've done, I think, in the community, was have a very positive reaction, but we've got enough flexibility so we can delay it as long as we want.

What about the Canadian thing?

I'm trying to see, but it says I mean, yeah, when it's appropriate, so we can do it.

So I think that we have a positive

So we can delay it that long and longer for one.

So he said that he doesn't get to delay it for even the first two years.

He's going to be in trouble anyway.

Right.

So he's quite satisfied with the outcome, I think he really is.

I ask this question.

And I realize this is a lot of work.

Yes.

I mean, he was studying this.

What is the effect?

You know what?

What is the effect of reduction of Americans and other forces in NATO?

NATO is a confidence in NATO countries.

Yes.

What is the effect of reduction of horses on the e-journals, the polls, the checks, and for that matter on hearings?

Of course, I realize we're talking about rather small numbers, 10%, 20%, and so forth, and how it's going to happen, but I'm thinking of just...

To the west, those divisions that they have in there, they're rather effective at maintaining the power of those states over what in each case must be at times, rather, shall we say, the...

Pact is certainly lodged.

There's a very real question about the reliability of those, of the other Slovak and Polish divisions, particularly in the context of war with NATO.

But I would surmise that they'd be glad to see their own forces drawn down, and along with that they could get some Soviet forces to get out.

The only possible place where there might be some small question about that is in East Germany.

Where I think even to this day, the East Germans are concerned about how much the Soviet forces can be drawn down, and therefore how much control they're going to have over that country in the future.

In the light of that, we, the East German countries, yes.

I mean, the 20 divisions is still a whale of a force.

The East Germans, 20 years after the war, they seem to demonstrate Soviet concerns as well as the East Germans.

It's administration's concern.

You don't have to use hockey as the message.

It's the other side that's taking East Germany to what extent.

Are those 20 divisions making enormous strength in the East German economy?

They are.

That's why the show that they were doing for a long time has always been such a threat to the East German government.

But I don't think that unifying the Czechoslovaks and the Poles with the Bulgarians binding in bed, they encourage the sexism and the rape and the sex, I think.

It's an amusing sight, like I had a talk yesterday with Bluthorn, and I had a golf lesson, and also a pair of pictures they made, because the picture wires, you know, in Ukraine, Russian soldiers.

And he said, go, how are we running about?

He said, we're talking to the Russian general.

And he said, well, he's just the only place I've ever seen any Russians, so if you're not in Czechoslovakia, let us make the picture of Czechoslovakia, the military in Hawaii.

And he said, well, he's just the only place I've ever seen any Russians,

Mr. President, we have had several meetings of the verification panel.

There may be issues that will have to be resolved, but I know that there is a very important meeting.

The purpose of this meeting is really primarily information for the members of the National Security Council who have not participated in these deliberations and who would have the decisions that may have to be made.

The following issues will have to be addressed over the following weeks of month.

The size of the deductions will be made.

The official deductions of the effective nationality of the forces will be reduced.

The fighting forces will be reduced, that is, whether nuclear and conventional combat, combat support aircraft and ground forces and so forth.

Finally, the verification requirements.

Let me turn first to the size of the NBFR deduktions and issues that they present, regardless of the area which is covered.

There are a number of schemes, when you don't have to get them.

One is a brief of orders at their present level.

This could be, for example, the first phase of any agreement.

then there could be a reduction of forces to account and see them.

There could be a mutual reduction of a small percentage and a larger mutual reduction of a larger percentage.

In order for us to be able to get a handle on the implications of this, we studied two cases, a 10% symmetrical reduction and a 3% symmetrical reduction.

For the last 12 cases, there was a

The situation on the day is what we call NATO M plus M plus 7 and PAK M plus 21.

That day was based on the assumption that it would take us seven days to realize that the main threat of Soviet mobilization was going on.

For that, we would lag in, Mexico would lag about 7 days behind the pack in the production rate.

And finally, NATO M plus 30, in fact, M plus 30.

By M plus 60, the effects of any reduction are erased, because then both sides will be reinforced with a withdrawn division.

Now, this stage shows that there are, on every day, this situation is actually improved by the usual voice reduction.

That is, the balance of voices actually becomes more variable.

And while that is not significant, if there is a determination to mobilize, that does not reduce the ability of the force of attack to attack from a standing side, say out in the blue area, and increases the possibility of...

As far as the other Kazakhs are concerned, no MPI bar improves the military situation for NATO in case of mobilization.

After that, they tend to stand tight on both sides.

Ah, at M plus 21, NATO is about 4 to 6 percent worse off than at present, depending on what indicators are used.

After a reduction of 30% in M plus 21, NATO is between 10 and 16% worse off.

In fairness, one has to point out what exactly 4 to 6% means, and 10 to 16% means is somewhat unfortunate, and it could be significant only if there is a difference between a successful defense

If we have a 4-6% margin for effective defense in our present deployment, then a 10% cut wouldn't make any difference.

If our press deployment is below effective capability for defense, then 94-6% wouldn't make any difference.

The same argument would apply to the 10-17%.

So before one can be sure what these figures mean, one would have to analyze two things.

First, exactly how far can I just deploy to 6%?

Secondly, over 10-17%, depending on what the issue is.

And secondly, what the effective situation is today, whether it affects the defensive capability of NATO, would be induced by...

By the situation we are on, and plus 21, the fighting takes ability to reduce by whatever percentage we are talking about.

Because if we have been on the necessary level, it doesn't make any difference if we can't set.

And this is an issue which we are now looking at as a very significant problem.

Contrary to the original investment,

Atometrical reductions in which the factory produces potentially more than a hill doesn't change the outcome very greatly because the factory efficiency is so much greater than that of a knife at the back, that's 21.

Even if they cut by a larger percentage than we do, which is highly probable from the point of view of negotiability, it will not change the situation at M plus 21 significantly.

And therefore the conclusion of our panel is that we shouldn't compromise the government by asking for that type of vast electrical cut, which will now change the situation of a significant mobilization rate.

Ja, det er det kalleste konklusionen.

is that the range of cuts could be somewhere between 10% and 30%.

It shouldn't be less than 10% for verification reasons, which are the expense management.

And once you get the loss beyond 30%, you get an area of resources where these imbalanced resources become very telling for the act.

We have had the opportunity, the objective, the task, which I have presented to you.

We will be in a better position to recommend to you later on.

For the time we should be here, we have been covered.

If you actually have a chance to listen to those, the voices that exist in various conceivable areas, one would be, he said that to be the only one.

Det er større størrelse.

That includes the two Germanists, Benidorms, Holbein and Srebrenica.

In this area, they are not bound to military manpower, and also they are not bound to military exhibition of force.

In this area, they are not bound to military exhibition of force.

And the mobilization and reinforcement disadvantage of the NATO would be somewhat less.

It is possible, finally, to include only East and West Germany.

This might be a significant option if one is concerned primarily about foreign forces.

If one includes indigenous forces, that would not be a good arrangement for Ireland.

Nå, men, inklusiv i æringen, man har til å minne at dette var en av de større forholdene, for det principale forholdet, at det var så høyt.

and also the most significant offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact.

And they are to provide one of the few one of the significant objectives of to reduce the Soviet forces as much as possible, and all at hand, also to put as much reputational value and voicing capability as possible.

The other hand, if we choose an area that is too wide, we choose the western region, so we can be a dry energy province.

But it's a verification problem, we do not have it.

Let me ask for an inspection.

We do not recently have a good capability of monitoring.

Now within the time frame that our residents are going to be unfortunate.

The movement within the western military district of the Soviet Union has not left until the east of Europe.

And secondly, the Soviet Union almost certainly will then ask for the inclusion of France and Britain, and maybe parts of the United States.

And therefore, in choosing the area, we have to trade off Soviet demands against what we would like to see.

One of the problems created, and that has been considered in the choice of the geographic areas, is that it is the end of whichever of the areas, but if included, it might be a facility using the option to redeploy the forces out of Central Europe to the flanks of NATO, and therefore...

and ask for the security of the land, of Greece and Germany.

And in an even larger context, as Dick has already pointed out, it might be construed by other countries, for instance, the Communist Party.

As a conclusion, it would be nice if the Soviet Union and NATO were to deploy forces to the Middle East.

It might have some relevance about the size of the area that is subject to the content.

Yes.

If you surprise the Soviet Union, we're completely free of arms control by the Western Party under strict arms control.

China is concerned, I think.

Obviously, Pakistan.

In general, I think the conclusion about the percentage cuts...

mean that if the percentage cut exceeds 30%, then we should probably want to include some part of Tokyo territory, and we would then also have to require some degree of draft inspection, because then it is important to have something like that.

Below 30%, I think we can't.

to one of the options that does not include building territory either in the Tarkovsky-planet area or the Nexokai-planet area.

Probably the area of the two Germanys alone would be politically unacceptable to the Germans, but this is probably expressed in the original.

Now then, the question, the next issue that we face is the nationality and type of Muslims that have to be, that have to be seduced.

On the nationality side, we pointed out in the case that they are broken down by taking to the stations, which in fact is far more difficult for them.

for the reduction of indigenous policies in this land.

The only reliable way to reduce them is to demobilize them, while the foreign soldiers can be reduced by being withdrawn into the North Territory, and therefore become available for the important.

Our studies have indicated that the process of monitoring resistance and forces, particularly when there is a substantial reserve country,

From many points of view, it's unfortunate that the domestic point of view of some of our allies, concentrating on the reduction of sanctioned forces, would have great advantages.

One, it would reduce the maximum reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and therefore a maximum reduction of the offensive threat from a standstill.

Secondly, it would respond to congressional pressures in this country, of showing that its mutual force reductions can lead to some kind of American forces.

It would automatically shift the relative contribution that is made.

I don't believe that any of us serious about thinking that indigenous forces should be used in the early stages.

They want to have the opportunity to talk about it so that the consumption is not just...

That they're not excluded, but I think they all realize that it wouldn't be sensible when they are in private sessions.

They all say a reduction of American forces and Russian forces would be acceptable.

And how do we begin with a broken strategy on the view that the maximum impact would undoubtedly be a reduction of Soviet and American forces?

And if only the principal disadvantages are that it might be taken by the Europeans at the beginning of an American withdrawal, but it would be under the best possible circumstances,

And secondly, that it would enhance the evidence, because that's the conclusion, that it is dangerous.

And that might prevent some difficulties.

But on the whole, a reduction of space resources

How many Americans?

How many Americans are we talking about?

How many Russians?

Well, right now, if we can have them in one area, then we can have them in the direction we'd rather not have to do their respective jobs.

How do we do that?

Well, how do we do that?

It's a good question.

It's a very small question.

Don't they have about 500,000 altogether in the Warsaw Pact area?

I don't think there is, but we're talking about these models that we use for our studies here.

But there are 350,000.

There are 370,000.

We've got a whole bunch of the three western military districts in the state of Virginia that are bordering Poland in order to get you into the troops.

Well, Hungary doesn't have 50,000 in Hungary, does it?

Well, there's nothing to trade off as far as possible.

That's what we're going to be making decisions for.

That's what we're going to make decisions for.

I wouldn't mind, I was an old soldier.

I've written too much messages when I returned from Moscow in 1959.

I shall never forget at the airport.

We called welcome to the city civilians.

They had a Polish honor guard, and they looked at us, and they said we were very good, and I wrote a poem on the truck.

He was quivering, you know, I mean, when he got down to town, they were all throwing flowers and cracking them off the wall.

And we were all having a cold fight.

We were really talking about a reduction of budget, but it was about 30 to 90 thousand.

I think it was in the 30s.

That's one of the reasons we all have to understand.

So while we talk about Warsaw Pact, the rest we're talking about are Russian reductionists.

And that gets back to the question I asked you earlier, which really gets back to that, from our standpoint,

We can say, you know, that NATO's confidence and so forth, because, well, the United States has reduced us.

But if, when we really look at it,

Certainly, I think the reduction of Russian forces in that area is a much greater blow to them than the reduction of American forces.

They must know this, because they have unreliable indigenous forces.

Our indigenous forces are at least reliable within their own people.

Second, the Texas need those Russian divisions.

The Poles need those Russian divisions.

The primary thing is to establish the principle that it is in our interest to have the station forces do it.

Or, in the business of mass exposition, as against the investment, as against the investment.

On the issue of verification,

I think, I know Jerry has pointed out, that the Soviet-negotiated history with respect to on-site inspection, monitoring, grounds and intentions to threaten Europe is less vicious than it has to be with respect to intrusion on Soviet territory itself.

that the reduction to be monitorable should be by units rather than by individuals.

And secondly, that we have an interest

I have to bring about some reduction of their equipment in order to improve the monitoring of their facilities.

Perhaps all of this has to grow by long, but I have to be persistent.

Equipment will have to find a balance between these two needs.

Actually, the study on verification has tended to drive us in the direction of recommending cuts of at least 10%.

Because the general conclusion of the verification panel has been that reductions in less than 10% are probably not monitoring.

And my turn to give the last of the cuts on our side.

If we want to monitor the agreement, the reduction will have to be in the neighborhood of 10% or above.

And actually they should be somewhat above 10%.

Now...

I should talk about this, but this could be another occasion of how these theories can be put together for various models.

I can conclude simply by pointing out where we are going from here technically in our preparation.

One, we are not just trying to get answers, analytical answers to some of the issues we have, that is to say,

for various models, for various percentage cuts we need to create models of what the composition ought to be in the combat forces and support forces in order to enhance the defensive capability to the greatest extent, which percentage cuts of the reserves that are promised

And for various occasions, this violence should be insisted on at various, at various levels, and also various approaches to the relationship between us.

As far as allied preparations, not on the diplomatic level, but on the academic level is concerned, we are sending a sanitized version of it.

Our evaluation of various MBFR approaches to NATO before the end of this month, for presentation to the NATO Councils and places so that they can begin talking about it.

However, sometime after July 1st, we are going to be able to present to our allies the elements which might us go into the basic framework of an attempt and be of our position and with detailed rationale for each of them.

And this attempt will help point them towards a substantive solution.

What is the situation?

Any position before that time to stay right where we are?

We don't have to say anything.

What do we say now?

I don't think we have any problem there.

We're moving further with our initiative.

Because I wish to respond.

So it's been three years to respond to our initiative.

Secondly, we said fine, we're prepared to talk to him, we'll talk to him right away, so we started.

And I said, what kind of procedure should we talk about?

He wanted to get the substance.

I said, well, let's find out what we're talking about first.

What kind of procedure?

You're talking about a conference, a European security conference, are you prepared to talk about negotiations on the mission of Donald Trump's production of birth?

And he said, well, we're prepared to...

I was talking about the mission of sports production first.

I said, well, what do you expect to attend?

I said, we wouldn't consider that a negotiation with anyone represented.

It would be too clumsy.

It would be a political ploy.

Wanting to have each ceremony there, that would not be possible.

So, on the other hand, if you're prepared to have serious negotiations, let us know.

I have several other questions for you today.

So I said, what would you like?

I said that we would have the Deputy Foreign Minister meeting in September or October.

Chances are we wouldn't be able to appoint a representative to explore the agenda and all the rest of it.

I don't think they have a position at all.

So I don't think we have any problem with propaganda.

I think we're way ahead of them.

So we all understand that's the question.

I think it's important to get these various plans over with military leadership.

in all of these countries, and with the military committee, and they go in with the various members of the representatives of the defense and presence of these various countries, as well as the foreign ministers and defenders, there's not going to be any reduction necessarily in their contribution to the defense security.

I have felt that Edwin Morse, I think he was with women, said at no time that we had to hold the hands of these protesters as much as we do right now.

He said they feel the right is kind of the products funded by the Soviet Union.

what they are talking about, and that is their own requirements to maintain their own forces, correct?

They know that.

On the other hand, they know that their populations get the ideal huge amount of force reduction when everybody reduces it.

Correct.

Mel, does that apply to the French and British forces in Germany?

And they're not crazy, they're staking the park, they're staking the move by the British class and the Dutch belt.

If it's crazy, it's the U.S. How many?

Well, the French have about 54,000 in Germany.

And, uh...

The ratio is about the same.

Mell spoke to me before he went about the attitude.

Interesting, I didn't find this at all true among the foremen.

But they say I think they were relieved because they had a feeling that the man's field of man-like type of thinking would pretty soon prevail here, and we'd have unilateral reductions, which would be chosen.

In other words, if we were forced to get out without some kind of equality, that would be troublesome.

And so, to that extent, they were relieved.

They said, this is going to help you who fight the man-killing amendment.

Secondly, if it's done on a mutual basis, it doesn't appear to be a pull-out by the United States.

It should appear to be a mutual reduction, so it's almost a good deal.

And I didn't expect any of that.

As a matter of fact, the attitude of the foreign ministers was the best that I've seen in any national meeting.

Well, that's the encouragement that you have.

And it's more of a title than you thought.

And you think this is going to happen.

A rather adverse effect all the way down through the Alliance from a military standpoint.

It's bound to be affected by the MDF-R discussions.

And so I'll follow this on one hand to deal with the MDF-R, and on the other hand at the same time to maintain this momentum that we managed to generate for the first time for the U.S. and the European Union.

Well, maybe I'm overstating, but I feel as far as military, we've got to keep this pressure on as far as these countries are concerned.

And I think that we've got to bring the

I think, Mr. President, what the others were saying was the same.

This mutual balance force negotiation is very helpful because it's going to prevent the United States from saying to their Congress, if you attempt to unilaterally force reductions, it makes the prospects of negotiation impossible.

Therefore, as long as negotiations are going ahead, because how long it takes, it will make it impossible.

The United States is going to maintain its present strength, and if the negotiations should be successful in the next 10-20% reduction, fine, that would appear to be a unilateral act by the United States, because it's lost interest in NATO.

So they were somewhat encouraged, and they were particularly encouraged by the fact that Gresham had made this decision.

Would you like to stay with me for a minute?

No, I've had a couple of little farewells, but we've been talking for hours and hours.

I think the point that you've all made, that Bill made, is that we're actually two years ahead of M&B as far as working, and we're ready to talk about what we've got to do very shortly.

The way I look at it, I should be here for it.

Anybody else want to ask any questions?

First, I have to predict what the best would be.

And so I...

They said more than anyone else that our security...

It seems to me that we still need to have a better focus on fire.

Some people think that the main purpose is to improve the daytime policy.

Secondly, I think that one should consider the relationship between reducing our forces in Europe and reducing our overall forces.

If the Soviets withdraw forces, they're probably going to keep them mobilized, maybe put them in China for it, and just keep them in these western military districts.

If we withdraw to the United States,

Yes.

And the first point I wanted to make was that I hope we don't go too far in saying that most of this has been done with international verification.

Because as Henry suggested, the record about Soviet interest in the Han side of the section, affirmative interest, is quite striking.

In 1957, the matter we were talking about, a somewhat different program, they were coming up with

A number of posts in the various parts, including in the Soviet Union.

Now this was in connection to the broader design, but this is an entirely different question on on-site inspection.

They're talking about install, or they're talking about giving to their factories.

So I would think at least for a starting position, we should have a good deal of on-site inspection factories doing it.

I also think, Mr. President, that just to add to some of Jerry's pictures, I think those are good points.

The Soviets, I think, are aftertrowing a lot of other things.

I think they'll bring in aircraft, and they'll bring in Navy, and they'll bring in the Mediterranean, and...

So, we're not really prepared for that part of this discussion.

We're prepared for this kind of discussion that we're talking about here today.

But we've got other work that we've got to do.

This doesn't affect Greece and Turkey, for example.

And also, Mr. President, if they just give them...

Det betyder, for eksempel, at de politiske bedriftene er betalt i denne samarbeid, annerledes enn i denne samarbeid.

Det betyder det.

I question how long you can do it.

It's good to have it maybe for two years, but after that, you've lost your advantage.

But then we have, as new issues are discussed, and that's one of the problems, which is the verification panel is based on that.

We may have to have two separate areas of the agreement.

One for the professional courses, in which we...

implying our states which we mentioned, second to nuclear forces, in which we will have to include some part of the Soviet territory, because the Europeans will not agree to a significant reduction of nuclear systems in Europe, unless there is a conventional reduction of the nuclear-led targets of Europe, and that nuclear plan is intended for the rest of the Soviet Union.

So we may need a different plan for a particular mutual balance policy adoption.

I plan for a conventional, which will add another complexity to the negotiations.

Should we presume we need to implement both conventional forces?

That would be the tendency that we are going to do.

Can I exclude the possibility of one for you?

If that's what you think.

...credible to connect mic and channel.

That's correct.

The archive exposes the usage of characters.

Attention, 30 percent.

Good luck.

And that, of course...

There is going to be the tendency of people saying, well, we're really going to do that any time.

You know, yes, yes, over that.

That would be very important.

This is what we do.

And nevertheless, we will learn from our allies.

We're going to have a concern that this is really what it means in our hearts.

It's been years, maybe two years, probably.

And don't you feel that I've failed you?

We have to step forward.

Step forward and try.

We have to realize that in this country, that the support for just paying any treatment for 150,000 people in Europe is going to be steep.

So we've got to press forward and make it.

That's why I say that, Michael, that if you wear the law and fail, you invest all that you've got on it.

Let's be sure that we have things to say that are positive, and that can keep us on the offensive that way.

We've got the Europeans, we've got the Soviets, we've got the American public, and we need that.

We need to press forward to that point.

One thing I'd like to mention briefly before we conclude, and I don't want to force you into talking about this right now, is that we haven't talked about this much yet, but let's talk about it.

One thing I'd like to mention briefly, before we conclude, and I know of course you've been talking about this much here, but nevertheless, I was going to say that

For the advice of all of you that have been worrying about how you get at the time, it's just marked top secret.

The thing I think we have to bear in mind is that those of us around us have a lot of special responsibility to protect the security of the document.

This may be me.

I did not realize that this was the case, but...

The documents, all the secret documents, with regard to how we got into World War II, have not yet been declassified.

All the secret documents, with regard to how we got into Korean War, have not yet been declassified.

And as far as this particular matter is concerned, I sometimes wonder why this administration is taking the position it is in the Attorney General's office, because there's no skin on our hands on that.

This involves what President Roosevelt did.

But prior to getting into World War II, what President Truman did prior to, and at the time he got into Korea, what President Kennedy did, and President Johnson, at least in the Kennedy-Johnson paper, has nothing to do with his administration.

The study stops in 1968.

Now the question is, why do we get so steeped up on it?

Well, you all know why.

We, as Bill Rogers put it, we've got to have, we've got to protect the...

It also has to do with the...

Ellen knows she's to stay and she will stay.

Nobody knows when you read it.

Mark, gossip, mark, copy.

Most of it should be mark, mark, mark, copy.

They shouldn't even be mark, classify.

We all know that we over-classify everything.

And I see everybody a little less classified.

Let's not classify for the purpose.

The security of our own things, that's classified only when the national security is involved.

We also know this, that one of the major reasons we do classify certain text sources...

And you just never know when a document's got something in it that was supposed to be the source and then cuts it off.

That's what this argument is all about.

So we have our sources, we have our names, our names.

Frank is for whoever sits in this chair.

And that means whoever sits in your chair, Bill, or whoever sits in your chair, can no longer exaggerate.

I have Frank.

So what we're really talking about here is the ability of the government to govern.

That's why this issue is so terribly important.

Now, you can cast it in terms of values.

It's the right of people to know how we got into a war.

I didn't see such editorial written about why we got into World War I, or World War II, or why we got into Korea, maybe a little on the latter.

And of course, you would get down to it, but he does make a strong believer in everyone.

From a political partisan standpoint, we ought to let all this stuff come out.

It would only be embarrassing to Kennedy, Johnson, their administrations, and those administrations.

There's a higher interest here.

It's the interest of the presidency in the years ahead, not just our administrations in the years ahead.

And we simply have to have, not only the presidency, but all of the various departments, particularly the sales and events, that have to have communication with our security.

And therefore we have to defend it.

We've got to defend the rights of the government.

Unfortunately, the panel here is totally absent with regard to individuals who carve out documents against us.

I was shocked to find that it's only $10,000 and 10 years in jail.

That's totally inadequate.

And incidentally, I want legislation prepared to increase that penalty.

Any individual who deliberately, with knowledge, takes a document that is classified as high class education has got to be subject to a higher penalty or he's not doing it.

I live at this song, and he'll be a martyr.

He'll pay 10,000 bucks, and he won't serve the term.

That's my guess.

And if we don't return him, that's the other thing.

For every other little kid sleeping around here in the government.

Some of us like this policy, somebody's mad about that, or somebody who...

He sets himself up as a higher authority, and that's really what the Times has done here, has the man who gave it to him, a higher authority, saying, we do not believe that this war is war.

We do not believe that this is war.

We had to make this, we did.

Not because we were concerned about the political damage it could do to us, if it all falls out.

It just happened that the injunction came forward, like some of those damaging papers.

So we thought that.

But I'm going to say that in this case, we have to remember that we all have an obligation to me.

I would just add that one thing.

I would hope that all of you, we know nobody around here.

Of all of you, and talking to your own people who follow the two or three things.

One, let's be as careful and restrictive as we possibly can with regard to injury.

We've said this before, but let's do it.

Always recognizing that this becomes very contagious, very impregnable.

They're all getting it all, the New York Times, a lot of defense of it by most of the media, and as the media always does, they come to the support of any iraqis who deserve it.

But the second thing is, I think that you've got to take a very hard line, and this is the line that I can take here, the line that I want to take to the administration.

I think that with regard to, I don't care about the job, but with regard to the top secret, the no-debt stuff, the stuff that is very, very important, we all know what it is, with regard to that, we'll have the distribution and responsibility with every person.

And then I will have to hold responsible whoever is in Section 2, at least as Secretary,

We have found generally that with links in the past, we are never able to find who did people of this nature because of the falsehood of the government.

But we do know, and usually it's compartmentalizing, it came from this department, or this, or when I say this department, I don't mean this department, but I mean within the department it comes from this division, this division, this division.

There's only one way to do this, and that is that the individual who is the assistant secretary, or the appointed official in charge of that in which department really goes, if it occurs, is responsible.

And that's the way it has to be.

We have to have, I think, a certain, I don't want, I don't want on the other hand, I think there's a panic, I don't know if you feel like that, but everybody, you know, they're all scared and red, but...

But we have to realize that if we do not put the fear of God to individuals who might go and do likewise with regard to policies that they don't like,

In regard to the top secret thing, it will become impossible for this government to be effectively run.

That's what's really going on, and that's what we've got to make.

Another point to add to that, and it doesn't relate to the legal aspect, it just relates to the moral aspect.

You know, everybody's presumed to be innocent.

In this country, and we have procedures for fighting all persons.

We have to go to the grand jury with the evidence, we have to present the evidence.

situation where eight single departments that took issue with the president decided to conduct an investigation.

They turned it over to people who were opposed to the president, didn't like him.

It was supposed to be three months to compile documents.

Instead of that, it was supposed to involve six individuals.

They are 36 in a year and a half.

They compiled it in such a way that it was a major indictment of the president of the United States.

They didn't get any documents from the White House.

President didn't know anything about it.

Secretary of State didn't know anything about it.

The men who made the decisions would never ask what their decisions were.

Then you have the major paper in the United States.

Yes, those documents...

In his secret in New York, assigned a whole lot of people to it, all of whom wanted to prove the president of the United States was alive.

So they compiled a document carefully over a period of a month, for one reason, to indict the president of the United States, and to convict him.

Before he says his answer, say the damn word.

Did they ever call him and ask him what he was going to do?

Did they call him and say, would you like to issue a statement or other documents that you would like to present in your own behalf?

Hell, even a good person used to do that.

They did.

They called up and said, well, we read an article about JFK's name.

Now, in this case, there wasn't any attempt to do that.

They published the documents in such a way that the Republic now is largely convinced that the President of the United States is a liar.

And governments all over the world now are saying that.

They're saying that it's not only the individual which is bad, but it's the system.

So they've indicted and found guilty the President of the United States as a liar, and how does he defend himself?

Now, I think that just the basic elements of fairness were completely overlooked and neglected.

And I think it's a tragic thing that a paper of this kind, this is much worse than having been indicted by some local grand jury, isn't it?

This is a major indictment by the leading two in this country, and I also know it's picked up, of course, there'll be an incident.

You look at the television, and I don't follow the figures, because I know 90% of the people now make up their minds on television.

Television has been on five to eight minutes every night with this stuff, because all men want to indict the President of the United States.

Now, to come to this...

The other side of this is finding Johnson.

I didn't want to leave the impression that I'll fire back because it proves these other people are high.

I am not of those.

I am not among those who believe that the United States should not have gotten into World War II.

I think we had to get in.

I don't want to know the reasons why, and so forth and so on.

I think it had to be done.

I'm not among those who think that Truman did not make the right decision to go into Korea.

I think we had to go into Korea.

I had great doubts, and many around us, people about how all this conducted, and we had to do it.

And I have to say, I have never included in any of my speeches the fact that, well, we shouldn't have gone into Vietnam.

I think great mistakes were made with regard to the conduct of the war that we got in.

But I have strong feelings with regard to doing this.

I can see, here's just the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and all the rest, and they haven't made any decisions with regard to what the United States does, so they didn't.

When I hear this thing, it says that Bill could be more right.

This is not only one side, it's within the Department of Defense.

But also, it's something else again.

It's something that we have to have in mind.

We have to have in mind the fact that the business class, what really is this?

They say that this proves the President of the United States is a liar.

Let's take the things on their face down.

It doesn't prove any damn thing.

I mean, all of you are aware of the fact, let's take a step back in regard to Vietnam at the present time.

You know now, and you know Dave, and you know Tom, that I have, over the past two and a half years, we've got plans, in case, for example, the Chinese, you know, we've got plans for very ultimate action, right?

So, you don't have to give me fire, right?

You also have plans with regard to the bombing of North Vietnam.

In the event, for example, that we have massive provocation in all the cities and so forth, you've got several plans moving across the DMZ.

You've got a plan, for example, for taking off the dice.

You've got a plan for Haiphong, all that rancor.

You know, we have started meetings where I said, have these plans ready.

And we said, we'll be ready to do it in case different things happen.

Now, if you take that, some bitch, at least down in the department, knows that much.

And he says, well, here's the plan, here's what he figured to do, and then at a later time he doesn't.

They say he lied, and as I have, stood before a press conference and said, no, we have no plans to do this or that, or the other thing.

I do not believe that Johnson lied in the campaign of 1964.

I don't believe that's what happened at all.

I mean, Johnson was expressing, of course, the desire that his policies would not have to have, as he put it, Americans fighting the war that Asian boys ought to be fighting.

Franklin Roosevelt said he hated war.

We all say that.

But the thing that is really naturally about this

is that a small part of the picture, again, from somebody within the administration, there were people that were divided, but a small part gets done.

And then it's...

flashed on the headlines and papers, it's written by the English media, who has always been against this thing.

Not really, I mean, he is.

He's got a right to his views, but he doesn't write with regard to any objectivity.

And the New York Times has its views.

The New York Times has its views.

Whoever prepared this study has the title of their views.

But on the other hand, we have to protect it.

We have to protect the integrity of the process of consultation, the process of advice for a friend, where individuals don't feel intimidated.

And also, basically, we've got to protect our relations with foreign governments.

And that is why we've got to be very tough on this,

We've got to take all the heat that we're trying, I don't care if we're in Patrick, call it anything you want.

Because it may not be a good public issue, but if we do not fight this issue, and if we lose in the lower courts, fight in the Supreme Court, fight it all out, the ability to run a government in the United States is going to be...

Almost fully destroyed.

Would you not agree?

I don't see how you can let go of it.

You could have a meeting like this today.

Mr. President, if you look at this thing too, and the pickups we made last night, the documents in the Times were not in the study.

They had the documents, and the documents so far were not in the study.

You mean these are other documents?

These are other documents that were not even in the study, and what we found is that there were several members in the latter part of January before the administration took office that really backed up what's taking place.

I think your files were leaked out here, weren't they?

That's what I thought they went through.

They went down to Johnson.

We didn't have any funds when we came in here.

We found a way out to pick up some of the material in this room.

I think according to the reports I had, the New York Times worked on this for about three months.

And they had a whole bunch of people.

And what they did was...

The Swedish government people over there read this, and they say the president of the United States is a liar.

And he was attacked by their selection.

That's what I mean.

And also, the news stories, you know, that you read.

The news stories and the headlines.

It wasn't recorded.

If they just heard of the documents, they would have known.

But it wasn't recorded then.

We started in the headlines.

Johnson knew in 1964, when the campaign, when he made a statement that we was not going to say it, he knew that we already was planning to do it and did it repeatedly afterwards.

Oh my God, that is just wrong.

I mean, the point is, first of all, nobody asked him.

Right.

That's what it is.

And I would think, Henry, that McNamara would be a little disturbed.

Oh, he's very, he's almost beside himself.

He ought to be prepared to...

I think we just have to stop treating this publication and others like it with respect, and treat it with contempt and reserve, and we get a chance to do that.

I think we've got to undermine these people.

The thing, as long as you have this kind of paper, or published, stolen material, you'll find these, you'll steal it.

I'm just saying, the attempts on our part to prevent this are going to be, I don't know, they won't work on us.

Because it's like, if I may just use one example, we had a lot of people who failed to drug the thing they made.

And we were pointing out, as we remember the other day, Bill, how we were going to cut off five countries because of our supply.

I said, that's not going to do any good unless you cut off the demand, because they'll grow up in some other countries.

And that's just the thing.

As long as you have a publication as respected as the Times, as rich as the Times, willing not only to print it, but pay for it, this guy shouldn't sell it.

He probably did it because he believed it.

They take all the news that fits to print.

And that's what they mean.

All the news that fits to print, including publishing stolen goods.

When you've got all this higher morality, it's like Aldrich Hiss' defense.

It's many things.

Well, it's like I took his position too.

They invented him on that ground.

Well, they said that you'll set her off in a higher morality.

And that's why they were like, you know, that's why the law provides a defense to as much more civilians than thieves.

Yes, sure.

Let me point out that the investigation indicates that people from the New York Times solicited this, helped carry it out, helped reproduce it, and used the White House press pass in order to have credibility to have these documents reproduced.

Yes, yes.

Why would they need that to reproduce it?

Because they went into this little printer and he saw a top secret on it.

He didn't want to have anything to do with it.

So they brought in the guy with the White House press pass and said, here, look, it's all right.

Is that right?

You've got that.

I think as a matter of fact, we ought to be very careful about not saying anything that would affect the judicial process.

I think it would be very damaging.

We've got plenty of time, we've got evidence, we've got the evidence.

We've got to keep the...

The point is, now it's the nation's war.

Every war is the nation's war.

And what we have to realize is that the public is making these fine distinctions.

Well, let's be real, this doesn't involve this administration.

This administration is trying to cover up how it got America into war.

...precisely important.

They do not distinguish between this presidency and the presidency of six years ago.

It is the presidents.

That's part of our nation's concern.

Johnson's sitting on the burden now.

They know he's not going to devote any more documents, but they're concerned about the veracity of government in the first place, and about the integrity of government.

If this is certainly correct, I get it.

My personal relationship is that the term is on the integrity of government.

Well, we just don't want a conviction, but we've got to win the public relations fight, too.

Yes, but we've got to do that most.

Well, that testimony is more of it.

We've got all the way through to the testimony.

It's going to be a testimony to our public.

There will not be a grand jury until after we get through the hearing and some of the system details.

And we'll have testimony later where you have an admiral with a fluid military cap and a comrade.

Thank you for our comrade.

We'll be testifying at that period.

I don't know how that paper got out.

That's not a joint point.

It's an injunction as to whether or not there is a nature that should be kept for the publication.

Because I was going to judge a little bit back there.

You were one of the players.

I was going to judge a little bit back there.