Nixon, National Security Council & Rogers on European Security Conference

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Unknown[unintelligible] on the floor.

Unknown[unintelligible]

UnknownWell, the other had a whole week with Secretary Rogers up. They spent all day with him. [unintelligible]

UnknownHe's worth the price.

UnknownThat had nothing to do with it. That was just a little [unintelligible]

Unknown[unintelligible] so that he could pass through then.

Unknown[unintelligible] I talked to him and said that I don't see how [unintelligible]

Unknown[unintelligible] about this thing, too. You don't like to shake things up.

UnknownWell, I [unintelligible]

UnknownSo [unintelligible]

Unknown[unintelligible] I feel very bad about it.

Unknown[unintelligible] I would have said yes [unintelligible]

Unknown[unintelligible] yesterday, though, at lunch. [unintelligible] late at night [unintelligible] but didn't come to an agreement until about midnight. Then sat up the damn all night arguing it [unintelligible] about 3:00.

— 5 min 20 s with no transcribed speech —

Unknownafter the inner-German talks were completed, the statement reads: "The government of the USSR expressed its satisfaction over the conclusion of the arrangements between the competent German authorities in connection with the Four-Power Agreement of September 3rd, 1971.

UnknownThe date of the signature of the final protocol will be established subsequently," the end of quotation. Moscow, for its part, has been pressuring East Germany to conclude the inner-German discussions and thus remove another obstacle to conference preparations.

UnknownThe Warsaw Pact meeting, which began yesterday, will try to keep the ball rolling in this direction. There have so far been no communiqués from the meeting, and our clandestine sources have not yet had time to ferret out what is being discussed or decided. Last week, however, Soviet journalists in Bonn were spreading the word that Brezhnev is under pressure from the leadership of the Central Committee

Unknownto, quote, "show results," unquote, on preparations for a conference. The first question of the ministerial meeting in Brussels next week will be the matter of timing. We can expect all allied ministers to be sympathetic to the need for extensive preparations before any conference.

UnknownMost, however, will not favor any lengthy delay before the opening of multilateral East-West talks in Helsinki. If the inner-German talks should be concluded before the ministerial, the allies will want, at a minimum, to declare in the communiqué their willingness to enter multilateral talks

Unknownas soon as the Berlin Agreement is signed. On the matter of timing, the West German position remains central. It is unclear, however, what approach the Germans will recommend next week. The West German ambassador to NATO has characterized his government's position on this question as, quote, "a mess," unquote.

UnknownEgon Bahr, at the Bonn-at the group high-level talks in Paris 2 weeks ago, implied that West Germany would support conference preparations prior to a Berlin signature. Despite this, we have indications that Foreign Minister Scheel intended to uphold the established NATO positions

Unknownin his talks this week in Moscow. And Scheel's visit to Moscow, this week's inner-German talks will weigh heavily on the West German's position in Brussels. The French are eager to enter preparatory talks. Foreign Minister Schumann almost certainly will argue next week

Unknownthat conference preparations should not be held up for the final signature of the Berlin Agreement. The remaining allies probably will not play a sturdy role. The Italians say that if the West Germans opt for the French position, favoring early talks, they will too.

UnknownThe Scandinavians already support the French, and can be expected to say so in the ministerial. Although the question of timing will be foremost in the minds of the allied ministers, there are a number of other problems. The allies differ on whether agreed NATO positions should be binding on the members during East-West discussions.

UnknownThe West Germans believe the allies should agree to reach as wide the view among themselves as possible. The French still dislike being locked into NATO positions, and they argue that the allied studies are only illustrative. The Scandinavians accept the principle of achieving common positions,

Unknownbut say the lack of agreement on all points should not stand in the way of beginning preparatory talks. The allies also remain split on how extensive pre-conference talks should be. The established NATO position calls for a lengthy process: initial exploratory talks should be followed by preparatory discussions to produce agreed texts,

Unknownand finally a conference to approve the projects. The French have attacked much support for their concept of just one lengthy pre-conference phase followed by an initial conference to appoint working groups and a second conference to approve agreed texts.

UnknownThe French are also in the forefront of those who want to see some permanent machinery established to monitor the resulting agreements. The allies have agreed on a number of general questions for inclusion on a conference agenda, such as principles governing relations among states,

Unknownfreer movement of people, information, and ideas, and cooperation in the field of economics. The allies recognized that much work remains to be done in elaborating Western positions on these items. This does not seem, however, to dampen their enthusiasm for getting multilateral East-West talks underway.

UnknownFinally, there is the matter of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. The NATO allies remain undecided on how to relate this issue to a conference on security and cooperation. The Soviets have been keeping these issues separate. Underlying this tactical problem are some serious worries about force reductions as such.

UnknownOne general concern is that troop reductions could increase reliance on nuclear weapons. Another allied anxiety is that talks on force reductions might in some way lead to unilateral US troop withdrawals. The Europeans find it hard to convince themselves that troop reductions, even though mutual,

Unknownwould not impair their security. The Germans, therefore, would like to get first priority to lesser measures, such as controls on military movements. The French remain opposed to any force reduction negotiations. They do not want to see US forces cut,

Unknownand they oppose bloc-to-bloc negotiations. The British, West Germans, and other allies are willing to participate in negotiations. Allied caution, however, has produced wide support for Bonn's, quote, "phased approach," unquote,

Unknownwhich might put off actual reductions until the end of the negotiating process. The general inclination of the ministers in Brussels will be to go slow without giving the impression that NATO is putting the brakes on a force-reduction dialogue.

UnknownBecause former Secretary General Brosio probably will not be received in Moscow before the Brussels meeting, the allies will not feel obliged to make any dramatic move on force reductions. The NATO foreign ministers probably will favor keeping the Brosio mission on tap,

Unknownendorsing continued NATO studies on force reductions and, at least, implying in the communiqué that it is Moscow that is held at the discussion of the problem. Soviets have been trying to minimize the importance of force reductions as an essential element of East-West discussions.

UnknownSoviet diplomats recently have been concerned that the West might try to make Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions a precondition to a conference. As one tactic, they have launched unofficial suggestions that this topic should be negotiated bilaterally by Moscow and Washington.

UnknownThe communiqué from the Warsaw Pact meeting will show whether the Soviets have come up with any new ideas to get around the force reductions question. German Foreign Minister Scheel tells us that Moscow has put force reductions on the agenda of this Warsaw Pact meeting. That concludes the briefing, Mr. President.

KissingerPerhaps I could briefly just sum-sum up the discussions on the issues as they emerged in the Senior Review Group starting with the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. As you know, the idea of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions has had an-it goes back to the '50s when it was called disengagement, and Jenner.

KissingerAnd it had been taken up for a variety of reasons, which are of some consequence depending on future strategy. It was picked up, at one stage, by us in order to have-not by this administration, but by previous ones-to have some answer to troop-to the demand for unilateral troop withdrawals.

KissingerThen it was picked up by Brosio in order to keep us from withdrawing unilaterally. And then it was, it came-was picked up by the Soviets last year for reasons that are not yet clear. The reason I mention this is because, until your administration came into office, there had never been a systematic analysis

Kissingerof what people were talking about when this-when they mentioned Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and their impact upon the military balance. Now the various agencies on an interdepartmental basis for the last two years

Kissingerhave made a rather detailed study, which is far from complete, but which permits some preliminary conclusions. They went they went through about 15 cases of possible combinations of troop reductions as between stationed forces and indigenous forces, as between percent

Kissingerand that they came down to four major categories: small symmetrical percentage reductions, something on the order of 10%; major symmetrical percentage reductions, something on the order of 30%; common ceiling options in where a common ceiling was established for the forces of both sides;

Kissingerand one mixed package option, on which, frankly, we haven't done a hell of a lot of work yet, in which something was traded off against together. The conclusion, while there is a lot of methodological and academic debate about

Kissingerabout the refinements, I think one can say this: reductions of the order of 10% or less cannot be verified. It is statistically

Kissingercould know whether the other side is making 10 percent reductions. But they seem to have a minimal impact on the on the security situation.

KissingerIt deteriorates, but not immeasurably. Any other symmetrical reduction will make the situation progressively worse for the NATO forces.

KissingerBecause of the percentage percentage reductions. We have some charts here. Phil, could you distribute them that show that

KissingerI could not insist again on every uh whether the figures are exactly correct. The percentages are certainly correct.

KissingerThese charts show the deterioration and the and the length of time it takes to reach the Weser River and the Rhine River, and and if there's a big one, it's very complex, but it shows that all the ratios change unfavorably

Kissingeruh as the percentage reductions. The only uh The mixed-package option, Mr. President, we haven't really had time to examine carefully, because it depended upon what we had. It speaks about nuclear warheads for a large number of tanks.

KissingerThe common-ceiling option would actually improve the situation. But we will have to face the fact that it is probably not negotiable. If a common-ceiling is established,

Kissingerwe would cut 80, 10,000, and they would cut about 100,000. Now, Mel has just submitted a paper which tries to combine various approaches to it, which will, if it's not feasible, but which the Senior Review Group has not yet had a chance to discuss.

KissingerNor is it necessary to become down now at this meeting on a uh on a solution partly for the reasons that DJ, there's no enormous urgency to get into negotiation.

KissingerWe have recently, I think this week, isn't it, Phil, State has sent an sanitized version of our conclusions to NATO, isn't it? So that and and our ambassador there will present some of these conclusions to the NATO Council.

KissingerAnd I'm sure that Bill will go I think he's already in Europe, Bill, isn't he? They probably have already met yesterday, John.

FarleyYes, sir. He reported this morning.

KissingerThe report wasn't polite?

Farley[laughter]

KissingerThey were asking, much as if you had come out of the session, [laughter] "Get on with another example".

RogersWell, at least we have full fields of fire on everything they've been talking about.

KissingerWell, we had a lot of disagreements here as to what these things meant. And they had to scan them down. The major problem now we have with MBFR is,

Kissingershould we come up with one position for the alliance now? Or, should we first analyze some of these and see whether we want to take a position on the grounds of what enhances the security?

KissingerIf we want to drive towards negotiations, then the high incentive to come down on one of the percentage cuts, which is probably the only one that everyone can agree on. And it's also the one that all of our studies show is the one that's most deleterious to the security

Kissingerof NATO. Secondly, it runs the enormous danger that MBFR discussions will become even more of a political issue than it already is in the other countries. We are the only country, I believe, that has done serious studies of the issues.

KissingerThe others are using it, partly for domestic politics, partly as a restraint on us, partly as a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the sense, as I understood it, of the SRG meeting was that it was in our interest

Kissingerto force the Europeans to discuss the security issues with us, to work through these options with us. Because the only way we can survive these negotiations is to have a concrete position and is to have them and our European allies have concrete understanding of what is involved

Kissingeron the military side of these negotiations. So if you go on into another round of last round, will be preparing a lot of the of the military issues. And I think we're prepared for Bill to at the meeting, and subsequently,

Kissingerto follow-on on these discussions, particularly re-working some of the recent DOD proposals and submit them later to the NATO Council if we haven't had a chance to present them. So this is in broad outline the issue as MBFR.

KissingerNow, the European Security Conference is a sort of an irony at the sense that, at first, when it started, it was supposed to include all these including MBFR. Then, Berlin was broken out, then MBFR was broken out. Remains a mishmash of generalities

Kissingeruh of which it's difficult to get proper guidance. The Soviets want to discuss renunciation of the threat of force, expansion of economic, scientific, and technical activities, and a permanent organ for questions of security and cooperation in Europe.

KissingerOn our side, we have similarly vague general principles, uh, except that there has been a recent study done in Hyland's [unintelligible] office in which we might throw some security issues

Kissingerinto European Security Conference if they could be uh if they could be made somewhat concrete. Now,

Kissingerthe problem is the Europeans If one looks at the enormous efforts the Soviets are making to get the European Security Conference started, as you remember very well, Mr. President, in your conversation with Gromyko, the high attention they high priority they give it,

Kissingercompared to the conceivable results of such a conference, one has to assume that the Soviets see in it, a see in it an objective that has to go beyond establishing trade, cultural, or a vague principle. Their objective might be to establish such a climate of detente

Kissingerthat, in the next phase, they can argue that military efforts have turn become unnecessary and the permanent organ that they want to propose can substitute can be a substitute organ for security. The other hand,

Kissingerour European allies are now pushing for the European Security Conference, as Hal pointed out, for a combination of reasons. Brandt uh because he's probably promised the Russians in order to show prog- progress in his eastern policy.

KissingerThe French, uh, for two reasons: because they don't want to be out-maneuvered in Moscow by the Germans, and because, as Dick pointed out, they are so opposed to MBFR that they want a meaningless conference to take the steam out of the MBFR

Kissingeruh conference, as they would like to push the European Security Conference into in order to avoid the MBFR Conference. Of course, the danger is that we'll get both in in this thing. So, the problem is

Kissingerhere, less what we're going to talk about, because these agendas uh are not overwhelmingly of all substances. The only issue is whether, in addition to these general topics, we ought to incorporate some of the ideas that are then

Kissingerthat we will stay on on the table on the security compliment, namely whether we could put some security issues in there such as staying in certain contiguous zones. Here, there are arguments pro and con. The pro is that it gives some concrete content to the conference.

KissingerThe con is that this is probably not the forum in which we would like collateral restraints placed since they have less of an incentive the European-wide countries to monitor any possible agreements and we would actually prefer it if we keep all security issues in the MBFR.

KissingerBut, before we ever get to agenda, the problem is, what procedures we should get to the conference. Of course, the Germans are pretty well committed to go it uh, to make, as a press-on token, places progress in the NATO.

KissingerThe Soviets have proposed a preparatory conference of the ambassadors to discuss agenda, procedures, and so forth. Normally, preparatory conferences can be used for a long delay. In this case, one has to keep in mind that these issues

Kissingerdon't lend themselves very well uh for delay. So, the question is whether we should progress prior to preparatory conferences. Up to now, we have used the argument that we would not consider a conference

Kissingerprior to the completion of the Berlin agreement. But once the two Germanys have completed the Berlin agreement, the only part of it that will be left will be the protocols at the end in which the four powers

Kissingermake themselves responsible for it.

KissingerAnd uh we will be in a tough position to use that, though we can't use it, uh to say that that has to be completed before we can consider a European security conference.

KissingerOnce that is completed, we then will be under enormous pressure because if we then say we won't go until the Germans and the Soviets have ratified the treaties,

Kissingerwe're really bringing pressure on the Bundestag rather than bringing pressure on the Russians.

KissingerAnd uh that creates a theoretical problem. But at any rate, we have two levels for delay. One is we can use the Berlin agreements to delay.

KissingerSecondly, we could delay by the mechanism of trying to establish a western position first, such as, for example, a deputy foreign ministers' meeting.

KissingerThirdly, we can delay by having a preparatory meeting prior to the security conference itself.

KissingerUh but uh on this opinion is divided how long the preparatory thing can be strung, strung out. Many people doubt that.

KissingerAs to the concrete content of it, uh politically, I think it's premature to decide now what we will do with this conference because until we have decided how long we can we want to string out the process, by what dev- devices we string it out,

Kissingerand until we get into the preparatory conference the issues that will enter will be in another round. Uh but those are the basic issues, those which pertain to MBFR, and those which pertain to European security.

RogersHow long?

UnknownHard to tell.

RogersFourth quarter?

UnknownI talked to Douglas-Home about this for six or seven days. He said,

Rogersand uh they also hope that it'll proceed, the two months following ratification.

RogersUh in the meantime, the Russians insisted that the ratification occur before.

RogersI, I think we can take advantage. I've already told most of this,

Rogersthis is what I've thought of, that we, that it was realistic to think of a conference in 1972. I've told this to the Russians, and I've told it to the Germans.

RogersUh now we will, as uh Henry has said, we will be under pressure, this ministerial meeting, to get started on the preparatory talks.

RogersWell, I think we can head it off for several reasons. One, we can state that there's not a satisfactory solution in Berlin until the protocol is signed.

KissingerMhm.

RogersBecause if, if, if there's not ratification, the protocol won't be signed, so there's no solution.

RogersUh In this sense, the Russians are actually playing into our hands for that. If they signed the protocol between us, Rogers says, [laughter]

RogersSecondly, uh we can say that obviously this mutual and balanced force reduction uh relates to the European security talks. We're not sure how.

RogersWe're not sure whether it's included, or separate, but in any event, because the Soviet Union has not seemed fit to invite Brosio to Moscow,

Rogersthat they're, they're delaying, so we can put the blame on them for delay. [laughter]

RogersUh third, we can point out that you're having a meeting with uh Pompidou and Brandt and Heath, and therefore,

Rogerswe shouldn't make any decisions until after that meeting. Fourth, we can say that you're,

Rogersyou're going to Moscow in May. And uh we expect that you have, keep those things in mind. And uh what we propose, if you agree, Mr. President, is we suggest that we show interest

Rogersin uh preparation. We say that we want to move on preparations, but only after the packet, only after the protocol has been signed.

RogersAnd then say that we recommend that we have a deputy foreign ministers' meeting sometime after the protocol has been signed,

Rogerswhich will give it further time. That's what we did the last time, so we have a precedent for that, deputy-level meeting.

KissingerIn fact, you can talk about it next year, could you?

RogersUh and we'll try to be forthcoming as possible, but still be dilatory if we can.

KissingerI think we can go ahead with that, the Russians'

RogersMhm.

Kissingerthe ministerial meeting.

RogersWell, I don't I think we should go through the motions, but I don't think we should push it. I think Brosio should go,

Rogersand I think if uh if uh there is any meeting, we should talk about it. Now, the fact is, I don't think we have to

Unknown[unintelligible] talk with the Russians [unintelligible]

RogersNo, I don't think it embarrasses the Russians to say instead of attempting to clarify by deciding what the agenda items should be and

Rogersso forth, they are the ones who propose the conference, and uh they are the ones that had to clarify what they're talking about, and I'm sure

Rogerswhen you ask them, they don't know. Most of these items are ones that uh that uh we have thought of.

RogersNow they, the Russians' party talks sort of vague, in general terms, but they don't, they don't have an agenda.

RogersAnd what we've been able to do is point out to them, saying if they're talking about a security conference, they don't have any items of security on the agenda at all. They haven't even mentioned it,

Rogersexcept us. They don't want to talk about Berlin, they don't want to talk about the mutual and balanced force reductions. What do they want to talk about that relates to security?

RogersWhat I've been doing is putting the word in the conference cooperation, calling it European Conference on Security and Cooperation, to make clear that we expect it'll be a word cooperation

Rogersrather than security. But in any event, I think that we we've got a problem, Mr. President. All our allies now favor a conference for different reasons.

RogersIt seems to me we probably are stuck with a conference. Now I'm not sure this is bad. I'm not sure what we can anticipate. One of the reasons that

RogersI think that is because the other countries, like Romania and Yugoslavia, very much favor it, and they have a feeling that we can use it to business for us, Mr. President, and Romania,

Rogersand as you know, Tito underscored that for now. There is language which they have used so successfully with them,

Rogersand uh so that that could be a model for uh, for [laughter]

KissingerThey get precise.

RogersYeah, that's right. Yeah.

RogersI think that what I think is, Mel, is we will be, we'll carry this course into taking part in some preparations

Rogersuh in 1972.

RogersAt what level we can decide. I would think that it ought to be at the fairly low level. I don't think it should be ambassadors, eh, level. It ought to be assistant secretary of state, or something like that, deputy ambassadors,

Unknown[laughter]

Rogersuh, and I think that then the, and we ought to say we don't follow preparatory conferences, let's get together and have some discussions, serious discussions about preparing the conference,

Rogersso it's clear that it isn't any preparatory discussions, period, at all. I think we'll be forced to do that.

RogersWell, we have and we've got the word out pretty soon that we can't even think of this conference in '72, but then the worry is done there.

RogersUh they'll talk about that next week. Uh we want to be sure that we don't want not use the fact that the British are in support of this view.

RogersUh I don't think we should think of it in terms of '72 at all.

NixonNow, uh, do you have some thoughts about this, Mel? Talk about the difference of some other

LairdNo.

LairdI think they're soon to be pressed, but I think they're in a position though where the United States can give the leadership in a mutual and balanced force reduction. A decision is taken by NATO, and it has to come through US leadership, because they're waiting for us and they'll go along with us

Lairdleadership. And the other ones, the NATO countries as a whole are willing uh and ready to follow our leadership. There is some

Lairdquestion in some of their minds that perhaps there's going to be some agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on a bilateral basis. I continue to reassure them in the best of spirits that that is not going to be the case.

LairdIn regard to the NATO structure. And I believe that it is important for us, even though the Brosio visit is put off for another few months, for us to work within our own government here to develop this to its final, let's get a very good picture based in position on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

LairdAnd that's why I presented the paper to the State Department, and he trade with others around within the government that show these two alternative approaches that we might take,

Lairdand that's being studied in all our departments at the present time. I don't know that we can take any position before this defense meeting, before the minister's meeting that starts next week in Brussels.

LairdBut I do think that it's important for us to work on this and resolve our position as soon as possible because we can give the leadership to this whole uh problem. And I don't think we should approach this purely to solve the political problem

Lairdwhich we may have here in the United States. And I think we can get good votes to maintain our position for another year. I don't think we're going to have the kind of trouble in here that some people think we may have in the Congress,

Lairdif this Congress will continue to support us. And uh uh but I do think it's- our utmost urgency is to resolve our position so that we can give the leadership

Lairdto this whole Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction argument. I agree with Bill uh that uh certainly it would be a- a mistake I think if we got into these details in the

Lairdin the European Security Conference. Dealing with all those 30 nations uh that don't have much of an interest in this thing would be a great mistake. Uh we can deal with our friends and allies in NATO in the security area. And our deci- our decision should be based on security considerations.

LairdUh it's important to develop that uh that discussion. Uh I uh I do think that uh all the departments in the government, our progress with this, we're in much better position than uh than we were a year ago. Everybody has stepped up in this whole area and uh I do think that uh we move very well in this.

LairdBut I uh I uh I think if we gather that leadership in NATO, then I think we can win it. [Pause]

RogersMr. President, one thing I meant to say, I don't think the Russians have a real interest in mutual and balanced force reductions. They they opposed that. This is months ago NATO was pushing this hard

Rogersand they were under some pressure. And I think Brosio really got an invitation to visit the conference. Now this is something that continually they put pressure. Every Eastern European

Rogersambassador talks about this first issue whenever Mr. Gromyko talks to you about it, he's talked a lot about it. This is a major item in their foreign policy. And I think their approach to mutual and balanced force reductions is ancillary to that.

RogersI think they're say- they're willing to say, "Well, if you want to talk about that in the conference, okay, we'll put it on the on the agenda." Actually what they're proposing now, I think, although they're careful on it is, is this: They say, "Yeah, go ahead and put that on the agenda." But the understanding is

Rogersthat we can't handle it in the conference, and that we'll panel a subsequent conference, set up some dispute to handle mutual and balanced force reductions after the conference.

RogersSo, I'm quite convinced that this is a device for refusing to get the conference underway. I don't think I don't think we're going to be faced with any great pressure yet for mutual and balanced force negotiations [unintelligible]

Rogersunder great pressure to start working on the conference, that these preliminary conferences.

RogersWe don't have any support, incidentally, for delay on the conference idea. Every Every, well, I shouldn't say every, the British portion, though, will support us,

Rogersbut It's a follow-the-leader situation in in Western Europe. Everybody's running, you know, to anticipate everybody else. And the the French are using it to kill off MBFR,

Rogersthey want to delay MBFR, and to not to be outstripped by the Germans in

KissingerOne of these, that and that, and also, why should one step another, why step, and turn it on?

RogersI don't know any area that's too persuasive, but except for France and maybe Britain, everyone else has been enthusiastic about this from the beginning. All the Scandinavian countries have certainly been for it. Italy Italy has been strongly for it because of the socialists'

Rogerssupport. Uh The British had been, matter of fact they've

Rogersalso suggested permanently machinery that this was not a Russian idea. This was an This is a British idea that was conveyed up on. Yeah. So, it's except for France, which is, which would rather get off the MBFR thing,

Rogersthe rest of them want it. They do it because they think there's a deal, political support at home for that kind of a side view. And because all the Eastern European countries seem keen too, and Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania.

LairdSooner or later, the Russians probably will seek those because of the pressure. And I think that hope might uh support as far as the NATO country's concerned was a very important one

Lairdand uh really put some mustard into that suit for us right now.

MoorerAdmiral Moorer, Mr. President. I like to assure you that some of our NATO allies have a slight suspicion that we are trying to use the MBFR, so-called, as a

Mooreras an adjustment and definitely not a unilateral withdrawal. In addition to that, I think that we also have a problem of securing the part of the make-up for the force improvements

Mooreruh does not uh fall by the wayside, while we're talking on one hand about improving forces, and on the other hand, about making reductions. I think it's very important now that we work very closely with the uh allies uh

Moorerall across the board, and assure them that uh we are uh making uh a forthright approach to the problem, and that yet have a voice on the manner that, and ways and means of approaching the problem. The British have made a study, the Germans have made a a study,

Moorerand uh and by and large, both of their studies have uh for instance uh, come to the conclusion that uh reductions would uh uh not uh certainly contribute to security, they'd make it worse.

MoorerOn the other hand, the Russians, if you read the various statements that they have made, they continually object to the word "balance." They say the word "balance" uh means that uh we're going to have a precondition at a discussion, and double what we're going to start out by making an assist that they make the cut. Otherwise, they really reject the concept.

MoorerAnd I think that uh, both in the case of the MBFR and the CES discussions, uh we should uh recognize in the outset that uh one of the key attempts of the Soviets that they make is to divide the United States from their NATO allies. And they will be trying to do that at every turn.

MoorerAnd uh one that they do every time.

RogersAnother concern, I believe, of our European allies is, one is the fear of unilateral reductions by us, and the other is that we will negotiate an MBFR bilaterally with the Soviet Union,

Rogerswithout bringing them in. And I think we should do what we can, however it comes about, if it comes about, it'll be done with them. It would be very important.

LairdI think the Soviets are planting stories around Europe at the present time that prior to the president's visit he may the Soviets may announce a unilateral reduction themselves.

LairdWhy, there's no question [unintelligible] whether they will or not, but I'm sure that there are ones that are hiding that uh around in all of the European capitals right now because in our conversations we have to we have so many of these NATO officials and others over there,

Lairdand they they feel that would you want to some sort of a spot if they announced a 5% reduction or a 10% reduction prior to the time

Lairdthat the president gets there, Soviet Union.

KissingerWell, the puzzle is they've got to reduce 20,000, 30,000 to move them into Russia. It wouldn't be tough.

LairdPolitically for us, if they did that. Now whether they will, I don't believe they will, because I don't see how they can do that, because from a military standpoint, that's just stupid for them.

RogersNow, they could still work toward burden-sharing in our standard approach to NATO discussions.

MoorerWell, I think the burden-sharing has been tougher because we have, until recently, we've taken the position that what we wanted was, was our allies to strengthen their forces.

LairdWell, burden-sharing is going forward in four different ways, and we can't get that burden-sharing discussion only over on the dollars and argue with them. I think that the president

Lairdhas made a great contribution by pointing out the other three ways to look at burden-sharing. First, through improving their own forces. Secondly, through procurement in the United States to help our balance-of-payments situation.

Lairdand the uh statement of the NATO Council again when it was in Ireland, I think set the context of of which we should look at burden sharing and we should stay within that definition that statement the President has set. Now there are these other ways to share the burden.

LairdTaking over more of the responsibilities as far as uh the military requirements, taking over a greater responsibility as far as the logistics requirements, taking over a greater responsibility as far as uh combat effectiveness of the forces that are stationed there, modernization of those forces.

LairdAll of these things are ways to share the burden as far as the security of Western Europe is concerned. And it isn't just a question of the dollars. In the United States I get a little bit concerned as we push when we're getting the uh getting in a position and I can get tough

Lairdas far as uh these uh offsets and everything else and it's an important part of burden sharing, but that can never be the only part of burden sharing as far as uh maintaining the strength of that alliance. Well, talking

Rogersabout an offset, I think that that's going to be settled within the next two or three weeks reasonably satisfactorily. And I talked to Helmut yesterday about it. I think we can work out the offset thing. Maybe we'll take care of it at the NATO meeting. But putting that aside for the moment,

Rogerswhen we talk about burden sharing, we have convinced our allies that we're talking about direct contribution uh from them to us. Now, we have taken the other line before, and say, "Well, what we want them to do is not to pay for us, not to pay for our men,

Rogerspay us, support these forces, but to improve their own forces." And well, they also they say within their country, they're willing to do that.

Lairdthat they're willing to do part of that, but they don't want it all to be just a question of that. I mean, we've we can't we can't let them back away from the alliance defense mind for the next five years, and the spend out in the AD70 study for their force improvements, because every time that they do that, they're going to be taking it away

Lairdfrom these important force improvements, and it goes down through the next six or seven years, and so our aim is to have those force improvements by those countries themselves. And case uh uh How they done it?

RogersHow are they improving forces or the strength of forces?

LairdYes, they're they are beginning to make some improvements. Of course we have some agreements with the frankly to start from the four aircraft shelters with net 19s. It's going ahead uh and uh certainly they've started to improve on their logistics posture, particularly the uh the Germans, uh the British having uh uh announced that they will build some uh additional Jaguar jets, and so on. So they're making some minor improvements, but that's just a beginning.

RogersWell, the main We want them to make But if we keep

Lairdthe uh Take the German defense budget, it's gone up 13% this year. A 13% increase as far as the uh amount that is being devoted to military spending in that particular country. And in Great Britain recently,

Lairdthe uh Germans have been able to get an increase. It's no large increase, but it's an increase in the defense budget. At a time when these other NATO allies are showing some decrease. And I think that the British and the French in this area uh should be uh encouraged, because uh they are increasing their strength. And there are others that I think,

Lairdwell, Norway's a small country and everything else, but they are showing increases, it is not it is a major thing as far as the security is concerned, but it uh, [unintelligible] uh, as far as their defense budget. They haven't done the job that should be done. But when we talk about burden-sharing,

Lairdthey've got to also share a part of this burden, too. Uh, and part partly it's tied up with the force improvements they have to make. And we don't want it all on the basis of the dollars that they contribute to the support of our force. We want to get as many dollars as we can

Lairdthat will uh that direct benefit to supporting German nationals, supporting our forces, and those things are all fine. But, we can't just place burden sharing only in that context. Uh, I think it's most important that we keep uh the uh the program going the way you laid it out.

LairdAnd we've met with those NATO people there in Naples. Uh, I just saw that that was uh uh unfortunate that uh and uh I don't think we should back away from that, because we're strong in that position. Well, it's true, you're taking on some of that. And the second response,

Rogerson the other hand, [unintelligible] 10% reduction in air force. So that, that group's response I'm willing to buy that. [unintelligible] Well, I'll tell you this, that's a difficult call [unintelligible] the socialist

Lairdgovernment of the Federal Republic of Germany. Uh I'm uh uh we've done better with them than I thought was possible.

LairdAnd we have some friends there that uh understands the security needs of Europe. We have some in that government that don't. Uh, and it's important that we encourage those who do.

RogersWhat about the Warsaw Pact? What are they up to?

MoorerMr. President, you'll recall that we uh went over this uh last June. In preparation for this meeting today, I went over the situation again. The Warsaw Pact forces, their state of readiness change very little. They still got about the same number of divisions at full readiness. They've got the same tactical aircraft behind,

Moorerand effectively, they changed their order of battle uh practically not at all, I mean, not significantly. The uh we hear rumors that uh they are considering in 1972, the Russians are, maybe a reduction of their forces in East Germany. But, I've got an idea this is all related to this matter here,

Moorertrying to soften this up and uh make themselves look friendly and so forth, just practical matter. They've done nothing to this point.

LairdOur forces are in a better shape in Europe right today than they have been at any time since the Vietnam War started, as far as uh readiness. This is uh quite important, I think, this kind of improvement, although I don't think we should shy away from stress,

Lairdfor it has some problems with these forces. You'll remember we are cutting back 60,000 spaces uh in the year, and they have to encompass, you get 50,000 man-years reduction and uh uh it isn't an end strength. It's 50,000

Lairdin man-years, and we're forced to do it in, it's might take 100,000 men. So we may be slightly, we'll have maybe 10,000 short in March in Europe. But we'll make that 10,000 up just right after the start of the uh next fiscal year,

Lairduh because we've got this we have to compress to get these man-years in, in uh two-quarters. So, we will be short uh 10,000 spaces in March, but we'll make those particular spaces up uh early in the fiscal year. That isn't bad.

LairdI mean, when we when we took office uh we were short uh uh some 30,000 spaces.

FarleyWell, I think that is pretty well understood. Oh, yeah.

UnknownThey're not going to be [unintelligible] talk.

Nixon, National Security Council & Rogers on European Security Conference

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Nixon, National Security Council & Rogers on European Security Conference

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NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on December 1, 1971

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