Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 86 › Conversation 086-001

Nixon, Helms & Moorer on India-Pakistan conflict and Soviet Union

Thursday, December 9, 1971 · 4:41 PM–4:56 PM ET · Cabinet Room · 16 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Irwin, John N., II; Packard, David; Helms, Richard M.; Moorer, Thomas H. (Adm.); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation086-001 on Tape 86StartThursday, December 9, 1971 at 4:41 PMEndThursday, December 9, 1971 at 4:56 PMRecording deviceCabinet RoomSourceNixon Library record for 086-001 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon met with senior administration officials, including Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms, and Admiral Thomas Moorer, to discuss urgent foreign policy concerns regarding the escalating India-Pakistan conflict and the geopolitical maneuvering of the Soviet Union. The participants evaluated the risks posed by Soviet involvement in the region and the potential for broader international instability. The meeting served to align the administration's strategic stance on these pressing global security challenges.

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NARA Description

On December 9, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, John N. Irwin, II, David Packard, Richard M. Helms, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 4:41 pm and 4:56 pm. The Cabinet Room taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 086-001 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 86-1

Date: December 9, 1971
Time: 4:41 pm - unknown before 4:56 pm
Location: Cabinet Room

The President met with John N. Irwin, II, David Packard, Richard M. Helms, Admiral Thomas
H. Moorer, and Henry A. Kissinger
[Recording begins while the conversation is in progress]

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     The President’s meeting with Soviets

     India/Pakistan conflict

The President left at 4:54 pm

[To listen to the segment (15m33s) declassified on 02/28/2002, please refer to RC# E-569.]

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Recording ends at an unknown time before 4:56 pm

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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I shouldn't have said that.
Well, let me get into the problem now.
Because he's a very important professional.
He's a professional who has very, very high goals for our communities.
Actually, I have high goals for him, too.
But at the present time, there is a very, very great love for him.
He's a great person.
As an example, three years ago, we made progress on the installment of the program.
We made so much progress on the program that it was possible to engage in discussions on a number of other subjects, including trade, very positive discussions about production, and of course the future of Europe, etc.
etc.
In present time, however, we hadn't realized that what was happening in the southern continent was seriously jeopardizing the possibilities of success in the highest continent.
Because this was a test of our relations, the two of us who end up on different portions of the continent.
I pointed out, of course, their support of India, of course, the support of the Chinese, and my support of India.
We're accomplishing several extraordinary objectives.
The embarrassment of the Chinese,
The discovery of Pakistan, who had made them say that they were excited for the Chinese, and that those were Japanese ones they had to consider.
However, I said we have to weigh that against the fact that this is an action of the subcontinent that we're seeing, and so on and so forth.
I was certain that I had been poisoned.
I argued with my agent.
I asked him what he had to say.
I brought the patient back to him, and he seemed to be wary.
I explained to him about the agent's name.
Then, it comes to me.
I walked into this picture here.
I didn't even know where I was.
I know that most of those cinematic visions take an attitude which the first eyes of everybody else should take.
That is, well, we've got six or seven people in the room.
Six or seven people in the room.
And if a democracy does something, apply one standard, a dictatorship does something, apply another standard, democracy engages.
That's the action.
I have said this several times, and because I am not a people founder, and not a founder,
I don't think the impression is going to cross that.
I want to be clearly understood that it is my duty that the United States stands by and does nothing, and allows the Russians, the Indians, with Russian support, not only to overrun this Pakistan, which now is a borderline institution,
and move their forces to West Pakistan, destroy the armed forces, for the will or the ability to resist in West Pakistan.
I believe the repercussions in terms of world order matters.
We cannot just take what I know as a conventional diplomatic line.
It's been coming out of state for years, and every crisis has come out of state.
And some of it ends the same.
That is, letting the dust settle until we no longer see the grave.
That's all right, it's not my policy.
And after all, none of the rest of the elected I wills.
My policy, I have laid out, it's not pro-Egypt, and it isn't anti-Egypt, and it isn't pro-Pakistan or anti-Pakistan.
But there is one principle, that is that the internal problems in one country affects another.
It would not justify the use of aggression against that country.
This is, that's why it's not wrong, this is because...
This is our people.
We understand who the rest of you are.
We probably shouldn't care about either of you.
We just want to report a great burden to the rest of you, not just to us, but to the public office.
But out of the circumstances, I'm very interested in that.
The United States must make an effort.
It will be, but it cannot be a success.
We require this.
We must make an effort.
to impress the Indians, just as I've already impressed the Russians, with the fact that the continuation of Indian aggression in Pakistan and the continuation of West Pakistan will lead to many consequences that would be
that would endanger the relations of not just people, because they don't do that, but they do the relations with Russia.
So, what can we do?
Well, first, I want you to do a little bit of a jury process.
The number of Americans in both countries, and I want you to carry it with you.
The second point is that I would like to do

— 1 min 2 s with no transcribed speech —

against West Pakistan can have very certain consequences.
The United States has certain obligations here.
They can't even, just as the Soviet Union has certain obligations, they can't have certain obligations.
Pakistan necessarily has certain obligations here.
And also, I want you to get a assurance from the Indian ambassador, a direct assurance,
that they are not going to annex any Pakistani currency in West Pakistan or East.
Just let him say that.
No annexation.
Perfect.
If he does not say that...
The fact that you've asked, we kind of have a situation where any of these, that we can move, actually, is, as I understand it, now moving west, with the thought of changing ourselves in the future, otherwise, the annexation will not happen.
Strongest thing is how, as far as I can promise that this brings her, is that we appreciate everybody.
It's very difficult for us to see, just to try, to listen to us.
I take this decision.
I don't ask the State Department to be loyal to the president, but I do expect them to be loyal to this president.
It's all true.
Where is it?
Where do you want to carry it?
The Arabian Sea or the Gulf?
The Arabian Sea or the Gulf.
Why not beforehand?
Gilbert's going to do some good, which is Karachi and so forth.
Maybe he's still got some left.
All that.
You have to move that carrier for us anyway.
Let me talk to him about how much of an announcement he wants.
For two days, nobody knows where the hell the thing is going.
That's what I understand.
Let's not make a public announcement where the thing is going yet.
You simply let me know when you want me to leave, and I'll leave it.
What I'm going to do is make it have to go to a point where we can decide where we want it to go up into the...
Wait a minute, you will not move it through this train, so whatever it is they can get locked in for without any power, it doesn't go up to the same good goal.
I mean, you have to...
I didn't know I had this problem when I got up here.
I don't know if I said it or I didn't speak of it, but I have a problem with it.
I think I'm a little curious about that anyway.
Just to say this is the problem.
The president has told us that the Soviets are in this position and are coming in this position fast.
Something doesn't have to be fast, right?
There is a problem.
There is a problem.
Yes, that's the reason I worry.
I don't think any of us will be left here.
They can't act like that anymore.

Also recorded on December 9, 1971

  • 634-009 3:32 PM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Jaime Arguelles, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:32 pm to 3:36 pm.
  • 634-010 3:36 PM · 28 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:36 pm and 3:57 pm.
  • 634-011 3:57 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:57 pm to 3:59 pm.
  • 634-012 4:00 PM · 41 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Vladimir V. Marskevich, Yuli M. Vorontsov, Henry A. Kissinger, unknown person(s), and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:00 pm to 4:41 pm.
  • 634-013 4:54 PM · 25 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:54 pm and 4:56 pm.
  • 634-014 4:54 PM · 37 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:54 pm and 4:56 pm.
  • 634-015 4:56 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:56 pm to 4:59 pm.
  • 634-016 4:59 PM · 53 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John B. Connally met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:59 pm to 5:54 pm.

All 44 conversations from December 9, 1971 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 086-001, December 9, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/086-001 (accessed November 2, 2026).