Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 092-001
Date: Tuesday, February 29, 1972 at 10:07 AM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Ellender, Allen J.; Mansfield, Michael J. ("Mike"); Byrd, Robert C.; Fulbright, J. William; Stennis, John C.; McGee, Gale W.; Scott, Hugh; Griffin, Robert P.; Smith, Margaret Chase; Aiken, George D.; Young, Milton R.; Goldwater, Barry M.; Hébert, F. Edward; Morgan, Thomas E. ("Doc") (Dr.); Mahon, George H.; Ford, Gerald R.; Arends, Leslie C.; Mailliard, William S.; Bow, Frank T.; Kissinger, Henry A.; MacGregor, Clark; Cook, Richard K.; Korologos, Thomas C.; Ziegler, Ronald L.; Rogers, William P.; Green, Marshall; White House photographer
Recording device: Cabinet Room
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/092-001

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[9:06] I saw a box of tickets, and I just wanted to know if it was non-alcoholic or something.
[9:12] This is nothing of any value, except that it seems to me that you're talking about something that's gone.
[9:25] I want to say that it must have been a credit to Mrs. Nixon before, when she was running around.
[9:35] Yeah, it's one of those boxes which is quite common.
[9:44] The first time a president brought one home.
[9:46] We don't have to report it anymore.
[9:49] The way it goes to
[10:02] And in a rather ordered way, I think a meeting would be helpful to everybody concerned.
[10:09] Not that I want to have people in person, because we always do at these meetings, interrupt any time you've got a question or any of that sort of thing.
[10:18] But here's what I had in mind, that I have a general overview.
[10:23] I'll then call on Bill to give us not only an analysis of particularly of the areas of trade and exchange that he's discussing with the board, but also the whole foreign reactions and foreign communications, particularly the Asian countries.
[10:50] And then he'll have an up to date report on this and also give you an indication of where we're going.
[10:56] And I told you Marshall agreed to be visiting several of these countries.
[11:01] So he's on that trip already.
[11:03] He had that last night before he left, and we had an hour with Marshall, among many good things.
[11:13] Henry will follow the action, too, because he sat in, and this is their custom, he sat in the meetings, the meetings that I had, and they, and Mao had one man sit in the center, and Henry will follow to pick up matters on a specific basis that may have come up in the meetings that I may not cover in my overview.
[11:44] Uh, the, uh, I, I seldom say that leaders read the speeches.
[11:51] I mean, I've made too many to know, and tried to read too many to know that it's a waste of time.
[12:02] I mean, uh, I know you all read congressional records cover to cover, but I don't, but, uh,
[12:08] I would say to those around this table, and that's all of you who are interested in a substantive statement as to what we did and what was agreed to, that you could one, of course, be indicated implicitly
[12:28] and then read the remarks I made when I returned last time, which was in very direct language, which is what I originally, I carefully altered back, and it represents what would happen.
[12:44] What I consider to be the significance of this.
[12:47] What we agreed to is what we did not agree to.
[12:49] I was to get through, it isn't long, I think it's no more than a thousand words.
[12:53] I was to get through in words.
[12:56] I'm not going to go into that.
[13:00] I mean, I may repeat some of the things I said there, because I understand the public address system wasn't working well last night, and those who were standing around didn't hear what I said.
[13:15] But there was a situation .
[13:19] Now, let me come to the, to some of the over,
[13:27] I think perhaps it would be.
[13:39] with a description of the meetings that occurred, how they were undertaken, why they had to proceed in the way that they did.
[13:58] The meeting with Mao was a meeting only between him and me.
[14:08] That is his custom.
[14:09] He had with him his prime minister, Zhou Enlai, and he had
[14:21] suggested, to show my suggestion.
[14:23] And of course, the sector interpreters, that was all.
[14:28] Some nonsense has been written to the effect that that was a downgrade in the Secretary of State.
[14:34] It was not at all, because their system
[14:40] that the floor minister is the fifth-ranking person in protocol, and if he had been the fifth-ranking person in protocol, if he'd had him, he would have had three others, which would have made it, rather than a first-time agent, which is what they wanted.
[15:00] And of course, it would have been just a matter of seconds.
[15:06] So that was the reason for that.
[15:10] The reason was, as Laurie said before, I cannot give you the context, but to say that it was just, he's very direct.
[15:27] He has a very lumpy sense of romance.
[15:32] He has a, his reaction time is quick.
[15:36] He basically talks in terms of the picture.
[15:40] Actually, it's the details to Joe Amai and to others, in particular to Joe Amai.
[15:49] My guess is that he probably watched the details carefully, but in the meetings that he had with me, it was more,
[16:03] a discussion in general, I suppose, of the significance of the visit, why we were here, and so forth.
[16:13] It was one that could be described as not only proper, but one that, where despite both of us, a, our own
[16:31] stating our own views strongly and appropriately with regard to our philosophy and with regard to our foreign policy gets done in, as distinguished from some meetings that occur in the Western world, and for that matter with other instances I have met, done in without rank, with much more scrutiny.
[17:02] Now, a word about Joe Klein.
[17:10] He is 73 years of age, and after going 20 hours with him in conversations, and that's just, that's just the ones we had pride of him.
[17:22] And of course, he ate him at dinners.
[17:26] I was able to get a very good impression of him and of course as I think all of you realize
[17:41] They were measuring us just as we were measuring them.
[17:46] We didn't know them, they didn't know us.
[17:50] Joe and I, as the vitality of someone of 40 to 45,
[18:03] He works about 18 hours a day.
[18:05] He works far into the night.
[18:07] Which horses who ever sees him work not so far into the night, as I heard.
[18:15] And he's a, and has qualities of,
[18:19] of ability and conversation that are quite outstanding.
[18:21] That would put it in, let me try to put it in perspective this way, these are things that I would not talk about publicly, but I think it's good to give you a feel of the kind of people we're dealing with.
[18:37] I have met, as many of you have, many foreign leaders.
[18:39] I've met most of them since World War II, most of them were major leaders.
[18:42] I did not see Churchill at his best, but I did know him for a long time.
[18:44] Well, first of all, National, Gasparino, Yoshida, and so on.
[19:00] and there and so forth and so on.
[19:03] And I think each of them has had, when they get to the highest rung of the ladder in their systems, each of them have certain great abilities.
[19:20] I would say that in terms of first an understanding of the world and an interest in the world,
[19:29] I expected him to be primarily as he was in our bilateral relations and in Asia generally.
[19:45] But what he demonstrated was that
[19:49] He was interested in discussing the specific tactical problems of what happens in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and so forth, in a much broader context.
[20:01] In other words, there was a man who was a world leader of the first rank.
[20:09] He knows, has known most of the leaders of the world around, and he demonstrated that in his understanding.
[20:19] This is also true of our city council.
[20:23] He both had done their homework on Punk, the man they'd been talking to, to an extraordinary degree.
[20:33] I mean, I had read what they had said.
[20:36] It's all usually in the background.
[20:39] What kind of people are they?
[20:41] What do they do?
[20:42] What are you going to talk about?
[20:44] But I was really amazed to find how much they knew about me.
[20:50] And while they were extremely polite, they knew what the press said about me, and I said, well, I can deal with it, but I just didn't believe what the press said about me, and I won't believe what the press says about you.
[21:03] But nevertheless, whatever the case might be,
[21:09] background, and they didn't do it in any other, in any way that, in any way that was appropriate.
[21:17] And that case, I hope that it enabled them as they conducted the conversation, something very much related to my own background, whether it be a personal background, a political background, and so forth and so on.
[21:38] They were also picking on Joe and I.
[21:43] surprising and very much up to date on developments in the United States, on comments in the United States about this trip that had been made by a number of people around this table.
[21:57] And it was a day-by-day, he had much good news on the kind of combat state in the world.
[22:03] In other words, there was a man who had showed an extraordinary capacity
[22:10] to prepare for the meeting.
[22:13] I had never met a man in all the people that I had met in world travels who was better prepared than he was for his meetings.
[22:20] He knew me, he knew the tactical subjects, many that I'd met.
[22:29] But he also, in addition to that, had an understanding of the broader perspective and was able to talk about the technical matters in a world framework with very great value.
[22:51] Now, I'm also worried about Tolman with him.
[22:57] He is a man who, that any of you would like to talk to.
[23:02] I think Bill and Henry would agree that he's a man of charm and a great sense of humor.
[23:14] A man who's never ruled or anything of the sort.
[23:25] But a man who, despite the turn of the killer, is locked in the hall.
[23:32] is utterly strong, determined, totally dedicated to his principles.
[23:39] There was never any question about that.
[23:43] And this would be true of all the leaders of the faculty.
[23:50] Perhaps because they were Chinese, not because of anything else, perhaps because they were Chinese, in terms of their personal conduct for us,
[24:01] were always and conducted themselves with great discretion and very very courtesy and all the rest but no one could make a greater mistake than to assume that on our part the ways
[24:26] for us to proceed with that, is to assume that if we were discerning, courteous, and the rest of you don't get along swimmingly, they knew exactly what they were doing.
[24:38] They were doing that because, not because they were trying to taste it, because that is their way, that is their way of conducting discussion.
[24:49] But in terms of the substance, the substance was
[24:56] all the words, charm, and so forth, on our part, not on theirs, was direct, was concrete.
[25:04] It was they who suggested, and we were very glad to agree, that the community
[25:12] take the very unusual form of not saying we agree about this and that and the other thing and leaving out the things that we disagree with.
[25:21] Say, we want to stay where our position is or we disagree with what your statement, your position is.
[25:27] There are other reasons they want to do that, too.
[25:31] They have their problem after 22 years of saying that we are, of course, international imperialists, bandits, etc., etc., etc., the things that they've said of it.
[25:45] That's rough for what we have here in common.
[25:48] And under certain circumstances, we're gonna have to turn around right away to have great crowds and welcome.
[25:54] But I can say we all love each other.
[25:57] Friendship is always there.
[25:58] It's always just a state in the past.
[26:00] It just wouldn't go.
[26:02] They would not be able to sell it there.
[26:04] And may I say we didn't sell it here, although we had perhaps a little better chance of selling it today.
[26:12] So, a word about, that's enough to give you the flavor of what the meetings were.
[26:18] In the, I would also say, in terms of the discussion, it was, it required on the part of both sides, and this is true of Bill's situation, I found it in checking with Henry that in his meetings in July and October, when he had long come to Joe and I, it was through him,
[26:44] are always just between two people.
[26:48] In the plenary sessions, they went through the motions of calling on various people, and they were very, they were basically performed.
[26:55] But in the discussions that I had with Joe and I, and the one I had with Moss and Tom, it was just one, two, one, two.
[27:04] Only now and then would there be any terms that Joe and I, myself for example, we both sat there with nothing in front of us.
[27:14] with no nose, right in the back of his arm, and ran over the problems of the world that were around us.
[27:22] So the takers, of course, took John Henry and the court, I suppose, on the arrest.
[27:29] And for one small thing, you ask, do they know English?
[27:35] I did not try to put him out.
[27:38] He probably had some pertain questions that Joe and I asked, but he often corrected the translator.
[27:48] He would correct him, only him or her if they used him.
[27:51] in tandem, and they were excellent boatmen.
[27:53] And we, of course, had our Chinese man over, and he did not translate.
[27:59] He was there just to listen.
[28:01] He told us afterwards that there was never one deviation in the translation.
[28:06] They were meticulously correct in the translation.
[28:10] But the caretaker of Joe and my office, he only had the tone of reflection of the word that he said, and he would speak the English version of what was done, but he couldn't speak it out.
[28:22] So that gave him a lot of attention, because I sat there when the Chinese, they were going on to have the slightest notion of what they were talking about.
[28:30] And while I was talking, he probably didn't understand totally what I was saying.
[28:34] He naturally could take that time as the translation went on.
[28:38] He was on here again.
[28:41] And as I was speaking, he would have a pretty good idea of what I already said.
[28:46] And then translating would be made.
[28:47] And he got that much more time to work on it.
[28:49] So I thought you'd be interested in a little of the background.
[28:54] And the background is far and broad.
[28:57] There's a little now premise.
[29:01] a better understanding of where we are.
[29:05] As far as the substance is concerned,
[29:10] I think, as I said, if you take the time to read, it's more important to me and more important because I summarize it in a language that is rather more easy to understand for the American audience.
[29:31] I read a remark I made last night at the airport.
[29:36] We indicated the areas of the district and the fundamental areas of the region.
[29:43] The agreements with regard to trade, regard to chain, regard to .
[29:55] how we can have a channel of communication in the future.
[30:01] Let me spend a little time on that at this point, because this is something that many of you, all of you will understand, but some of the people you have to talk to may not.
[30:16] You will know that we say that we will find a way to have our discussions continue in the future.
[30:26] We have to state it rather indirectly because we have this problem.
[30:31] While we can vote King, they cannot come to Washington as long as we recognize another government.
[30:43] So under these circumstances, therefore, the communications channel cannot be in terms of their sending an emissary here.
[30:51] The channel has to be one where the bar is heading in directly, capital, capital, and American may go there.
[31:01] On the other hand,
[31:04] We do understand that there must be a place where we can meet.
[31:08] And so that will be in a third country.
[31:14] We will work out a country within a matter of actually three weeks.
[31:16] And an announcement will be made as to where the medications can take place in that third country.
[31:21] It's probably the best in the real world.
[31:34] How about we're about,
[32:04] Okay, and so far as it deals with the American commitments, they see it as their standard position, a position that they hold very clearly, that the United States should aggregate its infantry and, of course, Taiwan, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and basically the United States should withdraw all of its forces
[32:33] Wherever they may be, not only from Vietnam, but from Asia, China, we have actions to not accept them.
[32:44] At least they did our position to the contrary.
[32:47] With regard to Taiwan, I think it's significant to note that the
[32:54] that because of almost unbelievably unspecific reporting that there has been a pressure created here in the United States that what we did on our part was to go to
[33:19] And there, on Taiwan, indicate that as a Washington Post headline, which was, I think, perhaps in terms of totally misrepresented due to what it did not say.
[33:33] The conclusion of the meeting is that perhaps as for a responsible paper,
[33:42] As an actor, have you ever seen the impression she created that the United States had made, basically,
[33:54] It did not say, but it was in fact, as I, as the communication states very clearly, as I stated last time,
[34:16] But I have often stated to people around this table, it applies not only to China, it applies also to our forces all over the world.
[34:31] And it is one that the United States will reduce its forces.
[34:37] in Taiwan.
[34:39] As the situation decreases, that's the next development.
[34:44] I mean, we have a desire to maintain forces all over the world, certainly for the sake of maintaining them.
[34:53] And as tensions increase in America, the United States policy is to reduce its forces.
[34:59] We are trying to reduce them.
[35:02] But the second question is,
[35:07] the United States believes that a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue would be in the interest of a more stable situation in Asia.
[35:19] That has been our position and still is our position.
[35:24] And then we go on to say that
[35:28] and having in mind the fact that goal of a peaceful settlement, if there is a peaceful settlement, we will draw our forces to power.
[35:38] More importantly, what are we talking about here as a force?
[35:42] I was here in Sonoma.
[35:44] The senator should have known better.
[35:47] He had 30,000, 40,000, 50,000 people.
[35:49] How many do we have?
[35:51] that were there prior to the war in Vietnam.
[35:56] 2,000.
[36:01] You know what they were there for?
[36:04] Not for the defense of Taiwan.
[36:06] They were based mainly on intelligence forces.
[36:09] So what we're talking about basically is that as the war is to get done, and that is clearly, naturally, the expectations in the area increase.
[36:21] the forces that are related to our effort in Vietnam would be coming back, just as they would be coming back, but being from Vietnam and from other areas where they're related to our effort in Vietnam.
[36:40] As far as the balance in 2000 is concerned, the assembly has said that that balance will be withdrawn as progress, as a piece of the settlement of
[36:52] And then of course, as you noted, speaking generally of our situation in Asia, and this is for all over the world, neither side, neither they or we, and this was an equal deal, aggregated any of our commitments.
[37:15] So much for that.
[37:17] Now, moving to that part of the Medicaid that is long term results is perhaps the most important.
[37:36] We agree that both governments do not use the term renounce force in international relations.
[37:51] But we do say that what we do say does
[37:54] does have that very dynamic implication.
[38:01] What we do say is that we will use
[38:14] and conducting our policies in a way that's for each other, without the threat of or the use of force.
[38:23] This is an enormously important point.
[38:30] It also indicates that as far as that neither of us seeks to dominate Haiti, and that neither of, and that both of us are opposed
[38:42] This is, of course, a very important one.
[38:53] Yet, looking to the future, of course, states in terms of our common interests and normalization of relations and our common interests in starting to build this long process of a better relation between the two countries.
[39:16] Now, let me get onto some cold turkey.
[39:21] What brought us together?
[39:26] Reporters have indicated that observers indicated that what brought us together is that, well, they vote in China tonight.
[39:34] The public in China and the United States realize that we shouldn't have those.
[39:44] that it reads from their philosophy.
[39:45] They weren't all that far apart.
[39:46] And that if we just didn't know each other better, that everything would be a lot better for each other.
[39:51] Not true at all.
[39:51] Getting to know each other better will reduce the possibility of miscalculation.
[39:56] And that we have respect for, because we do have an understanding.
[40:05] And I know them, and they know me.
[40:06] I would hope that would be true of whoever else resents this office review.
[40:12] That means that we'll be talking to them.
[40:15] And rather than having that, that inevitable road of miscalculation, and miscalculation, the miscalculation incidentally led to their intervention in Korea, which might have been avoided in this kind of contact at that point.
[40:39] The second part is that,
[40:43] My brothers gathered in the States and said, we're going to change our beliefs.
[40:49] They had very, very fun.
[40:52] I am dedicated to our system.
[40:58] I was totally different from the communists.
[41:03] And as I go there today, the totalitarian paradigm, it was not our common beliefs.
[41:10] What are, frankly, our common interests and our common hopes?
[41:14] What are those common interests?
[41:16] One is the interest that both of us have in maintaining our integrity and our independence.
[41:25] And second is the hope that each of us has
[41:28] to try to build a structural peace in the Pacific and going beyond that into the world.
[41:38] And on that point, that means that despite a total gulf, a gulf that won't continue to exist as long as their comments, as long as we're basically a group of total gulf police, that people of different faiths, of different polices,
[41:57] have gotten to find a way to live together in this world.
[42:01] And that leads to the People's Republic of China and the United States of America.
[42:08] the most powerful nation in the world, and the most populous nation in the world, if we do not find a way to, despite our differences, to have discussions.
[42:22] We are on a delayed course, years ahead, and we should be very, very serious.
[42:26] If we do find a way, we do have discussions, as we have started, in a sense.
[42:35] There is a better chance that we will not have that collision course years ahead.
[42:43] Word about the future.
[42:46] They are the first to say that they are not a super power.
[42:53] They say that they have mentioned this publicly.
[42:57] They do not, they say they do not want to talk about it.
[43:01] 750 million Chinese
[43:04] will be a curve.
[43:12] One, of course, becomes more dedicated to ours, but have no doubt about their dedication to theirs, and have no doubt, too, about their determination.
[43:22] Henry is referred to as almost a fanatical situation, and they have, as we call them, fanatical monks, basically.
[43:34] Perhaps these are social talents.
[43:41] But the deadest man they were destined to become in a suppression of time because of their numbers of their people and because of their determination and their faith, a very, very dangerous force in the world.
[43:58] And so the question is whether to, at this point, deal with them on the basis, reciprocal basis that I've described, or wait.
[44:12] and then have to face whatever they may be, whatever their attitudes may be, 15, 20, 25 years from now, and they will be much, much stronger.
[44:26] The second point is that we have to bear in mind this relationship we have is a very delicate one.
[44:35] Haidoo Khan, the president of Pakistan, said to me when I was traveling, when I was out of office, he said relations between nations are based on trust.
[44:49] He says if you like each other, he doesn't mean you agree with each other, but he says if you're dying particularly, or you may have very, very
[45:00] opposed to the news, that you have to realize that trust is the important thing.
[45:07] Even more important than when you are closer to death.
[45:11] And he said, trust is a very thin thread.
[45:13] If it is broken, it is almost impossible to put it together again.
[45:23] So it is here with the Chinese.
[45:27] We have started a process
[45:30] based not on common beliefs.
[45:34] Our beliefs are far apart of the old.
[45:39] But based on, step by step, a trust, a trust in the fact that we are reliable, that we are strong, that we will keep our word,
[45:53] And if that is the case, we can continue to build in the years ahead.
[46:02] Our problem is much greater than theirs.
[46:06] believe they read everything that is said on the Senate floor, on the House floor, among the columns and the newspapers.
[46:16] I say that everything that matters comes to their attention.
[46:21] And like most lawyers, they do not distinguish between statements made by whoever happens to be president or by an authorized spokesman for administration and government policy.
[46:34] They then
[46:34] That's the United States.
[46:37] Actually, I am interested in explaining the situation.
[46:42] As far as government policy is concerned, that we in our country have a system in which criticism, disagreement, and so forth is the right of anybody, and that they must not assume that when somebody says something that is critical, that we're doing it that way.
[47:01] That's government policy.
[47:04] but that will be a problem.
[47:07] On the other side of the coin, we have to realize that while we have, in certain areas, in the beginning, as I said, in certain areas, they are limited, we are still poles apart from other areas.
[47:21] We must first expect, for example, that in our policies, there are some areas, in the context of this pact, towards the Mideast,
[47:31] and let alone those in Jordan, Vietnam, Japan, etc.
[47:36] Their views will be different from ours.
[47:38] We must expect that the United Nations and their publications and the rest, they will express their views when they're different from ours.
[47:50] Let's not assume that those views were expressed.
[47:52] That means, ah, this great decon has been worked out as a result of these journeys for peace.
[48:01] Is that it?
[48:02] Not it is at all.
[48:03] That's only some of the facts presented, which will always characterize our relations, just as it characterizes our relations.
[48:11] with whom we've had for a number of years.
[48:17] And we must see it in that context, and we must understand it, but we must use as great discretion as we can.
[48:24] And I'm speaking now in the relationship I'm not asking you to do it.
[48:29] We as an administration have attempted never to destroy the trust
[48:38] in the rather limited areas where we are now because that will mean we cannot build other areas where we can have some communication and eventually some degree of blockage.
[48:56] So many years ahead, today, despite this, we are going to be dedicated to their philosophy.
[49:07] And I would just say, finally, this one thing.
[49:15] I said last time, I always feel secure abroad.
[49:18] I'm glad that I went.
[49:20] I am impressed when I see the wonders of ancient China, the changes of modern China and all of this.
[49:31] But I'm also glad to get home.
[49:34] And I always come back with a new appreciation of what we have and that we ought never to take it for granted.
[49:43] I also
[49:45] a new realization of the need for us in this particular person not to become one of them, but to recognize that what you have in the world of people with dedication, with drive, with determination, with discipline, who know what they want, that a flabby
[50:13] soft world that by age, and eventually we, Americans, will not be able to survive in the world.
[50:25] What we need, therefore, is to dedicate certain beliefs, certain strength, and also do all right.
[50:38] That means, of course, that we continue, and this is one of our strengths, our debates, our criticisms are destructive of the rest.
[50:46] That makes us stronger.
[50:48] But it also means that we, on great times, that we look over the history of civilization over and over again.
[51:03] great civilizations as they become rich, as they become better educated, et cetera, almost inevitably seem to fall into the position because they lose their determination
[51:17] They lose their dedication, they lose their political assets.
[51:22] What we call their party terms, their level of country, their .
[51:35] that we did not in an arrogant sense, not in the sense that we have to nominate everybody because we don't, but we did it because the United States must play that kind of role.
[51:48] I think that we must play it, not because we wanted it, but because in the United States,
[51:57] We're withdrawing ourselves.
[51:58] Live as an island, come to ourselves.
[52:02] Whatever the matter would be, it would be that others who may want to come and support us.
[52:14] with that in person, but we have to do so.
[52:19] And so as I see it from the head, I believe that we, this country, can develop a policy, a policy to keep the United States strong, to require commitments around the world, but most importantly, and this is something that
[52:47] far and apart, but most importantly, what we have to do is to keep.
[52:57] As they cuss and try to do that, cuss and try to reinvigorate their people, reinvigorate their relatives, what we have to do is to re-inspire our people.
[53:08] Not re-inspire them in a warlike way, but re-inspire them in terms of dedication, strength,
[53:15] willingness to work based on what people believe.
[53:18] This is a conviction that I come back to.
[53:25] I said that in the final minutes.
[53:26] One announcement that I wish to make before I go to jail.
[53:30] People cover exchanges.
[53:32] You will note that the paragraph on exchanges in the context of political review is not because we do not suggest it.
[53:40] The reason it couldn't is because we don't have relations with it.
[53:44] And as you say, political leaders and so forth, we have to promise.
[53:50] On the other hand, I did, in our conversations with the prime minister, indicate that I thought it was important that we have a possibility.
[54:00] I pointed out that, I don't know how long I would be in this office, but the relationship we began is one that has had to go on after eight months.
[54:12] or five years, it's going to be something that's going to take you over 10 years, 20 years, 25 years, and it would be nice to ask sometimes the Republicans in the office that I presently hold, and that therefore we should have a bipartisan approach to these matters.
[54:34] It was the first vote in that direction.
[54:38] They're not building it in their own way, their Chinese way.
[54:43] He said that he has to take a note of the fact that Senator Mansfield and Senator Scott and so they're the majority leader of the Senate.
[54:57] And so he asked me to indicate that they
[55:06] that includes others, it does mean that as far as I'm concerned, if that is another step in a changing relation, that can be announced, will be announced today.
[55:24] The education, as far as the timing of it, will have to be worked out after we set up the channel.
[55:38] I mentioned this just recently before the meeting, Senator Scott and Senator Manson, when they told me they thought they could work with the reschedulers.
[55:55] Two things that I might say by way of general impressions, because I'm sure that everyone who has this experience has different impressions.
[56:06] I think the impression that was most outstanding as far as I was concerned was the total discipline of the society.
[56:15] It's difficult to explain because it's unbelievable.
[56:20] For example, when you walk along the street, or drive along the street, and they do the presence there with their vineyard, there seems to be no one paying attention.
[56:36] They glance at the cars that go by, but no one really looks.
[56:41] And this is hundreds and hundreds of people.
[56:45] You walk into a store, they all appear not to be looking.
[56:51] occasionally a side glance, but they won't look.
[56:55] If you attempt to speak to a crowd, just smile and attempt to say hello when you're surrounded by security people, they sort of melt into the forest the way deer do in the national parks.
[57:09] They just disappear.
[57:13] When it snowed, they had live brigades of people, hundreds and hundreds and hundreds out, under leaders, walking along the sidewalk.
[57:25] And they attended to, or seemed to be clearing the streets, but at a very slow pace, almost to the tragedy of the WPA.
[57:34] So you have an impression of a spiritless society, totally disciplined, totally controlled by the leaders.
[57:42] Even if the president says the leaders are dedicated to the system, they don't believe it.
[57:48] I think it's difficult to tell what the people believe.
[57:50] There's no way of telling.
[57:54] Everything they get is controlled.
[57:56] I get a prepared television program, and it's just watched by people.
[58:04] They have radio, which is all controlled, and they have the people daily.
[58:11] And they also have a summary of the world news, which is put out by the government.
[58:19] And it's circulated to, I think they told me something like 20 to 30 million people.
[58:27] To illustrate it,
[58:31] the authority that is unbelievable in our system.
[58:34] On the night of the acrobatic show in Shanghai, there was a little Chinese woman who had been following us around for some period.
[58:44] And I saw her speaking to Joe White.
[58:47] I said to the Foreign Minister, who's the girl?
[58:48] And she said, a woman.
[58:50] He said, she's a reporter for the People's Daily.
[58:52] I said, what is she doing?
[58:54] She said, she's getting approval for the morning's paper.
[59:00] She had front page of the paper and he was going over and saying his deadlines should be over here and making adjustments to the front page.
[59:08] Still, if I get interrupted, he's traumatized.
[59:11] I don't know how he does this, his ridiculous attention to detail.
[59:16] For example,
[59:18] The night of the acrobat, the night of not the acrobatics, but the night of the show, we had the stadium gate.
[59:25] It was all over the pumpers, the bench, the ping pong players, and so forth and so on.
[59:36] He left, I wonder why he left out.
[59:39] And a bit later, it was up to 2.30 in the morning, but it had started to snow.
[59:45] He personally set up an optional way to go by train.
[59:55] He personally wouldn't let the cars take off.
[1:00:01] When we had the dinner, the second night after being in Hong Kong, I noticed that there was a 12-course dinner, and I noticed that he looked at the menu very carefully, and then
[1:00:25] And he didn't do it because he would not marry these two sons of his.
[1:00:30] But the other people there told him, he said, did you know that the premier called last time very late and the whole thing had to be changed because he says, be sure you don't serve one day in Shanghai that he's already had on show.
[1:00:45] Small thing.
[1:00:46] I don't want anything to do with that, but he's submerged down.
[1:00:51] He's got tails.
[1:00:52] He's a man.
[1:00:52] Watch his hairy tail.
[1:00:54] And it still says, the little girl comes in and shows the mock-up of the picture.
[1:00:59] I've already proved it.
[1:01:01] It's an interesting idea.
[1:01:03] They came up with the idea of squeezing the last leg.
[1:01:07] Well I think along that point that he was paying particular attention probably to what was going on.
[1:01:32] But I cite that earlier to point out that the society is so disciplined that it's hard to understand it.
[1:01:42] And furthermore, you don't see any enthusiasm for the leaders at all.
[1:01:46] I mean, we went through the park, and I was with the president, and the doctors were following the president up front.
[1:01:53] And the girl and I was walking behind about 20 yards, and I was walking along the window, and there were a lot of people in the park.
[1:02:06] And there were all of us, and the doctors.
[1:02:08] No one spoke to him.
[1:02:11] Nobody looked at him.
[1:02:12] I couldn't believe that he didn't generate that kind of excitement.
[1:02:16] Now, they must have known who he was, but they...
[1:02:21] Everything about the society is totally different than I've been in Taiwan.
[1:02:27] And I must say that the contrast between the two is exciting.
[1:02:33] One is a busy, excited, moving, fast-moving group of people on the go.
[1:02:40] The other is a
[1:02:42] The communist system is totally disciplined.
[1:02:45] They can turn up a lot of work in a short period of time and build a great hall of the people, which is a magnificent building in 10 months.
[1:02:53] They build a railroad, not show it to them.
[1:02:55] Not show it, they say there's a runway and build a road in two months, so they can air it in their terminal.
[1:03:02] And they can turn it out, work very quickly, because they have so many people.
[1:03:07] But it's a totally different spirit.
[1:03:10] In one society, there seems to be, I can help to take out a Bronx Zoo.
[1:03:15] When I walk through the Bronx Zoo and just see the animals, they're all well fed, well clothed,
[1:03:21] reasonably good houses, but they just seem to have, life seems to be endless.
[1:03:28] You don't have any sense of happiness or pleasure.
[1:03:33] I was training for a moment, and this is obviously a superficial impression, but in a short time, I think the press all felt the same way.
[1:03:43] It really is quite unusual that you can get that many people in those streets, cities.
[1:03:50] under such strict control.
[1:03:52] In my discussions with the foreign minister, at one point he was talking about, he thought that turmoil was a good thing in itself, and I took issue with him on that, as you might expect.
[1:04:02] He said, and I said, you know, I don't understand why you say that, because in 50 countries in this country, he said one country was no turmoil.
[1:04:09] I've never seen such a placid group of people.
[1:04:13] He said you should have seen it during the Gulf Revolution.
[1:04:17] So maybe the impression that we have is quite superficial.
[1:04:24] Trying to promote the leadership.
[1:04:25] And I think the general impression, and I have to each time say these are superficial because we're only there a week, and it's difficult to compare the names.
[1:04:36] I want to say, I have several Chinese experts with me.
[1:04:39] I want to say that the money line is, after the revolution, before the revolution, they speak of it just as we do, B.C.
[1:04:47] and A.D.
[1:04:48] It was 20 years ago.
[1:04:50] These men who had been there before said that the people were much better fed and clothed.
[1:04:57] They all wanted to save clothing.
[1:04:59] It was all in the draft.
[1:05:01] either blue or black, and blue in the middle, or the bottom light.
[1:05:05] I asked about whether the government did anything to encourage the same kind of costume, and they said no, no, that the people used to like colorful garb, but now they all just, all together decided they didn't like it, and they thought this kind of costume was more useful, and so forth, and they decided on their own, but hey, it looks like a good attitude for people,
[1:05:29] It's not the leadership itself that's concerned.
[1:05:35] I noticed this the first night, I think the second night of the day, the four top people, there were five Chinese leaders there, the four of the top five had been in a long march.
[1:05:49] and were quite old.
[1:05:51] And it's quite clear that that's a dividing line between the old guard and, to some extent, the new.
[1:05:59] Talking to Joe Lai about the Cultural Revolution, I spent an hour or so with him on the plane with the President.
[1:06:05] In fact, this is the word we wrote on the Chinese plane.
[1:06:08] He said that in the Cultural Revolution, they've been able to get rid of a lot of the older people, the older military people, he put it.
[1:06:16] and put in a lot of younger people.
[1:06:18] So there are quite a few younger people that sit around the committee, but they don't sit very much close to the, certainly in the meetings, the principal ones are these old, old people.
[1:06:28] And John Lyons on several occasions talked about the young, the group that we had, how young our people were and so forth, and he said that they were working in that direction, he called things,
[1:06:41] and he was quite candid in his comments that the way they change people is by revolution, the Cultural Revolution.
[1:06:50] He said it was by life and dedicated to changing people and getting the personnel.
[1:06:57] And he didn't say it quite that way, but he said one of the good results, one of the things we strive for was to get some young blood in our government.
[1:07:07] The other general impression that I got aside from the fact that they're very worried about the Russians and they're concerned about the Japanese, I think the principal interest seemed to be to get along with us.
[1:07:26] I think they feel comforted by having a somewhat better relationship with us.
[1:07:34] They need a lot of technology.
[1:07:36] They're way behind.
[1:07:37] They're moving pretty well.
[1:07:38] And some things, the gymnasium they have is very, it's quite, it's about as good as anything I've ever seen.
[1:07:45] The industrialization of the technology, too, is really way behind anything that we have and wouldn't get there.
[1:07:57] 10 or 15 years at least behind, and they're quite aware of that, that they are behind.
[1:08:06] There's quite a lot of population feel.
[1:08:09] They know that they've got a problem.
[1:08:11] We say they have 750 million people.
[1:08:14] I asked several people.
[1:08:16] They say they have either 800, 850 million, or maybe more.
[1:08:20] They're doing what they can do.
[1:08:23] to help with family planning, they had some success in the cities, but no success outside, they say, very little success outside.
[1:08:32] The first day that I met with the foreign minister, he asked about what we should talk about, and we talked, started out talking about specifics, and we talked about sports exchanges, cultural exchanges, medical exchanges, and so forth.
[1:08:47] They're very interested in exchanges in the medical field,
[1:08:52] They're interested in the sports field, particularly tennis and swimming and badminton.
[1:08:59] They're interested in cultural exchanges, although a lot of their culture is all propaganda, so they realized that it probably would have to change itself if they brought it here.
[1:09:11] In medicine, they are interested.
[1:09:14] He said, let's not talk about principle until the second day.
[1:09:19] So we talked a good deal about how we could maintain contacts and the like.
[1:09:23] The second day, he started out with a long diet map with about an hour and a half of prepared statements attacking our policies and saying what their positions and the usual stuff.
[1:09:39] So I spent about an hour responding, and I did it about as firmly as I could without being too contentious.
[1:09:48] I took my point by point, and I must say that contrary to the kind of reaction we get from the Russians, he was playing silly for us at the end.
[1:09:59] He talked about us wanting to dominate the world.
[1:10:02] He said President Nixon said that we wanted to dominate the world, and that he decided that we couldn't dominate the world.
[1:10:10] And I said, that's nonsense.
[1:10:12] No president of the United States ever said anything like that.
[1:10:16] And he said, yeah, yes he did.
[1:10:17] He said it was a Kansas City speech.
[1:10:21] And I said, that's nonsense.
[1:10:23] Never did it.
[1:10:23] No president.
[1:10:24] We don't have any interest in dominating the world.
[1:10:26] So they finally got a copy of the US News and World Report.
[1:10:29] And in it, it said that President Nixon has said in the speech that after World War II, we were predominant in the world.
[1:10:39] and that we had helped our enemies recover, and they now presented a challenge to us.
[1:10:48] And they construed that to mean that he had said we were attempting to dominate the world, and we failed.
[1:10:54] So we actually spent about 20 minutes on that, and we finally got the interpreters to agree that that was not what it meant.
[1:10:59] It meant just the opposite.
[1:11:01] I said if we had attempted to dominate the world, we wouldn't have helped our enemies.
[1:11:04] We had them on their knees.
[1:11:06] Uh, you and I would often say that we welcome this news.
[1:11:11] We welcome this challenge.
[1:11:12] That's right.
[1:11:13] And I said that you would read it.
[1:11:14] You just, it's a total misreading of what the President said.
[1:11:18] And revolution, that was the way it was usually talked about, Africa.
[1:11:21] And what they needed was revolution.
[1:11:25] And I had a chance to take him on.
[1:11:26] He'd never been in Africa.
[1:11:27] And I said, you know, he really doesn't know anything about Africa.
[1:11:31] The last thing they need is revolution.
[1:11:32] They just had their revolution.
[1:11:33] They're independent now.
[1:11:34] They need some peace and quiet and economic progress.
[1:11:38] They don't need revolution.
[1:11:40] In a way, if you think that's true, you just haven't been there.
[1:11:42] You should travel back, or you should travel outside of this country.
[1:11:46] In fact, most of them haven't traveled at all.
[1:11:49] With some exceptions, the fellow that Henry dealt with, who was in the U.A., and some of the younger ones, they just haven't been out of the country.
[1:11:59] And I think that although obviously you can't make much of an impression on them, I think that when they listen to you for an extended period of time, and when you take them on frontally the way we did, at least you make some impression.
[1:12:11] I pointed out that 4% of our people produce all of the food in this country, and we had a surplus.
[1:12:19] And I said, even in our poor areas, everyone has, most people have a car and a television set.
[1:12:24] We have, obviously we have underprivileged groups, but they're underprivileged in relation to the rest of the society.
[1:12:30] Anyway, it was a pathetic thing.
[1:12:33] I think the point I want to make is that there was no attempt to take issue.
[1:12:36] If I had said the same thing to the Russians, I'd been there for eight more hours.
[1:12:44] They said at the end, which we appreciate what the President is doing, we think that our good ones, we recognize it's a limit to what you can do.
[1:13:01] I think that in turning to the communicators at the moment, can I say, Mr. President, too, that
[1:13:10] I had a feeling that in the discussions, you could tell that the atmosphere had improved as we went along, particularly with young people, whereas the interpreters had a very harsh tone in their voice to begin with, and the younger people in employment studies were
[1:13:26] At the end, they were quite friendly, and they made friends with their counterparts.
[1:13:31] They talked about seeing each other, and that sort of thing.
[1:13:35] How much good that will remain to be seen, but it certainly can't hurt.
[1:13:39] I got to say there, the fact that the original first meeting with Paul, Kurt, probably had some leavening effects.
[1:13:55] Yes.
[1:14:01] Well, Joe and I came to Texas the next day and talked about the things he wanted to do in terms of contact, and then the Foreign Minister saw me tag on the day we left, and he said that they were anxious to have some trade that had to be gradual.
[1:14:19] I explained to him that trade wasn't all that important to us, that we were prepared to have trade.
[1:14:24] He thought it would be a good thing.
[1:14:26] that it didn't have much impact, especially as far as we were concerned.
[1:14:29] We couldn't for a long time because our trade was so large that any trade we had with China would be minimal.
[1:14:36] And I didn't want them to think that one of the reasons we'd taken the trip was because we were interested in trade, we were glad to have some trade, we thought it would be helpful.
[1:14:45] The last day he said that they would like to have trade with us, they'd have to do it gradually, but they would prepare to and that they would consider
[1:14:54] favorably applications from American businessmen to attend the Canton Unfair this spring.
[1:15:00] That's where trade deals are made and we've never been invited.
[1:15:04] The Japanese had 2,200 their last, last Canton Unfair.
[1:15:09] So we will have the opportunity to have American businessmen go to Canton Unfair and hopefully begin some trade with them.
[1:15:16] They are interested in cultural exchanges.
[1:15:20] They're particularly interested in exchanges in the field of medicine.
[1:15:25] Turning us for a moment today to the community area which Mr. President has referred to, and which Henry worked out with a Chinese fellow who's at the United Nations, a very young fellow.
[1:15:47] I think as the President says that it's been
[1:15:52] The principal parts have been overlooked, I think, by the press.
[1:15:56] And I'd like to point out that, as the President said, that the language is, I think, of great importance.
[1:16:05] As he said, the impact of the Jews should be settled on the basis of peaceful coexistence without resorting to the use of force or threat of force.
[1:16:15] The United States and the people of Republican China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.
[1:16:22] Now, they took the position that they couldn't say that they wouldn't use force in relationship to Taiwan because it's a province of China.
[1:16:31] But by stating it this way, they have made a pretty strong statement of non-use force, not related to Taiwan, but certainly the implication is there.
[1:16:43] Now, on our part,
[1:16:47] We say we reaffirm our interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.
[1:16:54] We first say that both the Chinese on the mainland and Taiwan stated there's only one China.
[1:17:01] And that is a fact.
[1:17:04] We generally agree with this on both sides persuasive that there's only one China.
[1:17:10] Total agreement on that.
[1:17:11] Total agreement.
[1:17:14] And we say we don't challenge that.
[1:17:16] We don't accept it.
[1:17:17] We don't challenge it either.
[1:17:18] We don't accept it or challenge it.
[1:17:21] And we say we reaffirm our interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan crisis by the Chinese themselves.
[1:17:29] No one can take issue with that.
[1:17:31] We're this prospect in mind.
[1:17:35] peaceful settlement by the Chinese themselves, with this prospect in mind, and we're saying that as a result of our discussions, we feel that there is a prospect for this, based on what I've just read.
[1:17:47] With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective, not present objective, ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan.
[1:17:59] The meantime it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.
[1:18:09] Well, that's what we assigned it to.
[1:18:12] That's why the Nixon Doctrine and Subversives said we now have 8,425 men on Taiwan.
[1:18:22] We had in 1965, 2,020 or something like that.
[1:18:26] Now, if the tensions in the area are reduced, we will reduce.
[1:18:29] So, with the ultimate objective in mind of a peaceful settlement, with this prospect in mind, ultimately we could withdraw all of them.
[1:18:41] Now, we only have, well, there's a handful of men there that are related to the defense of Taiwan itself.
[1:18:48] Some of them, you know, are sort of sincere, so...
[1:18:52] And we have another, say, 2,000 related to the defense of the whole area and distinguished by one.
[1:19:01] But the bulk of the build-up occurred after 1965.
[1:19:04] So that we, in this community, have said pretty much what we were planning to do anyway.
[1:19:13] So the idea that we made concessions is not correct.
[1:19:18] The president asked me to comment briefly on the
[1:19:22] international reaction.
[1:19:23] International reaction, generally speaking, is better than what we expected, although I think it's somewhat more favorable than we might have expected.
[1:19:30] In the case of Korea, the reaction has been quite favorable.
[1:19:36] In the case of Thailand, they're satisfied.
[1:19:40] In the case of Japan, it's been quite good.
[1:19:42] Marshall Green was there yesterday, and they've issued a public statement to that effect.
[1:19:51] In the Philippines, they have issued a strong public statement of support, although privately they expressed some concern, principally because they think maybe a secret deal was made, and their concern was expressed before the President's statement last night.
[1:20:06] In the case of Taiwan, it is understandable concern, and you can understand why.
[1:20:13] They have a feeling that diplomatically,
[1:20:17] The stand is slipping and they're going to lose support.
[1:20:21] We have to ensure, and Marshall Green will do that shortly, that our treaty commitment stands, we're going to continue diplomatic relations with them, and that our reduction promise in the community is, as I've stated here,
[1:20:37] and other parts to make sure the reaction has been very favorable in New Zealand.
[1:20:42] The New York Times article is pointing out that the Soviet reaction is not quite accurate.
[1:20:46] The New York Times reaction is that the Soviets are quite satisfied and relaxed
[1:20:51] The fact is that they're not.
[1:20:52] They're still quite concerned.
[1:20:55] They don't quite know how to react.
[1:20:57] I notice they're playing a lot of reports from other nations, which are critical.
[1:21:03] And they are considerably perplexed about how to handle the whole business.
[1:21:10] European nations, I think, should be able to respond.
[1:21:12] France has issued a very good statement.
[1:21:16] We don't have any statements from Indonesia yet.
[1:21:17] But on the whole, the international reaction has been quite good.
[1:21:22] And I think it has worked out the way the President planned it.
[1:21:27] And I think it's going to contribute to the cause of peace.
[1:21:36] No, never yet.
[1:21:57] take up on the theme on which I spoke just before you left, having to do with the impact of the two societies on each other, and how that is reflected in the communique and in what went on there.
[1:22:20] First, as the President pointed out,
[1:22:24] This is a different society than any we have encountered.
[1:22:30] It is a society of a quasi-resentious character in which there is what many of our yardsticks, fetus-pregnantic people find very difficult to understand.
[1:22:43] A society which is informed so much by doctrine and dogma
[1:22:49] much more so than in the Soviet Union.
[1:22:56] It is a society that is run by people who were on the long march and whose
[1:23:06] who could never have gone through what they have experienced, starting as a very small minority, and that's through all the suffering of these 40 years of these peoples, unless they had very profound motivations.
[1:23:24] of the kind of world that they want to build.
[1:23:32] I say all of this because to them, you could almost say that there's a biblical phrase that at the beginning there was the word applied.
[1:23:40] they attach a significance to the principle and the words to our pragmatic society almost incomprehensible.
[1:23:51] And as somebody who went through the mechanics of the drafting of the communique, always in the closest touch with the president and the secretary of state on the objective, but on the mechanics it is hard to believe
[1:24:08] that sometimes an hour would be spent on a word that to us did not make, might not even have had a say.
[1:24:19] Should we say foster?
[1:24:20] Should we say develop?
[1:24:24] Should we say maintain?
[1:24:25] We want to say, we want to develop the ties to Japan.
[1:24:28] They said, why can't you just say maintain?
[1:24:31] Can't we compromise on foster?
[1:24:33] The average, we insisted on development.
[1:24:36] It stuck there.
[1:24:38] And I don't think this is in itself significant, but with an American, you wouldn't really spend five minutes on this sort of a topic.
[1:24:50] Now, I say this with that, talking first about the communique, and then letting me go on to something more significant.
[1:25:00] On the issue of the communique, it has to be seen, one, from the perspective of a pragmatic legal society, which is ours, and then from the perspective of an ideological society, which is theirs.
[1:25:18] Now, we take what a number of our people have said, look at the transition statement they put down for the Chinese position in the document.
[1:25:30] and to American ears that sounds entrancing.
[1:25:34] But for the readers of the People's Daily, this is the mildest version they have of a thing, of their own position.
[1:25:43] For example, with respect to Korea and Vietnam, all they are saying is they're supporting somebody else's view.
[1:25:50] They are not saying what they say in their own, what they've always said in their own domestic propaganda, as well as in the UN.
[1:25:57] We are the reliable, real area.
[1:25:59] We are as close as the lips to the teeth and all the rhetoric that they have inevitably.
[1:26:08] So I wouldn't be surprised if
[1:26:13] Some of their people, when they saw this in the People's Daily, were, in fact, were wondering what was going on.
[1:26:26] On the other hand, they had to state something to indicate that they still maintained their rules and their security.
[1:26:34] But they said it in what was then the mildest form that they had expressed it.
[1:26:43] Now again, we didn't say anything about the commitment to Taiwan in the communique.
[1:26:54] But they didn't say anything about our treaty being nullified either in their statement of the issue.
[1:27:03] At the same time, we stated in Shanghai at a press conference that we intended to maintain all our treaty obligations, including that one, unchallenged by that.
[1:27:18] So one has to look at it really from the point of view of the impact of these two societies
[1:27:31] on each other as they're feeling their way towards a new relationship, particularly of this market society in which American countries would break everything, and in which they have to feel their way very gradually.
[1:27:47] I've asked myself, for example, what is Joe explaining today?
[1:27:53] It is a very cold one.
[1:27:55] And what is he explaining to him?
[1:28:00] What can he say he got?
[1:28:03] He got out, they seem to say, there's a certain withdrawal.
[1:28:12] It depends on a peaceful settlement.
[1:28:17] Of course they're going to withdraw if there's a peaceful settlement.
[1:28:20] What else are they going to do?
[1:28:22] There's a statement of reduction that's related to the reduction of pensions.
[1:28:26] So, yeah, well, something's coming up.
[1:28:29] What are you going to do about Japan?
[1:28:32] What are you going to do about Korea?
[1:28:34] The point is, as Sally Henry, I think you should mention, and Bill, our language was very carefully done to communicate with regarding the defense and then covered otherwise.
[1:28:48] We didn't, for example, refer to the treaty commitment on Japan.
[1:28:55] was that if we, that that would immediately have set off within the community a kind of debate that we didn't want to have.
[1:29:05] But we told them privately we were going to, we also told them we were going to say it publicly.
[1:29:09] And we told them they were going to say it publicly in fact.
[1:29:12] If they're not revolutionary citizens.
[1:29:15] And they did say, obviously, and obviously they were going to do it and they did it.
[1:29:20] What I said, and I don't know if this is going to appear in class at any point, is what did they communicate with me?
[1:29:33] They are not children.
[1:29:35] They didn't think we would hand over Taiwan to them in a communique or make them wave a document that doesn't say about these laws when peace, with the prospect of a peaceful settlement obligates you to do it.
[1:29:50] They needed a big lead to move into their new relationship.
[1:29:55] And they had to say something in it.
[1:29:58] The big thing was how does a religiously oriented society
[1:30:03] changed course in the direction of a new relationship.
[1:30:08] Now, I have noticed that our press has not covered at all, or practically not at all, these more principles than we are.
[1:30:18] We both want to reduce military conflict.
[1:30:21] We both are opposed to the domination of the Pacific by any country.
[1:30:27] We have never pursued against third countries.
[1:30:32] Uh, to us, this is the most important part.
[1:30:35] This doesn't mean anything.
[1:30:36] To them, simply the amount of time they spent on it in the drafting session and the amount of time that the Prime Minister spoke to the President was infinitely the most significant part because it was
[1:30:50] For the first time in 22 years, that they even admitted that there was anything in common.
[1:30:55] If I could interrupt there.
[1:30:56] The Prime Minister's long sessions that we had.
[1:30:59] Vietnam.
[1:31:00] Taiwan.
[1:31:04] This is practical.
[1:31:10] Even Korea.
[1:31:14] That's why we sat most of the time on the more significant list.
[1:31:17] It's the relationship between the two countries, basically.
[1:31:23] The renunciation, of course, is one of the dominant events that we consider.
[1:31:30] That is why those sections, they can't wear the most important, and we've got to realize they're the most important to us, but not in the sense of the legal obligation to maybe look at it.
[1:31:37] Because if they were to monitor Korea tomorrow, we couldn't say, now listen, this is inconsistent with paragraph four of the community.
[1:31:46] But in the sense that they are conveying to their people, in the only way that people understand that we are going to drive ahead on some parallel courses with a country that up until a country was considered the arch enemy
[1:32:05] of the United States, so that the fact that they stated common principles with us is perhaps the fact that while we are still in Taiwan, while we are still fighting in a country just as their southern border, they were willing to say that the two countries are prepared to renounce the use and the threat of wars in relation to each other.
[1:32:33] All of these, and somebody who went through these things, I can assure you, were traumatic things.
[1:32:42] Now, let me go, therefore, from there, to the most fundamental point.
[1:32:55] The president said that he met with a friend, that when he was spending these 20 hours with Joe Lai, he was talking about the West.
[1:33:09] And that I think we can confirm.
[1:33:14] The crucial thing, though, is that they were not talking about what deal to make about this country.
[1:33:23] Before we went there,
[1:33:25] I wrote a memorandum to the president and said that that's the most, this is one kind of philosophical dimension, maybe the most crucial one.
[1:33:33] They are going to look at you as you will look at them to see, not whether we agree, but whether we have a conception of the future which they can comprehend and towards which they can key their policy.
[1:33:47] And secondly, whether as a society we are reliable enough
[1:33:51] to carry out what we say our view of the future is.
[1:33:56] And it doesn't mean that we have to agree with them, just so that they have a framework.
[1:34:02] So this was really
[1:34:06] The key element in these 20 hours of discussion of what is the view of the world and why the two leaders did not agree, as you could not expect them to do, I think a understanding was gained of where each society is going and how they could adjust to each other in a way
[1:34:26] to prevent the catastrophe of a war among each other and at the catastrophe of the generals that may, that history may record as the most significant event that occurred.
[1:34:44] So,
[1:34:46] What you should do is to look at this community and not in the form of any particular concessions that were made by us because, in fact, there were no concessions that have any operational significance.
[1:35:02] So, knowing in terms of the concessions we received in exchange, trade and diplomatic contacts, which I believe are not insignificant, consider that less than 10 months ago, the visit of the table tennis team was headlines, and now these exchanges of all sorts are going to become routine in a number of months.
[1:35:23] But the way two countries, the most capitalist countries in the longest history of self-government,
[1:35:31] and the most powerful countries in the world are going to begin the long process of gearing their policies to each other in a way that the danger of war can be reduced, prospects of peace can be enhanced, and the welfare of all their peoples can be restored.
[1:35:56] And I must say that on this level,
[1:35:59] there can be no doubt of the success of the people.
[1:36:07] This was a very active question that I didn't cover.
[1:36:10] He asked whether we had any discussion about establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC.
[1:36:16] No, we told them we were going to continue our relations with Taiwan in our next treaty with Taiwan.
[1:36:25] There will be no diplomatic relations with the PRC as long as you have relations with Taiwan and we are continuing our relations with Taiwan.
[1:36:34] That is why our relations with the PRC have to be in what we call the third country operating.
[1:36:40] I think it's very, very important that you make that point.
[1:36:44] They won't send anybody to Washington, period.
[1:36:48] No Washington.
[1:37:12] As long as there's a Taiwan ambassador here, that's... That's why all relations between Taiwan and the U.S. have been disturbed.
[1:37:21] Uh, we'll see what we can do.
[1:37:22] We'll have to see what we can do over there.
[1:37:24] But, uh, we don't... We don't... We got... We got...
[1:37:27] But they had a place in Georgia.
[1:37:28] We didn't post nothing.
[1:37:29] Sorry, we took so long.
[1:37:32] And I wish it would be possible to say all of us, we have the first vote at 12 o'clock on the hour of the minute.
[1:37:39] And of course, this is a bushing, or anti-bushing day of the Senate.
[1:37:44] And I want to invite you to keep the forum on hand.
[1:37:48] I think I've never done this before.
[1:37:52] But it's been very enjoyable.
[1:37:54] It's been a whole lot of good.
[1:37:57] I hope that you will take the report to the American people.
[1:38:02] So I ask that you can admire what you've said, or whatever you think is good.
[1:38:07] Mr. President, I ask one question, and it's a question that Dr. Kissinger said to bring it down.
[1:38:16] He has also said, for many reasons we understand, the reason for those fallen is to communicate misunderstood, misinterpreted,
[1:38:27] by the American press, by other people, because it all comes down to the landers.
[1:38:31] We write in bills every day, except if it's decided, say, this is going to be this, except the president and the next president decides otherwise.
[1:38:42] Is that what it means?
[1:38:44] No.
[1:38:44] In other words, we are still the boss man.
[1:38:51] That's the language we understand, and that's what I'd like to hear from you.
[1:38:56] Please, thank you, guys.
[1:38:58] All right.
[1:38:59] That's it, my own language, and I'd like an opportunity.
[1:39:03] I'd like an opportunity to talk to someone.
[1:39:06] All right, let's see.
[1:39:08] Something that's good.
[1:39:10] Mary can talk to that language.
[1:39:12] We can understand.
[1:39:14] and point out that we've conceded enough and we've revised what we've said, and it doesn't just mean that we have an advantage.
[1:39:23] I don't want any sense of loitering.
[1:39:28] Is that correct?
[1:39:28] Oh, I believe technically, Jeff, I know you've said it, but I want to say it in my language first.
[1:39:32] Is my language correct?
[1:39:34] Is that interpretation correct?
[1:39:38] Just remember, I'm against busting.
[1:42:44] There may be some very delicate matters that he could not say much about.
[1:42:45] I don't think he said much about it.
[1:42:46] I don't think he said much about it.
[1:42:47] I don't think he said much about it.
[1:43:00] We discussed everything for 10 minutes.
[1:43:01] We discussed everything.
[1:43:02] We discussed everything.
[1:43:02] We discussed everything.
[1:43:03] We discussed everything.
[1:43:03] We discussed everything.
[1:43:29] I don't want to hurt the police, especially these.