Conversation 095-002

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I think they have used them for that purpose.

But we thought we would present to you three major ones at this time.

Perhaps one of them, the ABM level, the intrusion of submarine launch missiles in the agreement, the duration of the agreement, which is really tied to the scope of the offensive limitation,

And perhaps a word on a decision we may have to make later on other states, large states, the radar of which no decision is needed now, but in which we could perhaps go about what decision may become necessary.

With respect to APM levels, our current proposal is for two APM sites, 100 interceptors, and protecting ICBM fields.

For one site with 100 interceptors protecting the capital, with each site having the right to choose, we obviously would choose the two sites because this in fact reflects our existing program and practical requirements.

The intent of our proposal is to freeze both sides, and where they are, for a content building.

The Soviets are building the Moscow system.

Of our 12 sides, we are building at Grand Forge and at Malmström.

Malmström is at a very early stage of that.

The delegation has concluded that the 241 proposal is probably not negotiable.

The Soviets had proposed that we can keep one ICBM side.

They would keep Moscow, and they would want one ICBM side in addition.

So they had proposed 241 in reverse, and it's not negotiable.

And they have indicated that they think that a 242 arrangement might be acceptable.

If we wanted to have a side watching.

Now this then breaks down into six possible proposals that could be made, but rather than submit to you.

The categories are essentially as follows.

One is the stuff each side made it into, which in effect means...

Grant works for Moscow.

The second is to allow each side a limited ICBMT fence, which would mean that the Soviet Union would get Moscow and one ICBMT lease of the Euros.

We would get either two safeguard sites or one safeguard site in Washington.

And as soon as the proposal gets, the Department of Defense has developed over the recent months, which would be to permit each side what is called the outside defense of ICBM sites, which means, in effect, radars and missiles specifically designed for the defense of ICBM.

Aisby og Sankt Ferdinand, det skal vi kjøpe inn, innføren med Sankt Kronkast, for i dag.

I dag, sa jeg, starte vi i dag.

That reduces the concern that the Soviets may be developing a radar hat which may give them area coverage later on for population defense.

Secondly, it makes it easier, if that should be your decision, to move from there to a proposal of a zero avian.

We would have to start construction in Malmö, so we would have to start mining.

In fact, it would continue building up to the permitted sector level.

And it has the advantage of the greatest simplicity.

There are the following problems.

The present APM deployment can serve the following purposes.

One, operational experience.

Two, as a base for expense.

Three, to prevent accidents.

And four, to prevent limited attacks.

I think in fairness one would have to say that the Moscow system is better suited for more of these purposes than the Grand Forks system would be.

In terms of operational experience, it would probably be little to choose from.

As a base for expansion, the Grand Forks system suffers from the fact that probably we designed the defense of missile fields, we would design something different than the same kind of system whose original purpose was, as you remember, area defense against.

against third countries, typically with the same system as with the Moscow system, is that it has a small number of radars, and that the number of radars controls the utility of the system, and then it overruns the radar.

The defense would be defeated.

Therefore, one has to count the aiming points of the radars.

Therefore, if one wanted to defend an ICBM field, one would want more radars, and much fewer missiles per radar.

Now, the Soviets defending in population are not exactly under this constraint.

Now, with respect to accident and limited attack, one is probably less worried about an accidental attack on the Soviet than on anything else.

And as far as the limited attack is concerned, the enemy would be the same.

to launch a limited attack on the missile field.

And if he wanted to launch a limited attack on the missile field, he would have to compound his insanity by attacking the one defended missile field among the six we had.

So I think his primary use of ground force to us would be operational experience and would have almost no strategic utility, while the Soviet deployment would have the utility not against us,

But, through this certainism, that's into the age of defense against a Chinese attack, and maybe a French and British attack.

This is not decisive, but it is a factor to be considered.

On the other hand, one for one, if Trump is the most easy to go to, it does not put us at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviets, given bilateral strategic relations.

A variation of this is to adapt the Soviet proposal and have a two or two arrangement, which we could do with one or two variations.

Either taking two missile sites for hours, or asking that our second site be made Washington, rather than Maastricht.

This would sacrifice...

I think about $100 billion of investment in North Trust.

We can move the other equipment into Washington.

We can take all that equipment, yeah.

We'd lose $100 billion.

I think the investment is $200 billion.

No, that's $46 billion if the decision was made between now and the end of the year.

We'd sacrifice $46 billion.

Whether you decide to, if you were to go for a two-for-two system, whether you go for NCA, without the transfer of a dependent part of the judgment that you and your advisors make, or whether countries would in fact offer us a defense of Washington.

Because if it failed, we would have in practice accepted the Soviet proposal, who for one, if we ask for Washington, can't get it.

We came back at the Soviet proposal, which we have, which you never take into account.

And Malmström is authorized, isn't it?

Malmström is authorized.

We do with that if we want to be.

Under the central system, Washington is authorized, but we have not used the central authorizations.

We have been told that we would come back for an authorization on that.

Again, one would think perhaps better that a symmetrical arrangement is easier to negotiate, Washington and an ICBM site for Moscow and an ICBM site.

One other problem with the one-for-one agreement that I've mentioned is a technical arrangement of the grouping of radars

which makes it very easy to defeat them, because we didn't want the Soviets to build up a population defense, and that all radar had to be grouped into a circle of, what is it, three kilometers before the hitting point.

Now, if this arrangement, however, were to be adopted for the missile defense side also, it would make the defense, and it would make an attack on the missile side by major enemies really extremely easy.

Now, if one went for a, and the Soviets have already pointed out, that they would propose a different arrangement of radars, and presumably, if we would ask for a different arrangement of radars, at least one of those sides,

And we could therefore have a base that permits an evolution of the defensive concept that is now the case under the restrictions which we are imposing in order to prevent the population defense of Moscow against a major attack.

On the other hand, there is a...

an arrangement of rayars that will merge into a hard side concept which I'm going to explain in a minute.

That is to say, a metal field will be so resistant to quality and control that the drafting defense consequence of agreeing to a limited ICBM defense may be

that the whole exercise lies into a rather massive deployment of radars and launchers.

In other words, if you will ask for the middle option, that is to say, 2 for 2, some variation of 2 for 2, the delegation would have to be instructed to see whether the strips on radars handle launch.

and rather strict numerical limitations, even if the mark concept is advanced.

Now the steward proposal is the proposal that is the Furtwalle OSD, and that too has two variations, but I think if you accept the principle of any model piece, we can then come back to you with specific technical proposals.

That proposal, in effect, is that the present, it is based on the assumption that the present ICBM defense is not militarily very sensible.

It has too few radars, too few interceptors, and is too easily overwhelmed by the current attack.

Therefore, it has the additional disadvantage that the radars and missiles also

can be used for aerial defense so that it would animate, it may look like the beginning of an aerial defense, it's too little for an aerial defense, it's too inadequate for ICBM defense.

So the proposal that was developed by OSC in effect said so.

That we should have a substantially unlimited number of radars and unlimited number of interceptors at the permitted missile fields.

But that those radars and interceptors would be of the type that lend themselves only to the defense of missile sites, and not to area defense.

They would permit as many as a thousand interceptors at these missile fields, and

And I don't know the constraints on radar, but I... Just what?

Just what it is.

What it is, the constraints on radar.

This radar is both strategic and political, which is strategically easy to pay as you are unconditional.

Men would actually be saved by such an anti-defense and disputed downfall.

The second issue that raises this is that the practical result of such a scheme would be that what is advertised as assaulting women actually permits more

Interceptors and radars that mirror the part of any original alien equipment so that, cosmetically, it would have a building up.

I had to make the main decision on the political side.

It must have no nonsense, but it's a real problem politically.

Except for a few nuts around here, in this town.

It is not going to be whether or not this is an agreement, which lets the United States do more.

The real problem politically is whether it is an agreement, which limits us unless the Soviet Union go ahead and get superiority.

That's going to be the difficulty.

Let's get that dang clear.

As far as we're concerned, we want to make an agreement that will let us do just as much as we possibly can.

They're out to screw us, and we've got to screw them.

And that's the attitude we should have throughout these things, because I can see the political arguments already developing here on the salt agreement.

I know that if you read the papers here and the recipes, it will everybody just think that we can only get a salt agreement, and then

The world's going to be safer and all the rest, that's fine.

It's all over again.

We want one.

We hope we can get one, because it'll live with them and live with us in certain areas.

But when the political arguments are made, believe me, the critics that will have the most effect are not going to be those that say, oh gee, isn't it too bad the United States didn't tie its hands as much as it could have.

The political argument will be, you guys got to take it.

You tied here, and you didn't tie there, so no.

So let's just get that right out of the ballgame right away.

So, uh, that, and that's a good argument.

I'm trying to present both sides.

Everybody agrees that from a...

If you want it to defend the crystal fields, the hard side defense is better than the safe side defense.

I don't think there's any disagreement on that.

The disagreement concerns what the long range strategic utility of it is by the time you attack it.

It will be the late 70s or early 80s, as against the threats of the late 70s and 80s.

Secondly, to the point I've just made, it's soothing.

Første.

I felt he never fully made the proposal, because you know, it's always this mistake in understanding.

I mean, that's the little of mine, of course they're going to tell us they don't understand.

They understand the question, so we understand what they want.

But, those then are the three categories of decisions.

One is whether we need to build it.

F1-4-1, the second is going to be a service ICBM defense.

This would then get us into some variation of 2-4-1 and 2-4-2.

And the third is going to be one which is the whole concept of the defense.

At least for one of the sides, into a half-side mode.

Those are the three...

Let me hear a little more argument on the hard side.

I know this was discussed before, and we sort of rejected it, not on the hand, but on the ground, that, well, it would be hard to go to the Congress to get anything on his, what I think is, calculus around that, well, we have a salt agreement that lets the United States do more, that everybody in this country is going to throw up their hands and say that's terrible because the United States is not to be trusted with power.

I'll make a few comments.

I don't know whether it's negotiable, but I'd like to know what the argument about where we are on it in the United States, our problems with the Congress as far as getting it approved and so forth.

Mr. President.

The 12-Side Safe Pairs program, which we have approved and which we are supporting in Congress on a phased basis, is a very viable program that does meet the three criteria that you have.

wanted us to meet, and we had that, and I am still defending the 12-site program before the Congress, although we have done on a phased basis several sites here.

We have four sites presently approved, and we're going forward with the program to do the site survey work here in the Washington area, and that is before the Congress at the present time.

That program makes sense if you have 12 sets.

It makes no sense if you have two or four sets.

It cannot be justified on a strategic basis at all.

Because it makes no sense at all.

Now, the...

Because we wanted, we felt that we would be in a position where we might have to cut down on the sights in the program.

We have a follow-on program which is called, it's a point-defense system.

It's called HEARTSET.

We're changing that name really because some members of Congress have gotten the idea that that has something to do with hardening of the missiles.

It has nothing to do with hardening of the missiles.

It has to do with point-defense systems.

Last year we went to the Congress asking for money for Heart Sight.

Just fell.

And the Congress gives us the money.

We have recently left a contract just two weeks ago with full knowledge and support of the Congress to go forward with the development of this particular defense system.

This defense system gives you a small section that can be defended against a major threat and a major missile fire by the Soviet Union.

It does not give you any of the area coverage that the 12-site system gives you.

We will have less trouble getting hard site approved in the Congress than we would have getting this 12-site program approved.

We will have great trouble supporting a 4-site program or a 2-site program if it is geared to the safeguarding philosophy, however, because the safeguarding philosophy just doesn't make any sense unless you have all 12 sites.

Mr. President, I feel that this option should be maintained and should be open for us.

If we cut down on a number of sites, we should have this option to improve the system so that it means something strategically.

Any other system at one or two sites that does not preserve this option for the United States does not give us anything in the future period.

I'm just briefly trying to...

President, I'm joking to take it back in.

I can be sure.

Do you think the control site, one, makes sense, or two, makes no sense?

The safeguard system.

The safeguard system, two sides, makes no sense.

Yes, sir.

I just wanted to say that the Northeastern stand feels very strong in it, which is pretending it doesn't, to conduct the, you know, to be on the watch.

We feel that way because we feel that should we have a change, it's highlighted that we will not go first.

In other words, we feel it's imperative that the decision-making process be protected.

And consequently, we were very sick that any agreement relative to the AGM systems provided for the effects of the decision-making process.

And I think the Soviets tend to feel the same way because they have maximized their efforts towards Moscow from the outset.

But if you are going to go fast, in other words, if you are going to react to an attack, you need maximum time to move out what you are in a position to make the necessary decisions for.

This is the lunch that you have in time, Mr. President, because I don't think this is going to take quite as long.

But does the other side know as one who has that capability?

My problem here.

Why is that?

Well, that gives credibility to your deterrent, but I hope it never has to be used.

That isn't the point of having that.

Why?

Just like you said.

No, no.

It is the cheapest way to give realism to your deterrent, because hardness is the kind of accuracy that we have.

Hardness that's not given to you.

And, uh...

The point here that I would just like to add, and I know that you're not interested too much in the problem of the Congress as far as this, because we should make our decisions on the basis of strategic reality.

The NCA defense, the defense of the capital area,

would be approved by the Congress, I am convinced, now we have some people that would object to it, in the Foreign Relations Committee and some committees like that, that won't support a statement, but in the committees that I am in, with the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, we would have a very strong vote for that, provided it is a part of the Solve Agreement.

Now, if it isn't a part of the Solve Agreement,

then that will be the last site that's built in our 12-site program.

It can be approved if it's part of this agreement, but it cannot be.

It will be the last of the 12 sites built, I think, if it isn't a part of this agreement.

What about the argument that you made that you're...

You really can't compare Washington to Moscow, because of what Moscow defends.

Moscow defends a lot more than NCA does.

That is correct.

They also test certain strategic coverage in Washington, because they're industrial.

In Washington, that's correct.

We have a lot less time, comparatively, compared to other countries.

When you say Moscow and Washington, it's two for them and one for us.

But it...

They get a double pay-off from Moscow.

But we just can't put it on the other hand.

There may be some places where we can stay out of the way.

But let's not get our illusions if that's an even trade.

Right?

Some ICBMs.

I think you also ought to keep in mind that in the range of interceptors that we're talking about here, 100 interceptors, the fact that theoretically they can fly out and protect ICBMs is not a very real advantage, because 100 interceptors to protect Moscow plus ICBMs is nonsense.

What does population have to do with who strikes first?

I think the pigment... Let's just talk about that one question.

They have a first strike, they strike first.

Population all the time.

Yes, sir, because the more population of a nation can protect, presumably the greater temptation there would be to strike first, and that's why we're trying to avoid systems that have or have the potential to protect large parts of your population.

We're not going to strike first.

No, I think you can put yourself in their position.

I mean, is it allowed for that?

No.

I mean, the flight tech standards with Moscow, they have protected something that's far more important to them than population.

I think that as Malibu has pointed out, the main interest of the Soviets in protecting Moscow is not against an American first strike.

It's against some sort of a moving Chinese attack.

As they know, Moscow is not going to help at all against an American strike.

I think if there were any change, that's where the population might turn out to be.

I don't know.

Mr. President, I would just like to ... We have really conducted some very good studies on the ... We are going through the Congress with it.

We've got the full funding on this contract.

We just went forward with it.

It's a major contract.

Just let me ...

I do not look for any difficulty there.

We have people like some of our critics that were rather critical of the state guard program.

are very much in support of our going forward with the HeartSide program through everything we've got safeguarded going forward.

But you see, one of the problems with getting safeguarded was that you had to, in order to defend safeguard, you had to be for all sides.

And the talk and the discussions were that this could be overwhelmed by this whole thing.

Now in our studies on the HeartSide point defense,

All of our studies show that we can defend from 200 to 300 missiles.

Jerry, do I understand that the...

We haven't even mentioned this to our allies, or to Congress in the SALT context, and it seems to me, with due respect to Mel, that we went out with a SALT treaty that says connecting with us is appropriating for an entirely new ABM system costing billions of dollars,

I think that it would have a very large effect on the rest of the case processes.

That's all.

What's your answer to that comment?

Jerry, I just want you to know that that's the way I sold the system, that we might be cut down from a 12-site program to a smaller program to a smaller site, and that's the way I sold the program.

That's the way I got money for it.

Could I hear Paul?

Paul, do you have a view?

I have a question for you.

My next question is a question of negotiability.

The Soviets, not as part of their formal statements, but as part of the uniform, are searching and exploration of what kind of common ground might we find between their non-negotiable two-on-one and our non-negotiable.

They are the ones that have come forward with the idea of 242, one of those two sides, to be a hard-site ICBM.

And on both sides is the ground where we can find a powerful force.

And there are some things which still need to be negotiated, and that is the precise definition of the qualitative percentage.

And the other is the provision with respect to the number of interceptors involved on both sides.

Because they have talked about the lower number of interceptors than what is necessary for a meaningful effect.

Those are the only two areas of negotiation that are

I think any other proposal would be much more than that.

Mr. President, we have been talking for two and a half years ago about level of life for 200 intersectors.

The purpose of these talks is to limit ADF's

The Soviets within the last six months have reduced the number of interceptors for two sites from 300 to 150.

Now, if we go back to them and say, look, we'd like to have you consider something that might call for 1,000, 2,000, or 3,000 interceptors, an unlimited number of radars,

It seems to me if it is negotiable, it's going to be negotiable two or three years from now, not now, because it's an entirely different approach to arms control to build up arms instead of reducing them.

Except for that.

That means what's your argument on this here?

Their proposal is that the number of radars being unlimited within

They specified strictly that just one ICMP, you couldn't have them outside of that team.

And they also indicated that they agreed that they'd be outside the European part of the Soviet Union.

So they think that an unlimited number of radars, provided they are qualitatively described, and are geographically limited to one small place,

I think their last informal words were that they thought the best solution would be somewhere between 150 and 200.

I think the reason they've done that is that we have been pressing on to keep the number of interceptors as low as possible.

And I don't think that they wanted to get outranked on that issue by themselves being in a position of recommending more.

And I'm not at all sure that we wouldn't have trouble with the unlimited number of interceptors.

But I'm not sure that we would.

And particularly, the OSD proposal is not that we go in now and say we want to have a large number of areas.

The OSD proposal is that during the next three years, while we're negotiating, it's all in office.

During that period we negotiated a number of interceptions for these groups.

So at that time we will know better what times that we can foresee and treat, the opposite of treat, to know whether there's a real limitation on the trial, whether there is.

If there isn't a real limitation on the trial, then the explanation is that we wouldn't be free.

We'll follow them largely.

If there is a real limitation, then perhaps it wouldn't be that.

Do you want to go to the sub-region?

We'll come back to this in a minute.

Let's get that in.

One article, one of the three variations has been a false approach.

It's one that has been submitted to ICBM, one that has been submitted to ICBM Defense, one that still has been strained.

on launches, as long as the data are good enough.

And that gives a further deployment to the Atlantic.

And may I add, there is some common ground, but it would be nothing in what we are proposing to prevent us from deploying, let's say, at Grenfors, hard-site defense components.

If that's what we wanted to do, we could accept the facility and also deploy unlimited radar at Grenfors or at Maelstrom.

The basic question, I think, is whether you want to open up the door so slowly as we have thousands of ADN interceptors.

Our interest lies in keeping the facility of ADN systems as low as possible, not stimulating them to go to much higher levels that they're willing to settle for.

We're in, we've been driving them to high levels.

They said we'll settle for 150.

We say, how about 2,000?

I think that's just the opposite of what we should say.

We should not say that.

We should not say that until we know where we are in the attention area.

That is our proposal.

The way the city wants to do it right now, I don't think that is the character of what we want.

We want to keep that question open until we know where we are.

But I'm afraid that our problem here is to a large extent to be treated

Well, I don't think we ought to do that.

I think that we should negotiate that.

Well, we've been trying to negotiate on the basis of two for one.

Presumably, when we did that since last July, we thought two was all right.

Now we're being told that elect two doesn't offend anyone at all.

That's been the American position for eight months.

Well, as you know, Jerry, I have never defended a program unless it was a 12-side program.

I am under instructions to defend the 12-side program, and that's what I'm defending.

I was under instructions to negotiate two safe-carrier sites with the Russians.

Al and Inspector Adalbo and Madison.

Augusta Plus was on it.

I haven't asked Bill to say anything yet, because I don't see the time, particularly in the duration.

Go ahead.

On the power pressure proposal, it is said that long as the submarine has long ballistic missiles, the frozen at the number of miles is a good operation, although I've been struck since July 31st, 1971.

This would mean that the Soviets would be limited to 35 and 37,

Why class suffering between 560 and 592 Jews?

We have also told them that all metal submarines could be replaced with new ones, which would give them an additional roughly six submarines, and would bring them up on their pages to between 41 and 43 white glass submarines, which is to say that they should have the same number.

av moderne regjeringar, som har laga problemer.

De har allerede laga kvelda av nødvendige regjeringar.

Og det er en praktisk spørsmål.

Vi har mange regjeringar som har ikke realistisert seg.

to the inclusion of NLVNs on any formula in this brief.

Secondly, they have laid the keel of eight more white-line submarines, so that the cut-off date of July 23, 1979, would be forced not only to stop production,

They start laying new fields, but it will force them to self-construct on submarines on which they are already working.

They are producing submarines at the rate of about eight a year.

We are not producing any.

At the moment we have the ONCE program, but the first ONCE will not be completed until 1978.

And we are then building up to, I don't know, to what, about 50 years.

Not 80, but very old.

We do not get, uh, we do not get, uh, 10 of those until about 1972.

We have 10 by 1972.

We are planning 20 seconds of operation at our site.

We would be able to produce three, please.

Now, there are two decisions that we'd like to be made.

One...

What can be done to make our proposal what we have put in, which was in secret our existing proposal?

Secondly, can we attempt to make it more acceptable?

In either case, we may face the problem of having to decide whether we want submarines included, or whether...

We are prepared not to have an agreement.

There are two ways by which we can modify our proposal.

One would be to slip the reset from July 31st, 1971 to, say, July 1st, 1972.

This would then have left them the same number of Y-class submarines that we have for ladders, which I think they may have killed on their 41st flight in June, according to the French Academy.

In case we take them rather further.

They have to be 41 and 43 Y-class submarines, according to my test.

Uh, okay.

No, thank you.

Forty-three.

To keep an equivalent number of fish that we do.

And I think it is the judgment that a balance of 50 by 40 would not give them any significant advantage.

Unless they upgrade it and use the other business.

Unless they upgrade it, but that will take some time.

The second way to...

To make our proposals perhaps more accessible to the community, to allow freedom to mix from ICD-X to SLCS.

And on this, there are many variations.

One variation is that we permit them to conduce dissolved SS7s and 8s

There is old missiles that are standing in the open into SLBMs.

Those they have about 100, they have 134.

This would give them an additional 8, something.

Another argument is, however, not to permit them to use soft weapons, but to force them.

If they converse...

to use the more modern missiles for the conversion, and therefore say they can convert up to whatever number we decide of modern missiles into SLBMs.

The latter has the advantage that they have to sacrifice a modern missile to get an SLBM,

On the other hand, it would not significantly degrade their strategic capability, and they might be more reluctant to do it.

In either event, whatever scheme is adopted, the practical consequence would be to give the Soviets an additional X number of submarines, say 8 or 10, bringing them up to something like 60, through conjuring of old submarines,

I think the judgment is that without these additions to our proposals, it will be very hard to get an SLPM.

To get an SLPM of 3,000.

Thank you.

The major problem and the major incentive that we have to get an SLVM, to get the SLVMs into the treatment is, SLVMs remain unconstrained, as I understand it.

The Soviet Union continued to build 80 years, and there's nothing we can do until 1978 to catch up.

I talked informally to Tom about the possibility of a U.S. program, at least to put some pressure on them.

If I interrupted, like if you found, I suggested, like, why can't we do that?

Why can't we do that?

Well, sir, if we had taken it all out of our programs, our programs, I mean, just 6887, you didn't work.

We probably could construct, as I don't care, three or four of the 640 class, which is the type of submarine we have today.

These submarines, of course, would have the old technology, and it would take additional resources.

Then there's a possibility that that does convert it.

Well, if we got it in terms, the only reason we ask the question is if we got it in terms, we don't get a deal.

On a crash program, what did you come up with?

Well, so I'm a person that can't fix it, and I understand how it can be costly, and the rest, but what did you do?

Yeah, so what did you do?

Instead of, as I say, free without interfering with ongoing health programs, you could probably go up to Ryan's tent.

If you were willing to assign a charge in the field to the other systems.

But we wouldn't recommend that, sir.

What would you recommend?

I recommend, sir, that we design, that we accelerate the head-up program by acceleration of all programs.

Well, sir, then, rather than having...

I think the important thing is...

And it's publicly known that we are moving out with a new program.

That's really more important than having a ridiculous IOC state.

As good as a political leader.

I'm sorry, I said also to, in thinking about this, and I'm for including the government, so I'm not against it, but isn't it true that because we're moving out, the science is going to be ahead of the actual facts?

Yes.

Well, if you're going to balance the subway, you've got to stop right here.

We have 10 more heads on each side, so that's 160 we have, and what do they have?

They have 16.

They had the technology now.

I think the first time they could deploy it, the multiple warheads would be probably in 24 months.

It would be 24 months from now that they could probably deploy the multiple warheads.

I don't get into those discussions as to how their track system works, because we know that they can change their patterns, whether they use now-seeing and using stellar inertial guidance on their large missiles, and this argument is to how the bus system, whether they have their own computer in their bus, or whether they have just a track system.

I just don't think that makes any difference.

We know they can show multiple warheads, but we know that they have accuracy

The point here, Mr. President, is militarily, I'm not concerned about them having 51 submarines.

We're having 41.

As long as we have a nine-point program.

The problem that concerns me is not from the military standpoint, it's what our lives and our friends are going to think on and down the years if we get up to, say they get up to 70 and we're still at the 41 mark without a program coming along.

And so I don't think the number argument by itself, I can depend on that all over the United States and in our country.

I think we can feel secure as long as we have an ongoing program coming along so our lives, our friends, and particularly the people here in the United States know we have an ongoing program moving forward.

So the number business, although it's important in the minds of some, I think we can keep that technological superiority so we can continue to move out and have a better system of delivery than they do.

I think to build tiny copies of old submarines is really something that we ought to give some consideration to because I think that would be kind of a mistake for us to go and not use the technology that we have as far as quieting and some of these other things that give us an increased capability

And when I talk to our NATO allies and others, they understand that our submarine technology is better than theirs.

And this is an important thing to stress for technological advantage in this area.

We have two problems with respect to building a submarine.

One is what the rest of the position will be if there is no follow-on agreement.

The second is what the rest of the position will be if there is a follow-on agreement.

If we move at a very leisurely pace, then, if there's no follow-on agreement, then we go back to the situation that Tom and others have described, that she may have 70 submarines and we have 41, and then visually, no matter how we explain, there's no good to unsophisticated peace.

But supposing there is a follow-on agreement, a dexer is, or there will be follow-on negotiations, dexer is to take away the key and file a freeze of 16 more, then propose a freeze.

And then, if we have moved along at a leisurely pace until that point, until that point, it will be very difficult.

And therefore, if for any reason the SLPS

do not prove to be negotiable, then we ought to give some consideration to how we can, if we show some activity, it will bring pressure on them to have a quicker follow-on agreement, or it will give us high numbers if there is a three.

Otherwise, they won't have any pressure on them until 75 on this program.

They can look at it too well if it's at 74, with only one key of value.

Well, yes, sir, we come to the point.

Majority of it is what I know about it, so I understand that.

Out of the ballpark, sir.

I don't think so, Mr. President.

I think that we have made a damn...

I think we argue this case more powerfully than we thought we were going to.

We agree on this more than any other subject at the end of it.

There is an indication that as a result of that, they are restudying the question.

And I think it is much too soon to rule out some form of inclusionary of the S.L.s and the freedoms.

Mr. President, on this point I think that they have had the impression that we are going to succeed on this point.

I agree with what our previous meeting said, but we can't agree to this, because it's kind of... We can't agree to something that's going to put them in a position of superiority, whereas we are pretty much ahead.

This is something we're moving on to that day.

Well, I think as Jerry does it, we ought to press hard for this.

I think it's going to be very difficult to justify the things we don't have.

And certainly I think maybe our action by you at the highest level before we get to Moscow might help.

I think it's going to be very difficult to justify this if it looks now as if they stopped their deployment of ICBMs at least for the moment.

They've got a major program in Suffering, Phyllis, and we don't have one at the moment.

It's sort of lucky that we've agreed to let that go ahead in a major way, and we don't have one either way.

So, let's go right.

I think Nell's point is very important that he made first, that maybe it looks as if they've stopped the ICBMs, but we've seen time and again in the past where there's been these pauses.

And everywhere you get international zealot on the ICBMs, it's going to be very important.

Well, I was not against that.

I agree with that.

But I think that if you leave open...

Yes, I'll be in question, so that they can proceed at an accelerated pace, and I, as you hear, if I were standing still, it would be very difficult to justify it, wouldn't it?

And certainly it's going to be difficult to get an application, and people are going to say, well, he's telling you a trap.

I think that certainly we ought to make a major effort to include them, and I think maybe for one reason or another they decided that up until the last meeting, they decided that we probably wouldn't have found out who should give on this, and I think we should put an end to it.

We're not going to give.

Mr. President, one thing that bothers me is that we, in making an agreement of limiting numbers, if we make that agreement based on our personal technological superiority, and if the agreement provides for modernization and conversion of their units, the minute there's a limitation of numbers, they can then turn all their resources to

Their technology, and there's no reason to think based on their best performance that their technology is not going to sometimes catch up with theirs.

I don't think we can assume we're always going to be ahead of them technologically, particularly if the pressure is taken off of them and they can crush it.

So, I think we have to be extremely careful that we don't negotiate ourselves in a position where we have a good agreement at the time it's made that subsequently becomes a very bad agreement.

Mr. President, as you know, throughout the discussions with respect to the defensive systems, where we had an ongoing program that was delayed, or have restrained, or have an excessive possibility of restraining, while in the meantime, they continued with their ongoing programs, and I think that in the discussion of the offensive agreement,

We should insist on equivalency with equal seal, if they insist on equivalency within defense systems.

Otherwise, we're going to end up here with one and a half or twice as many ICBMs and twice as many submarines.

And from a global point of view, or Kennedy's point of view, that gets to be generally known as...

I think it puts us in a great disadvantage because the average person is not going to be able to evaluate in terms of accuracy and imperatives and all these technical details.

He just knows that two is bigger than one.

And that's really our problem, I see.

It's getting some kind of equivalency that we can rationalize before the Congress and before the public.

It's a question of people to be putting more pressure on them by letting the race continue.

When we can't race for a number of years, according to your own data, over whether we should limit what we can for midnight day, the ICBM, and then race in the one category, in the only category in which we have a program anyway.

Alden Woodrow, as much of this screening is in the proposal, will have to draft for consequence of giving him a two-year small production.

And that gets to the point of duration, Mr. President, because before you leave the other party leader and say, look, I guess I'll be out.

Of course, you don't have to be silent amongst the rest of the people, but...

They look down our throats here in companies of not what we say we can do, but what they know we might be able to do because of our political security.

You put your finger on it.

We all know that in terms of ICBMs and the rest, we have a very, very difficult time.

You know, it's going on a big program to build a hell of a lot more.

We don't even have a missile.

I mean, we haven't had any of those in a long time.

But the second point is that in terms...

in terms of suffering, this is an area where it is credible for us to say, now this also should help the negotiating side, in the event that it's negotiated, but assuming for the moment that you can't, that you couldn't negotiate, that you can't get it, it won't be started, and many of us can try, and these are

We have to remember that in the ICBM field, the land-based missile field, this is the place where it is imperative, if we can, to get a team, because no matter how much we talk about, well, we'll get going, we'll start something new and so forth, we have to be able to produce, and they know it.

On the other hand, the submarine field,

It's also in our interests to have appeal for the reasons we mentioned.

But on the other hand, it is an area where we can't move forward and where we can't get congressional support.

I've oversimplified it.

Some would say, oh well, if the people know it, it's okay, you won't make an agreement.

Anybody can vote for the American people and say we're going to be sure we don't fall behind in anything and so forth.

But just looking at the realities, some arrangements,

in terms of what you can do in the Congress, you're a lot easier than ICBM, wouldn't you agree with that?

We had good support there, I mean, we've got presidential candidates, we've got some kind of budget that's still out for our summary program, we've got Muskie maintenance, we've got somewhere in Kiev, they're all for summary, but...

Ja, søren.

So, supposing the Soviets continue building, start laying keels of that 25-foot-long submarine, and say, well, these aids we are putting in and out for modernization, they are not.

They are not within degrees, and as soon as they are far enough along, we may take out some other ones.

I think they brought the airplane with keel on it.

I say the breeze on submarines are less and stop laying keels when we really think about it.

We may retire some benefit.

Agreement is a relatively short duration.

We will never know.

We will not have achieved what we want, which is to interrupt their construction.

If we can't interrupt their construction program,

The trees move towards the hell of another church, and that is the nature.

This is in favor, this is what is.

Duration either should be long, and then we still have to make a decision which we haven't.

The dress-feet, where they should prohibit the laying of seals.

God-born duration.

But the issue of duration, I've just now got it.

There is a strong argument to be made, which the chiefs made, for a relatively short duration, which is that a short duration puts the maximum pressure on the offensive weapon.

A short duration puts the maximum pressure on the weapon.

Because the offensive reason would be...

and because there is a pattern that is presumably going to be some clause that links the end of the offences with Greece to the possibility at least of abrogating the defensive agreement.

On the other hand, one has to, on the other side, the probability of that exercising pressure has to be seen

in terms of their assessment of the likelihood that we would in fact abrogate the ABM agreement, and that at that point we will be in a better position than they should raise in ABM support.

But one consequence of the ABM really will be that it will interrupt our program, and that it will give them the time to catch up in tooling up,

One statement pleaded their head, Victor, is not a foregone conclusion.

That at the end of the offensive three, the people either abrogate the agreement, or we will be the better position than they should raise.

The second pressure we could have is that we will start raising on offensive support.

Again, this depends on the judgement who is going to be in a better position to race at that point.

That will depend on if they tooled out better during an offensive breeze, and who can go into production more rapidly.

Again, my judgement is that, precisely, if one could argue

Then, the shorter the freeze, the less the interruption in their submarine program, and at the end of the entering program.

And secondly, the easier it will be for them to stay tooled up, and therefore the easier it will be for them to start racing.

So that, while...

Everyone who's addressed this issue of duration has come up with a split with respect to breathing on it.

There's strong arguments to be made for the shore direction in terms of the pressure, but they may vandalize the pressure.

You're not absolutely sure that they really work in our favor and with respect to the submarines.

If you add all these sweeteners to it, they could lay shields within the...

Permitted to live for two years, and intended to live for two and a half years.

We have only had a cosmetic dream, so we've got to attempt to lead towards the proposition that the submarines are included.

The duration of the offensive freeze should be under lock and sun.

I would like to go back to the point I made before.

And that is, I think we should make a major effort to convince the Russians we're serious about having some reasons for this.

I think they're under the impression that we're probably prepared to give on it.

Now, maybe we'll have to, maybe we'll decide that, but it gives me and my team time to delegate and to come back and be in a position to bargain very well on this issue.

I think it's going to be, I think this will be a dream, although I agree with the logics.

I think it's going to be a much more doubtful proposition if we leave the submarine race alive.

So I think we should make this very serious effort, and I think the words should be left out.

I don't think you have to make the decision long before you get to Alaska.

I don't think this is one of the things you should decide then.

Somehow it got to the point where the Russians were serious about this, and they were interested in limiting offensive weapons.

And they are now up with this revalidation.

They should be willing to put a ceiling on submarines.

And it seems to me we're in a very disadvantaged position.

This program that they have underway, that's going so speedily, is continued while we're getting ready for the obstacle, which is not going to be ready for us for a while.

So I'm not suggesting what the final decision actually be that you have to make, but I think at the end of the day we should make a very tough stand on this.

Mr. President, I think what we really want, finally, is an action total, as opposed to if we really have to go on.

But I agree with the Secretary of State at the time.

If you cannot accept them to agree to a S.L.

and D.M.

phrase, then this period that we're going through will come into discussion shortly.

And if they do, then we can continue to try to refine it and come up with a final offensive treaty, which again, as I say, emphasizes the principle of equivalency.

Overall.

I don't think that she said he disagreed with what the Secretary of State said.

No, let's watch the other kind of duration.

We can say that it depends on what the Secretary of State says.

Anybody else want to talk about it?

Jerry said I'm not making it explicit, because if we tell them that it's not very exciting for them, the priest has to be gone, then all they want is to have dreams.

We put them in another argument against it, because it's not how we want it to be.

Mr. President, it seems to me that now is the time that we will have greater bargaining position, a stronger bargaining position before we go on this ABM thing than any other time.

That's why I think it's so important that we keep the pressure on now on the submarine launch business because our biggest...

The strongest position is now before we make the agreement.

Mr. President, I think also we have to keep in mind that I think the Russians think because of the visit that we're under regional pressure with this agreement, therefore our negotiation position is going to erode it.

The other day when I testified, I was sent a point of license to me.

I sent it to point out that we would like to have an agreement with something like the Moscow, but that we also might be during the year sometime.

I think if they have a feeling that we're just paying for an agreement before we get to Moscow, it's serious.

The job is going to be much more difficult.

Correct.

I say one other thing before we get...

I've gone over the treaty pretty carefully.

That's the dream, I think, because we have these discussions.

We get the excellent job these negotiators have done.

The language of the treaty is really excellent.

They've done a hell of a job, and they deserve real credit, and I think that we all should express that to them.

That's right.

The language itself that they've negotiated...

Superb, I think.

They've done a wonderful job, and a lot of the things that they've settled already, they've not even come up here because they've been included in the treaty.

And if we can get an agreement to do it in the public seats of the treaty, I think it would be very impressive.

We can catch the same translation.

Yes, it really was.

I can't get it right.

It will be at first, and then it will be at the end.

I know, we know, we know.

It's hard to realize.

The other thing about the team, I want to say this, is that it's one, too, that...

That expresses different points of view.

I mean, for all the banks that have been inside for a few years and so forth, it's hard to understand.

I'll read this back for you.

Of course, that's the place that the United Front is at.

Because the problem is, the problem is complex.

Thank you.

Well, Mr. President, I've said too much already today, but I think the critical question is to get ourselves in the best possible position for the follow-on negotiations, too.

And if we give up on the submarines, along with this missile, in this particular time, in the follow-on negotiations, then all the pressure will be on the forward-based systems, if they don't.

and to trade off all of those.

Let's, I hope, not get into that kind of a position now.

That's why I think the critical question we have to address right now is not so much where we're going to come out this year, but where we're going to be in these follow-up negotiations.

I'm concerned about where our present would be after your term is over.

The 1976 amendment takes this off,

It's got to have an incredible position as far as the world is concerned.

We can maintain that position through 1976, but I'm concerned about religion within after 1976.

It's a great question about the economy right now.

I think it's incredible what we can do.

Well, you know what I mean now?

Yes.

Instead of our working on their jobs, we do now have a very different situation.

You know, these American industries have to do a better job.

I'm sorry, sir.

...construction facilities.

You know, these are these construction facilities, President, that they have for those Russians.

Those are the Russian facilities...

Busted up the terrible film.

All about a YouTube and other things.

Well, I think we've got a, this has been a very hopeful discussion.

I'm sure you know that we're all willing to make the best possible deal if we can.

But it has to fix this problem of the

It's very important to the other side that they have to have one.

They don't want one.

The other side...

and it is desirable to have one.

And it may be that this is the time to achieve it.

There's just spending one moment on that on the matter of agreement.

And this is something we would not want them to do.

Well, I say we would want them to know, if they're smart enough to know, and I must say that if you go abroad and find that our frames, particularly the military, are very, very sensitive in some ways,

What is feasible?

What can be done in this area?

Look at me, an arms control agreement.

With all the problems of the possibility of splitting, I mean, and all the possibilities of whether it's going to be what is going to happen.

We have to realize and recognize pretty tough facts.

That they are moving very, very substantially.

Our moving is very substantially inhibited.

It will continue to be inhibited.

While cases can be made, cases can be made, you can scare the American people with them, and it may become necessary at some point.

If you don't agree with that, say, look, they're going out, and we're going to go all out.

But on the other hand, we have to realize that at the present time, on that score,

When they're moving ahead, moving ahead at a very, very great pace, I know it can be said, sure, we're doing all of this, and we've got the target system, MIRV, and all the rest.

We have some advantages.

We're not all that far behind, particularly in the technological field.

I know all those things.

But if you just, if you look at that,

In terms of what a totalitarian power like the Soviet Union wants to be ahead, and wants to be ahead not for the purpose of fighting the war, but to be ahead for the purpose of influencing the world.

They have a lot more hope than we have.

A lot more ability to promote their agenda, maybe even the fact that they'd like to put more of their GDP into consumer goods, and so forth and so on.

But they're not concerned about the image of peace in the world.

They're not concerned.

They don't need to be.

They're not concerned about an image of peace with their own people.

They are concerned about...

Things that have to motivate us.

And so under these circumstances, therefore, the arguments for agreement become rather strong.

And agreement now, speaking to that point, everybody has made it better.

I think we have to realize that the American position

insofar as are relevant to the Soviet Union, and have steadily eroded since 19...

The only new weapon system that we have initiated, and we did it with one vote in the Senate,

It was ADN in the last 10 years, and with our public opinion, what it is, etc., they know that this is probably even better than some of our own people do.

We have quite a problem.

Therefore, as far as an arms control would bring, our bargaining position,

Maybe it's better now than later.

It may be better now than later because this may be the last time that the United States can look at them in a relatively even position.

As time goes on, then of course it'll be, they'll want to,

Keep us, we'll be in a position where we won't want to be, because there'll be a hit.

I haven't said that, it doesn't mean that our negotiators will go back and say, hey, we've got to have an agreement now, at all costs, and so forth.

Let's just put it in this context.

We don't have to have an agreement because we're going to Moscow.

That is the reason for it.

We've got to put this on the basis of an annual interest.

We've got to look at it.

And that's why we've been studying for two and a half years in terms of whether...

We believe it is.

That's why we went into these negotiations.

So we're trying to get a limitation.

That will be the...

It is a beginning, a beginning on both sides to looking to the future of halving this escalation.

A race that nobody is going to be allowed to win.

We can never let them get this nasty superiority.

It's going to be much more difficult for us to get enough to support for it.

There are political reasons that I mentioned.

But we can never allow that.

And by the same token, the Soviet Union is never going to allow the United States to be in the position we were in the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

That's what we face.

And so, these are what brings us together.

We make the best seal we possibly can, hoping that it's one we can put back to sell here.

Well, we'll work this out a little later.

Better to get my camera out of the way.

Thank you for watching!