On March 8, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and members of the National Security Council, including Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, William P. Rogers, Elliot L. Richardson, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Philip J. Farley, U. Alexis Johnson, [David] Kenneth Rush, William P. Clements, Jr., Carl Duckett, Henry A. Kissinger, Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft, Helmut ("Hal") Sonnenfeldt, Philip A. Odeen, Ronald I. Spiers, and Paul H. Nitze, met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 10:09 am and 12:05 pm. The Cabinet Room taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 117-002 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
I think, uh,
that they would like to obtain a strategic edge over the United States.
They recognize that they cannot eliminate our second strike capability because of this.
When you get down to the throwaways and launchers, what really matters in terms of the second strike is that number about where we're four to one.
I might even get to drop in there.
Ultimately, Mr. President, it's the ultimate criterion of the capabilities of these forces.
I think that their objective isn't to appear to be number one, or actually to be number one, if the United States does not react.
So they are now number one in throwaway by a considerable amount.
Yes, sir.
They're number one in lawsuits.
Yes, sir.
But in terms of numbers and so forth and technology, they're not number one.
They are all behind.
And of course, we have a few bombers.
Yes, sir.
Do they manage?
Yes, indeed, Mr. President.
The Soviets are investing a very significant proportion of their budget in air defense, and that suggests that they are concerned about the weight of this.
I was going to ask you to say something about the bombers, and I'm glad you did.
I haven't brought that up, because I think they do represent a significant factor in the overall balance.
Certainly, they represent a factor.
And they have a very significant deterrent role, because it's basically all second strike.
Yes.
But they are also relatively invulnerable to attack, given some warnings, because they can be
They can be either dispersed or lifted off their fields, sent to a rendezvous point where they can hold until you as commander-in-chief decide what you want them to do.
So they do have a significant contributing role in the overall balance.
Could you say something, Jim, about what the Soviets are doing in bomber development?
They have, as you know,
a new medium-range bomber.
And they could use that bomber if they had refueling capabilities to attack the United States, as yet they seem not to be interested primarily in the use of bombers for intercontinental strike purposes.
Now, that could change.
They could use it if they had landing rights.
on the southern side of the U.S. continent, e.g.
Cuba.
Yes, sir, I'd not accommodate any.
But they have a, the new Soviet backfire is estimated to have a range of 4,300 miles, roughly, which would allow overflight of the U.S. continent if they had a, a, a full point beyond it.
Mr. President, they told us to get involved in the actual attack.
They were not concerned about whether they could recover these bombings.
I mean, in other words, they were looking at it as a one-way mission.
One-way for both sides?
Yes, sir.
Well, you know, the message is good.
You know, it's still there.
The message is better than ours.
They had vessels much denser, and they had, for instance, some 10,000 series.
They had vessels of several types that are designed for low altitude, high altitude zones.
And better than the ones they had in Ohio.
Yes, just better than the one.
So they had a very sophisticated and a very dense, I'll tell you, air defense system.
Then they had the B-1, don't they?
Well, I think what would be an honor to be able to kind of go over the major issues and discuss those.
Mr. President, we have had four or five meetings with the verification panel to develop the basic strategy and the provisions that we might take in the next round of talks.
I'm sure you might sound out the position as it is after SALT I.
That is to say, the limitations of SALT I were primarily, were entirely quantitative.
They rose to strategic weapons on both sides at existing levels.
They made it possible to particular qualitative improvements, which the Soviet Union is doing.
in the 10th grade, and which we are doing in the 11th and 10th grade with respect to Triton and B-1s.
Therefore, we are too proud to slice the divine objective for SALT II.
What is it we are trying to accomplish in SALT II?
Secondly, what precise decisions to be taken
I think it is one can say that the quantitative limitations occurred at a time, and probably both sides would unilaterally have muted the quantitative race and concentrated more on the qualitative changes that are made possible by the combination of merge, increased accuracy, and improvements in drawbacks that are made possible by new technology.
And with respect to those, the situation seems to be as follows.
That everyone who is 10 years ahead has written adverbs naming fixed ICBMs a high vulnerability.
And it's simply a question of time until the fixed ICBMs on both sides become extremely vulnerable to a first strike.
One of the significance of this vulnerability is
in terms either of strategy or of political agenda.
It's something that requires, that requires certain analysis and depends on what's theory of warfare to the extent that violent forces remain invulnerable, to the extent that submarines become, that remain invulnerable.
One can maintain and assure destructions, probably even ICBM forces become,
become very exposed.
On the other hand, as one element of one's voice becomes very vulnerable, the opponent can then concentrate on countermeasures against the other one.
And we have in this table, and I know you have a serious interesting question, under what circumstances a president can ever order an all-out attack on population centers knowing the certain retaliation
And while we need an assured destruction capability, the problem of implementing it in certain scenarios is a very difficult one to concede.
So it is easy to say that it's all too vicious, that we should strive.
for it insulted and hindered the result of end one of salt one was that we agreed to a quantitative disparity in our favor, in their favor, with respect to ICBMs and submarine missiles in return for a qualitative edge on our side in terms of accuracy at number four.
As we look ten years ahead,
The problem is that the larger drawback on the Soviet side can be translated into large numbers of warheads, which covers the fact that we should give them more strategic options than we would have given the present design of our forces.
So that when we say that the result of SOL-2 should be strategic equipment,
I think we have to be somewhat more precise and be sure of exactly what it means.
Because the situation that may arise, if these projections are correct, is the one that hasn't existed since the early 60s.
Namely, in certain categories at least, there could be a large gap between first and second strike capabilities with respect to ICBMs.
both sides could be theoretically equal in number, theoretically equal in capability, and yet decided strikes first could have a decisive advantage, at least in the ICBM equation, so that the gap between first and second strike capability, which was always described as a factor of instability, may be adhered to the technology that is now developing.
And therefore, simply to say strategic equivalent may not be enough, and perhaps to define it more precisely, what does one mean?
Equivalent first strike capability, equivalent second strike capability, equality in numbers, equality in throwaways, the right to equality, or the actuality of equality.
One can design, as I've shown many miles ahead,
to the Soviet as well as to our allies and to adversaries, the appearance of it all.
That's why it numbers broadly, et cetera, the sophistication, et cetera.
All that depends upon whether we have a foreign policy or not, the appearance of it all.
Exactly.
And of course, countries that have both the major powers and they are in moments of crisis and pursuing their objectives.
I think there's no disagreement in the government that we should go for strategic equipment.
There's some disagreement that's too hard to achieve.
There are three major categories that are relevant.
numbers of , and qualitative changes, and especially .
And the case, there are two decisions to make with respect to each of them.
And as we, if we ask for equality in each of these categories, at first I hope it is not equality.
And secondly, whether we should,
They drowned themselves, including Mervs, as part of the package.
And I would like to give permission to sum up the considerations that they have on each of these.
As Jim explained,
The Soviet Union has a lead over us in ICBMs, and we'll have a lead in submarine-launched missiles.
We have a lead over them in bombs.
The total available strategic forces for them have launched about 2,500.
If one counts the mothballed bombers, it's about 2,260 on our side.
However, the numbers are not effective.
Don't tell the whole story.
It's your question brought out.
The throwback on the farmers and the payoff on the farmers is essentially second-strike.
It cannot be converted into a first-strike capability except through freedom to mix.
That is, except if we shift from farmers into metal.
The farmer itself, of course, is primarily second-strike.
The Soviet force, while it is not a first-track force today, can be converted into a first-track force by improvements in accuracy and by the development of modes.
And the submarine force can be used to reduce the warning time for our bombers to perhaps a level
in which we may not be able to get too many of them out.
But anyway, this is the way they might, under certain English, use their summary.
Of course, the forces are not exactly symmetrical in their capabilities.
And this has a bearing on where one sets the limits and how one analyzes throwback equivalences.
we agree that we should, that we cannot accept as part of a permanent agreement in America a superiority in this agreement, if only for the reason which we must question here, that the impact it would have on other countries.
If one, however, then analyzes at what level that should be said, the
I think one has to answer the following question.
What is the situation that is ratified, whatever level ratified?
What are the options that that level gives to both sides?
How capable are we, or is it either side, to carry out these theoretical options?
And what steps have to be taken, for example,
At the easiest level to negotiate probably is one that sets the number of delivery vehicles at 2,500.
And our position probably would be that it should be freedom to mix.
That is to say, each side can determine the composition of its forces.
That would mean that the Soviet Union could keep all the strategic forces that it had
we have the theoretical right to these forces.
There is theoretical.
Exactly.
The question we would then have to decide is whether we would, in fact, this would give us maximum flexibility with respect to the composition of our forward and with respect to
building up to the Soviet level.
I know that everybody here is familiar with this, but I had a very interesting practice this morning with John McClough, the new chair of the Appropriations Committee, and Bill Young, who is the right-wing minority member in the Senate.
These are two senators who have always been supporters of, of of course, McClough, and perhaps even more consistent with him on the strong national defense.
As far as the Senate is concerned, in the present time, the reason the column is making the noise is about unilateral reduction of forces .
is not because he believes he should, but because he believes that he's got to have some kind of a bargaining position.
What I suggested to the President is we've often been around this over the last four years, and what's over the top is free, as far as the Senate is concerned.
and maybe Colin, and a few others, about the overgrowing during the summer, barred from being willing to go up, unless you just scared them to death, scared the country into it, that are looking for ways to go down.
So when we talk about this, that kind of an option, we're really not talking
We're concerned, and I think the Soviets are quite aware of that, too, on our political situation, but I don't know.
That's why we have to distinguish between being real and theoretical.
Could I interject, Mr. President, the point that I think we need to give a very hard look at the phasing of the
increased capabilities that are under development now, or are presently scheduled, versus the likely rate of sodium conversion of throw weight into a way of increasing the number of more accurate RVs.
I think this is quite important to both how the overall balance is perceived and to our negotiating strategy.
I've not had the opportunity to see this fully displayed yet,
because they say that I've only become more aware of the importance of this as a result, partly of a to our chief caretaker yesterday.
But the fact is that we do have underdeveloped some pretty impressive capabilities in the V1 and in the Trident and in the potential for the improvement of the warheads.
of the Minuteman, if you consider it an improvement, to give it a hardened ICBM kill capability.
And so if you look at these potential developments, which I think are within the realm of opportunity for the US to go forward with without
overdoing the business of scaring the Senate, we keep the pressure on.
And if you factor into the picture, and I think it takes some real thought on how we handle what we say, if we factor in an element of the kind of expansion the Soviets have held up to now, we could well be in a position to go forward with the
And I think that if, as I say, depending on how this looks against time, what they can do, what we can do, and how this is communicated, we may well be in a better negotiating position than I thought we were.
I agree with that 100%.
Assuming that I think these things are not well aligned with what you've already said we need.
You said we need to be one.
You said we need to try.
We don't.
It doesn't cost all that much to put a 350 KT warhead on the .
And these things, they're not
Well, I don't mean to repeat myself.
I just say that I think that before we determine on a negotiating position, we need to look at these comparisons pretty closely.
Without having us get on with this, I'd like to send a memorandum to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, possibly, to help me do it well.
in the game plan indicating the imperative necessity now of a one-on-one basis in both the House and the Senate and outside of the Armed Services Committee and needless to say the Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee.
But a lot, there are still some members of the House and Senate that I would trust the majority who in their face with hard facts won't do the right thing.
But they gotta get the facts and they gotta get them now because it's certain
They say we've had assault one and now we're having assault two and all this crap comes out in the paper for the tech.
Well, now that we're having all this, how come we're even talking about this defense and the war is over?
Why can't we cut the vegetables?
That is growing and it's even affecting, when it affects the McClellan.
And watch out.
What I'm simply suggesting,
I said to say, if they get the facts good, and Bill did a very good job reporting his two committees on TV, even that can be sold.
It can be very hard.
They've got to sit right down with them, and they've got to hear the kind of facts that you put out today.
Tell them, of course, that it's all quite super secret.
Recognize it.
Of course, it will all get out there.
You all would work out what I'm getting at if I can here, so if you have a mind.
You've got Assistant Secretary Bill, as well as yourself.
Elliot, you've got a whole bunch of them.
The Army, you've got the Secretary of the Air Force having their assistance.
And the Chiefs, and the Chiefs have got to be a little different.
They've got to be very objective.
You know which way.
The point is, they can do a lot, too.
So there's nothing that is more important to Army than to, at this moment,
and to be sure that the present attitude of the Congress towards the budget, that they don't cut the legs out of our negotiating position with regard to the Soviets and with regard to MBFR.
And I think that's what may happen unless we get going.
Also, take him on call on making a statement that he did already that, well, we ought to cut our negotiations by $30.
That's too much, that's nearly as much as a bull run, a bull run.
Mansfield would cut, take off the divisions.
But my point is, when I have a call that says that, what does that do to your coaching?
Mr. President, can I ask Elliot one question?
Sure.
What is the, what do you project to be the cost of any one force that we have in mind that we convert to?
About $13 billion.
$35 million a copy.
It would begin to be deployed about 1978.
I was very impressed myself.
A target coverage, for example.
In spite of that, you think it's
It's possible to get those levels of expenditure easy.
Well, it's already in the five-year defense program.
And if we can get something like what we have in the budget this year and factor in all the normal cost of living increase in subsequent years, we can.
We've had crash therapy every year.
But now, Andrew, just to go through those other options, which may be more possible.
I think he called attention to one experience we've made at Salk, which is that we have ongoing programs that they want to start.
We hadn't any negotiating position at all.
You had to fight a bitter battle, both with and APM, in the last administration without those.
you wouldn't have had SALT 1 and you wouldn't be now in SALT 2.
So, disrespect what Elliot said is fully borne out by our experience.
On the other hand, Elliot's point is not going to help us as far as numbers are concerned, because neither driving nor V1 projected increase in numbers of our total retaliatory force, on the contrary, if V1 leads to a reduction of about 200 as every vehicle
So those programs are not in themselves pressured in the direction of high limits.
They're a pressure on an agreement.
And when we ask for equivalence, the level we ought to ask for should be within the realm of something that we can perceivably threaten also quantitatively.
And the trend of our weapons development is in the direction of fewer but more complex systems.
And therefore, and maybe better systems, therefore setting it at Soviet limits gives us probably only a few radical capabilities, if not one, which we now intend to exercise.
Maybe if we have it, we would intend to exercise it.
Now, I won't go through all the numbers that could be considered.
One could theoretically set it at our existing level, which would force a Soviet reduction and enable us to maintain existing programs.
Or one could go for a small reduction initially, to say the level of 2,000, which is consistent with what we project in our forces anyway, when the B-1 comes in to replace the B-52, and which would then have a major impact, which would then begin to cut into some ongoing so-called program.
as one analyzes, as one has to see what we're willing to pay for the varying flow of their climate, of course, one can go to much lower, I would say a deduction of $1,500, which also keeps one problem with respect to all of these numbers is that the vulnerability that we're concerned with is not necessarily cured by low numbers.
The vulnerability that we're concerned with may be enhanced as you go to
as you go to lower numbers, if you do not also get other constraints.
And because it is the ability of an individual weapon to carry many that produces the vulnerability, and not simply the number of deployed delivery vehicles.
So what we will have to do is to present to you
various levels and the strategic implications of each of them before you can make the final decision at what level to send.
And for the purpose of this meeting, where there's one fundamental decision that is coming up, we simply want to put before you what the implications are of various levels.
And the same thing applies to Drogon.
First of all, there's a very big uncertainty in the area of 25% to 50%.
And again, the question is, what is it?
First there's the verification process, and then there's the process of .
That is to say, what methods are being included?
Should it be land-based methods only?
Should it be land-based methods and sequence methods?
Or should one also include .
Of course,
The Soviet IPVN throwback is the one that concerns us most.
The SS9 is the one in which they will convert to the greatest number of RVs, and where they have the greatest capability of the group, and also, as I said before, they do follow our preference.
Secondly, we can add the submarine missile throw bay.
And finally, we can add in the bomber bay.
Now, with respect to the bomber bay, there is an asymmetry with respect to the bomber bay, but unless it is transported, as I pointed out, into missile throw bay, it's not really commensurable with missile throw bay.
The bomb of payload cannot be, is not a first strike force, and therefore, if one says we have about an equivalence in payload in throw weight now, if one includes the bomb, and therefore it is easy for us to construct a position that looks equivalent in both numbers and in throw weight if we added the bombers to the existing tree.
we add the bombers to the existing crews and make a permanent agreement.
It will look rather equivalent.
The number of delivery vehicles will be about the same and the payload will be about the same.
The strategic implications are going to be entirely different because their force has the first strike capability.
Our force will not have the first strike capability.
We will have to have the intention to transform that payload into an effective throwaway
if we wanted to get strategic equivalence out of it, or we would have to say that a limitation on throwaways plus number is the first step towards a substantial reduction, and then we would have to analyze where we will be at these reduced levels and at what given time.
Now, if we are not willing to set the throwaway limit at the existing one for both sides,
and add the diamonds to it, then we face a very interesting question of where we are in a sense.
If we believe, as many of us believe, that the triad dividend is very important to development in our art, which means that it will increase our throw rate to about six and a half billion pounds,
If we set the throwback limit at around 600 African pounds, then we can do anything we want to do, and they would have to reduce their forces, and we would still have to bomb the spree.
Now, I have great confidence in Alex's negotiating with him, but at first glance, that is not...
It's not that easy to set.
If we set it at six and a half million or thereabouts, moreover, we would have to set the total numbers on both sides in a commensurate level because there's no way the Soviets can reach six and a half million pounds of throw-away without reducing the numbers of their missiles.
I think they'd have to release two thousand.
In 2000, I think, it is inconsistent with very high numerical limits to have a global incident at the one that we would like, which is at least six and a half minutes now.
If we go down to the level that we now have, say about four minutes now, then we would be sacrificing tribe.
They couldn't, what they would sacrifice,
One wouldn't know the decisions they'd have to make.
Almost certainly they'd have to sacrifice the SS-9s, because that's where their greatest throw weight is.
If they don't sacrifice the SS-9s, they'd have to sacrifice almost all of their SS-11s.
And that would put them in an extraordinarily vulnerable position of having all of their throw weight at 300-8 or...
The reason we call this to your attention, Mr. President, is at a level of four million pounds, which would then not count aircraft, at a level of four million pounds, we could retain most of our strategic force.
We could not go to dry, or if we went to dry, we would have to give up most of our, most of our existing polaris.
of Polaris for us.
So at that level, when you go to substantial reductions in throwback to Soviet times, we have to make a decision of what weapon, in our sense, we are willing to sacrifice.
The ideal one for us would be a throwback limit, as I said, of about six and a half million pounds, not counting farmers, simply on missiles that would enable us to do everything
would force the retains out, the substantial part of that is nine, and would set the numerical limit at about 2,000, which is where they're going anyway.
But there's no great expectation that that is a negotiable figure.
So if you go to high limits, such as in Soviet, around 10 to 15 pounds,
what you're doing is to ratify the existing strategic equations and retain the option of transforming the Obama payload into the Mezzel payload, if one thinks that we can do that over a period of 10 years.
And that has to be started at the time that Eliot was mentioning, whether they can move that, that we can restructure our force during that.
In this case, I stand really to the fundamental point.
It's clear that it was your directive for the last session on Solve that we should ask for equivalence in numbers and throwbacks, but we didn't give any precise numbers.
And I don't think Alex has to give any precise numbers for the first two weeks of his session.
Now, we have prerequisites and throwbacks only on ICBM.
Only?
Yes.
That's good.
If you commit yourself, if you say that you're going to insist on equivalence for numbers and slow latency moves for later, then if we ever do have moves, they will ask for it.
The big choice we have to make in the next three weeks is...
whether we simply have a quantitative proposal, that is to say, we're going to ask for equivalence in numbers and throwbacks, whichever seems optimal to us, and leave Moon out altogether, or whether we're going to record, whether we're going to say we are going to ask for strategic equivalence, maintain the right to equivalence in numbers and throwbacks, but indicate a willingness to trade
a superiority in throwaway on their side for a superiority in MIRVs on our side?
That is the big question, because if you, for example, if we accept the fact that we are not going to build up to their defective throwaway, then we could have as a concept of the proposition that we would stop our MIRV deployment or whatever.
that we would accept the disparity in their favor on throwback if they don't murder and recognize that we're not going to have equivalence in throwback.
If, on the other hand, we decide to keep Murphs out of this altogether, then we can say we demand equivalence in throwback.
We demand equivalence in numbers.
even if we don't really think we can build up to it, or even if we think we are, then the result of that will be that if it's all three modes are introduced, they will certainly ask for equivalence in modes.
When you talk about equivalence in number, are you talking just about equivalence in launches?
This is the decision .
Without arguing the point of this .
I was just going to say, without trying to indicate a view on either side of the issue at this point, I'd like to just introduce a couple of factors that seem to be relevant to the statement of the issue.
The question of the time over which we are looking at the impact of an agreement seems to me to present the question in a somewhat different light, whether we're looking at freedom to mix, to convert bomber payloads or throwaway equivalents into land-based missiles or sea-based missiles or something else, over an interval as long as from now to 1995, say.
than if we're looking at the question in terms of how to handle the immediate throwaway advantage that Soviets have and the question of whether or not they're going to convert that into merit.
That leads to another realm in some aspect of the issue, and that is whether we visualize introducing a progressive process of reducing numbers
whether the number is expressed in terms of delivery vehicles, north-rowing, or both, over the time involved.
So that, you know, if you put it another way, if you look at the issue as a relatively long-term issue, and if you factor in progressive reductions, then the problem of whether or not
this Congress or the next Congress would actually allow conversion of bomber payload into ICBMs is less important than if you are looking at the issue in a shorter time frame, in which so there's a catch-up with the Soviets and the Russians.
Do you agree with that, Henry?
No, the time frame has to be considered.
And this is one of the criteria that we have to take into account.
There are, however, a number of issues.
Can Russia, our verification panel, make a point, which I believe is correct, that if we want to get back on the Soviet program, we have about a year, year and a half to do it.
That after that, when their testing is far advanced,
move limitations are going to be very unreliable and subject to perhaps very drastic erosion.
So there is this high pressure on making a decision with respect to try to get an answer on the Soviet move program.
Four years ago, the president rejected the bidding.
program, the events have proved that to be a wise choice both in terms of the strategic equation and our negotiating system.
The question we now have is whether we should try to get a handle on the token, but secondly, it is true that over a period, it has to be weighed over against the evolution over a period of time.
Once these two sides are fully merged, however,
reductions may not necessarily enhance stability.
This is especially reductions in .
If the disparity is caused by the fact that one missile can produce 20, the number of offensive warheads is greater than the number of launchers, then reducing it
Reducing the number of launches may not necessarily help the demand.
That is a concern.
You could specify areas within which reductions would take place.
Or you could let it fade into mix.
That's right.
That's what happened.
Well, I'm going to say this, Fred.
Now, assume it, though, and I think it's probably an assumption that will never work out.
Assume, though, that you got an agreement that you'd have a moratorium on verb testing for a couple of years.
Sort of, on a theory, let everybody stay where he is under the agreement.
And let's have a look.
I didn't have, I was saying, I was not showing up there.
I was talking to him about that pair of testing.
For the sake of two years, why don't we try to get our house to go and sort out a permanent agreement on defensive weapons.
How serious would that be as far as our programs are concerned?
Well, I think there are several factors involved here.
In the first place, the first RV for the Triton is scheduled for testing in about a year from now.
The entire system of the bus and the nerves for the Triton is due for testing in two years from now, as is the improved MediMan Voyager Mark 12.
My serious concern about the moratorium on various testing is that I've accomplished that the organization and the people that bought it will drift away and dissipate.
In other words, you can't just turn it on and off.
We would definitely be faced with the problem of trying to assemble technical things.
You wouldn't actually be doing any testing.
Well, we had 12 months before we tested the Triton, the first part of the Triton.
And I just think it was a program.
And we've had very much difficulty getting up to our current state.
If the decision was then made, it would be reasonable.
Mr. President, I think the question is, whether we're going to allow the ability to include Murdoch and James, unless they would put a stop to their hesitancy.
And in the course of the negotiations, we will be restricted, of course, to other issues.
I think these negotiations are going to turn into a blast for all people, but I fear it's because time is in favor of the Russians.
They have a quantitative advantage.
We have a qualitative advantage.
There's a limit on how we cannot change the quantitative advantage that they have.
They can change the qualitative advantage that we have.
Therefore, the real issue is not whether we are perfect.
by a temporary ban on, uh, murder testing, but whether we get more than we lose by a temporary ban and keeping it in the, in the, uh, this year.
There wasn't quite a light year of the rush to the acceptance of that certificate, sir.
But it doesn't have any humbling around that they ever introduced us with.
They have never given us the slightest clue.
to what they were going to talk about.
I mean, a moratorium on testing would be quite a serious thing for .
Well, they may be talking about an agreement on .
We're talking now about a moratorium on testing.
They probably are thinking about something else.
They probably say, well, hell, why should we stop our testing?
You're way ahead of us.
And why should we stop it?
I guess we're considering a change to maybe
The basic choices we have, and we don't have to decide that in the next few days, is we can either go for real equivalence and not just theoretical equivalence if numbers throw away the technology, which would mean that we would have to be prepared to restructure our force over a period of time, essentially, or bring them way down, or find some way by which we trade off technology against their advantage.
Those are the two broad choices.
If we decide on the second, then we ought to examine which limitations on technology we are willing to accept.
None of it is going to be free.
And we are willing to accept in return for a day.
I think Tom is quite right.
Many of the things there is to our driving program, we go in the direction of technological.
It's barely conceivable that this obvious might be going to lead
rhythm with the mirth edge that now exists.
It is not conceivable to me, at least, that they will permit us to continue developing and refining mirths while they close themselves out altogether.
That is inconceivable to me.
We also have the verification problem.
I mean, they could continue to do quite a bit in this area, and we wouldn't be aware of it.
But, Tom, isn't that the advantage of the thought of a moratorium on testing?
We all agree, I agree, that they can't move ahead of Earth without testing.
Yes, but then if conductors develop testing, we wouldn't be able to identify as being directly related to Earth.
That's true.
We can monitor only the MIRV test flights.
They can develop the missile and the guidance system, and we would not know it unless we observed the MIRVs.
If I may amplify the point that Andrew made on the verification of the throttling, we are in a far better position to verify accurately larger missiles than smaller missiles, so that even if the error is 25% on smaller missiles,
it will be less than 25% on the larger missiles.
And we are in a position to add to our monitoring in such a way as to reduce the amount of disparity between what they pledge to and what they actually do.
In addition, if they key, that will not have the political consequences because it will not be observed by third parties.
And the difference of 25% throwaway
less significant than a four to one disparity.
Mr. President, one thing I'd like to comment on has to do with the program that Henry brought up a while ago and his relationship with the first strike capability.
Our technological base enables us to go the route that we chose to go a long time ago, which is smaller, tight weapons, accurate and highly refined
And its strike capability, as we pursue that, is capable of destroying those big missiles.
And we don't need all that throwaway.
But we must not lose our technological balance.
That's what we put our bet on all through the years, that if we conquer, it was right, and that's where we need to keep it going.
Because we don't ever really have to achieve their throwaway, Henry.
Well, but it's equivalent technology.
their throwbacks must give them greater flexibility than we have.
And that is the problem.
We always have to keep ahead of them quantitatively under that steering wheel.
I agree.
And I think that we will.
The assumption seems to be that we're going to suddenly stand still and they're going to go forward, and I don't believe that.
The question is whether over time the delivery vehicles and throwaways is not given
a continued technological epidemic by the United States, and presuming some intelligence in the right of our interests, being positive.
Now, everything considered, the most stable position you could have for the long term, especially since it lends itself more easily to at least fine reductions, including
that could contribute to greater stability.
And this is why I emphasize the problem of time phasing, because the longer the range view you take, the more sense that makes.
In the shorter range, going back to Bill's point, and Ken, the test moratorium,
It seems to me that, in any event, we should have decided first that that would be a desirable longer-term limitation.
In other words, that given, as I see it, we face really a fundamental fork in the road, two broadly characterized forms of parity, or ultimate parity.
It involves asymmetry between throwaway accuracy, numbers of warheads.
This really is the parity that was reflected in the sort one interim agreement.
So one course then is to say, we recognize that as parity, but let's keep it that way.
And the only way to keep it that way
You'll be allowed to retain your throwaway advantage and for us to be allowed to retain our technological advantage.
And the only way you can do that is for you guys not to develop the nerve.
So that is one way of doing it.
But that way of doing it, it seems to me, does have a whole series of consequences that would make it very difficult to get from there to an agreement that does represent
equivalence in terms of numbers of delivery vehicles and throw-in, so that we are right at that fork.
Now, if you take the, if you say, well, let's propose the temporary limitation on testing while we make up our mind whether to take the second proof, then what you have really done potentially is to convey
to the world and to the U.S. public, the idea that that may be a good kind of limitation.
And it would be very hard to back up, I think.
It might create a situation where there indeed the Congress would say, you know, why should we go ahead with the money we need to develop the triad system and so on?
Let's just extend the moratorium.
And this at least leads me to believe that we shouldn't propose it
even as a temporary device, unless we think that that would be as desirable long-term.
Well, that's a surgical issue, Mr. President.
If your judgment were, for example, that a nerve limitation could be negotiated within a year as part of an agreement, then one could argue that we should not now propose a nerve test band.
This would have all the consequences and might wind up as something, as he describes, might wind up as something, the worst position of having patent rights already before we even know whether we want it.
So if construction were that is sold to the agreement, including restrictions on Soviet merch, were possible within the year, I think Jim would agree that they could probably not test enough within that year
to have a substantial birth completion of their birth testing program.
So I think in your decision, you need not that a test plan, which has many of the attractions that Bill and Ken have described and many of the disadvantages that Eddie has described, must inevitably be proposed.
One could propose an actual birth limitation and see whether they'll take it.
and pending that until you are programed.
That would be another way of going.
And then, a year from now, if we were closed to a settlement, that not could go to the test bench.
I'm just saying it's intellectually separable from .
I see the argument, sir.
But I think what the No, I haven't .
But I was not all that keen on the test man treaty.
It was made several years ago.
But that's your own, that's them now.
But I think that the thing that concerns me about the test man has to do with the fact that it will basically give me
we can say as well, unless we look at British Islam, who's not, for a year, who's not restricted?
They have to be ready to test a year and a half, two years, right?
But we need to test you, too.
Some of your technicians and all that sort of thing.
You can't get it to come back again.
Leaving that out, who's a test fan?
What's your test fan that hurt the most, them or us?
sleep out the garrity of the fact that, well, it'd be great if people loved test bands and everybody would say this is the second coming piece.
So, plus and so forth, the new programs under development, I think it's correct to say that they are in a position to
conduct more tests and more developments during the forthcoming year than we are with our new program.
Wouldn't you agree with that?
In other words, it would hurt them more than us for a short period of time.
For a very short period of time.
But, Mr. President, we have two areas of superiority in technology for speaking.
One was ABM and the other is America.
And I think that, yeah, we have now restricted the ADM. And then the required is what we have left.
That's another way of looking at this.
The way I come to the test ban thing is, what we understand, I can see the argument, and there are many times you should be making reasons to.
But when you go back and read the history of the test ban debate and the rest, and it put the genie back in the bottle, did it?
But whatever the case may be, the idea that if you look at the desk man moratorium and that's pretty hard, what really it's going to do to us and what it's going to do to the
Yes, Mr. President, I want to make just a general observation of having watched their decisions over a period of time, both as a member of the council and read about them before.
It seems that we, in the reliance on this myth of our technological superiority,
I've found ourselves, every time we come to a new decision level of coping with what we would consider to be an unpredictable Soviet competence in making their technological advances, find we have been debilitated by always doing what Bill mentioned, relying on the fact that we are superior technologically and therefore we can keep it in.
All we have to do is look at what's happened to us industrially in our competition with the West Germans and the Japanese to see that this technological superiority, this arrogance that we have about our superiority is not something we can continue to rely on.
And unless we negotiate from a standpoint of realizing that in a given length of time, probably one hell of a lot sooner time than we envisage, they are going to be equal to us technologically,
we're going to wind up on the short end of the stick.
So when you come to throw weights, curves, all of those things, I think we should always negotiate from the standpoint that within a shorter period of time than we predict, they will have the same capabilities that we have technologically.
Which way does that cut in terms of, you could argue, because they're going to catch up technologically,
less focused limits on clear-cut things like number of glaring vehicles or throw weight assuming that could be made relatively clearly defined?
Or does it say, since they have the capacity to catch up and will in due course, should we try to prevent them from catching up by getting some kind of unilateral invitation on their opportunity to do that?
That seems to me
Those are the choices.
Well, I think we make a mistake in just abandoning all efforts to speak sensibly about verification.
I know they don't want verification.
I think it's a hell of a good public relations point for us to scream about verification and to possibly offer the alternative that with proper on-site verification we could
make certain that these balances remain in effect as we go along.
In other words, that we would not continue to develop technologically until they began to catch up.
But how can you do any of this without bringing change?
Mr. President, in endorsing Vice President's point, the position that we're in now is basically that for five years they want to negotiate for five years.
We're frozen qualitators, and we practically are anyway because we can't do anything about it in five years.
We're not frozen qualitators.
And the real issue to me is whether it is to our advantage or to our disadvantage to allow them perhaps to catch up on murder with us over this five-year period.
I must agree with you that we cannot assume that technologically and technically on a mission like this we're going to maintain our superiority qualitatively even though they infer
pretty well across the board.
And really, the whole, to me, the interest, do we want time to take away from us the option of including a MERV ban?
Well, time will give you a tilt toward having a ban on testing, so that time doesn't eliminate this issue from the negotiations.
Mr. President, could I say on that, I think you can make an argument for this, but I think
Probably none of us is quite ready to make the decision.
I don't, I'm not in a position to make recommendations because I think the argument is that it makes the situation worse.
And when we talk about the moratorium, first I don't think the Russians would accept it.
I think it probably would seem to them to be to their disadvantage.
In any event, I'm not sure it's our advantage.
Therefore, I would think that it would be the best course to follow would be to let Alex go to the meeting and
rely pretty much on the previous instructions and maybe make the decision sometime later.
I have a feeling that we're going to have a little time, and I think there's some advantage to having others get to know the people and have a full discussion and so forth before you make any major decisions.
In other words, I don't think, I don't have a feeling that it's an urgent matter.
I think we have on this side the next four or five months, but not right now.
One point that I think is something that they have in mind, of course, we want to hear Alex talk.
There was a feeling we went through the other case.
It was necessary for us to be forthcoming from a propaganda standpoint to all the rest.
That was necessary from a propaganda standpoint, not maybe yesterday was useful at least.
And it would have not been useful if we appeared to be negative and so forth and so on.
At this time, as far as our positions there are concerned,
what they say, what we say, and so forth.
I would be all that concerned about the propaganda.
This time it's a cold turkey.
I mean, look, we've been through one.
We know that we could agree, and we hope to this time.
So as far as making points, it's a question of putting something out that we think they may turn down and so forth.
I don't think we should be that, our position should be one of exploring in a pretty hard-headed way
I mean, I interject at this point, Mr. Brennan, that I'm not sure that we have made enough of, and that takes a little thought on how to do it and when and so on, but I don't think we've made enough of the very hard-line, indeed, extreme position the Soviets took.
And it seems to me that Alex would have plenty to do for a while in getting to talk seriously about the pursuit of Paris by any route.
When you look at what they suppose, one,
On forward base systems, withdrawal of all our forward base systems and dismantlement of the bases for these systems.
On two, on Rhoda and Holy Lock, they called for the withdrawing of sub-green.
Our scolaris decided sub-greens from those bases out of range, liquidating the bases.
On ICBM and LSLBM launchers, they propose making the interim agreement provisions permanent, which of course gives them their dual-armor advantage, plus the opportunities in her.
On heavy bombers and bomber armors, one of the factors that does equalize their launcher advantage, they call for a ban on nuclear weapons on heavy bombers and a ban on long-range air service missiles like the SCAD.
which would, in essence, amount to nullifying any use of the bombers in strategic warfare at all.
And finally, on restraint, they suggested that both sides exercise restraint on, quote, new, unquote, strategic systems.
And this turned out to be restraint on private V1, but not their YCPFs.
Now, you know, I mean, pretty good rule.
Our opening positions were the ones we already took, including equality of ICBMs, probably, that held a lot more rationally appealing than that.
And I think we could use this, you were saying earlier in the congressional briefings, I think we ought to use both Jim's material and this Soviet opening line, because what they have
In effect, the Senate is, we don't intend to negotiate about parity at all.
What we want you to do is agree to ratifying the Soviets' potential for achievement of superiority.
I think we have two problems.
One is, what do we say to the Soviets?
And third, unlimited buses.
Clearly, they weren't ready for the last session, and they just told the members to pile everything into their position to keep it through one month.
They clearly hadn't done any work.
And I wouldn't pay too much attention to it one way or the other.
It certainly is a conservative decision, I agree completely.
The second, the more important thing is what we tell to ourselves.
Where do we really want to go?
And there, it is generally, as far as we've been able to see, conceptually, we have to make a choice between these approaches because our experience with the Soviets has been not that they would accept our first position and anything close to us.
But if we have a framework, then we can begin training within that framework.
If we don't, if we start down one route and then try to shift to another,
then it becomes extremely difficult.
I agree with Bill on the test plan.
We don't have to rush after that now.
But whether we want to throw moves into the equation, we can't.
That, I think, we have to decide within the next month, because that will include leave.
If we take Mertz out of the equation, then we have to be much tougher on throw weight and numbers.
And frankly, we have to be tougher in designing our own 10-year internal program so that we know.
Because otherwise, we have no pressures on them.
And all of these things have to be faced together.
If we are willing to throw Mertz into the equation in some way,
then we have at least to open the debate in that direction without necessarily giving numbers by asking for compensations for their throwback.
Now, that choice, I think, has to be made within a month now.
The numbers and so forth, we have no time.
Yeah, I agree.
With one exception, we changed our position because the other installed one.
Well, I think that's going to actually be staying pretty well
except on .
Well, I think this is a good one, but I think we all .
We need to have ourselves fairly clearly in mind and fairly early to take a question of whether any equivalence, any equivalence we're seeking compensation in terms of
of qualitative restrictions, that is, the restrictions on birds for them as an offset to their written throw weight, or whether we're going to see equivalence in terms of numbers of vehicles and throw weight.
I've been for a limited time, you know, this would be, I've fuzzed this for several weeks or so, but
At some point, I'm going to have to start pointing in one direction or the other direction.
I thoroughly agree, Mr. President.
I don't think we need to make proposals.
I have no desire to make proposals.
I have no desire to put something on the table, necessarily.
But I need to have a sense.
The community delegation needs to have a sense of what direction we want to be pointing.
I think there's a couple of points that, this has been a very helpful discussion, just to talk these things over.
Coming back to the fundamentals,
We have what the effect of whatever we agree to is actually on whoever is the decision-maker here and whoever is the decision-maker there.
That's right.
What does he really think he has?
That's right.
Because what he thinks he has and what he thinks the other law has will determine how aggressive his policy is or how basically cautious it is.
That's why it's extremely important, not so much from the standpoint of whoever sits here, but from the standpoint of whoever sits there, that in fact, as well as in appearance, but in fact, we are not at a substantial disadvantage.
The other point is, and here's where I would go with Elliot on his presentation, is that
You have two other questions.
You've got American public opinion, and then, of course, reflecting that, you've got the idea of our allies around the world.
Now, as far as American public opinion is concerned, that's primary.
Earlier, I mentioned, and I think this is true, that I need a substantial majority in the Senate over Moscow.
as even as Steven in the House, that's a deeper danger than anything.
In other words, the isolation is the piece at any price, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
And to put the money into the ghettos, I think this is now very, very strong in this country.
We may turn it around some, but it's very strong.
Now, on the other hand, we have to remember our experience at Salt 1 was that our criticism, of course, did not come from those
Someone thought, well, we should have cut more, and it should have mattered, or limited more.
But it came from the right, the Jacksons, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
Now, how do we handle that?
Eventually, we'll make a deal.
When that deal is made, Elliott's proposition of what they asked for and then what we didn't give is very, very helpful.
In other words, it's opposite of the Soviet ask for a forward basis.
We didn't do that.
They asked for it, and they did it.
so forth and so on.
So the fact they took a position and we eventually ended up here, I'm not referring to we come back that we made the right kind of a deal, but then getting it across, reassuring the American people that we didn't get taken is very important.
And one way to ensure that is to say, look, look what we avoided doing in these negotiations, you see.
Now, the other thing is our allies.
I think with them, they're just like the Senators, Senator Hawks, Representative, the Republican,
with them, they have to realize, and this is all very complicated, but they have to realize that this was a negotiation which the United States did, a negotiation firmly and strongly, and that we have an agreement which does not jeopardize our deterrent capability, not only in our own minds, but also in the minds of the Soviet Union.
And here again, some of this kind of talk, where are we starting, where they started, where we came up with, is important.
The other thing I think we have to have in mind is that as we look at all this, we are, we're at a rather critical juncture, I think it's the same.
It's always critical.
Because,
The very relief the country feels because Vietnam is now released to its end, that relief and the very success of what we have done, the trip to China and the meeting of the Russians and the rest, now creates here, as I indicated before, an enormous amount of sentiment for doing what would be totally the wrong thing.
In other words, rather than continuing to do what brought us where we are as the Soviet and Chinese, we need to maintain their respect because not only were we strong when we stood by our allies, but people said, now let's change as we go forth in even more critical discussions because it is going to be a permanent matter.
It's going to be a permanent conversation.
And we said, no.
even though we got there by being strong and burned and so forth, now we're going to change.
We're going to weaken our position.
We're going to do that.
So, and there's going to be a lot of Senate in that way, so we're probably going to be swimming upstream most of the time against the Congress, against public opinion in this country, and for whatever word of opinion is worth, against that.
So, what I get back to is the point I made when Henry started his own retreat, is that
It's indispensable to go through this very, which I think is an excellent analysis of the verification, and I can think of the days and the weeks and the months that went into that.
And it's indispensable that we make the right kind of a deal.
But as we look at what will happen in the future, the disparity in numbers, the disparity in pro-weight, the disparity in technology, all these things,
probably aren't going to determine what the man who makes the decisions, the Kremlin, as he looks at those, he's going to know, he's going to figure it out just as we are.
What are the risks if he does something?
And if the risks are high enough, he's going to do it.
On the other hand, what appears to the public, what appears not only here, but mainly to our allies,
Japanese, Europeans, and the rest, is infinitely important.
And therefore, the appearance of what happens, the appearance of whether the United States is able to say, many can say, what matters if we're number one?
It only matters if you're number two.
Your friends get scared.
They worry about number one.
And so,
The appearance here becomes enormously important.
It's important from the standpoint to get it through Congress, not get it through, but at least to see that our congressional and others, critics on the right, don't raise such a star that they create a real doubt at home among the American people, but even more significantly among our allies that the United States is weak in this position and take it.
So we've got to avoid that.
The other thing, of course, is to conduct this in such a way that we don't discourage our allies, and most importantly, on the hard substance, conduct it in such a way that whoever sits there in the Kremlin
He gets no ideas and he's got that much of an advantage.
Now within that framework, it's a, it's a, when I mentioned gimmick real a moment ago, I didn't mean to disparage you totally.
I know some gimmicks are worthwhile.
If they affect this whole montage of what people feel, they come back to the fundamental one.
You know that he's weight, you talk about a million pounds here, and the experts know better.
But when you think of the responsibility of even a brutal, barbaric leader in the Kremlin of making a decision to launch a nuclear war, the likelihood is not all that great.
We all have it.
But the psychological war is on now.
It will continue to be on.
And that's really the game we're playing here.
It's just so important that we play it in the right way.
So we'll see if we can go where it is.
Geneva.
Geneva.
Geneva.
Got it.
After all the terrible things that have happened to Geneva, good luck.
This is the least you can do to change the consequences for each of you.
This is the most effective way to go about it, you know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Okay, Ron, go back to the drawing board.
Well done again.
The only point that I thought that you might have wanted to make was that last, and I'm sure the press can only record this, but it was that last lesson from Jay Park, the mayor, which is certainly an indication of some kind of a, if not murder, a related type of murder.
It's clear that they have a new development there.
It's very interesting.
It's interesting.
I'm glad you let me know.