Conversation 122-002

Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Justice Sylvia Taffer, Mr. President.

This case, as all of you know, is on NBFR.

And a lot of preliminary work is being done in the department.

Before we go to the discussions, I would just like to lay off the statement in regards to its importance.

I mean, and this will be obvious to all of you.

We're faced with a situation here where

horses is probably to our detriment.

I know we can remind some government that it isn't, but at least that's something we all know.

We're also faced with a situation where either we show some movement in this area or

and the whole NATO structure will come apart because of a very substantial reduction of support by the United States.

We face a political problem with Marcos difficulty with working with the group on the whole national defense .

I've got to give him a little shock tonight.

It's a little about national defense, too.

I had not invited you.

I invited the domestic members of the cabinet because these are domestic bills.

But if you're free at 530, drop over because I will be discussing with you and Elliot to be there because I'm going to get a little on national defense for about five minutes.

And it won't be going on.

If you're not a scientist, you're just a receptionist.

Who sustains veto, but, who, and I really can't explain it, but I'm going to try to solve it.

And, but, let me just, let me be quick.

We are going to have one hell of a time maintaining the military budget.

We're going to have a very difficult time, certainly, maintaining the forces against us over the Mansfield and other related things.

This is the obvious.

Now, what we're really doing here is keeping one company ahead of the sheriff.

And so,

We're faced with a proposition where we cannot say that any agreement is better than none.

That's bad, because then our bargaining position is just too bad, and this Hector Summit is worthless, and we just tell our negotiators to go over and negotiate an NBFR, because we've got to have it, or otherwise, in order to keep the Congress over.

We don't want to do that.

On the other hand, we have to recognize that we do not have the option of being purists on this.

We've got to show that we are making movement, and we've got to have something come out of this.

Because the argument that all of us are making to the Congress is, look here, don't unilaterally cut.

Because we are trying to negotiate, and we will negotiate, and find some kind of a mutual reduction that will be in our interest and not increase the danger of war by having an imbalance.

You see, it's just

We all realize that salt is somewhat like that.

We can talk all we want about salt being a good of itself.

Maybe it isn't.

Who knows?

And because, believe me, every one of these dealers, you wonder whether the soaker's cheating.

You wonder whether we're getting the worst part of the deal and the military thinks you're gonna cut us back and not them and so forth and so on.

I know all that.

But at the present time,

The domestic situation in this country, as reflected in the Congress, is such that unless we are able to demonstrate that we are going to try to negotiate the limitation on arms, then the Congress will move forward on the lateral reduction, just as Shirley was saying.

That's where we stand today.

I don't think they'll want you to agree on that.

They'll see you're buying that sign.

I don't know anything more than that.

And you're going to have lunches and dinners.

I understand.

Thank God there's still a few talks around saying, no, sir, you're going to cut our defenses.

We don't want the United States to be second.

I always say it when the speeches are made and so forth.

The audiences will cheer.

Polls will indicate that you say you want the United States to be the second strongest nation.

They'll say no by 75%.

But when it comes to specific cuts that Congress is going to vote, just as sure as we sit here, unless we've got our own game.

Now, last year, we had to face the China thing, the Soviet thing, the arms limitation, the fact that we were moving on MPFR.

All of that really bought us some time.

And the fact of the matter is, Vietnam, we were negotiating the rest, and so forth.

But we were, of course, kept this one company ahead of the ship.

So having said all that, what I'm suggesting is that I, in this one, that I do appreciate all the work that's been done.

Let's look at these things as cold as we can, analyze the dangers, and then let's come back to the realities and see what kind of a deal we can make, what kind of a deal we can live with.

And then when we leave this room, you've got to tell me,

The willy heads, well, they got insulted.

They're worse.

But I was going to say, I'm taking more of our congressional friends.

Our congressional friends have got to be in touch with the greatest and greatest chief.

So do I. Mr. President.

Let me briefly summarize the conditions that prevail with regard to the conventional forces on the Central Front.

As an initial observation, Mr. President, NATO has, at present time, a larger population, greater wealth, more military expenditures, and more military manpower under arms than does the Warsaw Act.

In gross terms, there is no disadvantage for NATO.

With regard to the Central Front, which in Warsaw Pact includes the Soviet Union.

Yes, sir.

And there's more military manpower in NATO.

Yes, sir.

That includes the U.S.

Yes, sir.

And that includes, of course, the Turks, the Greeks, and others who do not apply in the Central Front.

There are more military men under arms.

So you don't have a more powerful...

or military expansion.

That includes U.S. expansion?

Yes, sir.

That includes just NATO.

This means, in other words, this is military manpower assigned to NATO?

These are all military manpower of NATO nations.

Those, for example, are forces in the... And it includes all military expansions, not just NATO military expansion?

It includes all expenditures of NATO nations, not necessarily directed toward the NATO province.

So we're looking at the overall population, the overall military expenditure, the overall amount of all NATO nations against the Warsaw nations?

Yes, sir.

So it also includes the aggression troops on the Chinese border?

Yes, sir.

It includes that too?

Yes, sir.

In gross terms, we have an advantage.

That is not necessarily reflected on the central front, which is the critical front in NATO.

At the present time, if we look at our field forces in West Germany as opposed to the Soviet and Allied Pact forces in West Germany, they have an advantage of 680,000 men to 530,000 men.

These are deployed in a number of ways.

The Soviets have 20 divisions in East Germany, their divisions being smaller than ours.

They have an additional seven divisions in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In addition to that, the Poles, the Czechs, and the East Germans

had an additional 22 divisions, which are more or less up to strength, about 70% of strength.

They had, in addition, 11 divisions, which we expect would be mobilized very quickly.

In addition to that, the Soviets have 28 divisions in the Western USSR, which could be rapidly mobilized and brought to the front within 30 days.

If we look at the net position after 30 days, which is in the outcome, the Soviets and their allies would have 730,000 men, 58, possibly 60 divisions.

The allies would have 580,000, 26 and a third divisions.

Or, if we include French and Danish forces, 680,000, which is roughly comparable to the Warsaw Pact in 29 and the 3rd Divisions.

Once again, our divisions are larger than theirs.

In tanks, there is a substantial disproportion, Mrs. President.

They would have 14,500 tanks as opposed to approximately 6,000 tanks for the NATO nations, organized in units.

We have something on the order of 5,000 additional tanks in storage and for training purposes.

The true advantage of the NATO allies as opposed to the Pact nations is in the air.

Although they would have 2,800 planes against our 2,200 planes,

Our aircraft are far more capable.

Their aircraft were designed essentially for air defense purposes in a nuclear environment.

They do not have the payload that our aircraft have.

So that even with the lower number of aircraft, we have an edge with regard to tactical air.

You mean we really have some tactical ground support aircraft in NATO?

Yes, sir.

We didn't know we were going to be at all.

TAC air will be divided in the way that military plans call for.

75% of the aircraft, I believe, are intended to keep interdiction rather than close air support.

But do they have the capability of close air support?

You should mention, I believe, that the air defenses on the other hand are so different.

After 30 days of mobilization, once again,

there would be a rough equivalence in manpower.

If we are able successfully to mobilize, we would have about 1.4 million men, the Soviets and their allies, 1.3 million men.

There is still a serious disproportion in terms of tanks, but the basic superiority of allied air would begin to tell after 30 days as we move our aircraft into Europe.

To give you the next part, the Soviets

would reinforce with their second echelon they intend to move on three fronts as far as we are able to judge their war plans.

As a result, Mr. President, there is no great

disproportion in terms of gross capabilities.

The problem of the NATO alliance lies more under the heading of pulling together its forces, command control, which is cumbersome because of our alliances.

the alliance methods of dealing with that problem, and the problem of political decision within NATO, whether we would recognize a mobilization by the Soviet Union, move the forces forward rapidly.

But in terms of gross capabilities, we do not perceive an overwhelming threat from the Soviet Union

in a conventional manner.

That does not mean that they could not override us, but the Soviet marshals cannot assure Mr. Brezhnev that there is high confidence that they can override in view of the fact that there is a rough balance within NATO.

Let me ask you.

In other words, in the present time, assuming you could get NATO pulled together, that ruling out nuclear weapons

that there is a rough imbalance, basically, a rough balance, at least, shall we say, that NATO has a credible deterrent in conventional forces on them?

Yes, sir.

I think that the Russians would be very wary of moving conventionally against NATO unless they had what they discern to be a very sizable end.

They do not have, at this point in time, a very sizable edge.

All of your briefings have nothing to do with tactical weapons.

We have not included tactical.

We have not included tactical, sir.

Now, there are problems with the NATO alliance, but that is in terms of political cohesion, the ability to recognize and to mobilize and to hold the alliance together.

May I just add a word here, Mr. President?

Tom Moore and I have been testifying practically every day, morning and afternoon for the last three weeks in four different congressional committees.

A tremendous amount of time has gone into force level issues and the NATO issues generally.

On the Senate side, I would guess roughly two-thirds of all of our time up there to the exclusion of all kinds of things like Trident V1 and

the more volunteer force and so on.

So we've had quite a lot of practice in dealing with this issue.

And one of the problems that we see in the Congress, and I think it's a problem that also exists on the European side, is a tendency to downgrade the conventional capabilities of NATO forces.

There is a lingering adherence to the old tripwire theory

and the notion that within a matter of days we should quickly escalate to tackle nuclear weapons.

This is highly corrosive to the general efforts to maintain force levels, because the general attitude of what good are they?

And so we've been doing a lot of, we've devoted a lot of our effort to trying to convey the realization that they are capable.

We don't know, we can't predict the confidence of where the line would be on N plus 90 in Europe, but we think that in general the picture we've tried to get is the one that Jim has just presented.

And there is a lot of work in addition going on.

in detail to try to develop a better consensus within the alliance on the capabilities of fourth levels.

As much as everybody would, of course, want to see any kind of a war, when you really get down to the tripwire theory, what it says, in fact, is that if there is a confrontation,

That, to me, is a devastating answer to those who say, the hell with the conventional forces.

That's the most persuasive argument for the middle-type Congress is to give the president the option of having a conventional as opposed to... You've got to remember, too, that you think in terms of the decision in regards to any competition.

What do you think of that kind of a decision?

Come here, Jeff.

That's not going to be a hell of a lot easier for a Soviet prime minister and or secretary to think in their presence.

I mean, so there will be, over this, putting in first strike versus second strike, not arguing, and that's insurance, but we all know that

Well, we don't say this publicly, so we usually give it away.

So it's unthinkable that this would be considered first-class.

It's not for them.

So if you come down to something that the United States will have a huge nuclear capability, the Soviet Union has a huge nuclear capability, and you'll just have a few Danish, Italians without, you know, eating cheese and that sort of thing, and looking across at the East Germans.

So we have a little firefighter and a few Americans over there, you know, in the end, maybe just having fun with the German girls.

But you're just really, in effect, saying,

If there is a confrontation and an eyeball to eyeball thing, it's nuclear only.

And if it's nuclear only, they have an enormous advantage because they would appear to be more brutal and less restrained than whoever sits in this chair.

That's the thing we have to realize.

The Germans won huge conventional victories in two wars with inferior forces on every front.

They had inferior forces to the French.

On this sort of analysis, the Germans would never have started the war.

They were numerically inferior.

They were inferior in airplanes.

They were inferior in tanks in 1940 to the French.

They were inferior in 1914 to the French alone, not to speak of the British.

They achieved their breakthroughs by concentrating all their forces at one point.

They nearly won World War I.

They would have won World War I had they not lost their nerve

They defeated the French in World War II by concentrating their forces in this sort of analysis that adds divisions along the front and then says you have to have a three to one superiority all the way, all along the front.

It's not the way that it's going to happen.

The question is, how much can they concentrate?

What will they pay to support?

Supposing the Russians ran up the street and planned against us in NATO.

The forces with the largest supplies, I've been saying for four years, but the forces with the largest supplies are going to be in the pocket.

The forces with the smallest supplies, the British, who have 40 heavy supplies, are going to be in

confronting the right wing, the Russians would have the option of holding the line very simply against our forces.

In fact, maybe even letting us advance, which is what the Truman plan in 1914 presupposed the French advance and then backing the whole thing.

It's not saying that history repeats itself exactly, but to make a really dynamic analysis of the relative forces, one can't just say that the forces are equal.

They are never going to attack with conventional forces if they can get 2 to 1 or 3 to 1 at the point where they want to break through.

Almost every European war has started with equally matched, with equally matched forces.

And this leaves out of consideration another factor which we've been talking about.

which I don't want to, which isn't the subject of this discussion, the autistic situation in NATO, in which we don't even know exactly how many supplies each unit has, nor how they are, nor, I guess, what yards they have.

So while I completely agree with everything that has been said, that a conventional defense is attainable,

I don't think we should kid ourselves that it's anywhere inside the present.

Mr. President, I completely agree with what Henry has said.

What I've tried to indicate is that in gross terms, there's a match.

That brings you back to the question of how well-planned, how well-deployed the operations are.

He has some deficiencies, and his plane

that we are not in a position at the present time, given the piecemeal deployment of forces with the Dutch back in Poland, with the things questionable with three French divisions back in France that may not be attainable, that there is grave doubt whether these forces could be effectively utilized.

What we are saying here is that in gross terms, that there are the basic ingredients of a conventional defense,

We do not suggest at this point in time that the nail is in good shape.

Well, when you come down to it, we all recognize the validity of what you said.

You're not suggesting, however, that it's an animal, as these portions are, that they're a crypt, wherever he is.

I think the point that I'm making is this.

We all know that even a conventional thing is highly bad.

But the whole point is that without it, well, it's unbelievable.

But the tripwire thing is simply saying, it says, in fact, that it will be, if there is any kind of agreement, you go to a nuclear war.

And that is a hell of a...

That is much to base an American foreign policy on.

It could base a Russian foreign policy on that, in my opinion.

I agree with that.

It's a question of what dynamic you're talking about.

I'm sure Henry is right in that you visualize the unfolding of a situation in which the Soviets actually launch an offensive designed to smash Western Europe.

But the political dynamic we're dealing with isn't really that.

The political dynamic we're dealing with isn't one in which we're seeking to maintain stability in Europe and in which there is some reason to believe that the Soviets recognize some upset kind of stake in this as we do, which in turn leads to the opportunity for NBFR negotiations.

So the question then is, in terms of perceptions of our allies and our own Congress, is it

Does it make sense for us to argue that the U.S. should contribute to a major conventional capability in Europe?

It's by that process that you have to argue to the Congress that, yes, it does.

And that, in turn, forces you to say that we're not solely dependent on the tripwire, that these forces do.

reasonably balanced.

To be sure, we seem to improve them.

There is this problem of logistical backup, there is the problem of modernization and so on, but they're moving X, Y, Z toward modernization.

So it's really a question of which is you pick it up at and in what context you're taught.

I know there's another, Elliot, isn't it also true that, if you've seen Henry's series, that you have to

The premise is that their leadership is better than ours.

Now, except we have equivalent forces, which is what Jim's roughly saying, then theoretically at least we should be able to be as strong as they are.

Otherwise, you have to conclude that we have to be a lot stronger

in terms of our resources than they, because we don't have as good military planning.

I think it's that control, that political and military responsiveness, is where they really have the advantage.

I think it hasn't been, they don't realize they're in a big war, and that would all change, and the question is, would they have enough time to recover, so to speak?

But their capability to mobilize, their capability to,

move into positions, in other words, the warning time.

Whatever it is, what we have to, I think this is a repeat of one or the other point, is in terms of trying to sell the conquers on continued support for NATO, we have to put the best possible base on what we ourselves may recognize as strong as

because of all the political differences and the rest and so forth, may be pretty inaccurate.

But if you say, well, it's sort of a half-assed thing and it may not work and so forth, the Congress will say, let go of it.

I think we have to be pretty...

I agree with it.

It's a congressional argument.

It's the only possible one, the correct one.

In terms of the necessities of NATO over a period of time, we have the desire.

On the one hand, we want to, and we were going to discuss this.

You go ahead.

On the one hand, we have the necessity, which you pointed out, of moving in the direction of force reductions.

On the other hand, we have the equally strong necessity of moving in the direction of force improvement and of improving command and control, because otherwise,

NATO is going to go the way of the French Army if it's ever challenged.

And for the same reason, because the leadership and the cohesion won't be there to withstand the sustained attack.

That is the dilemma we face.

The resources are there, I agree with Bill.

It is possible to have a conventional defense, I agree with Elliot on that.

But I believe in its present shape and with its

it will not be able to withstand a major attack if it should occur.

And that is the problem we face.

We haven't heard of them, but we're not saying, look, kids, and that's what we've got to watch here.

Isn't it wonderful, Keith?

Isn't it wonderful how we can reduce our forces to make a lot of new children?

They just go forward and everybody can lay back.

At the same time, we have to say to ourselves, and particularly to our NATO allies, don't get off your bus and

and improve your forces, and it's a pretty tough deal to do it in both ways.

But that, as I understand it, is the thrust of what your groups have all agreed to on this point.

Is that clear?

Mr. President, I'd like to point out that the big factor here is that it's also a psychological factor.

That is, our European allies are very worried that we are not going to stay in NATO.

They're right.

That MBFR may be a cloak

for our gradual and gradual withdrawal of troops from Europe.

And the maintenance of our troop levels really has a very powerful psychological impact on our NATO allies and on Russia, and on ourselves, for that matter, as to whether we're going to withdraw or not.

And psychologically, I think it's very, very important for us to let our allies know and let the Russians know that we are steadfast.

With regard to forced improvements, I think there's a little bit of misunderstanding.

We have been pressing very hard for about three years to have the Allies increase the quality of their forces.

Now, in the last three years, their veterinary efforts have increased by about 28%.

Ours have decreased by about 3%.

As you know, Helmut Schmidt started the EDIP, which is symbolic of the attempt to improve their forces.

They may not be doing enough, but I think it's up to us

insists that they do improve their force levels if we're going to stay in Haiti.

And they're doing this.

I don't think we should tie it, however, to MDFR, because MDFR, in essence, means that we should be reducing along with the Russians.

But as we reduce, we should be working on another front to make them increase the quality of their forces.

Now, they do supply about 90% of the ground forces.

about 85% of the paragraph, and about 75% of the neighborhood.

So they're doing quite a bit right now.

They should do a lot more.

I think there's one other thing, Mr. President, we have to mention.

And that is, it's a suspicion.

We've already made a deal with the Soviet Union.

That's right.

And they're hanging it on an MPFR.

So every NATO country believes that.

And someone will tell you that in private discussions.

Someone will.

We've talked to each other about it, but there's no doubt that that is a suspicion.

And one of the things we have to be careful about, and one of the reasons we don't want to go very fast, is we don't want to convey the impression that we're anxious for an NDA as well, because we haven't made a deal.

I get that from a military point of view.

No doubt about it.

You get that from a military point of view.

I think that's the one that's on the line.

Well, this affects which company?

Well, we proposed that off.

I don't have a feeling that they're too darn keen on MBF on the record.

I think Mr. President, I mean, if I had to be made by a candidate in this room, we all know that they want to knock NATO down.

If I could disintegrate the European Security Conference, it would be nice to get the action for that purpose.

But they aren't, they are pressing and compensating

I mean, they figured we'd get a good deal, at least for this part.

No semblance of a deal.

On this, Mr. Burton, I think it was a pretty general agreement.

I don't know if you should approach that.

I don't know if there's any difference between the two.

And our objective really is to have NBFI laws in the head and proceed very slowly, but also with the impression that we're serious.

In fact, we're not told that we stay until we don't get to Congress.

So, Henry, go ahead on the analysis here of the working privilege.

There are three issues which were discussed in which one has already been surfaced.

The first is whether we should then get VIVA into the problem or force it through.

The second is whether, how we, which of the three basic options

where all of the three basic options which we have developed constitute acceptable outcomes for MPFR.

The third is what our strategy should be for presenting it to NATO.

In terms of the history, MPFR was first proposed by the Allies in June 1968, and subsequently reaffirmed in 1969 and 70.

the response to the Soviet proposals for security.

And secondly, as a means of containing pressures for unilateral relaxation of defense efforts, especially to demand .

There was no particularly precise idea that this would ever lead to a negotiation.

and the FBI negotiations have exhibited the same tendency.

The Security Conference negotiations exhibited that as long as they were in the draft proposal, they couldn't afford actions.

Everybody was bored, and as soon as we accepted them in turn, and in fact, as long as we opposed these negotiations, we were criticized for being rigid.

As soon as we accepted the negotiations, we were accused of having made a separate deal.

with the Soviet Union, and we are now faced with an effort by our allies to admit us in procedural debates about which countries should be involved in the enviable discussion, precisely because of the deal which Phil mentioned, that there is a separate deal with the Soviet Union.

Our approach is very conditional, that if we get into these negotiations,

on an entirely political and psychological basis will be the never-never-then, in which pretty soon criteria will disappear completely, and in which, in the allied discussions, the debates are going to become more and more venomous in the absence of any clear yardstick.

We have come to view that the only way the Europeans could be certain that no decisions would be made against the English, the only way we could know what

What we are doing is to develop some explicit criteria for what the elements of security in Central Europe were, and to develop very precise proposals which we could test against these criteria.

This is the way we handle this whole negotiation.

It is also the best way to deal with the domestic pressures because we can then always answer abstract arguments for cuts with very precise analysis of how we see security, what cuts we are prepared to make.

And therefore, the whole thrust of the internal discussions in the government has been to develop options which we genuinely believe would contribute to the security of the central government, or at least not weaken it.

and to try to engage in discussions about the security situation on the central front, rather than on the procedure of debate, of pure negotiating.

In doing this, we have a six-phase entrance, which we

took into account first that we are already embarked in a period of active negotiations which involves all the European Security Conference and FDFR, each of which based directly on aligned security, and which form a part of a general effort to create a more normal relationship between the East and West Europe.

In this sense, the whole context of our negotiations with the East is linked, even when they proceed on a separate basis.

Second, these negotiations occurred at a time when in each other country, including the United States, there are growing pressures with arbitrary sources to domestic needs.

Third, there has been an improvement in overall relations with the east in the past two years.

But it is also true that the Soviet Union may use these negotiations as a strategy to undermine the cohesion of the very

and to undermine the NATO defense effort.

Fourth, we face a strategic nuclear situation in which the predominance of the unit in the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union has given way to a rough balance and conventional defense, as we've agreed before, has become far more important.

Fifth, the issue of force reductions is an extremely complex one.

Because the forces are differently designed on both sides.

If it is true that our forces are technologically superior, they're smaller, then the cut of a certain unit on the western side has a greater significance than on the eastern side.

The trouble is that below 10% cuts on the whole cannot be verified.

If you get above 10%, if they are strictly symmetrical, they become increasingly disadvantageous to the alliance.

And sixth is the fact that, and Bill mentioned this, the suspicion of the U.S. Soviet detente side by side with a reluctance to make a substantial increase

in the defense effort.

Now, these are the givens in the situation.

Therefore, the overriding problem which we face is how to maintain an adequate defense posture that will protect our security interests, but advance our political objectives and negotiations with ease, and at the same time contains pressures for unilateral reduction.

As was pointed out earlier, we face two problems.

One is the need to make the conventional defense for which the theoretical capability exists more realistic and more real.

This requires unifying the logistics system, unifying the command and control, and a whole series of other matters which are being discussed with you later.

At the same time, we need to develop a common position on MPFR

related to the security issue.

The first question we have to decide is whether we want to ask for the force improvements within the context of NB of R or whether we want to ask for the force improvements from NB of R. When we put our NB of R ideas before NATO at the end of this month, whether we include a package or at least a recommendation for force improvements or whether we ask for the force improvements separately.

The argument for separating the two is the one they can make.

The Europeans and the British, they have no way of making it.

Consider the desire, the linkage of the two.

It means to give us an alibi to pull our forces out if they don't mean to pull it.

And they may resist a discussion of the two issues.

The argument against, the argument for linking the two is that the defense mechanisms of the Europeans to discuss force improvements in the NATO context are well developed.

They know that this involves increased budgetary costs and they are well prepared to have endless delays in these discussions or making token contributions.

They don't get to the heart of the problem.

if they see that we are serious about the security aspect, and if they understand the integral link between defense and reduction, it would make more logical sense to package the two.

But this is not an issue of absolute principle because the two discussions are taking place sufficiently close in time.

With Elliott going over there in May, that it is the future of the alliance won't depend on

on whether we think it's a largely tactical issue.

Actually, they are linked.

Every time we have a discussion in NATO, we link them.

Sure.

In other words, every time we talk in a NATO meeting, we talk about force reductions, we talk about force improvements.

And we've had innumerable discussions about this, and I have.

Every time we discuss it, and they know perfectly well that this is our problem, that if they don't improve, we're not going to be able to maintain our strength.

Right.

So that is one aspect of it, and relatively one which we have.

Well, let's have no illusions on one point.

All of this we know.

The whole thing falls down without the continued U.S. participation at approximately this present level.

Now, how are you going to get that?

We've got to give some hope to the U.S. Congress and all people that if we just maintain our strength, we eventually can reduce the amount of mutual basements on the second.

The U.S. Congress and, as I say, the people must be convinced that the Europeans are going to be there to care.

That's why the Europeans, the force improvements and so forth, are essential.

Because you go to the Congress meeting and say, well, the Europeans are sort of waiting in there.

Everybody's looking forward to this nice little straight-up detente.

And the Congress says, to hell with it.

I mean, if Europe doesn't want to do their part to improve their forces, to defend themselves, why can't we do just as much as we're doing?

That's why it certainly weighs in the political sense.

We've got to make both cases.

One thing that occurs to me to mention, I was aware of a report by Randall's committee of the House of Billionaire Services, which was rendered in late summer, I think, of last year.

And based on quite extensive tours and discussions and meetings with Europeans and so on, it's a really quite favorable tornado.

to NDFR and deposes unilateral reductions.

It's the only congressional document.

I only learned about it when Tom and I were testing it outside.

I mean, this is just as a reference source we can make the most of.

Go ahead, Henry.

In applying these criteria, we work through innumerable options that one can invent.

an almost unlimited variety of options, but we narrowed it down to really three basic approaches, or maybe only two of which the spirit can be then used to fill it in.

We concluded that simply that simple percentage cuts were

tended to magnify the Soviet advantages.

And therefore, we attempted to develop percentage cuts on our side and reductions to a currency length on the Soviet side, which would produce asymmetrical cuts.

And the two basic approaches are whether we should propose a percentage cut on our side that includes both stationed and indigenous forces that it's imposed,

forces from the U.S., U.K., and Canada, as well as forces of the countries in the area, or whether we should confine the MBFR to U.S. and Soviet forces or only to its stations and Soviet forces.

The area we are talking about includes, right now, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on the Allied side.

East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the Soviet side, with our European allies violently insisting that Hungary also should be included for a variety of reasons which we don't have to get into now, including the reason that this is a very convenient manner of delaying the negotiations on the substance

And it is one of these poisonous debates that don't do anybody any good because on any projection of percentage cuts, the figures are not very large.

Within this area, NATO has about 802,000 total ground forces compared to 834,000 for the Pact.

NATO has 341,000 ground forces stationed.

of which 191,000 are U.S., in fact, 390,000, all of which are Soviet forces.

I have a chart here of the various forces in the area.

Now, the advantage of having the way we would handle the cut of all NATO forces would be to begin with the 10% cut of Soviet and U.S. forces.

to be followed by another 10% cut of indigenous forces, while the Soviets would go down to the ceilings, and would then be .

The advantage of this approach is that it starts a process that continues, that we're not talking about a one-shot cut, and that theoretically,

One could relate the process of reductions to the process of political improvement.

The disadvantage of this course is that all our analysis indicates that reducing indigenous forces is disadvantageous to NATO because we basically end up reducing good West German divisions for second and third rate.

Polish and Czech divisions in the second 10%.

Secondly, the disadvantage is that it would open up allied defense efforts to extensive Soviet interference and make the domestic defense budget of the indigenous forces a constant subject for debate.

And therefore, it is interesting that many of our allies

that especially the Germans that had started out with the view that there could be no NBFR, they did not include their forces, are now coming to the view that they would rather not have their forces included in any NBFR because of the process of unraveling that it might start in their own defense effort.

This is not true of the Baltians and Dutch.

The second approach that we could choose

would be one explicitly US-Soviet reduction.

From a domestic point of view, that is, of course, the one that would be most advantageous to us because it would get us the largest US reduction.

And if we take the percentage correctly, it could wind up with a common ceiling on both sides.

Anyway, if, for example, the reduction is on the order,

of about 17%, the result would be that both the NATO and the Pactron forces would wind up at roughly 770,000.

So that cutting US and Soviet forces by 15% to 20% would result, in fact, in a common ceiling.

The disadvantage is that it will, of course,

tender strikes and condominium arguments.

And it is really a question of how the Europeans would react

I think that, I agree with, in general, with everything that's been said.

I think we should have our own minds, you know, whether we want to come out.

You agree with that, don't you, Henry?

Oh, yeah.

Of course you want to come out.

And I think that one point is, also on the black side, all the state enforcers are Soviet.

On our side, they're made up of several countries.

And I would think that

a 10% U.S. and a common ceiling of states and forces was 10% U.S. And then this would mean, of course, that the Soviets would have to make about an 18%.

I think that's the way we should go, as Chris said, because I understand from my information that the Native Americans are moving around to the point where they will support

just U.S. and Soviet withdrawal.

They began to think that way because, as Henry pointed out, if you go for all the station forces and the common seeding or the Warsaw Pact and NATO, you begin to make inroads into the German forces and think of this kind of

And this will start this unraveling process that he mentioned.

So I think that I agree that we have an agreement as to how we should set the status of principles that we should have in our own mind and direction that we want to go the way we want to end up.

And I think that we would hope that we wouldn't get into too much detail about the structure of the forces that are withdrawn because that's going to be worked out in light of the overall plans and the overall plans.

So I would hope that the military committee in Maine would have an opportunity to more or less come in and develop the exact structure of the forces that would be withdrawn.

I know they want to do that.

So I think we're on the right track to the uncertainty, wasn't it?

Well, I guess we'll start.

There's one thing that hasn't been mentioned, Mr. President, that is pretty important and could in the end turn out perhaps even more important than natural reductions.

This is the ending of confidence-building measures or collateral constraints, things like the stationing of observers who could give warnings of moves toward mobilization and so on.

And there is a discussion about whether or not agreement on this kind of constraint should be a condition proceeding to moving toward negotiations on force reductions or whether we'd be prepared to negotiate the collateral constraint concurrently with negotiations on force reductions.

But I insist that they should be part of any agreement that emerged

I think it's generally agreed, as far as I know, among us all, that we would be willing to go forward on a second basis, namely that we wouldn't insist on definitive agreements and collateral constraints first, before we went forward, but that we would insist that any first stage agreement, including reductions, also includes this kind of provision.

The significance of it, of course, is that all of these calculations about how the Warsaw Pact and NATO portions do, that is a key initial assumption.

The question is how much warning time has the West got?

And the less it is, the worse we do.

And so, therefore, whatever can be done to assure

or at least maximize the warning available to us, the better off we are.

And this, therefore, becomes quite an important element of the agreement.

Would you like to?

Just one point, Mr. President.

Regarding the way we handle this with NATO, I think we all accept that we need to have, and at the right time, make clear our view of the outcome.

But I suspect we all

if only out of salt, have a degree of humility about how well we can program that outcome ahead of time.

And I think we're going to find there are a lot of unexpected turns to this negotiation.

We're going to have a difficult time adjusting, as we'll have to with NATO.

And the more we can, at the outset, get them to look at different possible components to the negotiation, to whatever outcome we get, and to look at them

differences that have some security importance to the way they're handled, I think the better chance we'll have of managing this negotiation.

So I think it's quite important that we go through with the kinds of options that are talked about here and the security pros and cons.

also recognize that there may be different ways in the negotiating process.

These things are going to have to be put together, because otherwise it can get to be either a matter of forced trading and bargaining, where we may have our troubles.

It would be very difficult to get NATO to make the adjustments that are needed.

This is a multilateral process.

That's hard to do.

We've got to get across the idea at the outset.

We need some flexibility.

and that we need, nevertheless, to operate the flexibility with some consideration for what's involved from a security point of view.

This stage we're going into now with NATO, I think, can lay the groundwork for that.

Mr. President, I'd like to add to that.

I think that everyone should recognize that it's due to geography.

No matter what the Soviets agreed to, in terms of what's going on, they can get back to the place faster than the NATO forces, for sure.

God, I'm sure.

Well, I have his name, for sure.

Mr. President, I just am very much in agreement with the way Henry's outlined.

It seems to me there should be anything in that paper that we can't live with that goes to name.

And I personally believe that we should have more than one option in the paper for the reasons that have been stated.

I think also it would be helpful if the paper could have some discussion that kind of had our argumentation and our thinking.

beyond the specific options.

And I think the question of preference can be gotten around by honestly stating that we may have a preference, and we do possibly, with respect to the different approach.

But our final preference depends in part on the things that evolve in the consultation process and the views of the other countries, because we do play a premium on the cohesion and the involvement of the other countries.

But I think that if you didn't have a preference, it looks a little bit like you don't know what you're doing is a good one.

And therefore, I think if we do have a preference, but say that our final preference depends on their involvement, their ideas, and their views, and their feelings about these things, that we can possibly exert some leadership and...

What do you think of that?

I think if we give it as a lie, as saying analytically, we think this is the better way for these reasons.

However, we want their views.

And that is possible.

I mean, that would be the best.

I think what is highly honest, I reckon, is that we go in and settle on a proposal because they've never even discussed the exact answer.

You and I, we've always had this ambivalence inherent in this country.

If we don't take the leadership, we don't know pretty much what we want to do.

The exposition and discussion of the merits and the pros and cons affecting these alternatives really point in a direction which rational people, to the extent they're dealing with the derivative process, can agree on, you know, the easier it gets.

You can do good deals of selling on the basis that we back up the reasons for our premises are not, I mean, for our preferences are not capricious.

And to the extent that they make sense to us, they will carry a degree of weight with them also.

Third, oh, excuse me, go ahead.

Well, third, I do think it's desirable to include the path function

education, the value of them having to go through that and the contact with their defense ministries and their political leadership is just tremendously valuable to all of us, I think.

It forces them to focus on those things.

And I know the sensitivity of the November report, but it seems to me that that's very desirable.

I think, fourth, that it's desirable to include reference in the paper to non-circumvention.

It's something they're very concerned about.

and the constraints question, and I think it has to be addressed and discussed in the discussion paper in some way.

Also, incidentally, when you do it in the security framework, the Hungary issue becomes almost absurd because if we take either, if we take a common-sealing route,

Even under the arms we have today, the Soviet Union will have to cut more forces than we do.

They would have, for example, of that 18% option, we cut 32,000 and they cut 64,000.

To get your country, if you throw in Hungary trade, if we cut 32,000 and they had to cut 124,000.

Now that's just not on.

It's just an absurd proposal.

Or did you go the other route of 10% plus 10% down to account and say that we have to cut, we cut, the neighborhood cut 34,000 and the Soviet Union would have to cut 143,000.

And for that reason alone, to have a halfway symmetrical negotiation,

If you have Hungary, you cannot have a common ceiling approach.

If Hungary is in, you can only have a percentage cut.

If you have a percentage cut, every analysis shows that it makes the defense problem of the West worse.

If you have a percentage cut, then you're only talking about 7,000 Soviet forces at a maximum.

If Hungary is in, that you get

And therefore, if we cut off this procedural debate that is now going on about if it's fair and cut it to the level of analyzing options, the Europeans would recognize that including Hungary gets them a worse outcome than excluding Hungary, and it would get it off this debate and we cut a private deal with the Soviet Union.

With regard to this situation that you raised on the link, the ability to use the term, I get back to the point that we must be under no illusions that the improvement of naval abortions has gone to the law, but everything we do here is just implicit in the whole deal.

It's probably true from a military standpoint.

It's indispensable from the standpoint of the job we have to do to

U.S. support for NATO.

I mean, everything just appears to be

general well that's let down and so forth.

What I'm getting at is nothing to do with numbers or percentages or whether Hungary's in or this or that or the other thing.

It is kind of the general mood and psychology of the Congress of the American people at this moment.

What has happened is there's the failure of now what the American forces have withdrawn from Vietnam.

We've mined two wars over the POWs are returning and we have

Again, I'm going to have all this.

Now I can sort of relax and turn to get to work on the ghettos.

But now that is, that's very, first it's a fact, but that's an attitude.

It's an attitude.

by the people who should go back to the old internationals to become the new isolationists.

And there's hardly a columnist, hardly a columnist, hardly a, except for Howard Smith, a commentator on television and radio, hardly a college professor, hardly an intellectual leader who is considered to be with it, who isn't, or basically, oh Christ, I mean,

Unilaterally, they would vote for the Mansfield Amendment, they would vote for stopping the murder of Triton, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

That's what it is.

Now, fortunately, it's not a majority of the country, particularly when you get down to those that have not been, fortunately, exposed to a common institution in the city.

But on the other hand, it is a fact, it is a fact that

Congress constantly hammering in, makes our problems very, very difficult.

And that's why this whole meeting for us is one of the percentage of days and a hell of a lot of congressmen and senators are going to have to swallow us and frankly be safe and go against what they think, what they would think if they sit here in the atmosphere of Washington.

It's the attitude of the country and that is

Could God bring the boys home and stop foreign aid and cut their defenses?

That's what we recommend.

That's why this game has gone so quick.

That brings me also to the European side of the bill.

We talk about our own problems, and they are serious.

But as I talk to European leaders, I have yet to find one of them who talks in vigorous, aggressive, strong terms.

about their dedication to NATO and their willingness to go out and sell their politics.

Because, however, we are all

The American intellectual class, basically, is isolationist.

It is a unilateral disarmament.

It's all the way that way, and there is really, there is no substance, no guts in it today.

I know, I've talked to a couple of them, and I've read enough about it, and it's sad, but it's true.

And there are now and then exceptions, and I don't believe that it's a majority.

But back in mind, then,

You also look to the Europeans.

What do they have?

The British have one hell of a problem.

They have a hell of a problem.

He, you know, wants to stand up and be strong in the rest, but he's got economic problems.

And also, while his, the old establishment, British press, perhaps sees it a little more clearly than others, there is a growing sentiment that the Germans have one hell of a problem today.

I mean, look how they're acting toward our forces.

Look at the new, the young Germans.

What are they thinking when they're going through the same schizophrenia that Germans have gone through before World War II and after World War I and all the rest?

And their attitude toward, and when you have Braun at the top, who's somewhat of a muddlehead anyway, on this sort of an issue, I mean, looking toward his whole host politic and the rest,

You don't have very strong reasons.

I'm not talking about the German military.

I'm not talking about the defense minister and all that.

They give you the right kind of chance.

But I'm talking about the fact that you have here in Europe a group of basically war leaders rather than international statesmen.

They wouldn't like to be the latter, but they can only be as big and as strong and as outgoing

as the base of their public support for the law.

And having mentioned the Germans and the British, you go on, you have people like the Danes and Iran and the rest, and they're not

Oh, I suppose you get down maybe to Greeks.

That's pretty good, but then the Turks.

What I'm saying here is not to indicate that I think the problem is hopeless.

What I'm saying is that we are living in one of those ironically critical times.

It always seems to be that case where

As we at Bursa, we must recognize that we have a very difficult problem of selling our Congress due to the fact that the American intelligentsia, the leader class, is constantly hammered the other way.

We have very little support for these kinds of people.

In fact, the group, for example, that supported the Green Turkish Loan Program and the Marshall Plan and the old bipartisanship in the press and the TV and the rest and so forth, gone.

All lost their minds.

It was one or two recessions.

And so the middle grade thinks in a different way.

But difficult as our problem is, we have to realize that unless we are able

unless we are able to stand up for this thing.

There isn't anybody else.

And with me, I mean, the sentiment in Europe isn't all that strong.

We're not going to see London.

We're going to see London.

I know how he feels.

We stand here and there.

He better be strong and all that.

But he knows damn well that he is an exception to the European leaders right now.

Yes, sir, he is.

There are three or four others, but both of the politics of it.

I think that argument is persuasive.

I think the one you mentioned earlier seems to me that the European public opinion and the Congress of the United States, given that argument of saying that they're risking

forcing the President of the United States into a position where he would have to use tactical nuclear weapons.

He fails to mitigate a conventional force, and it... Tactical?

Well, okay.

Nuclear weapons.

What it does is it denies that option, and that puts them on the wrong side of the peace option, as to the peace argument, it seems to me, and I think that's persuasive of those countries.

And there are countries out there looking for arguments.

We can see that ability.

You see, the point was that when, at the time that McNamara and his little boys...

made all this argument about that we need the conventional forces and so forth.

It was not really relevant.

Not really relevant at that time.

At that time, because the U.S. superiority, which was in arms, was enough to carry.

But today, the game has changed.

Today, there is basically a parity.

And today,

As we've often talked around this table, the need for adequate conventional forces is there.

Because here, look what we inherited.

Look, for example, when Captain sat here after Eisenhower was here, he sat here with a 15 to 1 advantage in nuclear weapons, at least.

When the Cuban Missile Crisis came, it was 12 to 1.

All right.

Today, when I got here,

is equal and best, not only just to kid ourselves about where we are now.

What do we do about it?

What we have to do now is to realize that the idea that the United States, huh, huh, and so forth, and stares somebody down because of our great superiority, well, I mean, the point is that when you're equal, yeah, maybe you're deterred to an extent, but you're in no position to block.

That's the point.

You're in another position to go.

And that is why, in this whole game, you need some other option.

We need some other option.

Because if we don't have another option, this bill, I'm sure, will create an issue.

But, God, you don't have a foreign policy.

You don't have a foreign policy in the present time.

The United States, the President of the United States, dealing with the Soviet Union, it's either all or nothing.

Because if it's all or nothing, they're more likely to use all than we are.

That's as simple as that.

How are you?