Conversation 123-001

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Thank you.

You do not have to say you don't know this, but I'm sure you've stayed in touch with a lot of these people.

I don't have to say I don't know this, but I'm sure you've stayed in touch with a lot of these people.

I'm sure you've stayed in touch with a lot of these people.

Thank you.

the the

Well, I think that's it for this lecture.

Thank you very much.

This is United Health.

I'm my dad.

How are you?

Good to see you.

How are you?

Oh, yeah, yeah, his wife is a fucking impromptu.

That's right.

Good to see you.

How about your experience with your friends?

Yeah, first of all, you're killing all these people.

I know all these men, but I rarely take them.

We've got one gallon.

Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Paul's with them in the United States.

Yeah, we've got a lot of sinners.

Yeah, that's true.

Good to see you.

Hi, I'm Kyle Hiller.

And Mel, the rescue in front of the scene.

I'm sorry to hold you up.

I got you.

I had to get on.

Excuse me.

It's not a fault of his.

Thank you, Mr. President.

On behalf of this group, I really want to thank you for the, we call it, historic moment, the opportunity to meet with you this evening.

It was a great evening, sir.

At any time, I want to say this.

I want to say this to you because I want you to know that everyone here is deeply honored

The privilege and the opportunity to exchange views with you on this case really means so much to me.

Max, thank you.

Well, let me begin by saying that you've probably already seen the newspaper reactions to the message that we received from the government.

And my purpose, actually, in meeting with you and asking you to come here is not to try to influence your judgment of the matter.

And after Henry, and having read the messages, after Henry's messages to you, and after you, give me your reaction, which I assume will be negative, that I'll tell you what we're going to have to do, and which I think will be in the best interest of the people.

Let me say in advance that there's nothing that concerns me more than someone here telling me some terrible stories.

She's not better in her position than some of us at that point.

And I told her, I said, look, because she was asking me to intercede with the Russians.

And I said, well, we have a case after case.

We succeed sometimes.

We fail sometimes.

As a matter of fact, what all happened

that the Soviets should recognize and openly and publicly take a position and all of us want to do that.

So the real question is whether you want to continue a situation where we have some influence of the present Soviet government, or whether we want to take a straight-up position of look, no go, unless we get exactly what you want here.

We'll have to make the final judgment.

I can just assure you what that judgment will be like.

to be in the interest of what I believe is a terrible problem.

So you can think of those young people, older people in particular.

And as you know, you can imagine, it's the most part of the upper class, including the artists.

And they've got really great people.

I mean, Justin gave me a couple letters

I want to see what will really help there.

I don't want to give people on this thing.

I want some action on it.

I'll just be close by saying that I left a chance several years last year.

The senators indicated that we should not go forward with the termination of Joe Pai and the sale of the Greek Relief Company.

They never doubted us that they could do so.

I didn't fall for it.

I believe that I should have released it.

I felt strongly that that would be one that had to take that into consideration.

But I looked over the previous administrations.

And Downey had been over there for 20 years, and they hadn't accomplished a thing by being on the outside looking in.

We went to China.

We talked about Downey.

We didn't get him out that day.

A few months later, he got out.

But he'd still be there riding in that train.

He's changing, unless we were talking in Chinese.

That's the decision of Downey.

Basically, whether or not you want the President of the United States to continue to have some influence, maybe not enough, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know.

Cold turkey.

So, Henry, we're going to see what we can do.

We're going to see what we can do.

Mr. President, Mr.

Senator, Mr. General, we face in the Soviet Union, with respect to the Jewish situation, the condition of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union and the general conditions of their immigration.

The second is the head tax that was put on August 3rd, 1972, which put additional obstacles in the way of education.

The third is the degree to which American foreign policy can engage itself formally, and to what degree it should engage itself, as the President pointed out, informally.

Now, with respect to the U.S. issue, the general conditions of the Jews and the transatlantic Jews of the United States, the U.S. has consistently taken the decision that if we made this a formal issue in American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, the result would be

a test of strength in which we could not achieve our objective and in which this whole issue would also get deeply involved in our domestic debate of whether that is the correct exercise of democracy.

However, the President has also insisted that we use the special channels that have been established between him and the Soviet leaders.

to bring to the attention of the Soviet leaders our profound concern with respect to the Jewish situation and with respect to the administration.

And therefore, every conversation that I have had with Soviet leaders on this demand, as well as in every conversation that he has had, actually, with Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as with the Soviet leadership at the time of the summit, before the attack,

The President strongly emphasized the importance we attach to immigration and the importance we attach to the alleviation of conditions.

We never made this a formal part of a presentation which they would have to respond formally.

But in the Soviet system, when the President talks to the Politburo, that is a very serious, more serious matter than notes get passed by foreign ministers.

And therefore, to point out and see the difference between the system there is that when people say, for example, where are we going to get an ambassador to the Soviet Union?

That's an important and probably a prestigious post, which is making a difference in the national system.

Basically, if you do what he does in a way, then he's got to be a man who can handle this.

But in terms of dealing with such a totalitarian country, the problem we've got is that they don't even deal with the foreign minister like they've been.

So Reagan, for example, never talks to Henry except...

When he's talking in terms of a direct relationship, that's a very high level.

He always speaks, but he speaks to me.

It is on behalf of the president to the president.

That's right.

So that's the point that what we're talking about here is not the usual kind of formal communication that you have.

Like with you, with the British, I can get Alex Newman and say, look, Alex, here's the problem.

This and that.

Sorry to interrupt you, sir.

no these people so it's uh so that i want you to know that the level at which this matter has been considered is at the highest

because the system is that way, and because, and I must say, I'll take a little credit, because I want it that way.

I consider this of vital importance, and I want to keep it at the highest, but we're now at a crunch point.

We have some influence, but we haven't accomplished as much as we want, and I think that's what we want to bring up, too.

And so, the, the, the, the, the, the,

the president's influence prior to August 1972 had produced a not satisfactory, but nevertheless by Soviet standards, not a substantial flow of Jewish people, and that they constantly were aware of the fact that this was a matter of direct concern to the president.

Now then,

Because of the attacks of August 3rd, 1972, as Max knows, we from the first took the position that we would move this into the presidential channel.

rather than send notes back and forth, which would have been totally predictable.

We've been talking about notes for years, and they're a government cost.

And therefore, I was in the Socialist Union in September, as we told Max and a few others, as we talked for a bit at the time.

I, on behalf of the President, raised this issue with the President, had extensive talks with Chris Netzen,

But we will go through all the exchanges that took place, the parties, the five federations that Dobryin indicated on behalf of the Soviet leadership that they were willing to suspend the attacks.

And the direction of the President and I said to Dobryin that this was simply, as a statement of intent, this was not enough, that we needed some communication from them that had a more formal character.

I want to point out to you because yesterday put out a statement saying it was an oral communication and we said it was a written communication.

And I want to explain to you how this works.

What happens is that the reason I'm saying I have to follow an oral communication from the Soviet leadership for the president

reads it to me, and then hands it to me in writing.

So its legal status is an oral communication, but its actual status is they, in case, type on their paper, hand it to me as a communication.

They can never deny.

They can afterwards say, well, Kim should just make this up, or he must have misunderstood to bring it.

It is a, it is an official Soviet, Einstein Soviet document.

It's about the creators that know how that stuff is made.

In fact, a lot of visitors from the Soviet Union see it.

They don't put it on the embassy of the Soviet Union.

There's no letter in it.

It's just on a plain piece of a, of a full-scale top-line.

Because he brought them in to me, too.

I just reached in, here's a message from Mr. Breschner, this is on my arm.

And he reads it to me, and then he hands it to me.

And I put it in the file.

One second.

And I said, if you live with people here, I just want you to know that.

It's not easy.

One second.

Which people, of course, they could deny it later.

But I don't.

But in this instance, they never have.

They never, well, they could deny it only if it is correcting this whole channel.

Yeah, breaking off the nonsense with the president.

When they say moral communication, we want you to know it was a moral communication.

On that side, but on that side, but on that side, but we have impacted every negotiation with the Soviets, as we said.

They have broken agreements with us.

They have never broken their word in a presidential chance.

I have never broken...

And these oral communications, it's like, for example, we have to, and let's not give you the example, in case of assault, assault one, in setting up these, an agenda for the agenda of the summit last year, and Henry had to do an incomparable amount of work, working with the, the rim, you know, about, you know, this and that and the other, and look, that's patient.

If you can imagine, human, it'd be very important for you to work with the Soviet.

You go through a plea, you know, toasting each other's friends.

It's done long before.

But in this instance, there was a constant passage of messages.

And in every one of the messages that they sent in that form, they never back off of one.

It's ridiculous.

Absolutely ridiculous.

That is, to me, to me.

Now, you make a treaty, I must say, like Yalta.

We've got a pretty bad record there, haven't we?

But I think there's a curious fact that I am not a burden.

I mean, there's nobody in this room that has less illusions about what we're doing in the Soviet Union.

This happens to me that because they have the present time on a special relationship with the President of the United States, not because of his person, but because of who we represent, they have never yet broken their word once.

Is that true?

That's true.

And actually, if it was true in the Kennedy period, there the communications were much less.

and the relationship much less close, but they, in the presidential channel, just as they feel they can, they would really risk too much if they had reproduced every negotiation of consequence with the Soviets.

In this manner.

And we've never had any difficulty in this channel through these unsigned notes that we've had.

But of course, because we do research into that, our answers are always oral notes which I enter them unsigned.

And it's never gotten, it's never become unstuck.

So from that level, we can have, we want to have a feel of it.

Now that this went on, now may I make just one other point?

The Soviet's attention, no one's importance to the fact that it is not said that this was a communication by Brezhnev.

They attacked Gray, who had said at his head that this was a communication by the Soviet leadership.

And I think that's all due to, as I told the leader yesterday, it's not due to Brezhnev staying here, because it's the Soviet leadership.

You see, they have a triumvirate, basically, or more than that, a polymer.

And also, the evidence is that it's possible that Brezhnev was overruled in January when this all was provocated.

And therefore he has an interest to implicate the others in this commitment rather than make it a personal one that can be removed by removing him.

So it's in everybody's interest to make clear that this is from the Soviet leadership and not from one individual.

Now let me read the communication which we received from last year.

It is in the form of an unsigned, written, or a note.

The applications of Soviet citizens who wish to leave the USSR for permanent residence in other countries are considered, and decisions concerning such applications are made on an individual basis, taking account of concrete circumstances.

As a rule, these requests are granted, which is an interesting thing.

For example, with regard to persons who in 1972 expressed the desire to go to Israel, permission was received by 95.5% of those who applied.

A similar approach will be maintained in the future.

Then, if they added, it may be noted that more than 2,000 persons who received permission to leave for Israel in 1972 did not in fact make use of that permission.

I don't know whether that is true.

As regards the refunding of, say, educational expenses by Soviet citizens leaving for permanent residence abroad.

That's the... That's the...

The decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of August 3rd, 1972, and the decision taken in accordance with it by the USSR Council of Ministers, provided that Soviet citizens who received permission to emigrate

can be exempted fully from refunded edicts, as is mentioned above.

Accordingly, Soviet authorities, in considering the applications of Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate, have the right to decide that only state duties normal in such cases be collected from such persons.

the authorities are now exercising this right.

Consequently, only such normal and insignificant duties, which were also collected before the decree of August 1972, are being collected and will be collected.

from those persons who are leaving the Soviet Union for Berlin and residence in other countries.

In other words, they're saying that they will not collect the air tax.

When we received this, I transmitted it, of course, to Fred, and he asked me to put a number of supplementary questions to the bridge.

First, he said, is this an official communication or just a

personal expression.

Second, how do we know that this is not just now when they say it's not being collected or will be collected?

How do we know this doesn't have a timeline?

Thirdly, he said, does this mean the law is being repealed?

And fourthly, he asked, can we communicate this to other people?

It is easy for questions to ask.

We've got a fairly rough time.

I got the feeling at the end of the meeting I was the sort of salt of communism.

So, go ahead.

I don't believe what I hear, but go ahead.

Then we'll see another oral note from them on April 10th.

that was the time that I got in touch with Max and suggested that we have a meeting and we just moved right around here.

Because we didn't feel we had to see the leaders first.

Here is what the second sub-dimentary, or I don't know, the secondary lock in reply to the second sub-dimentary question.

The Soviet government provides the following information.

A.

The above statement, that is to say the one on March 3rd, should be regarded as an official Soviet statement.

Two.

The phrase...

The phrase in that statement, that only such normal duties which were also collected before the decree of August 3, 1972, are being collected and will be collected, has no time limit attached to it, and any interpretation implying the existence of a time limit does not correspond to the position of the Soviet government.

The reason that it's important is that Scoop Jacks raised the point, he said, well, there's no, there's, well, he put the point, supposedly, in MFN.

And then a month after that, there it goes again.

It's a real problem.

But there it is in that, and the point that I made there, I interpret that, Henry, to be that if they would then

then reinforce their vision, their work, and then, of course, that gives me a provocation to do a human saving on one.

It is absolutely clear in our communications today that we will consider the abrogation of this undertaking as inconsistent.

May I finish the other question?

Would you mind repeating that one you just said?

I'm afraid of the statement that only such normal tourists, which were also collected before the decree of August 3, 1972, are being collected and will be collected.

There's no time that was attached to this.

Yes, I'm quite clear.

I said that?

Yes, I'm quite clear.

Any interpretation?

Thank you.

which of defying the existence of the National Amendment would not correspond to the position of the Soviet Union.

C. The exemption from the requirement to refund state educational expenses is being granted on the basis of the terms of the degree of August 3, 1972 itself and of the subsequent decision taken in accordance with that degree by the USSR Council of Ministers.

In the Soviet view, this situation, how big is the need for repealing the decree of August 3rd?

In other words, they're not repealing the law, but they're not enforcing it.

If you read it again, you can say it's a scholarly group, but if you read more, they're trying to tell us an effect.

They're trying to say, look, this is a safe way for us to say that we're going, we're going to be reviewing them all.

That's what they're saying.

They're saying you listen to them, but on the other hand, they don't sit, but they are not going to sit publicly.

They're saying the exemption from the requirement to refund state education is expensive.

is being granted on the basis of the terms of the degree of August 3rd itself.

And, in the Soviet view, this situation obviates the need for repealing the decree.

In other words, the decree makes it possible for them to suspend the requirement to refund state educational expenses.

So it's the same thing as the President had to say.

They're not going to repeal the law, but they said the exemption from the requirement to refund state educational expenses is being granted on the basis of the law.

What they're saying is that they're saying that we are not going to do what we know we are attempting.

uh, split people from the law in 72.

So they sent in their communication to us.

And this we're exempting them.

This obviates the necessity for us to repeal the law.

You see?

So they still got the law on the books, but they are in fact, are amending it through an exemption.

That's what I mean.

But they're interpreting it to meaning that they have the right to exempt

The Soviet is very meticulous about wanting to do things in a highly, in a very legal way.

That is the better way to put it.

What they are saying is that their law of August is still in force, but that the law expressly provides for it.

Providing for exemption here is consistent with the law.

The law remains, but acting under that law, we get an exemption.

That's really what you're getting here.

I think that's the big figure.

The law is a dead letter, in a sense.

The law, as far as this group is concerned, is a dead letter.

That's what it means.

That's all it means.

But the thing is just a technical footnote.

The President is free to transmit the contents of the official Soviet statement, as well as of these additional explanatory points, to the Congress.

Yes, to the Congress.

So this is, they will have a high degree of formality attached to it.

And these other communications which

in our judgment, effectively restore the situation to what it was set on August 1st, 1972.

So that then, now, our problem is this.

Do we use the MMA legislation?

We've already used effectively to get the headhands.

to attach additional riders to it and therefore jeopardize the whole context of the negotiations into which this was drilled, including Soviet restraint in the Middle East.

More do we go back to what was the original approach, namely a steady presidential pressure

in his term, on the Soviet government, to help improve the situation as it was on August 1st, 1972, which we're not even there to be satisfactory.

This is the issue which we now face, and this is why we have made such a strong case.

Let me say, let me say, too, in France, because I am...

enormous respect for Steve Jackson and Jack Javits, if you've ever come for a record.

And there was a vision of the leaders, for example, Maxfield, Scott, and Ford, all felt this was a very significant message and that it gives us what we should have and they thought had what they're suggesting.

They can put in the legislation, they can put in the legislation, believe that the discretion of the president, if he's the national security, you know, he can use them as table so that he can negotiate them.

In other words, say, rather than mandatory, believe that discretionary depends upon what the president tells us in the national language and so forth and so on.

On the other hand, in fairness,

Mr. Reyes and the others to a varying degree supported the proposition that you can't believe in the first, that the conduct of dystopian in the past makes them highly suspicious of any kind of message, including this one.

Second, that

that the Soviet, at this time, is so desperately in need of American economic cooperation, like wheat and so forth, that the Soviet won't pay any price, including this price, if we just, as Scoot said, he says it's a case of losing our blood home.

And I said, all right.

So this is the reason I spoke about it at the beginning, because I want to put their case as strongly as they can, and why they came up with the negative view.

They said, in effect, pass the Jackson Amendment, and the Supreme Court will back down, and they will go further.

Now, I've got to tell you what might happen if the Jackson Amendment is passed.

You know, with a straight-out declaration that makes us all get passed out before the whole world on this.

that it would seriously jeopardize the possibility of going forward with the meetings we're going to have.

I think the thought hangs on a second time.

And it includes not only stoking restraint and ease, which is essential.

This is minor, he told us that.

I don't mean that restraint is as much as we thought, but it's at least a voice.

Let me put it this way.

Let me talk about it for a minute.

You're all interested in that, and I am interested in it.

We've all talked about it before, Max, particularly.

Some of the rest of you have heard the same.

Israel, today, for five years, ten years, has been completely, including all of their neighbors,

And they can't continue to do so, particularly if they have continued support from the United States.

When I met Mrs. Meyer this time, I pledged that support, and she knows it.

When I send it, I get it.

And so here's how.

You know what I mean?

They wanted more.

What was it, Henry?

They wanted more.

Yes, that force and so forth.

But they can handle all.

If the ejection starts something, they can go, fuck, there's one thing we have to do.

Mr.

Rush.

Some technicians.

And even a jackass plays my experience.

to fly the planes, to shoot the sand, or whatever.

It's a different ballgame.

And that is the concern Mrs. Meyer has.

And everybody's got a difference.

Now, who can stop the runnings from doing that?

Well, let's go back.

Remember the Jordan crisis when those tanks came down over there, you know, from Syria?

And when the Jordanians, to their great credit, did a pretty good job of knocking them off.

But we did, we made a little move, too.

You remember?

We moved in there.

That was vital.

Because I'll never forget, we talked to Rabin.

He said the important thing, he said, we did nothing.

They put some gas in the Golan Heights and probably scared us to death if I didn't get the gas at that point.

Yeah, that's right.

Now, the point is,

He said, remember that night Henry, he said, we can handle the situation if you can hold the ring against the Russians.

We held the ring.

And it was tough, real tough.

Because frankly, if they had called it, what do you do if you, if it's a six-fleet activity?

You start flying airplanes in the air, it doesn't really work.

The Russians do not want a confrontation with the United States.

We don't want one, but then, because a confrontation between Russia and the United States is going to end up in a nuclear war, no question about it.

We would all lose.

The whole world would lose.

No.

They really can't.

The ability of the United States

to avoid those confrontations will depend, in my view, to the greatest extent upon how much frank talk we can have through this kind of a message and on any of those funds which, by the way, will take place from now on at the highest level.

And so that they know, man to man, brain to brain, whoever is the successor, whoever, they know that when the president, this one, or the national, that when he says something about whether it's moving in Israel through Syria, or whether it's moving in a place like , remember there were two, three, two, and crashes in year two.

We had to get those salaries in.

That wasn't an accident that they left.

Now, they got to know that the president speaks

that they should be respected.

Now, in this instance, I can only say that as far as our ability, our ability to help Israel is concerned, we can help them in the arms, and Israel can help itself and let somebody else.

But the main thing Israel needs, the main thing, is that the United States may have influence with the Russians.

That's what we need to start doing.

That's why I think this containment contact is essential.

So, now we look at this problem.

Looking at this problem, uh, Schultz, Jackson, or I say that this is enough.

Uh, pass the, uh, make the Russians back down publicly in more formal terms.

Isn't that about what it is?

I mean, you know, the whole thing.

What Schultz is saying is, stress your system.

Beyond the attacks, we should now get a formal commitment from, uh, the standard of treatment of minorities in the Soviet Union.

And the standard of the, uh, standard of the high stride.

of immigration for the whole of Ukraine, consistent with the U.N.

Declaration of Human Rights.

And this raises a number of issues.

First, can the Soviets agree on an international instrument to change the whole system publicly?

And I'll just, that's totally out of the question.

Let me give you a little more specific.

Now, let's get down to the culture, you know.

Dystopian Henry can deal with us and agree with us for one point.

But if you spread this to others, their whole system comes apart because of Ukrainians and pyramids there.

Frankly, I was supposed to have the people of the place want to get out.

But if we limit it by broadening this thing to include other minorities,

I don't think that's in the interest of this one, are you, Frank?

We've got to take them on target in time.

The second issue is, it is truly, and it's now up before Congress, and therefore there's a tendency to look at it as a separate issue and to ask, what can we get from it?

We mustn't overlook that we've already got a hell of a lot for it.

First, it's our least answer.

Second, even more importantly, in the Middle East,

the Soviet Union has come down and has stepped in from going to war time again.

It's the Soviet refusal, one, to give them offensive weapons, and two, to give them diplomatic support.

So we have achieved a great degree of Soviet restraint and restraint in many parts of the world.

What we ask of Mr. George is something that in effect doesn't cost us a hell of a lot, namely some commercial deals with and the drummers of MFN, and therefore it's MFN our fault too.

The whole context of the relationship may unravel, and that is our major concern, but it shouldn't be looked at as a separate issue.

but should be seen in the whole context of this evolving relationship.

And we are not saying that we will stop threatening them on the Jewish question.

Frankly, we think it is better to press them on the Jewish question, as the President pointed out, rather than to bring in the Germans, the Tartars, the Ukrainians.

And every other minority they've got.

That word is not just even the one.

And you have to spread that name.

It'll destroy your system.

I know it.

The fact is that you do it in a way in which it is not part of a request for a formal international undertaking, which then turns it into a tremendous issue of prestige.

to which they will not yield, but rather do it in the channels in which we have had it before.

And finally, we have brought about, and that must be overlooked, something that most people thought was impossible, namely, an official COVID communication revealing the headhands.

which started this whole process.

If it hadn't been for the headjacks, there wouldn't have been this issue, and there has now been repeated around the world, bringing about a blanket exception for the Jewish community.

Mr. President, I think you're welcome.

I'm sorry.

Did I interrupt?

You were, of course, very well aware of my wife's issue.

But is it possible, in terms of responding to some of the concerns of the Jewish community as such, and I see this point that's just been made about the other minorities,

To get some kind of action on the two things that hurt most right now, A, the fact that there are 50 or 60 people who are in jail in Russia today because of the fact that they were attempting to open the door for immigration for Jews.

And secondly, the

And secondly, there is a hardcore Jewish activist there who, early in the game, in Moscow particularly, tried to get out and who have been kept from getting out because it keeps alive the threat against all those who might want to go.

A real leadership.

Now, they're making no progress on that.

They're letting a lot of people out from Georgia and other places, people who are not of public significance.

But the key people are not being let out.

Now, you know, it's in their interest for them to let out the key people.

Basically, then they don't have them there to stir up.

I think if we could have a substantial gesture on those two points, it might change the whole situation with respect to the community.

Mr. Victor, I'm amazed that we've gotten your leadership of almost the totality of the American Jewish community, and it affords us an opportunity to express our appreciation to you for inviting us to this meeting and sharing this information with us.

And also I think it gives us an opportunity, which we all too rarely have, to tell you of the appreciation of the support of your administration for the economic viability of Israel, the defense capability of Israel, and for your pledge of continued support of Israel.

And it's probably very time to tell you that we welcome the stand which our government is taking in the United Nations.

at the moment and preventing the passage of a one-sided resolution against Israel, which might even have an implication of sanctions in it.

And we wholeheartedly support and commend you on the stand against yielding to blackmail by terrorists, fully cognizant of the terrible price sometimes that must be paid for a highly principled position.

We welcomed your statement yesterday on energy.

We think there are very broad implications in this whole energy problem in terms of American foreign policy, as Bobby Cage became evident.

And we regard this meeting today with you as a continuation of your demonstrated concern for the quality of human life.

On many occasions, we've had the pleasure of meeting with Secretary of State Rogers on this issue, Mr. Siscoe,

Formerly with Mr. Davis and with Mr. Armitage on this second question.

And also, we haven't forgotten.

We've noted the personal and immediate interest you took when the Leningrad trials were about to commence and when some people's lives were, I believe, saved by your intervention.

We support Daikon as a path towards peace.

We feel that within the context of present trade discussions that the opportunity might exist to still secure further movement on the part of the Soviets towards respecting human rights and protecting human dignities.

We have special concerns.

We dealt with the head attacks, but Dr. Kissinger indicated in one of his three topics the general situation of Soviet Jewry.

Ninety percent of the people who apply for immigration from the Soviet Union are not subject to the hate pass.

And yet when they apply, they seem to be subject to very difficult conditions of harassment.

in prison and loss of jobs and loss of pensions, PR, and all other purposes of Soviet citizenship, such as they may be.

We're also very much concerned over the fact that there exists today in the Soviet Union over 100,000 Jews who have applied for exit visas, suffered all of the disabilities of making such an application, and who have not yet been granted those exit visas and who are existing under very, very difficult conditions.

We noted with interest the statement of Dr. Kissinger in the letter that the intention is to continue the flow of immigration which was built into there.

But we want to stress the point that Al Aaron made that there are some 42 or 50 people who are languishing in Soviet prisons solely because they have dared to make application to leave.

and certainly in terms of a gesture of human concern.

If there could be some movement on their part, as a highly visible gesture, this we think would be most appropriate.

And we look forward to your continued efforts, as you indicated, to work towards resolving these universal human concerns.

Your experience, Senator?

Yes.

I think we have so much confidence in you because you have done so many fantastic things.

You have more confidence than the Senators.

Well, we have seen during your administration the change with China and the change with the USSR that many people a decade ago would not have dreamed would come about.

And so we know that anything can be possible if that's the right moment and with the right development of leaderships getting opportunities to do it.

You know that this is a very special period for the Jewish people, Passover week, which is the start of our exodus.

It also happens to be the 30th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.

I'll never forget it.

I hope you don't mind a personal reference.

I went to the wall.

But obviously, you know, the press, the communist government, in the Poland and Leipzig, they take a very strong pro-Jewish position, although the polls have a

Great, horrible tradition, that Semitism.

But they are fighting it all, of course.

Nonsense.

I took them to the wall of the Herald Tribune, which you probably know.

They were so worried.

They were in this horrible murder.

And Earl Aso, who was then a reporter for the Herald Tribune, was standing there.

And I saw the tears running down his cheeks.

He said, you know, I have my family, uncles, and so forth.

And I think that is a great burden that's on the conscience of the Jewish people in the United States, that we did not lay down the terms to help the Jews in the Soviet Union.

More than that, I don't think the Jewish community will allow us as leaders

They would have been our leaders if we did not do everything possible to do this info.

I found a hopeful note in these two letters that I wonder if we could not explore a bit further.

When it does point out that the policy has allowed those who apply to leave, it's made it there.

Would it not be possible to firm this up into something much more concrete, since it's already in one of the letters that were sent to you?

Because our great concern is that the ransom tax may be lifted, but the reasons may not be granted and the people will simply be frozen.

And the people will fly or still have to get character references from lawyers and all the other things which you know so well.

So that we are concerned with the fact that this is a wonderful, fascinating gesture and a tremendous accomplishment.

Tremendous accomplishment to receive these two letters.

But in the end, it will end up with a braving of people who get the visas to come out.

Then we will end up in a very difficult position.

I think that many of us have a feeling that it is an aspired moment, this by itself.

And that there might be psychologically something very right at this moment that may not come again for a long time to come.

And while you're so right in the sense that the design will spoil the tremendous achievement

A gain so far will set us back, or does one take the chance of moving forward to get a greater gain?

I don't know how people will react, the Jews in the Soviet Union, the Jews in the United States, all the supporters of this problem, if they think that we have given up on the right for people to leave.

And since it is mentioned in this document, it is impossible to get some further elaboration on what this would mean in terms of the Soviet Union allowing people to leave.

My truth is that it is not possible to get another formal elaboration from Francisco.

I get back to my little example about death.

I get back to the question that you raised about 60 people.

I get back to the letter that Senator Jackson gave us about two people, apparently writers and so forth.

Man, all that I can say is this.

All the pieces of paper and formal declarations and so forth are going to mean nothing unless we are in a position

to insert the influence directly with the conquering machine.

Now, what is involved here is basically this, and it's my question of trust.

I can only say that I am deeply concerned about this.

And I will take up, we'll take all these things up, and we'll continue to.

We think actually that this is a much better start than most people realize.

We think, for the Soviets, it's a very, very difficult thing for them to have gone this far.

And I think the Russian-African colleagues probably are catching up.

I mean, because it's a...

If the Congress, if the Congress, if the Congress by passing a high-stomping amendment that says that unless we do this or that or the other thing, we will not have any economic relations with the Soviets, that's really what it gets to.

That's what happens.

And everybody in the Jewish community will cheer, and a lot of other people in this country will cheer, because they don't like the comments.

They don't like what they do to the minority count.

But the fight is, we, with death, lose anything else we've got to give up.

That's really what I'm saying.

I just, what I'm saying is this, this is a highly personal action that is required.

I think most of you around this table would agree that we have more influence for the Soviets today than we ever had.

Now, the question is whether you want to use this information to go back to confrontation.

That's what it is.

Or whether you want to continue this negotiation, conversations with one of these issues.

To answer your questions.

To try to get something formal.

No, I don't think you can.

I'm going to tell you more than this.

But in terms of action on individual cases and action generally and so forth, obviously, as they've been planning, this thing doesn't say that we have a meeting with the Senate.

This will be one of the Senate's discussions.

And, of course, we have other channels as well.

I think that we can do very well.

So my fight is that you can get a high-sounding piece of paper, a so-called amendment, or get action.

That's the choice.

You're going to give us the names of some names of people that are all different.

Sorry, I'm on the line.

All right.

If I recall the time that Russian promulgators and publicists decreed instead of so-called intents, they gave themselves a not a bad time, which was that the Minister of Interior, whatever his official title would be, could use his discretion for certain exemptions.

And to me, this is an extension saying that you will be more

Secondly, if I recall and correct me if I'm wrong, they said that 95.5% of those who requested visas were granted, which is really not true.

Right.

So, you've got to look at this thing with just a little bit more, some empirical evidence.

And the jackpot out there is over 100,000, let's call it 80,000, who have registered and have started their jobs.

They've lost their jobs, they've lost their partnerships, they've lost their pensions, they've lost their living.

And it's trying to point out to lift the head tanks.

There are things that could be a ruse where an agglomeration would go to them and say, we don't want that.

They just say, no.

They just say, no, we want to charge the head tanks, but it doesn't sound very much.

Believe me, the other line was Max and Jack said about how much, how deep our gratitude is to what you've done.

And it's a compliment that you understand the lives that you've carried because you've done great things.

You've stopped two Cold Wars, you brought the boy back to Vietnam.

You've done many things that took a lot of courage, and it was a heavy, heavy burden.

And as I know, it's another one, and it ties in with the work that you have to have to do.

And you could, of course, start an Addictions Doctrine, and you could go down in history and say that no one can get MFN.

unless they have unobstructed immigration for anyone who wants to go into any country in which they live.

Because if you split your WB apart from a person, they won't have to withdraw it to them.

So you're going to need to do that in Poland and a few other places.

So it's a problem, all communist countries.

It's a problem.

You know, there's something that impresses me, and it's this.

Along with senators and representatives who are behind this amendment, I'm not using this as a spelling word, I'm just taking it out loud.

They represent a constituent state.

And I will say that in their position, they're very sensitive to their jobs and to their people who live in there.

And based on a number of their scientists' amendments, it would hit more than half the population in the United States.

Oh, sure, sure, sure.

And that impresses me.

It'll go through the House like that.

Right, but I'm just wondering, is this what the American people want?

For you, no more than what the American people know, because you're on the farmland.

But this country was based on freedom.

That's how we were born.

And perhaps

The American people are looking for something out to latch on to and say that he had a courage to stand up for something and this is wrong and we want it.

I don't know, but it's impressive.

And so I think that should have that to be concerned about.

I would like to start by saying that there is no part of your community, regardless of persuasion, which does not completely admire

of courage and concern with which you have dealt with all of the issues that are particularly of concern to us, including the issues of this morning.

Obviously, we did not know which were going to say to us aside from what we had talked to you, but I can only say for myself that I am very deeply moved

by your continuing concern and the fact that you have never let go, very tenaciously stayed with it at every opportune, I would suspect even inopportune, moment.

Let me ask you, Mr. President, since you were moved enough by something someone else mentioned, to remember that you stood at the wall in Warsaw.

There is a very deep emotion that I really think, precisely because you've created a certain tone in this meeting, that I could want to communicate to you.

I could cry with Maisel because I was born in Galicia in 1921.

There are very few children born in southern Poland in 1921 who are Jews who are still alive.

The only reason why I'm alive is that we came to this country in 1926.

I think the Poles, just looking historically, are worse by as much as the Koreans.

Very much worse.

I love the Polish people, but they have a horrible history of other things.

And Mr. President, during the Korean War, which I had the privilege of serving my country's Air Force chaplain, I had the odd anomaly.

It was my wife who was English.

working in American staff headquarters, and is clear to top secret.

I have denied top secret clearance because I was born in the part of Poland that was then behind, it was already behind the Iron Curtain in Russia, and I'm actually pressure ruled.

I wasn't pressure ruled because my entire family was there.

Everybody left there.

Now, those of us who

Our Jewish leadership, Jewish men and women, I would say, live with one memory, a kind of pervasive feeling that our predecessors, talking to your predecessors, perhaps didn't talk to us.

That is, the feeling that perhaps when the Nazis were around, we didn't scream hard.

And I think, Mr. President, that you would misunderstand us.

It is not a disrespect to you, sir.

It is not a lack of real affection and concern, real feelings that what you have done, you have done with great heart and continue to do with great heart.

But look into our hearts.

There is a very deep feeling within the Jewish community that perhaps we didn't do enough.

We didn't speak enough to the men who could have done.

We didn't speak with sufficient force.

And that perhaps at any moment, if we had to decide, the American Jewish community is going to move towards the understanding of the path of quiet diplomacy

the worry that perhaps we were not sufficiently concerned a generation ago.

Now, this is, of course, displacement.

We are thinking about the present in terms of the past.

But it is something we ought to know.

At least I feel the need to say he was present, because my own biography is .

Now, on the very issue in front of us,

Everyone is undecided at the end.

You cannot be undecided enough.

The diploma tax situation is very, very, very quick.

But just last night, one of the members of my own congregation in Englewood was one of the leading figures in New Jersey, right?

Right.

In New Jersey.

Yeah, in New Jersey, sir.

Um, a leading figure in Lee Fairtrade, who was postman at the Land Guard for a market, tells me that his guide told him, Jewish girl, that her brother, who's a professor at the University of Land Guard, recently applied for a visa.

The result was not that he was told exit tax.

He was simply hauled up before the Senate of the Leningrad University in the full presence of the students and publicly degraded.

And the fact therefore means that no one else in Leningrad, out of Leningrad's academic life, is going to apply for an exit visa.

It is that order of concern.

Now obviously, Mr. President, from what you have been saying to us this morning,

You know these facts as well as we do, are as vigilant as we are, are as concerned as we are.

And I, for one, can only thank you very deeply for all that you have said.

But I could not let this conversation go by without saying to you, perhaps because...

The organization which I happen to head was once headed by Stephen Wise, and he was often in this room, in the room of one of your predecessors, and was constantly, constantly wondering, being wondered about, Stephen, did you tell it all?

Did you really communicate it?

We must communicate it, Mr. President, that our generation of Jewish leadership must, must, in its own heart and mind, feel that it is contributing within its power.

Just to prove if I can.

I think we've got to understand this, what we really agree on.

And frankly, we might agree on the goal, on the tactics as it is.

Let's begin with what has happened to the... Well, let's read what has happened to those of the Jewish faith through history.

I know what happened to Spain.

I know what happened to...

Possibly everybody knows what's happened to us in Germany.

I know what happened.

Many other countries have longed to forget that they were this way.

I particularly knew what happened in Poland because I saw it firsthand in the personal life of people.

And frankly, I know what's happened to the Russians, I know what's happened to the Jews, and I know what's happened to others as well.

I had to speak to my candidate about the fact that the communist system, in my opinion, is a

It's a terrible system that half the people in the world are living in.

God knows I wish we could change it.

It's impressive that all of this are the stories about how great red China is.

I don't believe it.

You go to Hong Kong, or to Taiwan, or to Singapore, or to the Chinese cities, or to Bangkok, and just go through first Chinese.

And you see the free Chinese there, and you go to Beijing.

It's terrible.

And so it is in Russia.

And so why did I lose all these things quite well?

Why did I do these?

conversations with the Chinese first, and with the Russians, with men who, and I give them this credit, able men, strong men, intelligent men, who get to believe in what I think is a terrible system, and they easily believe ours is a terrible system.

I must give them credit for that.

They're wrong.

I think we're right.

Despite the reasons that go far beyond the tuition, it's really a question of whether this world is going to blow up.

If we do not have a negotiation and a dialogue with the leaders of one-fourth of the people in the world, the Chinese, today,

20 years from now, we're going to have a terrible problem on our hands because the Chinese are among the greatest people in the world.

And he's under the communist system 20 years from now.

They will be a superpower.

And they won't care about losing half of their people because they'll still have a half of the city and 11 people.

You can't do that.

And that's why I'm over other presidents having tears.

Because I was not because I was taken in by Joe and Lai and all that sort of thing, but because I could not leave this office and have the man say, here's five years, 10 years, you know, look over there and be king and then look down at our troops.

That's what I was doing.

How did the Russians think?

The present time has virtually changed.

I don't give that.

They're ahead in throwaway and we're ahead in sophistication.

The criminals have demanded some madman either place or their status.

The world is gonna come part of it.

You realize that some people, like Jackson, he's been talking about, you've got to space them out, all that sort of thing.

What do you bring?

Well, I think they're strong.

It's a tough decision.

In fact, if we hadn't done Cambodia, and if we hadn't bombed the mine on May 8th, and if we hadn't ordered the bombing on December 18th, those men would still be in Hanoi, and they wouldn't have gotten out at all.

Now, that's the way it is.

It's a very hard decision.

Many of my good friends just approved of it.

But they didn't.

Well, let's focus on Russia.

Whoever sits in this chair and this, he pushes the button, so to call, immediately is going to the President of the United States of America and the United States.

No way with everything we've done.

And whoever sits in the chair in the crowd, who pushes the button, is going to the President of the United States of Russia.

Now don't hold me to something that you think is 100, maybe it's 120, but it's at least that on both sides.

So you see what we're facing.

Now, what I simply say is this.

I would like to change the communist system, not only for the Jewish minority, but for all, as Jackson would have them agree.

I would like to, I would like at this particular time, at this particular time, to say, look, unless these people who have this terrible system, unless they knuckle down on this issue, we'll have confrontation again.

That's the issue.

And that's what this nation is going to know in the event that this particular issue, they're going to know it because the Russians are going to say it.

Great stuff.

So I'm just going to say to you, it's not easy for me to oppose the Jackson Act because I deeply believe in what it's for.

On the other hand, I have to.

I have to.

I personally think it's in the best interest of what we're all talking about, because I believe the President of the United States having a direct channel to whoever's leading the Soviet Union can do a lot more from the inside than he can do from the outside, just, say, passing resolutions and Senate amendments and going home and getting cheered by the audiences.

And I like that, too.

But I'm already seeking to get some done.

So at the present time, I can only say that this instance might do.

I've listened to all your views and don't believe any of them, whether it's individual names or whether it's getting policies changed and so forth.

In my view, we have here a very significant step.

In my view, what we should do is to move forward with silence, Congress should express its views in silence, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

But don't, in effect, make the whole foreign policy of the United States hostage to this time.

Otherwise, you will take on your hands no further movements in this country, no further influence in the Mideast, no further influence in Vietnam, and no further progress in virtual balance force production.

Does that see us over in the Pentagon when this comes out?

It's tough to say this to you, because I believe, as I move, I want to grab my sense here.

This is, I have to remove my boyfriend, and I feel this is perhaps as deeply as anybody.

And also, I hate the system of the Congress.

I hate to see what it does to people.

And I'd like to change it.

But the reason that I started the movement and started the dialogue with the Russians is that I figured that, first, if we do change it, but don't change it, if we don't communicate with this system that we hate so much, we're going to be confronting and eventually the danger of a war is inevitable.

And that I cannot do.

And second,

looking at it from another standpoint, I feel that we can't force them when their power is equal to ours, that knuckle down.

And therefore, we have got to work from within.

And so I simply plead to you, I've got the case, we've got what we can't hear, you know of our concern,

You're going to blow it all.

You will not only blow these other great names, but you're going to blow the chance for the President of the United States to have a chance to vote for the Russian leaders.

Now, that's what's on the line here.

It's all President of the United States.

And that's what I have to say.

We have a very, very responsible group of kids here, but I know they're important.

I know.

It's a great thing.

Every one of the people here

This is a very important part of the question.

And everything that you said, those things, you need to become important.

Above that, there are many of us and all of us in this room can also ask you to listen to this ongoing, to talk and to peace in the world.

This is a very, very important thing.

Everybody around this room.

Well, everybody in Central America is basically an American first.

That's right.

You always, I mean, if there's anything in it that has been that, I mean, those leaders, the intellectual leaders of this country, my God, in World War II and the rest, you're all out in front.

I know that.

So I think this is a very important question to discuss.

This is an important question.

You know, when I think about it, when I stand up here, what has been done in the field?

We also...

Three things I'd just like to leave you with.

I think one of the things that bothered you was the head tax.

We haven't answered this thing.

I think all of us understand the words.

You can't sign contracts with us.

The second thing, the numbers, and I want to point this out to you, we have to pay $35,000.

You'd like to pay the numbers, but I'm dropping something.

I don't have to give you a note about it, right?

It can be done.

The third thing was this thing about these cases.

You know, they're really silly in doing this 40 or 50 or 100, you know, badge technique.

Now, you said to send me those names.

I can show you this.

This group on the piece, and that piece on the piece.

I mean, a great weight to all the things that you have.

That's all that matters.

You had great confidence in you and I. I must say this when all of us expressed our concerns.

I also remember very well, in 1960, when we talked about the Soviet-Jewish problem.

You remember that's when we had .

And I remember Bill Wexner was at some of the meetings.

So I noticed the fact that you took it upon yourself

is because I know what took place at the last Soviet conference, because the fact that Jews are coming out didn't come by accident.

Things are taking place, and you're doing it on this level, and this thing is certainly a great step forward.

And I must say this to this whole group, I must assure you this, this group are very sober,

serious people who feel their responsibility very deeply.

And I can assure you this, that all the things you said are going to be of great consideration.

And they're not here on the basis of, let me say, I understand, and I'm glad too, that I think what you said about you are leaders of the community and you've got to represent your community.

And I appreciate that.

And the position I think, like with Jack,

And Abe Urbacoff, they got to visit me in the country.

That's their job.

And I bought this book and took it to Jackie.

I said, Jackie, you've got to step out of here.

Don't you move.

You're a spokesman in this thing.

The only thing is I have, of course, another responsibility.

I have a responsibility here, but I also have a responsibility for the Foreign Policy General.

And I've got to call him like I see him.

And under the circumstances, I want you to know that I'm not supporting the amendment.

I'm not.

It isn't because I'm not for the cause.

I just believe the amendment would be disastrous to the cause first and potentially disastrous to the whole foreign policy of the United States.

That's the reason I haven't proposed it.

Max, would you permit a short question?

Yes, sure.

You know, it's what you don't need more of any minute.

I'm a lawyer.

Here's just one question.

Sure.

What is it that we can bring back from the President of the United States, not only now, but when you get around to it?

This will be words of encouragement to the Jews and the Soviets, Russia, because they're waiting for something.

And if we do anything that they can interpret as a letdown, that's going to be bad.

Well, I can only say that first, we can bring back this official that we had with us, and that we think is a significant statement.

And second, we can bring back what I think is the most important thing.

the continual personal concern for the President of the United States, and that's a hell of a lot more than I say.

And perhaps if you were to look at these people, you know, so what, where do you think it's done?

And what?

And also, I think you might come back to it without, since you have said it is, I suppose, as self-serving as it would otherwise be or not intended to be.

You can bring back the continuing personal concern of the President of the United States.

And finally, the record of the President of the United States.

He's done just about everything he said he was going to do.

So there you got it.

Now, before you go, I want you to know that you came all down here, and that you're all expensive, and you always have a little tip, even with our short motor.

Got a couple of compliments for the men.

And there, that's the seal of the flag, and that's what it's colored.

And the presidential...

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

Uh, uh, uh...

Oh, you want to walk?

Sure.

Where do you want to go?

To my office.

Oh, okay.

Alright, let's go.