On July 23, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at Camp David at 3:27 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 136-031 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Hello?
Yes, Jim, Mr. President.
Mr. President?
You in Washington?
Yes, I'm in Washington.
Oh, yes, they told me it's hotter than hell down there.
It's even warmer in Camp David today.
It is hot.
I was at the swimming pool of Henry Branson, so I was cooling off.
Was it all right sitting outside?
I would think it would be pretty warm.
No, it was.
Not too bad, huh?
It was not as bad.
It is very hot.
Around the pool, that's right.
Yeah, yeah.
I thought, I'll just go on one thing.
I thought that that statement by McGovern about cutting off eight degrees is really an opener as far as we're concerned.
That's just almost so totally irresponsible as to be frightening, isn't it?
That's right.
I mean, it destroys...
mean the the you know you well and then you cut off turkey he wants to keep our forces in the middle in the uh mediterranean yeah yeah the only place where are they going to stay where are they going to stop the only place in which we can mount operations that's right that's right connolly made that point on his program today he hit it hard he said it would cut off turkey it would cut off uh he would cut off the mid-east cut off israel he said there was no way he said you could uh he said unless if you've got degrees and of course
leaving out the fact that it just destroys the southern hinge of NATO and opens a big gap through which anybody could walk right down into the Middle East.
Isn't that something?
That's the line.
That's the line.
But we'll add a few of these.
It's going to be hard for them to get off of some of these because he moves off and on of them like he was on some program, I didn't see it today, in which he was sort of dancing around on Thailand.
And they said, well, you said you want to...
He said, we...
what about keeping troops in thailand and he said in view of the fact that it also is uh has been charged with being a corrupt and dictatorship at which he agreed it was well first bite the questioner didn't follow up and say well but about our treaty commitment you know do you think we should get out he says no we should withdraw of our troops but he said he says the north vietnamese and the vietcong haven't asked us to get out of thailand
Now, can you imagine, good God Almighty, are we going to make our policy based on what the North Vietnamese... Well, in effect, his policy is to accept what they demand.
Absolutely.
And that's what we should say.
He doesn't have a Vietnam policy.
His policy is accepting what they demand.
Yeah, yeah.
Well, anyway, but the Greek thing, I thought in view of what we have... Of course, it's... Let me say, he'll have...
the bureaucracy at state will be for him almost 100 on that oh yeah not at the top because bill is having stopped there now knows how damn important it is well i think the intelligent bureaucracy is but the uh you don't he will get increasing support out of them yeah no question about that because they they're bug-outers too aren't they oh yeah yeah
And they're above all... Well, they want to get their old man in, or somebody that will let them run the show.
That's what it really gets down to.
But what I found interesting, I talked to Henry Brandt, who was the convention minister, and he and his wife was basically very pro, and he isn't, but his wife is, the Democrats.
Sure, I know.
Are appalled by McGovern.
They are now?
Yeah.
They haven't done that.
I don't know whether you know who Adam Walensky is.
Oh, I know.
I don't know him, but I know of him.
Well, he was on the left wing of Bobby Kennedy.
Oh, I know.
And he feels that they're too radical.
Really?
Yeah.
He does?
Yeah.
I'll be darned.
So the Brandons aren't taken in by his attempts to shift now and so forth.
No.
That's the thing.
Well, really, when you come down to it,
you consider the Greek thing and of course the Thailand thing and so forth, if you look at it in terms of a policy and you add to that the defense cut, the United States simply would not have a foreign policy except defend itself.
We would have no friends in the world.
And that in a world on which we are becoming increasingly economically dependent.
That's right.
And we would thereby have a tremendous jolt to our economy.
And it's going to be one of those, I mean, where are you going to get your raw materials?
Where are you going to get your oil?
Where are you going to get other things in the world?
And we'd eventually have to rearm at a level far beyond this or collapse.
That's right.
That's right.
Well, that was an interesting point, I thought.
I think it's fascinating.
There isn't much foreign policy news.
We're going to announce the Japan visit at 9.30 tonight.
That fits best into their time.
Good.
And we don't really care too much.
No, no, no, no, no.
Whenever they want, because it's just one of those things that we'll do the proper time.
It's the 31st now, isn't it?
31st of August in Hawaii.
We haven't set the place yet.
Yeah, two days.
My inclination is that it should be on, you know, in the end
In Oahu, Honolulu, rather than off, because I think we've got to have two hotels.
We can't be in the same hotel.
I think that's good.
So we've got to go back and forth.
You know, there's always got to be that little business, and otherwise it just isn't going to work out in another place.
And also, it will look to as if we didn't want him there.
And it doesn't get to the right coverage, and it looks like sneaking around.
That's right, that's right.
And he'll be well received when you figure that about 35% of all the people in Hawaii are Japanese background.
Oh, he'll get a good read, I'm sure.
And the Pearl Harbors 30 years ago.
Yeah, well, this fellow was, he's 50.
Heck, he wasn't very old then.
Yeah, at most.
So that's, he's not, and I think that's going to be an important meeting.
I thought, Mr. President, that we might consider sending one of my staff members, Holdridge, over.
before your trip to tell him, first of all, that you want a direct channel to him.
Sure, that's a good idea.
And to just find out what he wants to discuss, because if you do it through channels, these guys leak so much.
Yeah, we have no problem with the ambassador, but there again, he doesn't know that kind of a game yet.
Of course, there has to be a direct channel.
The ambassador, he can come in on the meeting.
Yeah, but we have to have a direct channel, not sending it...
because it'll leak all over the place.
One thing that is, of course, important, too, as I told Eberle that I wanted them, if they do, are able to make an arrangement on this, you know, this trade pact or whatever it is.
That's a billion-dollar deal.
Well, if it does work out, which I hope it does, that should be held for the meeting, so we've got something positive to come out of the meeting rather than just getting to know you, you see.
Good.
And I just hope that it isn't the actor on...
too much in the state and so forth, and that no memoranda are written, well, that'll be hard.
I'll do my best, yeah, but around the bureaucracy already.
Oh, sure.
One other thing, Mr. President, that... You haven't heard from the Italians yet, have you?
Yes, we have, and he can't do it on either day.
Oh, well, that's all right.
In other words, he can't come at all?
No.
Mm-hmm.
Yeah.
But we could conceivably have the President of Italy come if he wanted that.
Well, what do you think of that?
Might be a good idea.
Why don't we examine into that, just to show that we're not ignoring the Italians.
I mean, he wrote you a very warm and profuse letter.
Yeah.
And he has very good reasons.
Yeah.
I mean, he has a... Why don't you explore having the President of Italy, but having it in the September period?
Right.
And see if he'd like to come on a state visit.
Right.
And this September, around, say, the 15th of September, how would that be?
That'd be excellent.
Yeah.
Because, after all, then you can put it on a little.
I mean, it's more political-wise, but also he's a...
good friend of the united states and having him would show attention to the italians which we've been unable to display up to this point right okay fine uh the other thing mr president that concerns me a little it says the north vietnamese are now pushing putting all all their divisions in military region one on the flank of this unit that's fighting the thing we've been raising questions about i know i asked you about yesterday i think
We ought to consider having them pulled back because we don't need Quang Tri.
No, what we don't need is a defeat.
What we don't need is a defeat.
There is no way the North Vietnamese can defeat them if they go back to prepared position.
That's right.
While if they are fighting north while they are hit from the west, then they could create some disarray.
That's correct.
That's correct.
So with your permission, if you don't think that if we withdraw before we are hit, it will look like a strategic move.
It will completely upset the planning of the North Vietnamese.
Right.
Right.
And the military will never do it unless we suggest it.
Yeah.
Yeah.
What does Haig think?
Have you talked to him about it?
Yes, he agrees.
Yeah.
He says we should, huh?
Yeah.
Above all, Mr. President, we don't need country, but what we cannot handle is a defeat.
That's right.
I think that has to be put to them very directly.
We can't handle what would appear to be a defeat, even though it isn't going to be that bad, but it'll be blown up like hell over here.
Mr. President, I am certain that if these guys are forced to attack prepared positions, they'll never make it.
Right.
But if they can hit in an unexpected direction, they might just panic one of these divisions.
Right, right, right.
So I'm having breakfast with Laird on other matters tomorrow, and I thought I might just review this with them.
Yeah, well, more or two, or no?
I don't know.
More tomorrow, too.
Yeah, and I think, you mean they withdraw from Quang Tri City?
Of course, that's, well, that's all right.
That's all right.
That's better.
They withdraw a little bit so that they can form the line like what they had when the offensive started.
Mm-hmm.
And it will look like a strategic withdrawal because there hasn't been an attack on them yet.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Mm-hmm.
You see, what worries me is that they're meeting no opposition north of them.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
So that apparently all the units are on the other side.
Which would be exactly what they ought to do, to mean the other side would do it in order to... That's right.
If they want to attack towards the west, I'd be for that.
Yeah, yeah.
But I'm worried about extending their flank, keeping extending their flank on which the enemy is massing.
That's what the Germans did at Stalingrad.
Sure.
Well, that's what the Allies did at the Battle of the Bulge, too.
Exactly.
I mean, the Germans went ahead and they cut in behind them.
And it's a classic military maneuver.
Everybody knows that.
That's right.
And, well, I would, my time's a-wasting.
I'm not sure you ought to wait till the morning.
Am I live?
I've already cabled Ryan with these thoughts and his reaction.
Yeah, all right.
But we haven't ordered anything yet.
Well, there's nothing more important than not to have.
First, it's important to our negotiations, and it's important to the reaction of Americans here.
They can get damn discouraged with this war.
That's right.
If the press out there, which they will inevitably try to do, builds up something into a big damn defeat, that sort of thing.
Now, I assume, of course, that we're, Haig says, we're still pounding the hell out of them with the air power.
Oh, yeah.
I mean, we're not in any trouble there at all at this moment.
They must be taking enormous casualties, Henry.
Good God, there's no way they can avoid it.
But I think the withdrawal, I called Haig about it last night.
I mean, and I said, how about this?
And he said, well, as of the present time, the attacks have been,
greatly exaggerated by the press, but on the other hand, I mean, I said, by gosh, watch it, because we just, I just used the term, we can take a retreat, we can't take a defeat.
That's the point.
A retreat is no problem.
I mean, particularly if it's, you know, you don't do it in any big way.
You may leave some forces there, leave a thin line in there, and then go on in and get down there where they're coming in and turn on them.
Exactly.
Well, I would think that, as far as that's concerning me, that damn it, that's what Wyatt and Boat, they're all bright guys.
Why the hell don't they think of this?
Well, because they want to stick somebody else with the responsibility.
Like who?
Like us?
Like us, yeah.
Oh, for Christ's sakes, we didn't tell them to take Quang Tri.
Yeah.
Huh?
Certainly not.
No, that's not our...
I mean, that's Chu's idea, of course.
He wants to regain it.
But in terms of the negotiating position...
I think that's what we say.
We don't want to get into the military thing in terms of negotiating position.
The important thing is not to have a significant enemy success at this point.
They cannot have us just put it squarely on that.
In fact, you ought to wire it to that effect that we've discussed it.
Let's get it moving a little faster than waiting until the time the molasses gets through the bureaucracy.
Mr. President, if he feels confident that he can hold it, then they're better off staying in country.
And he has a better feel for the situation.
I agree, yes.
So, but let's just let him know what...
In fact, you're going to put the monkey on his back, so he will really consider this thing, huh?
Well, I put the monkey on his back in this end.
He now knows that if he wants to withdraw, we will back him.
That's right, all the way.
So I have, in effect, assumed responsibility for us on the big decision.
So now he can look at it.
If he feels he wants to stay, then he can do it on the assumption that he feels quite confident.
Correct.
Well, you know, when you come down to it, on Lamson, he took the heat with the withdrawal and the like.
but uh but we took the responsibility i must say there they there they did exactly what they're doing here remember they outran themselves they were they were going in what was that damn town they were trying to take japon japon you remember yeah and they threw everything in there and that was a stupid thing to do wasn't it that's right they should have stayed where they were and let the others but them but they didn't but uh
But we're, let me say, we're a lot better off now than we were then.
Well, we didn't have 195 B-52s.
We didn't have the 52s, and we weren't concentrating them either.
We were fighting, hell, at the time of Lamson, we were fighting all over the place.
We were fighting in Laos.
we were fighting in cambodia huh that was our big mistake when we did land we should have fought forces and that's right but there there we were just piddling it all away you know we just didn't give it to them but now they are there's no question there there's no question about what it is putting it in where it matters and not going just for the milk run strategy i'm checking
You're checking me because I'm not going to look at these, you know, I don't count the sorties every day, but I'm counting on you and Haig who've got to do that.
Haig and I are.
And if it ever changes, I want to know.
I get a briefing every morning on all these things.
That's great.
That's great.
And then August 1st is your next meeting.
That's pretty soon.
That's next Tuesday.
A week from this Tuesday.
This is the 24th, yeah.
Mm-hmm.
Well, in the meantime, we can...
I have a feeling that it may not be as...
I mean, it may not be as bad as it... Well, it isn't that bad, but I mean, Wyatt may come back and say, look, we can do it.
If he does, fine.
If he does, then we should let him have... That's right.
We're not trying to make the battlefield.
We are saying, though, that based on negotiations, the effect of negotiations, that
We do not want to defeat at this point, and the effect on the American support, and that's the important thing.
Retreat's okay.
Defeat, avoid, which we can, good God.
The defense can always avoid a defeat, Henry.
They have never won a victory against a prepared position in this offensive, and they can't do it up there.
You don't think so?
No.
Not against a prepared position.
I would think, what's the weather factor up there?
September 15th it will close down.
Yeah, so they'll have a hell of a time putting on a major offensive after September 15th, won't they?
That's right, certainly after October 1st.
Yeah, that's good.
That's good.
Even the rest of the country after October 1st, but it won't dry out until November.
They'll have one hell of a time in the month of October, in other words.
That's right.
Well, and also they're going to have a hell of a time for another reason.
They're shooting their rod now.
You remember Thompson said that, made a very perceptive remark when it first began.
He just said that the enemy had launched its offensive too late for military purposes and too early for political purposes.
That's right.
And it may be that that's true.
That's too late for military purposes, but it's too early for the election.
That's right.
I think that's right.
But thank God they did.
Isn't that true?
They did, but I think they launched it for a very different reason.
They were launching it to affect that Soviet summit.
Well, and to get us to panic into a settlement.
Right.
I suppose both things.
Both things.
Right.
Okay.
Follow up and let me know tomorrow, will you?
Absolutely.
All right.
Good luck.
Bye.