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Conversation 151-007

TapeTape 151StartSunday, October 22, 1972 at 12:22 AMEndSunday, October 22, 1972 at 12:27 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceCamp David Study Table
AudioNARA Description

On October 22, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone at Camp David from 12:22 am to 12:27 am. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 151-007 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 151-7

Date: October 22, 1972
Time: 12:22 am – 12:27 am
Location: Camp David Study Table

The President talked with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

[See Conversation No. 223-15]

        Vietnam negotiations
            -Hanoi
                -Public disclosure
                     -Henry A. Kissinger
                         -Possible meeting with North Vietnam
                               -Bien Tien
            -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin’s previous meeting with Haig
                -Leonid I. Brezhnev’s message
            -Haig’s previous call to Dobrynin
                -Agreement breach
                -Soviet effort
                -Compared with 1968 negotiations
                -Dobrynin’s response

                                        (rev. Oct-06)

                     -Leaks
                           -[Pham Van Dong]
            -Kissinger's itinerary
                -Phnom Penh
                -Saigon
                -Meeting with Nguyen Van Thieu
            -Prospects for success
            -Haig's call to William P. Rogers
                -State Department efforts
                     -South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand
                     -Taiwan, Republic of China
                     -Iran
                     -Time, Washington Post
                           -Leaks
                               -Effect
            -Press coverage
            -Proposals
                -Public reports
                -Thieu
                -Issue of coalition government
                     -Wording
                           -The President’s instructions for Kissinger
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, hello.
Mr. President?
Yeah.
I had one thought that in view of Hanoi's having, you know, totally broken their word with regard to publicity and so forth.
Right, sir.
Don't you think Henry ought to, I mean, insist on that we meet them in Vientiane?
You know, the Hanoi ploy, I think they really welch so much that...
I know how passionately he wants to go there, but you know, they really handled this in a very shameful way.
Well, let me tell you what I've done, sir.
Dobrynin was in here this afternoon with a strong message from Brezhnev.
He called me at about 10.
Yeah.
I just called him and laced it to him.
I said, you tell your goddamn people in Hanoi that they have broken our agreement, which we considered sacred.
that if you want to be helpful in getting this thing settled, you insist to them that there'll be no more of this, and that we expect them to be flexible or we cannot have a repeat of the 68th situation, and that we may have some additional requirements that they have to understand and meet because we have a very difficult problem.
Now that they have broken... Because they've broken... That's right.
What did he say?
For the first time, he was very much on the defensive.
He was shocked.
He said, this is inexcusable.
And I told him who did it.
It was the prime minister and who they gave the leak to.
And it's all over the press.
And I said, it's given us incredible problems, which could delay this thing and require additional negotiating.
Right.
Good.
We've done that to safe side it.
Yeah.
And I think we ought to wait on the Hanoi thing until we get Henry's bunkers.
Is he going to go from Phnom Penh to Hanoi?
No, no, no.
He'll come back to Saigon.
Oh.
And then we have, in effect, all day tomorrow.
Oh, good.
He'll be in Saigon.
Meeting with you tomorrow.
That's right.
Oh, good.
And then he would leave Monday, our time.
But when he says he thinks he has break for then, he's still got a day's work.
I think so.
Yeah, yeah.
And I wouldn't add...
this burden to him now until he gets this.
I get your point.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Okay, that's good.
Well, since you've taken that, but do you see what our thinking is?
Oh, absolutely.
We can't get sucked into this now, Al, on any, and then have it broken off on some.
No, if this is a locked agreement with two on board, I don't think there's anything bad at all.
I think it's damn good.
No, no, no.
I agree, I agree.
Now, I've called Bill Rogers and told him
He was running all day, too.
But you told him, did you tell him we were laced to rain, or you didn't?
No, I didn't.
No, you didn't need to.
You just told him it looks better, and that's that.
That's right.
But told him to keep shut.
I mean, let's don't sound better, because this thing may still blow, you know?
Oh, it could still blow.
Yeah.
You see, we've had them working full bore on getting this equipment out there, getting aircraft back from the Korean side.
Yeah, right.
The entire thing, yeah.
China and the Iranians.
And they've been working like hell over there.
At State?
Yes, sir.
Well, they must be pleased.
Oh, I know we have to tell them, but I just want to know that we don't want to...
He doesn't have any of the details.
We don't want to leak anything to Time or the Washington Post or something.
You know, that's...
The whole settlement thing is just...
If they leak it, that's one thing.
But when we do, it's inexcusable.
Well, we've held the line very strongly since then.
You understand, the reason that I don't want it leaked is not because of the goddamn enemy.
The reason I don't want it leaked is because it might hurt us.
Very much so, that's right.
But there's going to be a lot of stories tomorrow on this Inouye story.
They all have it.
They spread it all over town this afternoon.
Sure, sure.
But...
It's really turned out to be a damn good help to us because we can really bludgeon Hanoi for whatever additional nickels we need.
But doesn't it say coalition government?
Not really.
What is the story?
Essentially, it has the outlines of the political settlement.
It's heavy on the two will stay in power, there will be two governments, and they'll negotiate what will ultimately be a coalition, which is true.
We wouldn't put it that way ourselves.
Yeah.
Well, now, Henry understands.
Now, Al, that word, as I said, cannot be used.
No, no.
In fact, or, you know.
We'll never use it.
Our parents.
Right.
Right.
Discussion of it.
Right.
Right.
Okay.
All right, sir.
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