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Conversation 151-011

TapeTape 151StartSunday, October 22, 1972 at 10:10 AMEndSunday, October 22, 1972 at 10:16 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceCamp David Study Table
AudioNARA Description

On October 22, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone at Camp David from 10:10 am to 10:16 am. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 151-011 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 151-11

Date: October 22, 1972
Time: 10:10 am - 10:16 am
Location: Camp David Study Table

The President talked with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

[See Conversation No. 223-20]

        The President's schedule
            -Return from Camp David
            -Meeting with Haig
                -Executive Office Building [EOB]

                               (rev. Oct-06)

Vietnam negotiations
    -Haig’s call to Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
    -The President’s possible meeting with Dobrynin
         -Soviet leak
              -Evidence
              -Impact on Nguyen Van Thieu
         -Future settlement
              -Time
              -1972 election deadline
              -Proposals
                  -Thieu’s future
                       -Military issues
    -US-Soviet Union relations
    -The President's schedule
         -Forthcoming meeting with Haig
    -Henry A. Kissinger's schedule
         -Possible trip to Hanoi
              -The President’s view
              -W. Ramsey Clark
    -Prisoners of war [POWs]
    -Kissinger's schedule
         -Timing of actions compared with the election
    -Settlement
         -Timing compared with the election
         -Status
              -Military
              -Diplomatic
                  -Soviet help
              -US bombing
         -South Vietnam’s future
              -Thieu
                  -Compared with Ngo Dinh Diem
                  -Future US assistance
                  -Possible additional deal with North Vietnam
                       -Political aspect
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yes, sir.
I will be back about 12 o'clock or 12.15 from Camp David.
I was coming back anyway.
And I thought that we could get together over at the EOB then and sort of
talk this thing out a bit.
All right, sir.
You free at that point?
Oh, absolutely.
Okay.
And I've... Have you done any further thinking on...
Yes, I think... Have you talked to DeBreenan again or not?
I've got a call in to him.
He went out for... Now, the only thing that I was thinking there, if you want to play at a higher level, I almost think I might have to talk to him at this point.
In other words, to keep this lid on.
Yes.
And I will do it.
I mean, I have a...
What I have in mind is this.
I think we just simply have to tell him that, Mr.
Ambassador, because of what happened and because of your people blowing this, I mean, then show him the papers that this is, Q has reacted as we would expect negatively.
We had it all set because, that is, he was, you know, so that he could play a part in it.
But they're going to have a victory celebration.
They played this.
He put the whole thing out.
And now he's throwing up his hands now.
We do not think this is permanent.
We think we can handle it.
But the main thing is that two things.
One, we will settle on the basis that we have described.
Two, we have to have the time to settle, and you must not push us.
And three, you need not be concerned about the election deadline.
Because he knows that that's a total commitment that you can pass on.
Right.
I'm not sure I would...
My commitment to go along the route outlined because he knows that without you there is no commitment.
Well, oh, I see your point.
That'd be dumping him.
Yeah, tell him we've got to, we will say basically on all the military sides and so forth and so on.
That's a deal, and we're ready to...
Right.
And we'll see, and we'll work with you to see what we can work out.
We may have to go our own... We understand that we'll have to go our own way, but we haven't given up on Q.
We're still working on it.
We're still working on it.
But we've got to put the lid on this thing and hold it.
That's right, and we need... And just say that our relations, the two great powers, must not be affected...
by the fact that these two dipsqueaks are acting the way they are, and that now let's keep our heads, and you keep theirs down, and we'll keep his down.
But that's the responsibility.
I really feel that if I told him that, that could have quite an impact on him.
Yes, I do too.
I do too.
So you think about it, and I'll be there at 1215.
Okay.
And if we think well of it, we'll call him in and just lay it out like that, but we'll talk it through first.
All right.
But you had no other thoughts since we've talked.
The other thing is that I just have a little more thinking about one thing.
I am just really adamant on Henry not going to Hanoi with this thing in mind.
Basically, the way it'll look is a complete surrender.
You know what I mean?
It'll be played that way.
And also, it'll look like Ramsey Clark going to Hanoi, hat in hand, making their deal.
Sure, we're going to get the prisoners back, and sure.
But they'll say, what the hell have we fought for, the prisoners?
I agree.
You see the problem?
Oh, absolutely.
He's going to Hanoi.
I can do it now.
I think another part of the game plan, he can make a commitment to go to Hanoi later.
Later.
Yeah.
You know, say, all right, let's meet in Paris, and then he'll come to Hanoi later.
Exactly.
And then there's no problem.
But it must not be before the election.
It must not be.
Third point is this.
I strongly feel that if we could make the case that we really would prefer not to do this before the election, I mean, not just politically, but not to do it,
because basically one hell of a lot of people in this country and, frankly, in Vietnam, South particularly, think that we are doing the wrong thing because of the election.
Exactly.
And I just think we ought to say, no, we're just not going to be doing it.
But I think that point has just got to be made, that this isn't the right time.
That's right.
No, this is right.
And in many respects, this has pulled us back from what could have been a more palpable situation.
Yeah.
Who knows?
But we're going to work it out in the end.
The main point is we've come a long way on these negotiations.
As you well know, the war has got to be ended now.
And we're now at the point where we've got a basis for ending it.
We know that the enemy's hurting or they wouldn't be talking.
The Soviets are helping.
In other words, they haven't got all the cards either.
And we're still bombing.
And that's the way it's going to be.
And so, therefore, we'll end it.
But I think the sad part of it is that I just don't know how South Vietnam...
I don't see any leadership other than Pew.
I don't see any other horse.
Do you see this DM syndrome starting again?
No.
No, he's going to come out of this very, very strong.
Yeah, he too will.
Oh, yeah.
Yeah, I know.
But then what happens?
How can he be strong if we cut off assistance to him?
Well, what we've got to do is work with the same parameters we've put on the military side and keep the economic in and
Maybe we can work another deal with Hanoi.
With Hanoi, without the political?
Without the political.
They're hurting so badly, they may pay the price.
Okay.
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