Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 151-011
Date: Sunday, October 22, 1972 at 10:10 AM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Haig, Alexander M., Jr.
Recording device: Camp David Study Table
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/151-011

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[0:00] Yes, sir.
[0:02] I will be back about 12 o'clock or 12.15 from Camp David.
[0:10] I was coming back anyway.
[0:12] And I thought that we could get together over at the EOB then and sort of
[0:18] talk this thing out a bit.
[0:19] All right, sir.
[0:20] You free at that point?
[0:21] Oh, absolutely.
[0:22] Okay.
[0:23] And I've... Have you done any further thinking on...
[0:26] Yes, I think... Have you talked to DeBreenan again or not?
[0:29] I've got a call in to him.
[0:31] He went out for... Now, the only thing that I was thinking there, if you want to play at a higher level, I almost think I might have to talk to him at this point.
[0:40] In other words, to keep this lid on.
[0:42] Yes.
[0:42] And I will do it.
[0:43] I mean, I have a...
[0:44] What I have in mind is this.
[0:46] I think we just simply have to tell him that, Mr.
[0:49] Ambassador, because of what happened and because of your people blowing this, I mean, then show him the papers that this is, Q has reacted as we would expect negatively.
[1:00] We had it all set because, that is, he was, you know, so that he could play a part in it.
[1:06] But they're going to have a victory celebration.
[1:08] They played this.
[1:09] He put the whole thing out.
[1:11] And now he's throwing up his hands now.
[1:13] We do not think this is permanent.
[1:15] We think we can handle it.
[1:17] But the main thing is that two things.
[1:19] One, we will settle on the basis that we have described.
[1:24] Two, we have to have the time to settle, and you must not push us.
[1:30] And three, you need not be concerned about the election deadline.
[1:34] Because he knows that that's a total commitment that you can pass on.
[1:39] Right.
[1:40] I'm not sure I would...
[1:43] My commitment to go along the route outlined because he knows that without you there is no commitment.
[1:49] Well, oh, I see your point.
[1:51] That'd be dumping him.
[1:52] Yeah, tell him we've got to, we will say basically on all the military sides and so forth and so on.
[1:58] That's a deal, and we're ready to...
[2:01] Right.
[2:02] And we'll see, and we'll work with you to see what we can work out.
[2:08] We may have to go our own... We understand that we'll have to go our own way, but we haven't given up on Q.
[2:13] We're still working on it.
[2:15] We're still working on it.
[2:16] But we've got to put the lid on this thing and hold it.
[2:19] That's right, and we need... And just say that our relations, the two great powers, must not be affected...
[2:25] by the fact that these two dipsqueaks are acting the way they are, and that now let's keep our heads, and you keep theirs down, and we'll keep his down.
[2:32] But that's the responsibility.
[2:33] I really feel that if I told him that, that could have quite an impact on him.
[2:38] Yes, I do too.
[2:38] I do too.
[2:39] So you think about it, and I'll be there at 1215.
[2:41] Okay.
[2:42] And if we think well of it, we'll call him in and just lay it out like that, but we'll talk it through first.
[2:48] All right.
[2:48] But you had no other thoughts since we've talked.
[2:53] The other thing is that I just have a little more thinking about one thing.
[2:57] I am just really adamant on Henry not going to Hanoi with this thing in mind.
[3:03] Basically, the way it'll look is a complete surrender.
[3:06] You know what I mean?
[3:08] It'll be played that way.
[3:09] And also, it'll look like Ramsey Clark going to Hanoi, hat in hand, making their deal.
[3:14] Sure, we're going to get the prisoners back, and sure.
[3:17] But they'll say, what the hell have we fought for, the prisoners?
[3:21] I agree.
[3:21] You see the problem?
[3:22] Oh, absolutely.
[3:23] He's going to Hanoi.
[3:24] I can do it now.
[3:25] I think another part of the game plan, he can make a commitment to go to Hanoi later.
[3:31] Later.
[3:31] Yeah.
[3:32] You know, say, all right, let's meet in Paris, and then he'll come to Hanoi later.
[3:36] Exactly.
[3:36] And then there's no problem.
[3:37] But it must not be before the election.
[3:40] It must not be.
[3:41] Third point is this.
[3:43] I strongly feel that if we could make the case that we really would prefer not to do this before the election, I mean, not just politically, but not to do it,
[3:53] because basically one hell of a lot of people in this country and, frankly, in Vietnam, South particularly, think that we are doing the wrong thing because of the election.
[4:04] Exactly.
[4:04] And I just think we ought to say, no, we're just not going to be doing it.
[4:08] But I think that point has just got to be made, that this isn't the right time.
[4:13] That's right.
[4:14] No, this is right.
[4:15] And in many respects, this has pulled us back from what could have been a more palpable situation.
[4:22] Yeah.
[4:23] Who knows?
[4:24] But we're going to work it out in the end.
[4:26] The main point is we've come a long way on these negotiations.
[4:29] As you well know, the war has got to be ended now.
[4:33] And we're now at the point where we've got a basis for ending it.
[4:36] We know that the enemy's hurting or they wouldn't be talking.
[4:38] The Soviets are helping.
[4:40] In other words, they haven't got all the cards either.
[4:43] And we're still bombing.
[4:45] And that's the way it's going to be.
[4:46] And so, therefore, we'll end it.
[4:48] But I think the sad part of it is that I just don't know how South Vietnam...
[4:53] I don't see any leadership other than Pew.
[4:55] I don't see any other horse.
[4:57] Do you see this DM syndrome starting again?
[5:01] No.
[5:01] No, he's going to come out of this very, very strong.
[5:06] Yeah, he too will.
[5:07] Oh, yeah.
[5:08] Yeah, I know.
[5:08] But then what happens?
[5:10] How can he be strong if we cut off assistance to him?
[5:14] Well, what we've got to do is work with the same parameters we've put on the military side and keep the economic in and
[5:23] Maybe we can work another deal with Hanoi.
[5:27] With Hanoi, without the political?
[5:29] Without the political.
[5:32] They're hurting so badly, they may pay the price.
[5:36] Okay.