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Conversation 151-003

TapeTape 151StartSaturday, October 21, 1972 at 5:39 PMEndSaturday, October 21, 1972 at 5:47 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceCamp David Study Table
AudioNARA Description

On October 21, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone at Camp David from 5:39 pm to 5:47 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 151-003 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 151-3

Date: October 21, 1972

                                        (rev. Oct-06)

Time: 5:39 pm - 5:47 pm
Location: Camp David Study Table

The President talked with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

[See Conversation No. 223-11]

        Vietnam negotiations
            -Current proposals
                -Henry A. Kissinger’s role
                -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.’s view
                -Haig’s view
                -Nguyen Van Thieu’s response
                     -Haig’s view
                     -Forthcoming meeting with Kissinger
                          -Previous meeting with Abrams
                -Cambodia, Laos assurances
                -The President’s message for Kissinger
                     -Thieu
                     -Delivery
                -Thieu’s possible response
                     -Possible risks for US support
                -Possible delay
                -Public perception
                -Thieu
                     -Possible reaction
                          -Thieu’s cooperation with Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV]
                          [North Vietnam]
                          -US reaction
                               -Possible US bilateral agreement with North Vietnam
                          -Public disclosure
                -Instructions to Kissinger
                -US reaction
                     -The President’s view
                          -Public disclosure
                               -Thieu’s future
                -Thieu’s demands
                     -Removal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam
                     -Tripartite government
                     -Possible reaction
                          -Public disclosure

                                       (rev. Oct-06)

                    -US reaction
                -Kissinger's instructions
                    -The President’s view
            -Timing of settlement
                -1972 election
                -North Vietnam, Soviet Union
            -Kissinger
                -The President’s message
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello.
Yes, Mr. President.
It seems to me that if they have accepted those, those proposals were the ones that Henry developed after the last deal.
In other words, he just laid down all these conditions, right?
That's right, sir.
And now let's examine it for a moment in terms of that.
Would Abrams say take it?
Yes, he's already said take it.
Even without this?
Even without it.
Yeah, with this, he would say it even more so, would he?
I'm sure of it.
What would you say?
Well, I would say no question how I felt about it, and that's to take it.
Yeah, yeah.
I think we've taken some risks in doing it, but I think they're acceptable.
Yeah, yeah.
But again, I've always done this with the assumption that we could get Q to come along.
Right, right.
while at the same time being skeptical about that.
Now, as it turned out, he's been goddamn tough.
Well, Al, when you say that he's not going to take it, I would say that is there a meeting tomorrow with him alone or with the full security council?
Henry, just Henry, private.
Mm-hmm.
And you would say that Abrams has already worked him over, huh?
Yes, he has.
And Henry said he made a very good case.
And I think he could make one, especially now with these new assurances on Cambodia and Laos.
Well, I think the message to Henry should be now, in view of this, that I am convinced that Pew should take this.
Do you want to put it in that context, so that he just hands it to Q, and that's an effect of confrontation?
Now, that's one way.
If he thinks that'll do any good, or how do we... Well, I think that's the best way to do it.
Yeah.
But then if he says, well, no, then what do we do?
What do you say?
I'd say this cannot but have a serious effect on our ability to support him from this point on.
Yeah.
Yeah.
That's right.
Don't you think he has to say that to them?
Yes, sir.
Mm-hmm.
No way you could work out a further delay of a week.
Well, I think we can.
I mean, if...
But I think we have a campaign plan that's firm in doing so.
We've gone back three times to these people.
And they've met each requirement.
That's right.
So if they go public, we're going to look pretty damn foolish.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
That's the point.
You've... On the other hand... Oh, wait just a second.
Yeah, on the other hand... On the other hand, if Q doesn't agree, the provisions of the agreement are meaningless because it requires him to cooperate with the DRV in a series of measures.
And without that cooperation, you've got no agreement.
So the only alternative would be if he goes, refuses to do it, is then for us to turn around and work out a bilateral arrangement with Hinoe, which I think he must know we will offer to do.
Yeah.
If he can give us no hope.
Yeah.
We would put it this way.
Well, if you don't want to go along, then we will have to work out a bilateral.
We'll have to go on our own.
That's in effect what we say to him, right?
That's right.
And not only do that, but he's going to be without our...
Yeah.
Our support.
And that we, well, when you say that, what does he do?
I mean, I don't think he's got a cave.
What the hell can he do?
He's got a cave or commit suicide.
But that's not something that he might not do.
He might decide he can blow.
Yeah, I'm here.
Hello?
He might go public and just say he's not going to be forced into this and hell or high water, he'll fight it out on his own.
Well, shall we just say this, that I realize that there is a risk in how he's going to handle this.
Not being there, I cannot judge from here what he should do, but that I think that he should make the strongest possible statement indicating that I now have personally examined it
and believe that if this goes public, which it will if he doesn't take it, that there will be an enormous demand in this country that we go unilaterally and that we dump two.
I think he should say that we cannot handle it here if this offer gets public.
How does that sound to you?
I think that's fine.
That there's a grave risk of that, that under the circumstances I feel that we should...
Now, the things that he's insisting upon are what?
What are the things?
Well, Q wanted some changes which got the troops out of the South.
Yeah, we can't get that.
And which deleted some of this tripartite thing.
Yeah.
So he really wanted to emasculate the whole thing.
Well, what are your reactions to what he'll say when that's put to him that way?
Of course, it's the total truth.
We're simply saying it's my...
I don't want to go as long, but I think he should know that the risk that we have here that he's running is that they are likely to go public with this.
Yeah, we should put a threat from you, but it's a reality.
But it's a reality, and when it does, there will be an enormous demand for, I mean, to drop him.
I mean, you know, and just to accept, you know what I mean?
Right, exactly.
I think that's about the way I'd put it.
I think that's the best he can do.
But to tell him that he has the most liberal ground rules Henry has and play it as best he can and that I'll back him whatever the judgment is.
I mean, if it doesn't turn out, we understand.
But the only thing I can think of, of course, is the possibility of delay.
I mean, if we could, really, the best of all worlds, I would put the damn thing off until the day after the election.
And tell the, but I think they have to be told that now, the North.
They do.
They must be told.
That's right.
And the Soviets must be told, all right, it's a deal.
But they must be told that if it blows, we'll deny it.
Right.
They have a commitment.
I think that's the way I'd do it.
Well, the real problem now is to get him through this next meeting, and I think this is right.
He's got a damn good feel.
He's got to know that you're going to back him, that he can use as much pressure as possible.
Yes, sort of.
Yeah, but in view of these latest concessions, that we've just used all the pressure he can.
Okay, and that that's a personal message from me.
I've told him I studied it all day here, thought about it, examined it from one end to the other, and that...
No deal is perfect, but he has our continued assurance that we'll see that the deal is kept.
Okay.
All right, sir.
All right, thanks.
All right.
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