Nixon phone call with Kissinger on People's Republic of China and Vietnam War

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Hello.

Mr. President.

Hi, Henry.

Before we talked about the last night, I wanted if you'd get one of your

I was talking to Billy Graham.

He called from Tokyo, and he's going to be in Taipei tomorrow with Madame Chang.

In fact, he's going to be there today, but he's not going to see them until tomorrow.

And I just said, well, just reassure them of my friendship and appreciation and so forth and so on, and that we stand by our friends.

But I said that I'd have your office send him a little cable

through McConaughey as to sort of talking points.

Would you just have him give them a, you know, this can be good reassurance for them.

We'll get it over there.

Fine.

Within the next couple of hours.

Fine, fine.

And that, you know, I don't need to know what it says, but just so he's going to see them and he could sort of feel a personal feeling that they could give them.

Great.

Well, how'd you go last night?

It was fine?

It was an unbelievable day.

Really?

Where'd you have it?

Or did they have it at their own house?

I thought I'd better entertain them.

Good.

I did it at the Century Club.

Where is that?

Is that a... On 42nd Street.

That's a...

Is it up, is it in the, in the, up in the...

It's on West 43rd Street.

Is it upstairs?

I mean, up, uh, top, in a high building?

No, it's, uh...

I've been there, but I can't...

It's a whole building.

It's... Oh, I don't, I don't know the club, no.

It's, uh...

It's, uh, it's got the entire building.

Yeah, yeah.

Well, go ahead.

And, uh, say, well, first of all, personal felicitations from the Prime Minister to be conveyed to you urgently again.

Good.

And they are so delighted.

And the man who made the historic opening towards China, and they'll never forget that, should now be again president.

So they were just burbling on.

Then they talked about Vietnam.

And they said, of course, we won't interfere.

But we are in favor of a quick settlement without humiliation of either side.

And we'll use our influence in that direction.

And it's the softest I've ever heard them on Vietnam.

No particular support for the North Vietnamese.

And if they talk to the North Vietnamese the way they talk to us, they're going to be coming through Peking.

But the whole tone of it was, A, they couldn't have brought gifts for everybody.

But the whole tone of their conversation, it couldn't have been that cordial unless they were determined, unless they had a pretty good idea the war was going to be settled.

Because if this headed into a confrontation, this would be a very odd behavior.

They, as much as said that they would use their influence,

to keep things quiet in Cambodia.

Yeah, that was the key point.

They did say that.

I told them it was absolutely essential.

And I said, look, they were violent on Russia.

And I said, look.

Really?

Yeah.

Good.

They said, were you able to make that hague point?

Absolutely.

That must have impressed them.

That is true.

that we have to make some tough decisions in resisting hegemony around the world in the next four years.

And it cannot be in anybody's interest that the United States is put into a difficult position in Southeast Asia after the war.

As a matter of fact, sucked into a peripheral war anyplace, Henry.

That's the real thing.

Africa, anyplace.

Things have to be kept quiet.

They can't be immediately starting again.

said they understand that, and then they asked us about our basic attitude towards Suyanuk.

Were we willing in principle to talk to them?

And I said, well, at first there has to be a substantial period of tranquility, but they should remember that the President had engaged in correspondence with them, and there was no diplomatic relation.

I think if we can keep things quiet in Cambodia for a year, I'm not sure that Sheehanook may not be somebody that could come back there at the right moment.

But at this time— Cambodians wouldn't want him now.

That's the problem.

No, they wouldn't want him now.

But the major thing now is to get the ceasefire established in our country.

Yeah, if the poor people quit killing each other.

That's good.

They still, they still petrified of the Russians.

And the words about you, I mean, it couldn't have drank a toast to you and to your victory.

I mean, if we had said that the senior vice foreign minister, who had given a virulent attack on the Soviet Union in the afternoon, made a virulent attack on the United Nations, did he?

would drink a toast to the president in the evening.

What's he attacking them on right now?

What's the line?

He's attacking them on the non-use of force and renunciation of nuclear weapons.

Oh.

And he says they're frauds.

If they want to renounce force, let them get out of Mongolia.

Isn't that great?

Why doesn't he tell them to give the outer islands to, I mean, the Japanese northern islands?

He said he wants to assure us

They will do nothing with the Japanese to weaken our position.

They think it is a good idea for us to have our military arrangements with Japan.

That's come 180 degrees.

They know it.

They're not dumb.

Well, they gave us back almost verbatim what you said to Cho in your conversation.

Remember, we had that whole business where Bill was reassuring the foreign minister that, gee, we're not trying to help the Japanese and so forth.

And I was telling Cho, no, we're going to stay in Japan.

And he said, don't believe this business about the Japanese.

doing enormous amount of business with us.

They tried to have us a colony for fifty years, and we are not going to be a colony of Japan.

It was the warmest meeting I've ever had with them.

And on Vietnam, couldn't have been warmer.

Did the matter of the possibility of David and Julie going over there come up?

No, I mentioned it to them.

They always, those things, they always have to always sit.

You didn't have to, but you didn't have to.

But on Mansfield, you got that on that back burner, as I say.

I really feel on him.

I've been doing some thinking about that.

I just feel we've done enough for him, Henry.

It's not going to happen.

You know what I mean?

We've done a hell of a lot.

Let's let it go.

I don't think it's going to happen.

We should help our friends.

They're not going to invite us.

Right, good.

It was very, very positive.

You will talk to Brennan about the other one, though, because that is coming up.

That I will do today.

But let me say, only if they feel that way, because the kids really don't give a damn whether they go or not.

But if they would like, you know, for them to represent or, you know, among the official delegation or something like that, let it come naturally.

You'll understand.

Right.

Now, with regard to this, you know what you left me—

yesterday was simply a copy of the letter that Tu had sent to us, to me.

Oh, God, I'm sorry.

You see what I mean?

I don't have the copy of the proposed letter.

Okay, I'm sorry.

Now, it was useful to read it.

Now, on that letter, I think that...

But the tone is certainly conciliatory.

The substance, of course, on the troop patrol is tough.

And yet, of course, the way he puts it, it's a very cogent case.

If you get arguing about it that they fight for ten years and what happens is that we get out and the North Vietnamese stay in, if you consider both of us foreign troops.

So I'm just putting the argument the way he does.

He makes a pretty good case.

Now, the only way I think he can get around it is to what he needs more than anything else.

As far as the fact of their being there and the danger of their being there, it's nothing, because they're just as dangerous across the BMT.

They can pour it on any time.

I understand that.

The main thing is, from his standpoint of security, is our commitment.

On the other hand,

On the other hand, what he is concerned about is the appearance.

He's concerned basically about the fact that after all these years, does he sign an agreement which says the North Vietnamese can occupy part of his country?

That bothers him.

Now, on that, it seems to me that there could be some fuzzy language just in principle that at the conclusion of the political process, that is, and so forth,

that all, that the North Vietnamese troops go out or something like that.

Now, I...

He's got to have something in there that says that we, that the principle of the occupation of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese troops is not recognized.

That's his real problem, as I see it.

They don't admit they haven't.

You see, one thing that he doesn't recognize is

It is actually an asset from the point of view of principle that they do not say they have troops there.

They don't claim they have a right to have troops there.

They claim they don't have troops there, which is a lie, but which from the point of view of principle is easier to handle.

What I think we can do, however, Mr. President, we can, in the section on the demilitarized zone, put in a clause that the demilitarized zone must be respected.

That establishes the principle.

Second, we can put in something about demobilizing troops in the south and returning him to their home.

And thirdly, we can add to the agreement a protocol of their unilateral statement saying they have no troops there, with an American statement saying we don't recognize their right to have troops there.

Yeah.

Well, yeah.

I understand it's to do everything we can.

But I know on the other points that he makes, most of those are basically

We know purely cosmetics, but enormously important to him and couldn't matter less, in my opinion, to the North.

Of his other poems?

Yeah.

We can get 80 percent.

Yeah.

And so that's why I read his letter, whatever it's worth.

I left you the wrong copy.

Right.

Well, I will immediately get up to you.

Now, how soon do you need the other one?

Well, I'd like to get it off tonight.

Well, then you can get it up here today.

I'll get it up within the next two hours.

Okay, bye.

Bye.

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on People's Republic of China and Vietnam War

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on November 14, 1972

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