Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 153 › Conversation 153-028
Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Nguyen Van Thieu
Wednesday, November 15, 1972 · 9:08 AM–9:14 AM ET · Camp David Study Table · 6 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the delivery and strategic framing of a letter addressed to South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, intended to pressure him into accepting current peace terms. The conversation focuses on Thieu's ongoing stalling tactics and the potential, though undesirable, option of the United States pursuing a separate, bilateral settlement with North Vietnam if Thieu remains obstructionist. Both men analyze the diplomatic breakdown between the U.S. embassy and Saigon, ultimately agreeing to maintain pressure on Thieu while acknowledging the significant risks associated with unilateral U.S. withdrawal and the future of regional stability in Laos and Cambodia.
- Vietnam War
- Nguyen Van Thieu
- Peace Negotiations
- Henry Kissinger
- U.S.-South Vietnam Relations
- Diplomatic Strategy
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data
· Click a timestamp to play from that point; the page address then links to that moment (e.g. #t=125).
Each line starts with a timestamp button; press it to play the audio from that point.
Hello, Mr. President.
Hi, Henry.
Did you get the letter down there?
Yes, I got it last night.
I thought it was tremendously improved.
Well, there's no substance, but I just thought we ought to put a few subtleties in there.
And psychology is everything at this moment.
It had in fact been delivered.
I put in a few things that were very tough, like that unalterable, as you noticed, but also I put in some soft things like I look forward to seeing you in San Clemente.
And you gave it nice nuances all the way through, but I wanted to be sure you got it because, you know, the helicopter wasn't running yesterday.
Well, I mean, we were socked in here, so they had to drive it down.
Oh, I got it about 5.30, and we got it off at 8.30.
Oh, good.
It's already been delivered, but that goddamn Chew is again going through his stalling act.
What's he doing?
Well, after having proposed task forces, we sent him some changes ahead of your letter.
Oh, I see.
And Chew wouldn't receive Bunker for 24 hours.
Then he received him with your letter.
Now he's asked for another 24 hours to study the letter.
And he just won't meet, made no comment.
Yeah.
And we just have to go ahead on Monday if we don't get his reply without him.
Put it to him.
Well, I don't know.
I don't see how, or maybe he can continue to stall it out, but I don't see how he can, Henry.
I don't see it.
What in the hell is he going to do if he's the way that
The way that letter is written, it's put in a context that we have to go another way if he doesn't go.
But I don't know.
I think what we should do is get the best agreement we can next week.
Then if he doesn't accept it, go bilaterally with Hanoi.
That would be a terrible thing.
That would be a terrible shock, too.
Let's face it.
We don't want to do that because of the fact that it would be, in effect, they'd say, well, hell, you could have done that all along.
You see what I mean?
Yeah.
No, it's not that good an option, and he's probably savvy enough to know that.
But he undoubtedly is, although we will do it.
But withdrawal for prisoners after Vietnamization has succeeded was always implicit.
That's right.
The people who'll get the beating on that are the Laotians and Cambodians.
Yeah.
Because I don't know whether we can make those agreements stick under those conditions.
Yeah.
Well, there's no reason to borrow trouble on it at this point.
No, no, no.
It can't be mad enough to drive it to that point.
I think what he wants to do, if he's going to yield, he wants to yield at the latest possible moment.
Yeah.
You can't get—one of our real problems here is that we don't have any real communication between Bunker and him anymore, have we?
No, not really.
That's the point.
See, Bunker used to go in and be able to talk to him, and the rest—no, he didn't talk to him.
Well, that's as long as we did what he wanted.
Yeah.
The same is true of—Hebrems is not there anymore, and he doesn't talk to Wyatt, apparently.
But anyway, it's premature to draw any conclusions.
But at any rate, the letter was— Well, the letter is so tough that he's—but he just—I suppose Henrik can just come back.
I was looking over again his letter to us with another goddamn song and dance here about, well, I—you know, a debating point.
And then it's got to be pretty damn brutal.
But I don't think it—I have some ideas on that then.
Well, we've given him 15 changes, which we're willing to probe.
And that's what they're now discussing, and it's not unreasonable for him to spend 24 hours studying those.
What is unreasonable is that when Bunker wants to see him yesterday, we sent him all the technical changes ahead of your letter, that he can't get an appointment.
That's unreasonable that he asks for time to study your letter.
That's fair enough.
Then he asked to deliver a letter and got put off?
No, he asked to deliver the changes.
Yeah.
And he got put off.
Then when he had your letter, they saw it.
Well, maybe we should have sent the changes by a letter.
Well, I thought it was better to wait to give the impression.
I mean, to give you a chance to consider it, too.
He didn't even know that the letter was coming when he gave the appointment.
He almost automatically keeps Bunker waiting twenty-four hours.
That happens all the time.
Well, the way this leads it is that we're going forward on our course of action and we're asking him to come along.
But it comes to the hard point until we've got that next round.
Because we may have the North Vietnamese in a pretty tough frame of mind either.
We have no reason to suppose that they'll take any or all of these.
Certainly not all.
Oh, not all.
You noticed I changed the letter in that respect.
How many they'll take still remains to be seen.
Yeah.
But I think they are at this moment somewhat less of a problem than so far.
Yeah.
Well, we'll have to see what kind of a problem they are.
Okay, thank you.
I'll come up on Friday morning.
Bye.
NARA Description
On November 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at Camp David from 9:08 am to 9:14 am. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 153-028 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 153-28
Date: November 15, 1972
Time: 9:08 am - 9:14 am
Location: Camp David Study Table
The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.
[See Conversation No. 225-9]
Vietnam negotiations
-The President’s forthcoming letter to Nguyen Van Thieu
-Substance
-Subtleties
-Delivery
-Wording
-Tone
-Use of “unalterable”
-Invitation to San Clemente
-Nuances
-Delivery to Kissinger
-Means
-Timing
-Delivery to Thieu
-Thieu’s tactics
-Delays
-Task Force proposal
-Technical changes
-Meeting with Ellsworth F. Bunker
-Resumption of talks
-Context
-Settlement agreement
-Possible US-North Vietnamese bilateral deal
-35-
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Conversation No. 153-28 (cont’d)
-Thieu’s attitude
-Problems
-Possible criticism
-US withdrawal
-Prisoners of War [POWs]
-Timing
-Vietnamization
-Effect on Laos and Cambodia
-Thieu’s tactics
-Purpose
-Yield
-Timing
-Thieu
-Relations with Bunker
-Relations with Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-Relations with Gen. Frederick C. Weyand
-The President’s letter
-Tone
-Recent letter to the President
-US settlement agreement changes
-Number
-Study
-Timing
-Tactics
-Delays
-Relations with Bunker
-Technical changes
-Timing
-The President’s letter
-The President’s letter
-Contents
-US action
-Request of Thieu
-Settlement agreement
-Problems with North Vietnamese
-Concessions
-Compared to Saigon
-36-
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Conversation No.153-28 (cont’d)Also recorded on November 15, 1972
- 153-027 9:00 AM · 13 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:00 am and 9:08 am.
- 225-009 9:08 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 9:08 am to 9:14 am.
- 225-010 9:14 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:14 am and 9:50 am.
- 225-011 9:14 AM · 19 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and John V. Brennan met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:14 am and 9:50 am.
- 225-012 9:14 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:14 am and 9:50 am.
- 225-013 9:14 AM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:14 am and 9:50 am.
- 225-014 9:14 AM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:14 am and 9:50 am.
- 225-015 9:14 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:14 am and 9:50 am.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 153-028, November 15, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/153-028 (accessed October 9, 2026).