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Conversation 153-048

TapeTape 153StartFriday, November 17, 1972 at 6:20 PMEndFriday, November 17, 1972 at 6:24 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob")Recording deviceCamp David Study Table
AI Summary

President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman coordinated the administration's second-term reorganization, specifically focusing on managing the departures and status of Cabinet members and White House staff, including William P. Rogers and Charles Colson. Nixon instructed Haldeman to pressure Rogers to accept new terms for his continued tenure as Secretary of State and to push for Colson’s exit while maintaining a facade of presidential loyalty. Additionally, Nixon directed Haldeman to reprimand Henry Kissinger regarding potential leaks of classified SALT negotiation materials found in a manuscript by a Brookings Institute associate.

White House reorganizationCabinet appointmentsWilliam P. RogersCharles ColsonHenry KissingerLeaksSALT negotiations
AudioNARA Description

On November 17, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone at Camp David from 6:20 pm to 6:24 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 153-048 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 153-48

Date: November 17, 1972
Time: 6:20 pm - 6:24 pm
Location: Camp David Study Table

The President talked with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.
                                      -54-

           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                 (rev. Mar.-08)

                                                      Conversation No. 153-48 (cont’d)

[See Conversation No. 226-15]

Second term reorganization
     -William P. Rogers’s tenure as Secretary of State
           -Haldeman’s forthcoming conversation with Rogers
                 -The President’s recent meetings
                 -Cabinet
                        -Status
                        -Peter G. Peterson
                        -Rogers C. B. Morton
                              -James D. Hodgson
                 -Rogers’s role
                        -Defense of colleagues, November 16, 1972
                 -Departures
                        -Rogers’s role
                              -Defense of colleagues
                                    -Sincerity
                 -Meeting with Haldeman
                        -Time
                 -Elliott L. Richardson
                        -The President’s decisions
     -Charles W. Colson
           -John B. Connally’s view
                 -Politics
                 -Replacement
                 -Indispensability
                 -Changes in Cabinet and White House staff
                        -Timing
                        -Congressional relations
                 -Departure
                        -Timing
                              -Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, the President
           -Departure from administration
                 -Forthcoming meeting with Haldeman
                        -Connally
                        -The President’s loyalty
                              -Chances of firing
                                    -Ehrlichman
                              -Replacement
                                          -55-

                 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                    (rev. Mar.-08)

                                                          Conversation No. 153-48 (cont’d)

                                        -Recommendation
                 Meeting with labor, ethnic leaders
                      -Camp David or White House dinner
                      -Discussion of Colson’s future
                            -The President’s role

      Personnel management
           -Paul H. Nitze’s recent meeting with John N. Mitchell
                 -Nitze’s interview of [John Newhouse]
                        -Brookings Institute
                        -Manuscript on Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT] [Cold Dawn:
                         The Story of SALT]
                              -Quotations
                                    -National Security Study Memoranda [NSSMs],
                                     negotiating transcripts
                                    -Henry A. Kissinger’s alleged influence
                                    -Haldeman’s forthcoming conversation with Kissinger
                                    -Possible leak
                 -Nitze’s concern
                        -Publication in April, 1973
                        -Possible impact on negotiations with Soviet Union
           -Instruction to Haldeman
                 -Kissinger’s contact with Haldeman

      Haldeman’s schedule
           -Return to Washington, DC
                 -Time

      Rogers
           -Forthcoming conversation with Haldeman
                 -Possible resignation
                       -Rogers’s action on November 16, 1972
                       -Terms
                             -State Department
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I think the important thing to get across to Bill in the morning and what I'm really trying to do with regard to the exercise today and Monday and Tuesday is to surround him as I'm sure you sensed.
I think you should tell him that, Bill, I must be candid with you that the whole cabinet thing has now been worked out and everybody is very relaxed about it and happy about it.
It's all worked out.
I mean, you're the only problem.
And you do that.
You see, my point is there isn't really anybody else.
You come down to it, is there?
Peterson, maybe.
Martin, we'll handle.
Hodgson, we know there's no problem.
I think Bill's got to know that he must not get away with the idea that he's standing up and defending his colleagues in the cabinet, which was that act he put on yesterday.
Right, right.
Don't you agree?
Sure.
How does it sound to you?
say that, well, Bill, the president's now directly or indirectly contact all the members of the cabinet.
Everything's worked out.
They're all very happy about it.
They're either going to be in other positions.
Some of them want to leave, or some are going to stay.
The only problem really, Bill, is you.
And so you've got to remember that this is where the spotlight's going to be.
Can we justify it?
I think you ought to put a cold turkey to him.
So he doesn't think that he's... See, he's putting himself in the position, Bob, of defending his colleagues in the cabinet, and that's bullshit.
Absolutely.
Bill never cares about his colleagues in the cabinet.
He never has.
He never cares about anybody but himself.
Am I being unkind?
No, you're being accurate.
Okay.
What time are you seeing me?
11 o'clock tomorrow?
Yeah.
Now, don't tell him that we worked the Richardson thing out and the rest.
don't tell him a goddamn thing right just say it's all worked out bill i can't tell you about it because the president's keeping us all close to the vest right okay do you have any other thoughts now on connelly what did he really say because i was with other people when we talked about the colson thing but what do you really think because he likes colson doesn't he yeah but but he felt very strongly that that it was a uh question now let me get the note on it that
Well, first of all, he made the point, as I said, that we've got to have somebody handling politics in the White House.
Right.
Well, he realized that.
He thought that's all Colson was concerned about.
He got the distinct impression on Colson that he was leaving, that he was concerned that we weren't going to put someone in to replace him.
Of course we are.
And he says, Colson's got to recognize, which he doesn't, that he's not an indispensable man.
And it's much better to make changes of the cabinet and the White House at the same time.
It's a bad signal to just do cabinet and not clean up your White House.
Right.
Absolutely.
Good, good.
Then he said he agreed that we should
make our move now, that Congress is going to be mean and testy, and they're going to cause us all the trouble they possibly can, keep them off base by shifting people, moving them in and out, so they can't pick on the old people.
And he said, there's a lot of merit on that basis in getting Chuck out.
And he said, I don't think you have any problem.
And I said, well, we do on timing.
That's the thing.
He's concerned that it'll look bad and all that.
Tommy said, it won't look bad at all.
This is the best time for him to get out.
If he stays around...
he'll be a bigger issue.
If he's out, he doesn't matter.
So he saw it the same way that you and John and I saw it.
He definitely should move out now.
All right.
In the morning, you're to talk to Coulson, if you will.
And I wouldn't quote Connelly.
I don't put him on the spot because Coulson will call him.
But you think you might?
Yeah.
No, I won't talk to him.
I won't quote him.
I don't think you should anyway.
I simply say, Chuck, it's your judgment.
I mean, because of the one to five chance that
the president might have to turn his back on you.
He doesn't want to turn his back.
He's never turned his back on anybody in 25 years.
He doesn't want to be the first man to be you.
He thinks there's probably one in five chances that we could do it, but we must not do it.
Does that sound like a good ploy or not?
Yep.
Even though Chuck thinks there's no chance, but I think there's a one in five chance.
See?
Yep.
And you, what'd you say?
You think there's one in five chance.
Yep.
Perfectly agreed.
Yep.
In the meantime, we want his best man to be recommended.
And second, as I told you earlier, I want him to set up, at the earliest possible time, within the next couple of weeks, a small dinner here at Camp David over in the White House where he gets some of the top labor people in, got makes and others that he's been, so that I can sit and talk with him about his future.
See, and I will make the transition myself.
See?
Yep.
Okay.
We'll do it.
Anything else?
Well, there is one minor item here.
Mitchell raised a question.
He felt I should raise with you that Paul Mitzi came in to see him and to report something he was very concerned about, which is that he was looking for a staff man and interviewed a guy who works at Brookings who was applying for the staff job Mitzi was looking for.
And the guy said he was writing a book on salt.
And he showed Nitze the manuscript.
And the manuscript has very extensive direct quotes from Nissims and from the actual negotiating transcripts.
And Nitz has said that apparently Kissinger has some sort of tie with this guy and apparently has a veto on the book.
In other words, the guy has access but can't print anything.
I want you to call Kissinger and raise holy hell with him.
Do you know the name of the guy?
Nope.
But you just tell him.
And that's it.
Because Henry does leak things, Bob.
You know that.
Or don't you agree?
Oh, I think he probably does.
That's it.
I told John that the reason he was raising it with him is he thought that it ought to get to you because he was, apparently the guy plans to publish the book in April.
And he says it would be disastrous, especially with the Russians.
Right, right, right.
We should get at Henry right away and tell him I hold him personally responsible for this because it's his man.
And get him in the first thing in the morning.
But he's not to call me.
He's just, always when you call Henry, tell him the contact is to be with you and not with me.
Okay.
I will cover that.
Good.
You going back now?
No.
Going back in the morning.
Good.
Okay.
Okay.
Well, I think everything's in good shape.
Don't you think so?
Yeah.
But you talk to Rogers at 11 o'clock.
Right on the line, though.
Right.
And you think there's a possibility he might say the hell with it all, huh?
I think there is.
I think as he's thought about it, he may realize, you know, that that was a pretty cheap play he made yesterday, too.
Mm-hmm.
If he does, we accept it.
Yep.
If he doesn't, fine, we accept him.
I'm not going to say we accept him.
We're going to accept the cold turkey terms.
That's the main thing.
We're going to name everybody in the department, everybody up and down the line.
There isn't going to be, he is not going to be Secretary of State in the way that he's been.
Okay?
Yep.
Okay, Bob.
Right on.
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