On December 6, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Col. Richard T. Kennedy talked on the telephone at Camp David from 4:40 pm to 5:31 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 157-016 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Hello.
Yeah, Colonel Kennedy.
Hello.
Hello.
Yes, Mr. President.
Why, you be getting any sleep these days?
Not very much, sir.
That's right.
That's really not the problem of their meeting.
I understand that we have one more day tomorrow again, huh?
Yes, sir.
Meeting tomorrow afternoon at 3.
3 o'clock rather than at 10.
They met today at 10, huh?
Yes, sir.
10, 10, 10, 10, 1030, I think.
And they went on...
I think they had a short break for lunch, which they did right at the house, and then went on.
All together, it was about five, five and a half hours.
You did receive, have you had a chance to look at Henry's message?
No, I don't have it here.
See, I'm at the, but I will get it.
Give me a summary of it, will you?
I'll probably get it.
It's probably over at Laurel.
he he said they had a pretty tough five-hour session better all that why do you have another one than tomorrow uh well because um uh he he has some he has some thoughts around how he might proceed yeah they uh both sides uh reviewed the uh the positions and uh essentially stuck to their positions he emphasized your willingness to make a settlement but only if we could get the changes needed to undertake a massive effort with saigon right
essentially, as they were on Monday.
The choice of returning to the October agreement, or he said they would exact concessions from us in exchange for any concessions that they would accept.
The problem with that was that all their proposed changes were unacceptable.
And he said that they decided they'd make another effort tomorrow.
And he told them he'd present our absolute minimum conditions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Cho held to his position that there'd be no changes in the provisions of the agreement, except that we could discuss details.
I think that's an interesting formulation, what he means by details.
Well, yeah.
It might mean something.
It might mean...
mean nothing of course right well he he believes henry believes that we ought to to maintain all the changes that we uh we took in last week i think that's going to be tough because uh some of those are substantive not just the tail if those changes those are the ones they tended they had agreed to yes in the last meeting yeah the ones they
administrative structure, making sure it's non-governmental.
Get a three-month target date for the demobilization provision, which would give two a little leverage on the political side, line those up.
Put a provision in the chapter on north-south relations that they won't use force against one another.
That would be cosmetically, I should think, helpful to two.
Retain the prisoner chapter as it was in October, and it just
leave it to leave the question itself yeah these prisoners in two parties not link it two hours on that that'll be very difficult he believes uh and i might say that uh we had a conversation with uh and he confirms that that problem that uh section 8c paragraph 8c is a very tough one for them he confirms that is a tough one for them uh now he'd make the ceasefire
more simultaneously with Vietnam, about 15 days.
Get the ICCS in place before the ceasefire, at the time of the ceasefire.
Do a little compromise on the preamble.
We could sign one document, the PRG would be here.
And then, in order to allow Coe to say that he got some changes from us, Henry would offer a language that
concerning the withdrawal of American civilians engaged in military activities.
Now, we worked out some language, and I went over it with Alec Johnson and Barry Shillitoe yesterday afternoon.
Sent them a long piece last night giving them some optional formulations, any one of which was pretty well protective.
So they could put that in and it wouldn't hurt us.
And then a sentence that would stipulate that North and South would
would discuss modalities for crossing the DMZ.
Those are two things that he would give them.
But he put this in as a final rock bottom position.
And he feels that even maintaining the changes of last week is going to be difficult.
And he thinks getting the package he's suggesting here is nearly impossible.
Then he's afraid that even if we did, Saigon wouldn't buy it.
we're sort of back to square one if this is really the way it comes out.
We would have strengthened the agreement, but still wouldn't have gotten enough probably to bring Saigon fully along.
Well, however, if he obtains basically substantial progress on that,
on those lines, yes, we have to look at the option as to whether a resumption of military activities on a heavier scale is going to change their attitude and how soon.
Right.
And my guess is it's, that is not a very strong possibility either.
You see, that's the problem, which we have to face, too.
Now, we'll have to do it.
We'll have to do it if they remain as entrenched as they seem to be.
We'll have no choice but to go along the other line.
But we're going to do it rather than do a lot of talking about it this time.
My impression, sir, is that in talking with the brain, he called last night about 11.
had a message in response to the one that I told you that we'd given him before.
He had a note.
The note was a bit stiff.
He asked me to read it first, and then he wanted to answer any questions, and he had some things he wanted to say.
He, I must say, several times during a long rambling discourse about what the note said kept
repeating that we were his words were exactly we were and we now are in touch with the north vietnamese and the president henry should i hope would realize this and understand this there was no question in my mind he was saying um we're trying to be helpful yeah i think that i think the message that the military picture might be changing
from our point of view here and we might be moving moving more dramatically and drastically in that field has come across to them whether that whether that's being impressed not annoying but if it is it may be causing them to think a little bit too well his uh he does have a uh he wants to watch your guidance um
whether he should make another last attempt to get an agreement or stalemate it tomorrow.
He could stalemate it by trying to put in something specific on the troop business that would simply be unsalable.
Or alternatively, go the other way and try to get an agreement
recognizing that it might be an agreement which his judgment probably would be unacceptable to Saigon.
The question is whether it's acceptable to us.
Well, his view is that the October 8th agreement was acceptable to us, right?
Well, I think he felt, yes, I think he feels that he was, provided, of course, that the two sides were indeed sincere.
And he brings it out in this long piece, that if the South Vietnamese really put their energies into it and turned all the pressure they could turn into getting political solidarity, that the October 8th agreement would work.
The problem with it, of course, we knew from the outset, was the troop problem.
And that's a pretty intractable problem, except with a lot of tricky formulations and a willingness on the part of the people in Saigon to face up to what is, unfortunately, a reality.
As seen from the other side, they're just not going to give that kind of an overt guarantee.
They're just not going to say that, or that they're going to withdraw.
Nope.
And so one has to figure a way to get them out at the same time, not saying that they're going or that they're there.
Well, the answer to his question is that the...
you see when he says should he scale made it he said or uh go ahead so he said that uh in other words we'd go for the agreement and try to get something on the basis of the package which he outlined yeah if on the other hand they just they break down over the thing we'd have to resume bombing and take the position that
our only objectives from here on out will be our military disengagement and return for release of prisoners.
Well, you see, it's that bottom line that is a damn poor line.
That's what I think he has to have in mind, that if our option basically is to get the best possible agreement we can, I mean, let's even go back to October 8th, the best possible agreement we can in Saigon,
still doesn't go along with it you know but we we get that we get an agreement uh or to uh to uh not uh uh but then failing to do that uh that we just break off and then resume bombing and then uh get our prisoners back well what the hell is that my point is uh what are we what's the game
In other words, the best possible agreement we can get, even if Sidon doesn't go along, is certainly no worse than getting our prisoners back for withdrawal, because either one flushes Saigon, which is putting it cold-blooded.
That's the reason I think the choice he presents is, I mean, he's thinking in rather melodramatic terms here, that in terms of, well, if they don't give us this, then what we will have to do is to break off the agreement, resume heavier bombing, although I have determined I will not go along.
I mean, I'm not going to do it in a big melodramatic way.
That isn't the way to do it.
We'll just do it.
We'll resume the bombing.
And then with the hope that after a reasonable time of military action, they will then say, well, we'll now give you prisoners for withdrawal.
And so all of this will have been done for that.
If that is the choice.
uh breaking it off as against getting even an agreement that is unsatisfactory it's better to get the agreement that is unsatisfactory because the agreement that is unsatisfactory also gives us our prisoners probably both courses that's my point where both courses would wind up
pushing Saigon over the brink.
Exactly.
Exactly.
But my point is, the point that I make is that at least the first course makes an effort not to push it over the brink.
In other words, they are committing harry-carry.
The second course means that we would, in effect, and the first course does not entail a continued escalation
Let me put it this way.
His second course of action, in which he has an impress, and which you break off, and of course I've already messaged him that he should not think in those terms, because he looked at the same thing he did at the time of Russia.
He says, we should cancel the summit and start bombing and mining.
Well, that was not the way to do it.
What we did was the right thing.
We bombed and mined, and
They didn't cancel.
Now, it's not exactly the same, but it's relevant.
Here, what he's thinking of is in terms, well, these people are so bad, so difficult to deal with, so he's on both sides.
But he's saying, in effect, they're so difficult to deal with, he's throwing up his hands and saying, all right, we break off the talks, he comes back.
And then he wants an announcement made that we're going, because we failed the negotiate agreement because they reneged.
uh we are therefore going to step up our military action and we will continue it until they return our prisoners and as soon as they return our prisoners as they really return our prisoners we then will withdraw our forces and start the bombing of the mining period yes he estimates here that could uh he believes we could obtain a prisoner for a military disengagement deal by next summer yes only if we keep up the bombing the point is
what he fails to bear in mind that if that happens if that happens then you have dragging into the summer the sort of domiclies of congressional pulling the rug out for it from under us and driving us out that way all that period of time you understand
You're thinking in terms of the defense budget, not the aid problem, not the assistance, but just cutting off funds that we wouldn't... We need funds to bomb.
That costs us one hell of a lot of money.
Now, that's one line.
Now, the other line would be to make a settlement now.
uh i mean there's october 8th and as much possible better as we can get you see if if if the if the uh if his second course of action and i know i know what's going through his mind he's just he's terribly frustrated and disappointed that
The North Vietnamese, after he talked to the Russians, after he talked to the Chinese, and after he'd gone back to them, and after they had told us just before the election they were willing to talk again, and after they'd make 12 changes, he's so disappointed that they now have said, no, we're not going to do a thing.
But I think, very candidly, he's not thinking too rationally in terms of what the choice is.
Now, of course, he can say to the North Vietnamese, now, you bastards, we'll teach you.
You didn't want to do this, so now we're going to bomb, and we're going to continue to bomb until we get our prisoners back.
And next summer, about next summer, we'll get them back.
All right.
What happens between now and next summer?
What happens between now and next summer could well be that we could get congressional action.
which could drive us out.
Now, the one thing that could avoid that is if this thing could be postured in such a way that the North Vietnamese were totally blamed for it.
But on the other hand, that's probably not quite right, but on the other hand, we've got to remember that if the only goal for which we continue our bombing and our mining is a return for prisoners, look what that does to the South Vietnamese.
It leaves them with very little.
All right, let's look at another course of action.
I would think, too, that if it came to that, assuming that we can keep up the bombing, I'm not at all sure that we still wouldn't get congressional action, at least on cutoff of funds for South Vietnam.
I think we're going to get both.
I think, actually, that if it rolls on that long,
when he talks about the summer and the rest, that it's just not realistic to think that we can fight those battles and all the other things we've got to fight with the Congress.
See, we've got a lot of other things on the plate now.
But Henry, you know, when he talks about rallying the American people now for the purpose of bombing and so forth, we don't need to.
There will be some heat and so forth, but the American people, they think we're bombing already.
So we just do it, and there will be a couple of three-day stories that we bombed and the talks are broken off and this and that, but that isn't the effect.
Where he is, where he is.
What we have to realize is that running the course that long until next summer, and who knows whether it will even work by next summer, there are several other things that can happen.
It exacerbates our relations with the, continues to exacerbate them with the Russians and the Chinese for that six-month period right through the Russian summit, right?
It continues to pose an enormous problem with the Congress in terms of getting what we need on the military budget for South Vietnam.
as well as for the budget to continue the bombing and the mining.
And at the end, we don't know what the hell we're going to get.
And incidentally, we're going to have BOWs, that emotional subject, hanging over us for another six months with all that's involved in that.
All right.
Now, the other course of action is also not a good choice.
But it would be to make an agreement, do the very best we can to make an agreement now, which would give our prisoners.
I mean, at least that's in it, right?
Yes, sir.
Let's put it this way.
You can get prisoners for withdrawal right now, can't you?
I'm sure we could.
I mean, prisoners for withdrawal can't come out of the aid.
Yeah, but I mean...
You can probably get prisoners, you can probably get those sections of the stuff even without the cutoff of aid, you know, and so forth.
I'm, although that's doubtful, but we'll see what will be done.
But if the only goal you're going to continue the bombing and the mining for is to get our prisoners back sometime next summer, it's not something that's going to wash, in my opinion, for that period of time.
It's not something we can really, we can really handle for that length of time, see.
So it seems to me that the better choice at this point is to continue the discussion and not for him to take the initiative.
to break off the talks or to break off negotiations on the ground that they have been intransigent.
In other words, I think his going in in the morning and giving an ultimatum saying this is our minimum position, take it or leave it or we go back to bombing and mining, I think is bad.
What I think he says, what I think is the preferable position,
is that he'd go in and say, no, all right, we've got to have these things, or we cannot make an agreement.
Then they will say, we can't give you those things, and so I guess that's the end of this meeting.
And then he says, well, under these circumstances, we'll have to consult our superiors on these things.
He comes back, and then we do bomb.
My point is, you don't, but you don't tell them.
You don't need to, I mean, you don't need to make a big thing out of it where you're going to break off arrangements, go on national TV and announce you're going to bomb because, again, you're not announcing a hell of a lot in the minds of most people.
So you're going to increase the level of bombing in North Vietnam.
That basically is something that is not a winner unless it's going to accomplish a goal of very great significance and a goal that could not be accomplished in another way.
And the North Vietnamese, if they're as clever as I think they are, are going to come right back and say, hell, we offered you the prisoners, right?
We offered that.
We offered a ceasefire.
And, of course, the answer there would be that we could say, well, yes, they offered the POWs and they offered the ceasefire, but they were insisting on a political formulation which provided for a coalition government.
But my point is the breaking off of the agreement and going back to and just saying, now we're just going to bomb and mine until we get our prisoners back, which is what he was recommending in his long message of yesterday,
is totally unacceptable because I just don't think the Congress is going to buy that as a goal worth doing for that length of time.
But I think, on the other hand, I know that what he can get from the North Vietnamese at this point is not likely to be acceptable to Saigon.
I think, however, we may be in a position that if it is acceptable to us that we believe it, then we may have no other course but to go it alone and see what Saigon does.
Now, my view, then, is that Saigon might collapse, and it might not.
Well, it could collapse in one of two ways.
It could either collapse by agreeing to go along, or alternatively, collapse because by not going along, all that's left back here would be pulled away from them.
That's the problem, you see.
But if by...
If he was beginning to develop, you see some reports that he may be developing some sort of an alternative formulation.
in which he'd agree that we should go ahead with prisoners for withdrawal and military action.
He would support that, but as to the other issues in the agreement,
that would be something that they would have to work out directly with the North Vietnamese?
Yeah.
There, of course, I'm sure that the reaction of the North Vietnamese, at least Henry has always said this, would be that they will never agree to prisoners for withdrawal.
In other words, that they won't give us our prisoners back for withdrawal and stopping the mining and the bombing.
That they will insist on the extra court, which is stop all military and economic aid to South Vietnam.
Isn't that really what the position is?
They've said that in the past.
The question is, would they say it now?
This I don't think we know.
Yeah.
Now that to me, that to me, if you would like to do that, that's a viable deal.
That's a viable deal.
A deal that I have never understood that that's something they would accept.
In other words, if...
This is just to encapsulate something that we've seen in the last day or two that they may be thinking about, but they've not serviced it.
Well, it's sort of the idea that they began to monkey around with when they were talking with us here, that, well, we make a separate military deal, and they'll go ahead and continue to fuel war.
I said, but without our military and economic assistance.
Oh, no, we need that.
That's the problem, you see, whether or not you can continue the military and economic assistance.
So the separate deal with the North does not bother me one damn bit, if we can get, I mean, provided we can continue, Dave, to South Vietnam.
What I am...
This would, in fact, work within the context of a reasonably viable posture between the South Vietnamese...
would have been would have been upheld we'd still be giving yeah chance to survive that's right that's right that's right let me say this i think the i think this is too important for henry to decide it on an emotional basis you know that well now we'll lay down and i'll limit him tomorrow and break it off for this or that it's it's just not that kind of thing i have an uneasy feeling i i about just between me about his his
and balance at this moment on this issue.
What I think is needed is that in terms of guidance, in other words, what he's asking is whether we want him to create an impasse and break off the talks or whether we want him to try to make a deal, right?
That's what he's asking.
Yes, either make this last enough to get an agreement.
Right.
And if so...
whether you would agree with the minimum position which he's proposing to go with to that end, but recognizing that it probably would then, if the North Vietnamese would take it, and he's not at all sanguine on that, he's still not at all sure either that Saigon would accept it even if the North Vietnamese did.
I understand that.
The other alternative would be just simply stalemate it by introducing a law which would imply the removal of North Vietnamese troops, which Tho would not agree to in his judgment.
And we'd have gone that, as he puts it, we'd have gone that extra mile of the negotiations, and the agreement would have founded on two issues.
North Vietnamese insistence on their right to maintain troops in the south,
and secondly uh having triggers on that administrative structure translation problem well that translation problem he just can't that that even he shouldn't do in a background or that is that's going to look as if we're too stupid i mean it's it's true but you know what i mean it's something you can't sell to people
Well, we've had that time-to-time with the Russians, I recall.
I know we have.
I know, and the Berlin thing and the rest.
But on the other hand, it is something that only statistics understand.
It isn't something that people want to fight the war for two or three years over.
That's the point.
That's what I'm making.
No, I think here... We wouldn't want to make it that way.
That's right.
That's the point.
The only way you'd have to make it is say they're insisting on a coalition government in the South, and we're insisting on an administrative structure around the elections.
He's basically then trying to really understand what he's...
In other words, he wants to know whether he should propose an unacceptable proposition and force the talks to break down.
It's an agreement.
It's a proposal which, in fact, well, the two choices, as he sees them, are to go ahead and propose
a this minimum package uh as as our final and rock bottom position um yeah an agreement which would in fact be a decent agreement it would be better than it would be as good as october well it would be better than october 26th in a couple of respects
but would still be... Short of Saigon.
Short of Saigon, and he's not at all sure that it would be satisfactory to tow either.
Right.
That would be the effort to move to an agreement.
Then he just said, if you authorize him to proceed that way and we succeed, then you'd face a major confrontation with the GBM.
And he said, if you...
unless you're prepared to undertake that confrontation, then he should not follow this court.
The alternative would be, he said, another point he makes, he said, perhaps you should consider whether we want an agreement at all.
Even the October 8th, as I mentioned earlier, the October 8th agreement was a good one if Saigon were to pursue it with the energy to drive a political victory.
In any, no matter what happened,
unless the GVN does a major turnaround in its own attitude, it could easily collapse under any agreement.
Certainly because Hanoi and the VC are gonna be relentless.
I think that goes without saying.
There's no question that they are.
So on the one hand, the choice would be to have them break down in that way because they would refuse that minimum package
The other way would be simply to don't try to get an agreement, but rather to, in effect, stalemate them by producing... Stalemate it and then come back and... Stalemate it by putting... Then go back and bomb for six months.
Is that right?
Well, I'm not sure in the way he puts this.
I'm not sure that, in fact, the results don't turn out to be the same.
By stalemating it, he means introducing...
you see, this one additional item on the troop withdrawal.
But if he does this, he's confident that the answer is going to be absolutely no.
Absolutely no.
The other way, he isn't quite as confident, but he thinks it will be.
In any event, the second course, the stalemating, would mean that the other side would have broken them off, in effect.
Yeah.
They would simply have refused to consider our proposals, which, I must say,
I would think that the American people, we were speaking of that, sir, the other morning about that poll, the American people would see a requirement from our point of view on at least a minimum level for a withdrawal clause to be a perfectly sound and defensible one.
So it's a pretty close choice.
Yeah.
Well, except he doesn't make it a very close, it may be a pretty close choice, except that he's, the only difference is he's totally bearish on the possibility of getting them to accept on the one case, and he's almost totally bearish on the possibility as far as his minimum requirement case, isn't he?
This is correct, yes.
So really it's, he really doesn't think he's got any chance again anyways.
just going through the motions but on the other hand we were also doing a little contingency planning on the possibility that something just may come out tomorrow and that for the vice president making sure we had some oh yes oh hell yeah
And we're just doing that contingency planning on the theory that that might even arise as early as Saturday.
Well, yes, yes.
Well, we should always have that in mind.
So, well, they asked us to do this.
Who asked us?
Henry and Al.
Oh, sure.
Well, sure.
And so it just may be, you see, that the possibility is they see it not quite as stark as it seems to be as you read this.
And I would... My feeling is this.
I think he should lay out what he honestly believes is an agreement they can and should accept and that we can and should live with and that the South Vietnamese can and should live with.
You got that?
Yes, sir.
Now,
I would put in only the with regard to the withdrawal thing just just put it in enough that it's there but not as frontally as to make it a an absolute certainty that they have to say if that's it we don't even talk you see my point so that we can just talk about it in other words we can say
as a political issue why if it breaks we can say well they insisted on they wouldn't even discuss the matter of uh returning in other words get that uh don't let uh you can get them to so that's at the later time you can say that's one of the reasons that we were unable to get agreement but but i don't but i think going on what he knows is a course
will lead to an impact breakdown means that we break off the talks with knowledge that what we are proposing is something that they cannot and will not accept and that i do not want him to do what i wanted to do is to at this point is to pursue basically the limited option but with modified just enough to have the thoughts
of the principle in some way of withdrawal in there.
You get what I mean?
You can work some language out like that, can't you?
It's just far away from it, but not as friendly as it presently is.
Or you think you can't.
I'm not sure that it can be done.
You've tried.
It's been tried.
Well, if you can't, then you can't.
I understand.
But he can discuss it.
But he can discuss it.
He doesn't have to lay that down as one of the conditions.
He can just raise it and they turn it down.
And then he goes from there to the minimum conditions.
All right, then there's what we've got to have.
If you won't give one, then here's what we've got to have.
You see what I mean?
So that he has made the record that we have asked for that.
In other words, he can have his, we can have our cake and eat it too in that respect because he can make the record that they will not accept that and he should make it tomorrow.
This is not what they understand.
This is what we need.
What is your answer?
They say, no, all right, here's the minimum.
And they said, no, we won't accept that.
Then we made the record both ways.
But try to negotiate a deal if possible.
That is what he should try to do.
Then we will have to take our chances with the South Vietnamese.
And we'll be prepared to do it.
And if the South Vietnamese decline, then we will then have to go
on basically the second line of settlement with the North on what we can settle with them, hoping that we can still get the Congress to support the South Vietnamese, which will be a tough titty, but which might happen.
it's obvious that he prefers just to break it off and come back and and go hard i understand that and i understand why because he's frustrated and tired and really thinks it's a hopeless business and he's probably he could be very right on his judgment is what the situation is however it's wrong for him to do this because the option once we have done that for us is no better than if we try to get an agreement and and get something
All it means is that we bomb for six months longer with a constant fight with the Congress going on.
A constant fight with the Congress going on to try to get the money, not just for aid to South Vietnam, but for the military at the cost of continuing the war.
You see, that's the point that we have to have in mind.
That's the weakness, and the second thing, of breaking it off.
And is it your feeling that your messages to Doreen, despite the soft talk he gave to you, that probably he hasn't gotten through to Saigon?
What does Henry think on that?
Well, I think there's no question that they've gotten through.
Does he think their attitude's any different today than it was yesterday?
Henry?
Yeah?
Well, but Dobrynin said last night, he said, you know, I think Henry ought to think about, you know, having another meeting.
And I said, yes, he is, sir.
He's meeting again tomorrow.
That would be today.
And he said, oh, I know that.
No, I meant, you know, perhaps even another day.
What's another day in Paris?
That's right.
was no question sir and he reiterated again this morning he said yeah i want you to be sure that henry understands that we are in touch and we are working on this you pass that to henry of course yeah now the see my feeling is that i i i want him to i want him to continue to talk to make the most reasonable proposal he can and then
Try to keep it open.
But also get into the conversation a flat turn down on the other point so that we can go back and talk about that.
He's already had a flat turn down, but get it in again tomorrow.
But then he says, now let's see what we really are.
You're not going to give on that.
Here's what the minimum is, what are we going to do?
And try to get an agreement.
And if you can't get it,
Emory shouldn't be so obsessed with this idea that I think he's concerned about his press a little bit too much that he's set by there be just one more meeting and so forth.
They don't worry about that.
There could be 10 more meetings if necessary, you know.
Yes, sir.
That's what he's doing.
But it's to our interest to keep this going at this point, to keep this going.
And now, if he, but he can also have the card in mind
that if they don't uh if they don't play if they if at the conclusion of tomorrow's meeting he sees a totally intransigent attitude then he says well we'll have to go back and you'll have to go back and then we'll just we just personally say that we uh
We're unable to reach agreement on some basic points, and we're ready to talk seriously about this whenever they are.
And then we'll resume our military activities at a highly intensified rate, but we're not going to announce it.
We're just going to do it, because we don't have to announce it.
I mean, it isn't like mining, bombing for the first time, Cambodia.
You see, when you just step up something you're already doing, it doesn't make a goddamn better difference anyway.
That's the point that Henry doesn't understand the PR side there.
I'm not concerned about that.
We just took a little sack around here, but we're prepared to do that tomorrow if necessary.
I'm sure he understands that.
Yeah.
understand that you're you're prepared fully prepared to do it i think it's just a question but you see he feels that the reason the reason he's pressing so hard that i have to go on the television that i've got to explain to the american people why we have to step up bombing and why the negotiations failed that's uh that's exactly the wrong approach the thing to do is to indicate we're talking
And they've been intransigent, so we're going to continue our bombing, but we're willing to talk.
In other words, keep the action going.
Keep the dialogue going.
And to the extent that we can.
And we can explore the situation that this separate deal is concerned.
I don't know any formula by which we can do it, which does not involve stopping not only the mining and the bombing, which we could easily do in turn for our prisoners.
We'd be glad to do that tomorrow.
But which would not involve also stopping aid to South Vietnam.
Which would lead to the same end.
that we cannot that we well it would be it would lead to the collapse so that's my point so you see when you look at the collapse that you're looking at it in a variety of ways here you're i mean uh henry's henry's line uh which uh from a melodramatic way of course is much more exciting and so forth and here too well they have broken their word higher
I, Henry Kissinger, am breaking off the negotiations.
I'm returning and reporting to the president.
The president goes on national television.
He announces to the world that the North Vietnamese have broken their word.
We are going to step up bombing, and we are going to continue it until we get our prisoners back.
It won't wash. That's not a set-up appeal, because first, the goal isn't great enough.
That is just for that purpose.
And in the meantime,
You have to have in mind that doing that and financing it over the next six months, and I agree it'll take six months before they're going to change their mind.
They take a hell of a beating the way the Air Force works so slowly.
What's going to happen is that the South Vietnamese may go down the tube.
because of lack of support from the Congress of the United States.
That's the point.
Because the word will get out.
It can't help it that the reason this thing went down is the South Vietnamese wouldn't go along with what we thought on October 8th was a good deal.
There's been too much written and said about that.
Right?
Yes, sir.
I think this is correct.
Now, what it was is not so relevant.
It's been written and said.
So the other line is this.
It also risks South Vietnamese going down.
South Vietnamese, too, thinks that they signed the kind of an agreement that we have made that this will bring them down.
She also believes that, uh, but, uh, uh, and all sorts of possibility you won't sign Paul.
And then you make a separate deal.
And
the Congress may bring them down.
But at least on that course of action, if we can get our POWs back now, which is the only goal, understand, Henry's got in this fair play, getting the POWs back, right?
Yes, sir.
All right.
If we get them back now, and as a result of all of these, at least we will not have to go through six months of hell
and the problems with the Chinese, with the Russians, with the Congress and everything else in order to do something is going to happen anyway.
So my view is that try to make the very best possible agreement you can now.
Be sure to get in so that it's thoroughly discussed, the fact that they've turned down fatally any idea for moving, but don't make that a condition for the settlement.
You must not make that a condition.
You must not make that an absolute condition.
And then if possible, keep the talks open for another round.
I think that would be useful.
I'm through for another round.
And then we can come back and have what we really need is with him a thorough discussion of what our options really are rather than, you know, all this dramatic stuff while we're
I mean, we rally the people and so forth and so on.
That's fine when you've got something you're going to do that is different.
And when you've got a great goal, it will not work if you're just going to do a little more of what you're already doing and when your goal is one that you could have gotten through negotiation without even doing it.
See, that's the weakness in, I think, the position that he's now stating.
In other words, the hardline position.
don't you think there's something to that i i i must say sir i'm i'm of the mind that um uh a dramatic move the the escalating would probably tend to to have an adverse effect on the hill and the probability is that you
damage your chances of getting it, not helping.
Well, when I have an adverse effect on the Hill, an adverse effect on the country, on the support for what we're doing, and on a hell of a lot of other things we're trying to achieve, we can't just continue to allow the war, this war, to poison everything we're doing.
Now, we're going to go the extra mile.
We're going to try to save them, but if we have people that can't be saved, we would have tried and
And it isn't going to happen that fast either.
That's another thing.
I don't think that this collapse theory is going to work that fast into his case, not when he's got that big an army and so forth.
The army is terribly dependent upon us.
What's that?
The army is terribly dependent upon us.
Yes.
It will be for some time.
Oh, yes.
Yes.
But that's why, and that's why, that's why his, if he has any,
judgment at all, he's going to think a long time before he says, go along.
I'll go along.
That's what it gets down to.
So have you got now the signal?
Or do you want anything further on?
Yes, sir.
I think I have something.
What I'd like to do is draft something up and let you have an opportunity then to think again or look again at Henry's message.
because they're not meeting until 3 tomorrow afternoon.
Yeah, but what time can you get... Can you call me back when you have it, or do you want to send it up, or what?
Well, I can do that if you'd like.
Because I can read his message any time.
I think it's going to come in very soon here.
Well, why don't you do this?
Why don't you work on your message now?
All right.
And shall we say that...
by 6.30.
Could you make it by then?
Oh, I think so, yes, sir.
And have the message as you see it, and then I'll let it together with the phone on it, okay?
In the meantime, I will read his message.
But I'm very certain as to the direction that we want.
I don't want to break off the deal, okay?
Yes, sir.
Right.