← 158-025158-027 →

Conversation 158-026

TapeTape 158StartFriday, December 29, 1972 at 6:28 PMEndFriday, December 29, 1972 at 6:44 PMParticipantsKissinger, Henry A.;  Nixon, Richard M. (President)Recording deviceCamp David Study Table
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the political management of the ongoing US bombing campaign in North Vietnam, specifically focusing on how to frame the rationale for the strikes to Congressional leaders and the public. They emphasize maintaining a hard-nosed stance to ensure North Vietnam returns to serious negotiations and secures the release of American POWs, while coordinating efforts to keep domestic supporters aligned. Additionally, the pair reviews diplomatic strategies regarding France, including potential support for President Georges Pompidou amidst his domestic political challenges, and touches upon the reception of a message from the People's Republic of China.

Vietnam WarUS Bombing of North VietnamCongressional relationsPOWsUS-France relationsGeorges PompidouUS-PRC relations
AudioNARA Description

On December 29, 1972, Henry A. Kissinger and President Richard M. Nixon talked on the telephone at Camp David from 6:28 pm to 6:44 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 158-026 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 158-26

Date: December 29, 1972
Time: 6:28 pm - 6:44 pm
Location: Camp David Study Table

Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.

[See Conversation No. 237-34]

       Weather

       Vietnam War
            -Status
                  -Col. Richard T. Kennedy
                        -Briefing of U. Alexis Johnson
                  -Kissinger’s conversation with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                        -Report from Hanoi
                              -Resumption of negotiations
            -Congressional relations
                               -33-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                          (rev. May-08)

                                                Conversation No. 158-26 (cont’d)

     -Kissinger’s telephone calls
           -Hugh Scott
                 -The President’s message
                 -Michael J. Mansfield
           -Leslie C. Arends
           -Gerald R. Ford
           -Carl B. Albert
           -F. Edward Hebert
           -John C. Stennis
           -Barry M .Goldwater
-US bombing of North Vietnam
     -Explanation
           -The President’s possible speech on television [TV]
                 -Kissinger’s conversation with Ronald W. Reagan
           -Resumption of negotiations
     -Gerald L. Warren’s press conference
           -Consultations with Congressional leaders
           -Explanation
     -Explanation
           -Resumption of negotiations
                 -Tone
                 -Stopping invasion, return of POWs
                 -Announcement
                       -Forthcoming week
     -Congressional relations
           -Briefing of Congressional leaders
                 -Timing
                       -The President’s role
                       -Kissinger’s role
                             -J. William Fulbright
                             -Edward M. Kennedy
                       -Success of negotiations
                             -Kissinger’s conversation with Mansfield
                 -Kissinger’s possible meeting
                       -Senate Foreign Relations Committee
                       -Senate Armed Services Committee
                             -“Hawks”
                       -Charles H. Percy, McGeorge Bundy
                             -George S. McGovern
                               -34-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                          (rev. May-08)

                                                Conversation No. 158-26 (cont’d)

     -Explanation
           -Kissinger’s response
                 -Negotiations
                        -Breaking impasse
                 -“Doves”
                        -Cambodia
                              -South Vietnamese troops
           -Necessity
     -Forthcoming announcement
     -The President’s critics
           -Demonstration
                 -Dean Francis B. Sayre
                        -[Thomas] Woodrow Wilson
           -Warren’s press conference
                 -Protests
           -William B. Saxbe
                 -Briefing
     -Effect
     -Explanation
           -Kissinger’s conversation with Mansfield
     -The President’s statements
           -Press and Congressional relations
     -Explanation
           -Negotiations
           -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                 -Political prisoners in South Vietnam
                        -Exchanges
                 -Press relations
                        -Liberals
-Negotiations
     -Following round
           -Possible failure
                 -Publication of record
-Congressional relations
     -Kissinger’s telephone calls and meetings
           -Stennis
           -Goldwater
           -Percy
           -Fulbright
                                    -35-

           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                               (rev. May-08)

                                                    Conversation No. 158-26 (cont’d)

                -Albert
                -Mansfield
                -Ford
          -Leaders
                -Instruction for Warren
     -US bombing of North Vietnam
          -Public relations [PR]
                -Liberals’ view
                       -US government’s position
                       -Congressional relations
          -Cessation north of 20th Parallel
                -Notification
                       -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                              -Message
                                   -Tone
          -US-PRC relations
                -Chou En-Lai’s statement
                       -Tone
                              -Washington Star
                       -Settlement agreement
                -Meeting with Kissinger
                       -Timing

Harry S. Truman’s memorial service
     -Reception
           -Arrangements
                 -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman
           -Edward R. G. Heath
           -Dwight D. Eisenhower’s funeral
           -Gen. Charles A. J. M de Gaulle’s funeral
                 -The President’s attendance
                 -Reception by Georges J. R. Pompidou
           -The President’s schedule
                 -Heath
                 -[Gough Whitlam] of Australia
                 -[Pierre E. Trudeau] of Canada
                 -Pompidou
                 -Heath
                       -[February 1-2], 1973 meetings
                                         -36-

                 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                    (rev. May-08)

                                                        Conversation No. 158-26 (cont’d)

      US-France relations
           -National Security Council [NSC] memorandum
                 -France election
                       -Socialists
                             -Francois M. Mitterand
                       -Pompidou
                             -The President’s written instructions
                       -NSC
                             -Liberals
                             -State Department
                       -State Department
                             -Polls
                                    -Pompidou
                                    -Socialists
                       -Pompidou
                             -The President’s written instructions
                                    -Socialists
                                    -Public support
           -The President’s possible visit to France
                 -Kissinger’s meeting with Pompidou
                 -French Ambassador to US [Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet]
                 -Kissinger’s trip to Paris
                       -Timing
                       -Message from the President
                             -The President’s support for Pompidou
                 -Announcement
                       -Timing

      Kissinger’s schedule
            -NSC
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello?
Hello, Henry.
I hope you've had a good day out there.
Nothing new as far as I can see coming this time.
I can't be a very good.
The afternoon reports depend.
I talked to the.
The, uh, the major problem that I see, uh, or did you get my message that I thought that you wanted to improve?
Excuse me?
You have a late time, you know.
But, but if you call me, I'm sure the mountain's got all of our equations.
Right.
But I'll call you not in the morning.
Not in the morning, right.
But you won't go to the mountain.
I sure will.
Yes.
You can call me.
And you, you didn't include both leaders, Aaron and me.
I know, well you see that's the point.
Well, they want me to go on and explain why we're bombing.
That's right.
Well, the reason we're bombing is to bring them back to the Constitution.
You can't say that, can you?
No.
And you think you'd go ahead and that, or would you go?
Well, no, I can tell you the reason.
Yeah.
Over the period of time.
The other point is that, uh, why, uh, we don't go on and complain while we're on it.
Well, the point is we didn't.
We made that decision early on because the moment you say you're on it, you're a person who's getting them back to talk seriously, but they can't come back.
That's right.
Okay.
And, uh,
What's going on with the high-frequency thing as well?
They refused to come through, so we're going to bomb them so they don't talk to the airspace.
By and by, that's a dead laser.
You can go out and say, you're bombing me, that's an invasion.
You're bombing to get your prisoners back.
There's nothing else that you cannot say you're going to bomb in order to negotiate.
Nobody will ever buy that.
Exactly, I see.
But on the other hand, how to handle that problem, you're going to be one of the two on your own, because it's not going to work.
I think they're going to say anything, and I'll make a case.
I do.
Now, you understand that the Norman Center is doing that for you to brief congressional leaders when they come back, and if not, or maybe when you have to brief Bill Price and the committee and all that sort of thing.
And, uh, of course, if you have any issues with it, prior to any, any normal breathing, prior to the meeting you want to do, it's going to be a utter damn disaster.
You do?
How do you know that?
You just say, we won't do it until the end.
That's what I want you to get across to Mansfield.
So we've got to start talking to the Hawks and not to the Perseus and the George Pundits.
You see what I mean?
I agree.
We've got to go through our own circumstances in the fight.
I do not know all the Perseus we need.
How do we, uh, if you were asked a specific question, why did you, um, I know the reason, what did you say?
Well, I would say, I will go into it, why did you go into it?
No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no,
You know, a lot of the guys are saying, well, if we had just pumped it to in there, it wouldn't be with us.
Well, that's not true.
That's like they, if we had gone into Cambodia with the Indian East Coast, they wouldn't have to take it.
And that's what I would say.
But frankly, I think you can say anything.
I agree.
I don't frankly think you are going to take all these things.
Oh really?
Yeah.
I don't know if you know the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh,
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
They say if it isn't going to work, they'll give us an advance deal.
That's my thought.
Oh, that would be a deal then.
Just do it, I mean.
On that, I'll get a deal, then I'll talk to you.
When you're talking to somebody who's executed, you can't just say, look, I'm not going to defend you.
So I just wanted to tell you what kind of questions you're going to get.
That is why.
That would be very high up.
And I'm not worried about it, because I'm not going to answer any questions.
I'm going to be hard-nosed, you know.
I'm not going to be depressed at the time that anybody's going to be asleep.
All right, thank you.
All right, thank you.
All right, thank you.
But that's, if you can't show that you did it for that person, you have to take it off in order to get to talk to that person, or did you put it in a different way?
That's a zero.
That's a zero.
I think we're going to have that.
I think that if the next round fails, then we can put the whole record on it.
We don't plan that at all.
We'll see.
Okay, we'll have that in mind.
The only weather point that I think we want to raise is the weather area.
What about the conversation with Congress?
When I began to think about it, with all the calls that you've made and you've seen
Oh, that's good.
Sweet.
My point is...
I think Mr. President, we could go on the defensive.
I think if we go on the offensive, we can get the government violent.
Anytime we go down the middle, they don't like it.
They have two arguments with me.
The government doesn't really support me.
and you overrule your own people because you're doing the best you can.
That's another reason why we're doing the best we can in the Congress.
The second is that we are doing the best we can in the Congress.
Now, it's never been the case that the Georgians did something until they would have actually stopped the bombing and no one spent the time that they could bomb nor did they kill.
That's right.
That's the truth.
That's why we're doing the best we can.
That's why we're doing the best we can.
That's why we're doing the best we can.
That's right.
Anyway, what about the Chinese?
Did you get the message yet?
Yes, one of our rockets that gave us Chinese territory.
It was in a very low-key way.
They gave us the number.
Actually, you know, at the start, I played short lines and they were doing it very, very restrained.
It was very restrained.
I don't know if it's a good word, but I think they want to ban people.
No question about it.
But I would show up on the tour and come up to the sign.
Yeah.
Okay.
Now into that, like, final point.
I guess, uh, I mean, because all of a sudden, early on, everybody's gone.
Now I have to do these things, so I have to, uh, everybody's left, uh,
I think it occurred to me when I signed something with regard to who goes up to that bridge in general, that they said that two people would have come.
They're coming to our authority.
Now, obviously, and we're looking at it out here at two states, real quick.
I remember that I put on a whole set of receptors for all the facilities.
Yeah.
That's right.
Right.
Of course I understand.
We just can't work it out.
But I think that'll be a very good deal.
I don't know what the property looks like, but I don't see where it's at.
But if he's coming with it, too, it's going to be a good idea to send him now within two or three hours.
So my view is to go out and go for it again at the end of the month.
I don't want to build it up.
And the other thing is that I saw whether it's knocking him around.
I don't know if you were here, but coming to your office, with regard to the practicality of the situation, I'm afraid it's at least implied to be out of town.
Absolutely.
I don't see how that could ever have been sent to you.
Well, it's up to me.
All right.
That's what my office is saying.
Well, the office did well, but what I could tell you is what happened.
They just don't know when I was supposed to go.
We don't know what the political situation is.
Maybe the polls are wrong, but look.
I got the polls showing that I was behind, and they just don't know how to play the polls right.
Well, how was it?
You let it play to your enemies.
That's my point.
Now, Papa Dewey, at least he heard them well, and we're going to find every way, and I wrote him on there on the piece of paper, we should probably get, you know, get to you, to your people, and it'll work out.
There's nothing to do down until this day, but everything that you've done for Papa Dewey, it's better than nothing you've done for him.
Okay, we'll see you later.
Uh, then I saw him and I was there.
He would like you to say his name, but it doesn't matter.
I want to do that.
The thing I want to do is, if you were to do this, I don't want to go through this.
If you were to go in and he was down under here, maybe you'd trust him.
But the point that I'd like to do is, if you could come to the room, you'd be the one to do it.
When I'm there, I'll be able to do it.
I want you to bring the first one that you can bring up.
OK, drop over the NBC.
← 158-025158-027 →