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Conversation 158-015

TapeTape 158StartFriday, December 29, 1972 at 12:01 PMEndFriday, December 29, 1972 at 12:08 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceCamp David Study Table
AudioNARA Description

On December 29, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at Camp David from 12:01 pm to 12:08 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 158-015 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 158-15

Date: December 29, 1972
Time: 12:01 pm - 12:08 pm
Location: Camp David Study Table

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

[See Conversation No. 237-19]

       Vietnam War
            -US-People’s Republic of China [PRC] relations
                 -Chou En-Lai’s statement
                      -Analysis
                      -Possible intent
                      -(Madame) Nguyen Thi Binh’s location
                             -[Peking]
                                   -The President’s conversation with Col. Richard T.
                                    Kennedy
                      -Significance
                             -Copies of notes
                             -Previous statements
                                   -US bombing
                 -Message
                 -Chou’s statement
                      -Tone
                      -Message
                             -Content
                                   -US bombing
                                -20-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                           (rev. May-08)

                                                 Conversation No. 158-15 (cont’d)

                  -Delivery
                         -New York
                  -Significance
                         -Marilyn Berger
-Cessation of US bombing north of 20th Parallel
     -Aleksei N. Kosygin
            -Statement
                  -Expectation
                         -US
     -Chou En-lai’s statement
            -PRC-North Vietnam relations
                  -Madame Binh
     -Notification
            -The President’s conversation with Kennedy
                  -U. Alexis Johnson
                  -Britain
                  -France
                  -Australia
            -Australia, South Korea
                  -Johnson
            -Britain, France
                  -Restraint
-US bombing of North Vietnam
     -US-Australia relations
            -Gough Whitlam’s statement
                  -State Department
                         -[National Security Council] [NSC]
                               -Kennedy
                  -Meat quotes
                  -Communications
                         -Cables to Canberra
                               -Clearance through NSC
                         -Birthday, New Year’s messages
                               -Clearance through NSC
                  -Whitlam’s election
                         -“Peaceniks”
                  -Effect
                  -Ambassador [Sir James Plimsoll]
                         -Avoidance
                                             -21-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. May-08)

                                                             Conversation No. 158-15 (cont’d)

                               -Whitlam’s letter
                                     -Lack of reply
                                           -Kissinger’s conversation with Plimsoll
                                                 -Australia’s message to North Vietnam
                               -Whitlam’s meeting with Charles H. Percy
                                     -Kissinger’s and the President’s position
                   -Percy’s position
                         -1976 election
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yeah.
Mr. President?
Oh, Henry, I wanted to...
I forgot to ask you about your anonymous one that Joe and Lyle stated.
Well, I haven't seen the actual text yet.
But for now, let people know what's going to happen.
A lot of the text relies on it.
Yeah.
So that they can then pretend that what they said caused it.
You may not have known, I am the Kennedy Center man of business in the county, which I live with.
One is man of business there, the second is that of course we've been sending him copies of our notes.
Oh, I see.
So, uh, and that is many things that he hasn't said before.
Well, in fact, well, of course, but maybe before the bombing imperils our relations and all that stuff.
Well, I don't know what's going on.
They might have hit something.
Or worse.
Uh...
They might just be acknowledging the message is rejected.
It's a private message.
It's coming through New York.
But I don't say much.
If they had something vital to say, they would not say it that way.
They would not say the man in the shirt.
Well, like the speaker said the other day, we expect this to end.
Well, that was a safe thing for him to say.
Mm-hmm.
That's right.
He meant the bombing.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Oh, well, we expect you not to die.
That's right.
I mean, that's what I mean.
So, uh... Well, and also, there's a lot to say about these other allies.
Well, we've met them sitting in town, and he had to do something.
But, uh...
The other part, I don't know, I told Kennedy about, uh, what he did, about Johnson being a pawn, and he said that, I don't know, let's not get around any more.
A lot of government issues that are going to inform the British, and I think they're going to.
I don't mind that.
That's a lot.
But I said, under no circumstances, and it's your point of view, under no circumstances must the U.S. military be involved ever again.
Absolutely.
And, you know, how much do you think, like, do they want to get out on the hard and inform the U.S. military into the crew and, you know, that kind of thing?
Well, the British have grabbed over because they see better this time.
That's right.
But I don't think anybody else.
No, I agree.
And particularly, I just want to be sure that if somebody... Hmm.
I'm not going to...
I'll try to...
I'll try to...
I'll try to...
I'll try to...
I'll try to...
And I don't want the, like, you know, the first day messages and all that crap.
And, you know, coming into the night with New Year's messages, it's no good.
It's not going to help none of us.
We'll just see you tomorrow.
See you tomorrow.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
Well, it can't be.
You know, this thing is going to end.
That's what I'm afraid of.
From that time on, from the minute we're in Vietnam, they will need us a hell of a lot more than we need them.
And for him to close the door out now, making grandstand plays, it's very, very dangerous.
It's very stupid, too.
And I think if we breathe it for a few months, you'll get to know him.
Absolutely.
And we never answered his letters.
We told him they were CNN.
Right.
I told him it was an absolute outing.
That an ally of ours was putting Hanoi and us on exactly the same level and writing a different and identical message.
Let's put it that way.
Let's put it briefly, but congrats to him.
All of that already seems reported because when Whitliff stopped, he fled all over again.
He did?
Yeah.
What did he speak to you about, about bombing?
Well, no, no, he said all over him, he said he thought I was mad at him, and so I got rid of him, but that had come from you, not from me.
That's what he did.
He was like, I want to get a line out of it.
I told the ambassador that I'm mad at him about it, too.
He said he wanted to know that they changed the rules.
Right.
Yeah.
Okay.
Okay.
Well, he said he would.
I think what truth he wants is...
I think we can keep him dangling for a bit.
What he wants is for this not to be knocked off for 70 days.
Well, I think he's going to play ball for the rest of the season.
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