Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Soviet Union and Foreign Policy

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Yeah, yeah.

Hello.

Henry, I just had a chance, just got here to read the first draft by Price.

Let me make three or four suggestions.

One, I don't think we ought to go into Vietnam in this speech.

Second, I think that it's important not to go on and on about liberty and freedom and all that sort of thing.

No use to throw that to him.

Yeah, yeah.

Yeah.

The other thing is I think we should talk about our, something about our alliance in World War II, the great suffering of the Russian people in war.

I think simply about that should be shown.

I think some of their other things, the words are fine.

But the point being that they don't know America.

We wish that they did.

I just want to tell them that I speak for the American people.

I know our people.

I know what they want in the world.

We like our system.

But on the other hand, we're not trying to impose it on anybody else.

And that we want peace in the world.

That means that great powers have a particular responsibility to use their influence to preserve peace and not to break it.

and that uh this we we would like to have that kind of relationship with the that i respect the russian people as a great people and let's start along those lines you know no no no no i'm not not no i this speech is not for that purpose it's uh and it should be the other thing is that and this is always the weakness of the speechwriters the russians

not only love, but have to have some anecdotal material.

They've just got to have a story or two, you see?

Well, no, what I mean is, if it relates to something that I've seen while I'm there,

In other words, if you read my speech when I spoke in 1959, the most effective parts of it was when I referred to seeing Russian children where they drew flowers from the car.

And that's what I mean.

No, no, no, no.

I meant examples so that it relates to them rather than just cool top logic, you see.

Our people just don't know how to...

There needs to be that, that I, as I was talking, as I saw Samar Khan, 67, a Soviet citizen, you know, with one leg, he lost in World War II, and he said,

We want to be friends with America or something like that.

That's what we want.

That's the kind of thing that he ought to put in.

Well, I don't want to spend too much time on it, but if you can get them.

It's not his fault because he was blind-blind and he said so, but if you could sort of give him the feeling of not too much substance, not too much...

I don't think we ought to go into the rigmarole about we have agreement on arms control and agreement on trade and agreement on... That's right.

It's more in terms of saying, look, I'm an American.

I'm the first one on an official visit to this great country.

I wouldn't slobber over it too much.

I'd be very proud of what we stand for.

But on the other hand, I would say that we respect you.

We want you to respect us.

But we can assure you on peace, but peace is not something that we have simply by being foreign.

We have to act responsibly through the world and our relations with small nations and others and respect all other peoples in the world.

So we say something to China at the same time.

See?

That's right.

Yeah.

Yeah, it's the first steps, but I would say that it means that the great nations, you know what I mean?

Well, that's sort of there now, the thing, but if you could get Ray back on that tack, I'd be fine.

And as you may have told most of us already, those are my reactions, and I just didn't want him to get bogged down in some of the things that we know we don't want to, we can't use.

They'd be playing a damn dangerous game.

Well, they can't now anyway.

It's too late.

Well, they can, but then they're proving that they're utterly stupid.

And if they're utterly stupid, we could be smart.

With regard to these talks, it would be helpful if you're talking to Green, if we worked it out, if we did it.

sort of in lines of subject by subject.

What I meant is that I don't have to prepare each one.

See, then I can brush up on a certain subject rather than read all frequency.

You've got four books up here on issues now.

And I can't read four books before each meeting.

See my point?

That's right.

And what I was going to say is that what

what you might do then.

He's obviously done a lot of this work.

It's just a brilliant job.

It's an excellent job.

But the point is, whoever worked on it.

Anyway, I would think that if we did that then before each meeting,

you could have one of them go through the talking points there and boil it down more and say, these are the things they'll bring up, things you should emphasize.

So that I, because the mental, I can retain most of this and I can fly blind pretty well, but it will help me very much to have it done that way.

Now, yeah.

All right, good.

Have you told, uh, to bring in the call on Rogers?

Oh.

Oh, he's gonna come back and call on you, good.

And he's told himself, good.

Right, right, right, right.

And, uh... That's it.

Now, with regard to that, too, when you're talking to Britain, you do work out like you've got to let Rogers and D'Amico haggle around about the Mideast and European security and all the other things.

Now, the statement of principles, of course, is you...

visual fidget, it will be one that they'll try to nitpick like hell.

And I don't know quite how we're going to be able to handle it.

I know the Rockers will be smart enough to know the impression that when I didn't sit down and count the whole goddamn thing.

How do we explain that to him?

I can't say that they submitted some things.

I said, well, we'll let you submit some things, too.

It sure worked.

It can't be for me, because I'm going to take it again.

I've told you I'm not going to do it.

I'm going to borrow trouble if I...

If you could find anything to call him about today or tomorrow, I hope you will do so.

Yeah.

What I meant is to say that we're working on it and I'm reading the books.

No, I don't think so either.

I'm just trying to

set him up for what to do later.

Now, he's apparently going to go to NATO and then come back to Poland.

I don't know.

I don't know what the hell he wants to come to Poland for.

There's nothing to talk about there.

But the point is, even if there were or there weren't, does he want to go to Iran?

Well, that's my point.

Why the Christ does he go to Poland and not to Iran?

See, I think that's an affront to the Iranians.

No problem.

We're arranging the schedules, you know, in such a way that when I go to Leningrad, what's the other city in Kiev?

What, do I go to Kiev?

Yeah.

Anyway, when we go to these cities, these other places, you know, I'm being really brutal.

The alderman is arranging all the parties.

All the parties.

goes in Leningrad and Moscow and others, when we do go out, go separately from me.

They go see some things.

I go see other things.

And rather than have them all tag along with me, because I've seen most of the things in these places, and that's the way it's going to be.

And if they want to call it, it's too bad if they don't like it.

Because one thing we certainly got to do was this.

You see, in reading this, I think we have to recognize we have a totally different relationship with Brezhnev and Gromyko.

I saw it on the right.

Brezhnev does rely on Gromyko.

And the main reason is Gromyko does not try to upstage.

He does what he's told and does a hell of a lot.

And so I hope that Brandon understands the difference in the relationship.

I wish you were working for us.

Oh, I wish you were working for us.

He's exactly that because he carries out things meticulously.

He works his tail off.

He has some ideas of his own.

He never tries to upstage.

And as a result, of course, Gru Meikle's become a very great figure in the world.

You know, he really is.

That's the way to do it, you know, rather than trying to do it in your own right.

Well, that's another problem.

I just have a feeling out of this that it's just a mistake.

If I ever do any more foreign travel, I don't think any cabinet people should go along.

None.

At all.

We have to, but, yeah.

The sensitivities of people that are going along, I mean, are not going along.

Nobody's going to go with me.

We just have to pay that price.

Oh, well, don't worry.

Because I shouldn't be worrying about these things.

And I'm not going to worry now that I've mentioned it to you.

It's all done now, and all of them understand.

And that's the way it is going to be.

They're not going to...

And you're going to set up two plenary sessions, I understand.

And if you told Bill that, he knows that.

I'm not sure that you ought to set up a separate meeting.

Holloman told me about this.

I don't think you have to set up a private meeting between him and the president.

I just don't think we ought to do that.

Yeah.

That's right.

And so I hope you haven't mentioned that to him yet.

Has he suggested it?

No, no, no.

Well, there is no reason for it.

Brezhnev talks to me, right?

And basically, I think this thing should be that Gromyko and Rogers meet, and sometimes Gromyko, Rogers, Brezhnev, and I will meet.

I'll be damned if I think we ought to have a situation where I ask Brezhnev to meet with Rogers.

So let's not do it.

Since you have the plenaries, I see there's no reason to.

Now, how does Kosygin fit into this whole thing?

Always, I understand that.

Well, now, is Kosygin going to, is he going to see Rogers somewhere?

What I think we ought to do, and I think you ought to all agree on this, the best thing to do is opposite number, opposite number, period.

In other words, Rogers and Gromyko should be either together or in a plenum.

And as far as the others are concerned, it should be exactly the same way.

I'll meet with Breschner.

I'll meet with, or do they plan to meet with Kosygin alone at all?

Yeah.

And sometimes from England.

Now, I don't want to, under no circumstances, make it clear.

I don't want Rogers to go to that town.

Isn't that right?

Isn't the purpose of that is basically a personal visit?

That's right.

And I would simply say that, and incidentally, Rogers doesn't have to be sensitive about that.

I don't, when I'm here, I don't have the foreign secretary along with Heath when I see him.

Do I?

That's the way it's done.

Particularly since we're having the plenaries.

And I put it all in the Russians.

That's the way they want it.

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Soviet Union and Foreign Policy

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on May 17, 1972

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Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Soviet Union and Foreign Policy

AI Summary

Audio

Transcript (AI-generated)

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on May 17, 1972

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Cite this conversation