Conversation 194-001

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You have done a hell of a job, and all these horrible trips and everything.

I just want you to know that we appreciate it.

You know?

You've taken great risks for your career, everything you believe in, all the rest.

By God, you've done the right thing, Henry.

And...

But you have had the courage to come out.

I think we're on the verge of having him come out.

I was glad the way you handled Rodgers.

You're very skilled at it.

You should tell him about that.

He can't go out there and indicate everything.

That's one thing that has happened that I didn't tell Rodgers and I haven't had a chance to tell you yet.

Do you remember before we met?

I proposed to the North Vietnamese a meeting, a private meeting in Paris on June 28th.

June 28th?

Yeah.

Now, to prepare a possible plenary meeting.

Yeah.

You proposed a private meeting on June 28th?

Right.

In Paris.

Wait a minute.

Before the plenary or after the plenary?

That was the preceded plenary session.

Preceded?

Before?

Yeah, we never did that.

But then I figured they wouldn't agree to it.

Because I figured then we'd be in a position to continue for a while and gradually slide into a plenary.

And I already had two positions so that he'd let us go to a plenary.

But they played our game beautifully.

Today came back.

You must not think I'm a hard line.

Are you against Congress?

Well, sir, I used to do French wine in Chateau Margot in 1959 because we don't have any child wine in here, sir.

Oh, ha ha ha, you've had one.

Well, uh, they've come back now, and, uh,

They have suggested a plenary session on July 13th, which is right smack in the middle of the Democratic Convention, to be followed, which was the date you and I had picked, to be followed by a private meeting on July 15th.

What's that?

What?

I'm sorry.

The North Vietnamese have received a message from the North Vietnamese today saying...

This lead-octo ends once we cannot be back in Paris before July 6th.

Therefore, they propose a plenary session on July 13th, good, to be followed by a private meeting on July 15th.

Now, I'll move the private a little further back just so we don't say to the 18th, but that's unimportant.

I think we ought to accept this.

Are you still planning on a press conference next week?

Yes, Thursday.

Well, then I think you ought to announce on Thursday that they're resuming platters on July 13th.

Not mention the pregnant, of course.

No, but they'll ask how they're driving.

It's just the enigmatic.

We just have to not comment on that.

We don't comment on driving.

Everyone goes on that.

Well, they're going to be good.

They'll find everything about the fucking Democrats.

You see, then the Democrats will scream politics.

then we can say, I'm sorry, because we've proposed to stay, we've proposed to 28.

So we'll be, so we've got this beautiful, to breathe in cold, this is why it's so late.

Also, I wanted to, I, of course, regret all the questions.

We did just right.

We got right.

We controlled just enough, but not too much.

But the Breeden called.

The Chinese name is more hopeful than Control Rogers.

Oh, yeah.

The Breeden called while you were alone with him.

That's right.

He went home.

And he said he wanted to tell me that Port Coney received assurances.

that if we are willing, if we resume negotiations, the North Vietnamese will discuss our points and not just their, which is an absolute innovation.

Secondly, that they would conduct negotiations in a business-like way, that is to say they will not engage in propaganda.

This is publicly or privately opposed?

Both.

While they are negotiating,

And third, that they will want to make a rapid settlement because they too have become convinced that you're going to win.

Oh, you're convinced of that?

Yeah.

So... No, Henry, I think we're going to have to make the most overwhelming suggestion.

The only thing that's keeping the war going is the fear of McGovern.

He ain't going to win this election, I can tell you.

Apart from the international things, I can't allow it.

You can't allow this son of a bitch to be president.

I asked him for refuge in China, in Beijing.

I told him, really, mister, this miserable hijo de la grandísima put a big prison in United States, sir.

This country loves his training too much.

This country wants to disappear.

You know, let me tell you this.

I know

would be the finish of the United States.

I mean, I don't get that.

I wouldn't have said that about Musty or Humphrey or the rest.

You know what I mean?

I'm a reasonable man.

But shit, this son of a bitch is a believing, unilateralist armorer, isolationist, radical.

It's unbelievable.

You don't agree?

I agree.

100%.

I agree.

And you manage the social things.

Well, in addition...

He believes that you can.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I don't know.

But as president, you need a lot of... Of course, nothing else to do on that that I view.

But in addition, you have to be able to lead men.

You have to be able to take tough decisions.

You have to... Can you imagine him taking...

But he's a pouty little man.

Pouty, you say?

That's right.

There's nothing to keep...

I mean, if you watch him, he has that weak face.

And he's a myth.

He's an invention.

An invention of the left who wanted to be a...

So...

Yes, sir.

Well, now,

I'll come back to your trip in a minute.

So basically, it's more hopeful to you than any of you thought.

On Vietnam, the very first evening, he began asking me about ceasefire.

Asked a lot.

You saw the announcement we're going to make tomorrow, don't you?

Didn't you?

I mean, it's not spectacular, but we don't want to brighten the Russians too much.

To me, apparently, I thought it was the right balance.

Just right.

And the very first evening, he went through...

I didn't mean it, but I just meant that I...

I'll have it ready for you, but don't bother.

You just give me the highlights.

That's all I need to know.

The first meeting, he met through, within an hour of my arrival, he came to the guest house and asked a lot of detailed questions.

The day you arrived, E, that's right ahead of China, came to your guest house.

I arrived at A2E.

We had a quick dinner at 9.45.

He and I first met with my whole team for about half an hour, just greeting them, saying, thank you, and you know how he is.

He's a hell of a guy.

You can compare him with the Russians.

Oh, they are uncouth.

They are uncouth.

That's why the New York Times editorial burned my head.

What do you think about China first thing?

to burn him up.

I thought it was the most horrible thing I ever saw.

So I thought it was revolting because China has made our policy go over.

I mean, China has helped us to manage it.

As advocates of China's birth policy.

That's another revolting thing.

They've been advocating it, and if we weren't doing it, they'd be killing us for not moving fast enough towards China.

Anyway, go ahead.

We then went through, in effect, UMA's proposal.

This is the first day.

Ten minutes of the conversation.

And he said, I will have something further to say to you about Vietnam, but I just want to think about this much more.

And we went through it, and very gentlemanly.

He said, it's got to be ended.

And that's when I began saying, you know.

He said it had to be ended this summer.

Yep.

And I said, the first day, I said to him, I said, you know, they have only one hope.

And that's McGovern.

And McGovern cannot be your hope.

And he said, if he were to be elected, I mean, I said, he said, McGovern is a sentimental ideologue.

I had dinner with five of your people.

The only one who I could even talk to was Fairbank.

And anyone who wants to cut your defense budget by 30%,

I cannot take seriously because he cannot do it, he said.

First, he cannot do it, and secondly, he should not do it.

He shouldn't.

That's all the first evening.

In fact, then we talked a little bit about it.

That's because of the Russians.

Oh, that's because of the Russians.

And then...

The next day, we had another session on Vietnam.

And I really laid it into him.

I gave him my... At first, we met about six hours that day.

Three hours on the Soviet Union, which I'll come to in a minute.

And three hours on Vietnam.

Vietnam, I was just cold-blooded.

He said, I bother you.

It was really horrible.

We went through it.

And I gave a very cold-blooded, unsentimental analysis.

I said, in our business, it's essential that our analysis is right.

Let me tell you how the president sees this.

And he said, militarily, there's no way they can win.

They are now in a position where even their victories will turn into defeat because they've accosted too much.

And he said, well, but you can't defeat them.

I said, we're not trying to defeat them.

That's not our point.

Our point is that if they cannot win, they will lose in the south, which is all we are interested in.

And so we had exchanges on many points.

And at the end of it, he said, this is when I sent you the telegram.

He said, the one thing, he said, I'll respond to you tomorrow.

He said the one thing that must be clear is whatever happens anywhere, you and we must continue our relaxation of tension in our two relationships.

And so then the next day he did make a very strong defense of their point of view because he had to do it once.

Again, in that meeting when I presented, he asked a lot of questions about these fires, and you may have proposed them.

But that was a fairly acrimonious debate when he presented his case.

And I said to him, at one point, he said, we'll create our peace, and we will fight.

And I said, well, if you're going to want to fight the wrong enemy in the wrong place,

And he pulled off it immediately.

Did he?

Immediately.

And... Like, like, like Braxton pulled off the night in the garage with him.

Well, that's why I did it so brutally.

I really, uh, uh, and, but, so this was a long session.

But then, the very last evening, in fact, at midnight, he came at 11, he came back to the guest house, stayed till 2, because Chris

drafting one of these goddamn announcements, it's like pulling teeth, and you know, the way he does that, he's great.

And, well, I just outweighed it.

I just don't know.

But he read me a statement of Vietnam, and he said, I have thought about all our discussions, and I have come to this conclusion.

Yes.

If I were the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, I would not have started this offensive.

If I were the North Vietnamese, I would accept the proposal of the president.

We think your proposal is reasonable, and we think it should be accepted.

They should have enough confidence in themselves to wait for a better historical moment.

However, they are our neighbors, and we have to stand by them.

He said, if they ask us, we will tell them to negotiate.

If they do not ask us, we will have to support them.

That doesn't mean anything, because if that's what he sees, this will affect them.

It's a very significant thing.

Oh, enormously significant.

It's an unbelievable statement.

That's further than the Russians' message.

I mean, the Russians went pretty far.

But, uh, that's, that's a great thing.

And the right exposes the right, because you know how these people are.

I mean, he keeps saying, how do it count?

And you know that with this conviction, he's going to use his influence.

And he said, well, what are your plans for negotiations?

I said, I'll make it worse in the middle of July.

I didn't know them.

I thought, what do you think?

You said, I'm sorry, that the thing was true.

Give everybody a chance to think.

He said, let him.

He said, this gives everyone an opportunity to reflect on the consequences.

Well, when do these dates and rework come?

Is that not why you were there later?

They worked out today, for all I know, he may have talked to them.

They?

Who do you hear from?

Paris.

In Paris?

Well, I sent a message to them in Paris two days before I left.

on the theory that I wanted to dissuade a little bit about her, about her speaking, proposing a private date on the meeting on Tuesday.

You knew that.

I told you that.

This is their reply to my proposal.

And so their reply is?

Their reply is, closed in goodwill, they said.

What?

Closed in goodwill.

Closed?

In goodwill, we are prepared to negotiate, but unfortunately,

It's a very threatening lie, very uncharacteristic.

Special advisors, and the ministers want we cannot return to Paris before July 6.

And so we propose a public session on July 13.

to be followed immediately by a private session on July 15th.

Why did you turn down the 15th?

I prefer to have yours a little closer.

Because it will be on the west coast.

Great.

It will be in any event.

It's just worth making that difference.

Having a public session will screw the fucking Democrats.

But you remember, Mr. President, I asked you when should we start the plenary session.

You told me July 13th.

I asked Mitchell from his point of view when he thought it would be best.

He also said July 13th, provided we can announce it early.

Now, I was a little boozy.

If we had had to take the initiative of proposing July 13th, it would have looked too obvious.

That's why I figured if we ask for a private meeting, they will certainly come back asking for a plenary.

But I didn't think we could be so lucky that they would propose our preferred date.

I will send them a message on Monday saying we agreed to the plenary on the 13th.

We would like to move the private one to the 18th.

Then on Thursday,

When you ask a question, you'll say, we are prepared to resume veterans up to 915.

Right.

It's a very long private session.

Well, I'm not going to comment on private sessions.

Everyone will bring it in context of the .

Henry, how are we going to get out of that very horrible statement of yours?

I mean, the only thing is to lay the settlements for whatever.

Well, I haven't heard that it's not that big of a deal.

Somebody's got to start fighting.

See, now that we've got these negotiations set up, I think the government is over a barrel because if he starts screaming, then I think we should move it to say, then we should just scream that while we are trying to set up negotiations, while we are setting up these negotiations, this man is...

uh is is giving any comfort to the enemy that's right we can guarantee that he'll do it mr president because he's going to go through a legal platform here uh without screaming on i think though that if i could next week and keep we're going to have to go back to sessions because that's why what i mean the second thing is with regard to the troop thing

I think, you know, and I'm glad you pointed out to Rodgers, it was two months.

Of course, I didn't see it.

But nevertheless, whatever the case is, it should be two months.

And over two months, we'll draw 10,000.

Period.

All right?

That's that.

No more time.

Thank you.

We've never got much mileage out of these troop announcements, and that will be superseded anyway by the resumption of planners the next day.

And all of this in the context of the Fusconi trip, my trip.

One would have to be a fool, and I'll plead it a little bit tomorrow, by being very mysterious.

I mean, I won't say anything, but... What are you going to say tomorrow?

Well, I'll put what I'll say out when we receive it.

Right.

And then I'll give them who participated and how many hours they chose.

And all of this I'm clear with them, you know.

And they'll say, was Vietnam discussed?

I agree.

I'm clear with them to say, yes, of course, Vietnam was discussed as a question of common interest on both sides.

And then I'll say, are you more optimistic?

I'll say, I don't want to give you any wrong impression.

Of course, the Chinese have a different view than ours.

But our problem is how to find a reconciliation of the different views.

And whether progress was made will be seen only as events unfold.

But, you know, Tleskis, your three lines on your return from Moscow did more to scare off the liberals than you said you wouldn't.

say anything on these now that might hound the ground space of future negotiations.

It would not serve the interests for me to discuss this matter.

Play it mysterious, right?

We'll get a little mileage from the Russians and tell them.

What have we heard from the Russians?

But what we've heard from the Russians is that there's a letter from Gresham in which he's just overflowing to reply to a letter which you sent him after you came back.

And he's just overflowing with tremendous achievements, the importance he attaches to personal contact with you, and so forth.

Then he mentioned to me that he sent

They're prepared to negotiate.

They were very interested in the presentation of the proposals we made to them, which is fascinating because they've turned them all down already.

They'll conduct affairs in a business-like fashion.

and so on and so forth.

This arrived last night.

Now today, the president called me just after I had returned the war.

And what did he say?

He said that the Brezhnev wants you to understand that businesslike means, people not engaged in propaganda, that when they say they were interested in the presentation of your views, they're prepared to discuss our points in addition to their.

They've never done that.

and three, that they want to speedy settle.

I'm beginning to believe that.

Another point, which is quite fundamental.

What do we do about bombing and all the rest?

Now, hate wants to intensify.

That is wrong.

Because we have two legs to our public view.

One is

the neutrality of Moscow and Peking.

And it's a miracle that we have maneuvered those two in such a way that they're not jumping us.

And so they're the same target, right?

Yeah, or maybe a few other targets.

But the point is, these guys are reeling as it is.

There are not all that many targets left in North Vietnam.

Now, one thing we spent a lot of time on is the overflights of North Vietnamese territory.

He showed me

He really has been very decent.

He's never made a public protest.

He showed me maps.

I'll, if you're interested, I'll bring them to you.

Of every violation, he gave me the map.

You'd be shy of an army gun.

Well, we'll just pull out another 10 miles, so it's 25 miles.

I can't believe that this area, 25 miles south of the north of the Chinese border, which is rugged mountainous territory, is very sensual.

Okay.

So then, I think that we, I thought they would be very brutal to us on this trip.

I didn't think this would go so well.

So Henry, the game, helped the way we played.

It's such that it's designed.

And I think we may get something by the end of August.

What I'm beginning to think we'll get is maybe the prisoners, or at least we may finally wind up with a limited ceasefire, not a permanent one.

Say a six-month ceasefire that all prisoners held for more than three years.

Believe me.

The trouble they have with letting out the prisoners back and any of them back before it's all done is because, no doubt, there'll be so many horror stories coming out.

They'll be afraid of their mistreatment.

Why, Henry?

So I think this is the closest.

I know you've always been skeptical about this.

I'm not now.

But we've never had to think going so well.

We've tried to do it with mirrors.

We've never been bombing them, blockading them, and dealing with their two major allies simultaneously.

Well, first thing that I read, another thing, well, for the Soviet Union, I've given you the play, but they, they are really worried about, they're filled up, they're incredibly, you get no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.

that's that's the effect it's a true thing without asking for anything in return then i went through with a new decision last december of the uh india pakistan which i had only what is it what will you know but i went through it i said you know when we were discussing our defense economy i said you know people say a lot and that is so

And I'll even grant you that some people will change in August, so I do not believe we'll have a change.

But let's go through this decision and accept the rising list of us in New York so we know it all.

We went through hour by hour what happened from Friday morning till now.

I think I have, I think they really do trust me.

Because I've always been very, you know, the Russians, I don't claim to have, I think the Russians respect me because of my position and because I'm a top negotiator.

But I don't think there's any personal feeling.

I think the Chinese have, you know, a lot of confidence.

Have a lot of, couldn't handle it better, believe me.

So they, but then they made an analysis of some of these motives, which could have come from the Shah.

What did they say?

They said, here is what the Dogis are doing.

They're surrounding Iran through Iraq and Syria.

And they're using India to press against Iran on one side.

You're right.

And Burma.

Do you think you're right or not?

Absolutely right.

They said they thought a lot about the international situation since their talks with you.

They said, in principle, we have to remain committed to the withdrawal of forces.

But in practice, we think you can take many years before you withdraw your forces from Japan and Korea, which is amazing.

They said, we don't want you to withdraw the fellow 40,000 in Korea.

Well, you've had enough of Henry, you've had a long day.

Then they went over possible actions we could take jointly in the need to keep each other informed.

They said they promised us they would make no major move with the Soviet Union in India without checking with us.

It's unbelievable.

We practically have an alliance with them on many parts of Europe.

It's much better to ally with the weaker and the stronger.

And they said, look, we want to strengthen the Germans against the Russians.

They said, we've invited Schroeder over here because we think the CDU is the better party.

They said, is Schroeder the right man, or should we have invited somebody else?

So they said, no, Schroeder is the right man.

For their purpose, he is the right man.

Strauss would be, I told them, Strauss understands things better, but he doesn't have the political base.

They said that was their reason, too.

So they ordered the foreign minister of the CDU, who's coming at the end of July.

They want me to talk to him before he comes.

They said, just tell him one thing.

Be honest with us, and we'll be honest with him.

because we have common objectives.

Because the beauty of the Chinese is most of these European governments have to play with the left a little bit.

Now, if they have a left-wing alternative in Peking, they don't have to go to Moscow.

And they are against mutual force reductions in Europe.

They said, well, if you keep it at 1050 percent, it's all right.

But if we had predicted a year ago, Mr. President, that Joe and I and we would sit down together to discuss how we could conserve our measures around the world, it would have been unbelievable.

Well, we worked too hard.

I'm sorry you have to go down.

You've got an impressive arm that can do it.

Well, let me say, it wouldn't have all happened unless you'd have done all these things.

Mr. President, if you say this long enough, I'm alone.

But it wouldn't have happened without you, because the moral courage it takes.

I didn't have the responsibility.

I know what you went through.

to announce that November 3rd speech, Mr. President, three weeks ahead of time, when everybody coming into the Oval Office was telling you, was arguing, including you, what confessions to make.

The Cambodia decision, the Laos decision, the Seoul decision, to hold firm

I mean, during May and June, McGregor last year was in every day who could agree to some congressional proposal.

The May 8th decision this year.

Oh, you've done it the hard way, against your government, against the establishment.

And for Kennedy, it was a piece of cake.

Isn't that good?

For he never took a tough decision, but then the newspaper supported him.

The establishment loved him.

He's got it all working together now, Mr. President.

I think we'll, uh...

Uh, how concerned are you about the tax relief?

I cannot believe that they can make it.

Okay, well, enough.

Now, if you want to, you don't want to see the movie yet.

What is it?

It's a pleasant movie.

It's a Clint Eastwood western.

It's very nice and easy.