Conversation 224-011

TapeTape 224StartTuesday, November 14, 1972 at 9:36 AMEndTuesday, November 14, 1972 at 9:48 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceCamp David Hard Wire

On November 14, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 9:36 am to 9:48 am. The Camp David Hard Wire taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 224-011 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 224-11

Date: November 14, 1972
Time: 9:36 am-9:48 am
Location: Camp David Hard Wire

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

[See Conversation No. 153-5]

[End of telephone conversation]

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello.
Hi, Henry.
Before we talk about the last night, I wanted to get one of your Taiwan people.
I was talking to Billy Gray, and he called from Tokyo, and he's going to be in Taipei tomorrow with Madame Chang, which he's actually going to be there today, but he's not going to see them tomorrow.
And I just said, well, just reassure them of my friendship and appreciation and so forth and so on, and that we stand by our friends.
But I said I'd have your office send him a little cable through McConaughey as to sort of talking points.
Would you just have him give them a, you know, this can be good reassurance for them.
Fine.
Fine, fine.
And, you know, I don't even know what it says, but just so he's going to see them and he can sort of feel the personal feeling that they could give them.
Great.
Well, how'd you go last time?
Everything fine?
Where do they have, or do they have their own house?
Good.
Where is that?
Is that a... Is it in the, up in the, up in the... Is it upstairs?
I mean, up in a high building?
I've been there, but I can't... Oh, I don't know.
I don't know.
It's... Yeah, yeah.
I'll go ahead and watch this.
Okay, my God.
Yeah, good.
Were you able to make that hey point?
That must have impressed him.
Yeah.
There you go.
That's good.
They still, they still, they still petrified of the Russians.
Good.
You're talking to them all right now.
What's going on?
Why doesn't he tell them to give the outer islands to the Japanese northern islands back?
180 degrees.
They know it.
They're not down here.
That whole business where Bill was reassuring the foreign minister that we were
We're not trying to help the Japanese and so forth.
I was telling the children that we're going to stay in Japan.
All right.
All right.
What is the matter of the possibility of David and Julie going over there to come out for us?
That's just, well, I don't want to press it.
You didn't have to, but you didn't have to.
But on Mansfield, you've got that on the back burner, as I say.
I really feel on him.
I've been doing some thinking about that.
I just feel we've done enough for him.
You know what I mean?
We've done a hell of a lot.
Let it go.
We need our friends.
Right.
Good, good, good.
You will talk to Green and about the other one, because that is coming up.
But let me say, only if they feel that way, because the kids really don't give a damn whether they go or not.
But if they would like it, you know, for them to represent, you know, among the official delegation, let it come naturally.
You'll know how to do it.
Now, with regard to this, you know, what you left me yesterday was simply a copy of the letter that you had sent to us, to me.
Thank you.
So I don't have the copy of the proposed letter.
Now, it is useful to read it.
Now, on that letter, I think that the tone is certainly conciliatory.
The substance, of course, on troop control is tough.
And yet, of course, the way he puts it, it's a very poignant case, you know, if you get arguing about it in quite 10 years.
But what happens is that our Vietnamese, that we get out and our Vietnamese pay him, and he consider both of us foreign troops.
So, you know, I'm just really arguing the way he does.
He makes a pretty good case.
Now, the only thing that, the only way I think he can get around, I mean, which of course you've got to think of, is what he needs more than anything else.
As far as the fact of their being there and the danger of their being there, it's nothing, because they're just as dangerous.
across the DMZ, they can pour it on any time.
I understand that the main thing is from his standpoint, his security, his argument.
On the other hand, on the other hand, what he is concerned about is the appearance.
He's concerned basically about the fact that after all these years, does he sign an agreement which says the North Vietnamese can occupy part of his country?
That bothers him.
Now, on that, it seems to me that there could be some fuzzy language just to
just in principle, but at the conclusion of the political process and so forth, that all the North Vietnamese groups will honor something like that.
Now, you have something in there that says that the principle of the occupation of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese troops is not recognized.
That's his real problem, as I see it.
They don't admit they have a mind stand.
do everything he can but on the other points that he makes most of those are basically we know purely cosmetics but enormously important to him and could matter less in my opinion to the norm yeah yeah so that's why I read his letter to Earthworth well
Now, how soon do you need the other one?
Well, I can get it up to you, David.
Fine.
Fine.
Okay, fine.
Fine.