Conversation 233-006

TapeTape 233StartTuesday, December 5, 1972 at 10:05 PMEndTuesday, December 5, 1972 at 10:34 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Colson, Charles W.Recording deviceCamp David Hard Wire

On December 5, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 10:05 pm to 10:34 pm. The Camp David Hard Wire taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 233-006 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 233-006
Date: December 5, 1972
Page | 4
White House Tapes of the Nixon Administration, 1971-1973
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, NARA Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 597542
Time: 10:05 pm - 10:34 pm
Location: Camp David Hard Wire
The President talked with Charles W. Colson.
[See Conversation No. 157-4]

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello.
Are you home now?
Yeah, well, you're quitting early, huh?
Yeah.
Well, I went over today and saw the Californians.
Without saying it.
They're a great bunch, though, I must say.
You know, they raised $9 million in that state.
You know, they're in trouble in California.
It's all the young people.
As a matter of fact, you know, when you think of this thing, I think probably, you know, 64 apart from the 49 states where it came from, it's quite over a meter.
That's the right achievement.
Oh, yeah.
So, like, when I talk about that, I said, that's sure.
I think that's how nice it is.
He is really, he's really a suspect.
Especially for me.
The number out, it must be very, very small now.
There's only five states.
Slightly over 60 already, so... What was this?
I'm doing some more thinking, and what are your...
I can think of some more of your reactions to what we're doing.
Of course, our sentiment is that you could make a pretty good little talk, but the point is that it simply has nothing to do with us.
It just escalates the war issue and puts it right on the front line.
Again, it gets everybody talking about it far more than it does.
And the point is that if we needed to rally the country, that would be different.
And we can do it later if we have to.
It would be effective, but the problem with using a truck is that on all the previous occasions when I've done it, I've used it.
I have done something.
You know what I mean?
I have either, I mean, I haven't just said, look, follow us above November 3rd.
I said, but I said, no, I asked, I heard all these people march around the White House.
I had to rally the country, and I said, I asked for your support.
The silent majority, so they supported me.
What do we talk about?
You see, that's the point.
We're saying now these negotiations, if you were also willing to see
our impasse because the enemy has tricked us.
It seems to me that he's in a position where we're looking at it from a standpoint where he's not going at all.
It's like when he came back from Russia that time, not getting what we wanted.
He says, well, we're going to break off the summit.
And, uh, all right, then that would of course be the same to break off the summit when we did something.
This time we're not going to do a damn thing.
That's the point.
I've got to do something, but I don't want to talk about it.
The point is that they are testing us, and that the answer is for me to go on television and rally the American people, because that will call their bluff.
But, you see, my argument there is that you can call their bluff by what you do and not by what you say.
And also, my own point is if you rally our supporters, you also rally the opposition again.
I know they cannot but think that we are innocent.
And if they don't think that, they're out of their minds.
Now, the real problem, I think, though, is that they're clever enough already to just hang on and don't settle down.
The Congress cut off the water.
Well, he called me and asked me about it.
I said, well, I don't understand.
I said, well, I don't understand.
I think, I don't know, that's the real problem.
And this comes off the way that what it means is that they're going to be meeting at me.
I think they are too.
I don't think people are going to be asking them, they're going to be meeting at me and say, well, they were there with me.
You know, other times we've, uh, we've all been pursuing that for a certain amount of time.
But, you know, I'll figure out, uh, you know, I'll take a, I'll take a meeting for a few days.
But, you know, we can't, we can't, uh, deal with something because, uh, we're, we're not going to be, because we're not going to be able to.
It, uh, goes so far as to say that I'm confident we're going to have an agreement
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
The North Indian Marines aren't backing on.
That we cannot go back to because we've gone and we went to Saigon.
Saigon said no, we're going to Paris.
And going back to Paris, he said no, we're going to put her back.
No, no, we're going to Paris.
He says no, we're going to Paris.
I'm sorry.
It feels a need to lock it back and get out there.
Again, we can't do that.
Those bastards off.
That's the problem with rallying our own forces.
You can stir it up again and get the idiots coming down again and saying, oh, boy, they're bombing all our...
I had deliberately had all of them read it.
I mean, let him look at it first.
He first read his first reactions.
Well, of course, I guess he's got a good reaction.
So there's some more of that.
That's exactly how he felt that way.
That's the way the American people would feel if I went out and did it.
We've got to run it through the end.
We can come to it if we have to.
People said the president should come out and explain all this and report on the war again.
All right.