Conversation 234-004

Transcript (AI-Generated)

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Yeah.

What I'd like for you to do is to prepare, you know, just in rough form, the guidance that I gave you.

And you better be sending it up, you know, right up to me.

Then I'll have time to work on it for an hour.

We don't have to send this cable off to...

It would make a difference until 10 or 11 at night anyway.

Because he won't need to have it until morning.

Fine.

All right, you do that, and then I'll work on it here.

So you just got the general feeling of what I mean, right?

Right.

And then after I've had a chance to look at it, then I'll edit it.

Edit it twice.

Something off to it.

Okay.

Thank you.

Fine, fine.

But my name.

My own preliminary feeling about it is this, that I think that if you look at it in the coldest way, it would be totally objective.

You've got to see where you come out at the end and on both lines.

And on both lines, if you come out only with your prisoners, it's a hell of a lot better to get them now than to get them in July.

Do you see what I mean?

That's the real problem.

Do you see any coal in that?

I just think that's the weakness of the case for this dramatic, we'll step up the bombing until we get our prisoners because both South Vietnamese parties were so intransigent.

That's in effect what he's saying.

But you see, the point is, and so why?

I mean, you get the prisoners now, they're both intransigent, you just wash your hands of the goddamn thing and get it done now.

You could say, well, June would be in a stronger position next July.

I can't be sure of that.

To that point, it's made, it's wired.

If you have another view, I'd be interested in it.

Maybe I'm wrong about it.

If you've got any questions, there's a different opinion I'd be glad to have.

There we go.

But that's the case.

If that's the case, then we just, we do have the only other course to go the other way.

My whole mind is, though, that it makes the case for offering the minimum conditions.

See what I'm getting at?

You see, if you offer the minimum conditions, and if you offer the minimum conditions, and by some, by unexpected, they happen to be accepted, and if you get minimum conditions,

are only two or three that we can mount anything on.

I mean, I know it's important to, you know, but they're not that useful.

None of them are fundamental, so when I talked to Doug, he didn't mention any of them.

But my point that I'm making is this, that the case for at least trying the midland position is that it does give the prisoners

North Vietnam.

And if we're turned down by South Vietnam, it does get the prisoners, right?

But that money you lose, see my point?

So the only other thing is you put yourself in a better public posture by breaking it off.

That's what everyone wants to do, by breaking it off, by giving them what we know is an impossible demand.

And then having it turned down, and then we go back to bombing.

You see what I mean?

Well, if you have another view, I think we can cut it all through and cut through all of it clearly.

I think I can see what he wants to do.

He really wants to throw his hands up and say this bastard just can't be talked to.

And take a long, long time.

And now when he comes off, when he comes back, though, we do bomb.

That's what we're going to do.

That'll put some pressure on him.

But anyway, I do prepare along that line.

In other words, I'll be two.

Okay?

Or no, I'll be one, of course.