Conversation 234-006

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On this offer, I'll grab double-spaced to Dr. Kissinger.

Bring it back to me and I'll check before it's on.

After reading all your messages, I am, again, honestly impressed by the skillful and dedicated way that you're handling terribly difficult problems.

I have a terribly difficult situation for you right now.

Before a decision of this enormous importance, a decision of this importance is made, it is imperative that I talk with you personally very good to accomplish this goal.

I suggest that you use tomorrow's session for the purpose of, you should start tomorrow's session by saying that the president has read all of your message and a full account and a full transcript of the conversations today.

Great.

He is frankly shocked by

their total intransigence to the North Vietnamese in particular by the fact that they have backed off of the commitments they made on the meeting of October 26.

I want you to go down a list of specific questions on all of the proposals that are

obtaining your last message.

Adding, and adding to it, of course, a specific question about whether they will agree to the withdrawal, or agree to any language for covering the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, period.

I know that their answers to virtually all of these questions will be named.

But the purpose is to make the record, make it clear on withdrawal for me, and not simply for the negotiating purpose, not simply for the negotiating purpose.

for the historians who observe the negotiations in the later days of Perry and Perrin.

I then want you to ask them what is their final offer of Perry and Perrin.

You will then tell them that you will report the answers they have given to the President directly, and that you will contact them with regard to setting up another meeting

I am totally convinced that our breaking off the negotiations by making a demand on a demand for them to withdraw their voices

South Vietnam, which we know in advance they will reject, would be a disastrous terror on our part.

If the negotiations are to be broken off, it must be crystal clear, no, it must be absolutely clear that they were responsible for breaking off negotiations with them.

I also

I'm perfectly convinced that we should not paint ourselves into a corner again by saying anything like, this is our last offer, or this is our final meeting.

Leave a crack of the door open for further discussion.

You can indicate, of course, that the offer you are making

It should be option one of your last message to me.

It's the only one that you believe I will approve.

But beyond that, I would not indicate that this is a final officer offer and that they don't take it through any break-off negotiations and that they will have to take the consequences.

I want you to give them every opportunity to accept your first, the first option of your last message to me.

I agree with you that the possibility of their accepting it is quite little, but they should be given every opportunity to accept it or reject it.

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

But what is absolutely imperative is that we not put ourselves, is that you not put ourselves into a position where we break off the talks.

That will play directly into their hands and will be damaging to our domestic position.

I realize that you think that if I go on television, I can rally the American people, support an endemic continuation of the war, something to the purpose of getting our prisoners back.

I agree that there's a possibility at this time, but that can wear very thin.

particularly as the propaganda organization brought the apartment in this country.

We didn't have a way at the time.

We had a much better deal in hand.

And then because of the Saigon and trash cans, we were unable to continue.

Subject which you and I must discuss at length.

when we meet.

But which we mustn't, but where a decision does not have to be made right now.

To weigh the option of taking the heat for massively increased bombing for eight months for the medical purpose of getting our prisoners back.

Nash, which of course was McGovern,

with the high possibility that South Vietnam in that period will collapse due to the fact that we may well have the Congress, despite all of our efforts,

uh, cut off military and economic assistance to Saigon.

As the story unfolds, Saigon's intransigence was really the cause for the breakdown of the Helmets' pre-tournament.

We must wait.

The, uh, the course of action in which we will definitely

decide what was necessary to offer the North Vietnamese to get our prisoners back now and get out and let what is probably going to be the inevitable collapse of Saigon occur now rather than waiting until later for the experiment.

But continuing the bombing for the sole purpose of getting our prisoners back, whether continuing the bomb

going to be worth the cost in terms of what it will do to our relations with the Congress, to our support of the country domestically, and to our relations with the Chinese and the Russians are also factors that we have to consider.

However your meeting comes out today, if it does not end in a settlement, of course I know that

I agree with you that there is very remote possibility that you will make a breakthrough on the settlement side.

We will resolve.

We will embark on a very heavy bombing program in the north, but we are going to do it without a sensational television announcement of it.

The people are...

With no draftees like in Vietnam, with casualties at virtually zero levels, and with most of the people thinking that we're bombing anyway, the thing to do here is to take the heat in the Washington establishment and know the difference for setting up the bombing, which will occur for a few days.

without escalating our actions by what we say about them.

That's the end of the tape and the memorandum.