Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 237 › Conversation 237-048
Nixon phone call with an unidentified caller on Vietnam War
Saturday, December 30, 1972 · 10:12 AM–10:54 AM ET · Camp David Hard Wire · 11 min
AI Summary
President Nixon dictates a memorandum reflecting on the political fallout and public perception surrounding his recent decision to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam and resume peace negotiations. He contrasts the public's current anti-war outcry with the support received during the May 1972 invasion, acknowledging that his administration faces intense criticism from Congress and the media. Nixon evaluates the strategic effectiveness of the bombing campaign, concluding that while it successfully compelled Hanoi to return to the negotiating table, it necessitated a more proactive public relations strategy to counter domestic opposition.
- Vietnam War
- Paris Peace Talks
- Aerial Bombing
- Public Relations
- Congressional Opposition
- Henry Kissinger
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
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on the morning of December the 30th, 1972.
It is 10.30, and by this time, Warren will be making the announcement in regards to the suspension of all the 20th parallel and resumption of talks on the 8th, between just early October, period paragraph 18.
I have certainly been through one of the toughest periods of the four years in the period close to me.
And the closer or I believe it was Scullin made various observations that the decision with regard to resuming bombing, normally the one that I made on September the 18th, was going to be far more difficult than the decision to, on May 8th,
On May 8th, there was a massive invasion, and the public generally supported the president in taking action to stop the invasion of the program.
In this case, there was no incident of this sort which would justify military inaction in the public mind.
After all, the talks were simply going along.
They got winning tests, as has happened before,
People do not expect you to engage in massive military activities because there is a law for suspension and or an impasse in cops, very apparently.
This is the point that we have been unable to get through Henry's head.
And we were so prepared with our animals this morning, and I called him in the morning, that we're not going to do this.
We're not going to do this.
We're not going to do this.
What would I explain?
After all, perhaps our state could be made one less of a sigilary of the Black Scully, and others have turned on the needle enough so that they can follow up, which is a great weakness of a whole temperature operation.
The musician resounds, attacks on an IRN.
I did not represent the policy at all.
We had a policy that represented a continuation of the policy of the river at May 8th, which I had interrupted very slowly because the enemy was the bush.
And I, as long as the bush has seen any chance of success, we have to continue to do that.
We tried to play a little team, we got away with it for a while, but what really sent it in that respect was that it didn't work.
at least in the public mind, although it did do a lot of good in retrospect for the department.
Here, the real question, I thought it would be nice if the day would be interpreted in the public mind.
Of course, it will not be so interpreted by our opponents in the media and in the Congress as having been a result of a policy that was
And I have gone over this with Colson and me in terms of stuff.
Both of their reactions were as well, next to the stuff again.
They both recognized that the media, much of the media will try to say, the fight was not necessary, or will try to say, might try to say that we were forced back to the table because of the world out in the eye and all that sort of thing.
On the other hand,
is scholars being able to call some person who shares such a view.
That is an incredible position.
predictably, he was very pleased with the city, the right to city, the federal, and seemed to be able to turn around in terms of the public reaction.
Interestingly enough, when Kennedy came on, he pointed out that Russia far wanted to continue their bombing for a while longer, that they were concerned that
It would look like we're concerned that we might be listening to the body because of the protest, rather than because they were coming down to the table.
Of course, they were reassured when they were appointed.
As Kennedy recognized, the district also recognized that Stuart's small base would not be worth quite in terms of the cost that it would entail as far as additional professional
All right.
uh, looking at all the, uh, protests, etc.
It's really, uh, I suppose rather, uh, to have had this happen.
It hasn't happened.
Very good.
It exposed people like Sexton, who jumped in immediately for the kill.
Uh, it exposed, uh, some of the other part of the Democrats,
The real problem we have now is how we can maintain the confidence of those negotiations that at least have a reasonable chance to proceed.
Uh, this witness has been insulting the Congress in the course of the war on race.
I mean, it takes quite a bit of good grace.
And I find out that the Congress has been insulting the Congress.
I remember when I called home, I saw some speech during this, uh, past my day of prison.
I received a broadcast from the Congress.
And on top of all these, I vote determination.
Of course, I was aware of the protest.
I've been through this before, and I was going to do it right.
I suppose the other point that's been made is that you have some belief in the needs of the president's company.
You hear the president go on and reassure them as to why we are doing the bombing so that they can know
This does show the need for more press appearances on television.
I think that's not my perspective.
Of course, I could care less, as I told
Meow.
NARA Description
On December 30, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:12 am and 10:54 am. The Camp David Hard Wire taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 237-048 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 237-48
Date: December 30, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:12 am and 10:54 am
Location: Camp David Hard Wire
The President dictated a memorandum for the file.
*****************************************************************
[Begin segment reviewed under deed of gift.]
Vietnam negotiations
-Announcement
-Suspension of bombing
-Resumption of negotiations
-Henry A. Kissinger
-Le Duc Tho
-Executive decisions
-Charles W. Colson
-John A. Scali
-Bombing
-Compared to May 8, 1972 decision
-Invasion
-Public support
-Henry A. Kissinger
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Scali
-May 8, 1972 decision
-Compared to Hanoi bombing
-Success
-Hindsight
-Laos
-Public perception
-21-
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Conversation No. 237-48 (cont’d)
-Announcement
-Public perception
-Press relations
-Congress
-Colson
-Scali
-U. Alexis Johnson
-Reaction to decision
-Public reaction
-Col. Richard T. Kennedy
-Soviet Union
-Reaction to public opinion
-Kissinger
-Opposition
-Australia
-Johnson protests over bombing
-William B. Saxby
-Wilbur D. Mills
-Edmund. S. Muskie
-Hubert A. Humphrey
-Success
-Congress
-Press relations
-Protests over bombing
-Gerald L. Warren
-The President’s reassurance
-Television [TV] appearance
-Kissinger
-Paris peace talks
-Colson
[End segment reviewed under deed of gift.]
*****************************************************************Also recorded on December 30, 1972
- 158-035 9:53 AM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson talked on the telephone at Camp David from 9:53 am to 10:02 am.
- 158-036 10:02 AM · 13 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:02 am and 10:04 am.
- 237-045 10:02 AM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:02 am and 10:04 am.
- 158-037 10:04 AM · 8 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at Camp David from 10:04 am to 10:12 am.
- 237-046 10:04 AM · 7 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 10:04 am to 10:12 am.
- 158-038 10:12 AM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:12 am and 10:54 am.
- 237-047 10:12 AM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and William Hirsch met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:12 am and 10:54 am.
- 237-049 10:15 AM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:15 am and 10:54 am.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 237-048, December 30, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/237-048 (accessed October 11, 2026).