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Conversation 246-029

TapeTape 246StartWednesday, April 7, 1971 at 5:22 PMEndWednesday, April 7, 1971 at 5:40 PMTape start time04:53:15Tape end time05:06:55ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to coordinate strategy ahead of the President's April 7, 1971, address regarding Vietnam policy and troop withdrawals. The discussion covered potential reactions from political figures, the management of congressional expectations, and the status of ongoing peace negotiations. Additionally, Kissinger briefed the President on intelligence suggesting North Vietnamese morale was declining, while they debated the risks of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's separate attempts to influence negotiation timelines.

Vietnam WarTroop withdrawalsNegotiationsForeign policyPublic relationsHenry KissingerMelvin Laird
AudioNARA Description

On April 7, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 5:22 pm to 5:40 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 246-029 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 246-029

Date: April 7, 1971
Time: 5:22 pm - 5:40 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger

     Cabinet
          -President’s conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
               -Kissinger’s reaction
               -William P. Rogers’ calls
               -President’s schedule
                     -Phone calls after speech, April 7, 1971

     Vietnam
          -Negotiations
              -Melvin R. Laird
              -Cease fire
              -Troop withdrawals

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-015. Segment declassified on 01/10/2018. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[246-029-w001]
[Duration: 55s]

       Vietnam
              -Negotiations
                     -Henry A. Kissinger’s conversation with John N. Mitchell

                                -Robert O. Anderson from New Mexico
                                       -Negotiations with Algeria
                                       -Open negotiations with Hanoi
                                              -Nicolae Ceausescu
                                       -Open channels
                                       -Vietnamese and Algerians

******************************************************************************

     Vietnam
          -Negotiations
               -Robert O. Anderson’s views regarding North Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese morale
          -Congress
               -[Thomas] Hale Boggs
          -Negotiations
               -Anderson
               -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
               -Timing
          -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
               -Laird
               -President’s options
               -Possible actions

An unknown man entered at an unknown time after 4:30 pm

     [Unintelligible]

The unknown man left at an unknown time before 5:40 pm

     President’s forthcoming speech, April 7, 1971
           -Kissinger’s calls to Ronald W. Reagan, William F. Buckley, Jr.
           -Possible reaction
           -Possible calls
                 -Reagan, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Cabinet
                 -Congress
                 -John B. Connally

     Vietnam
          -Policy
                -Donald H. Rumsfeld’s comments to Haldeman in staff meeting, April 7, 1971
                -General Nguyen Van Thieu
                -Troop withdrawals
                -Timing
                -Thieu’s forthcoming election
                -Troop withdrawals
                      -Terminal date
                      -Residual force
          -Negotiations
                -United States’ policy
                      -Prisoners of war
                      -Timing
          -Military activity
                -Bombing
                -President’s options
          -President’s forthcoming briefing of Congressmen
          -President’s forthcoming speech, April 7, 1971

Kissinger left at 5:40 pm
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Oh, I was talking to Bob, but I was telling him your reaction to the captain.
I'm going to wish you luck.
It's hard, you know what I'm talking about, but we've gone through a lot of extensions here, and I'm a little bit worried about some of the things that I was concerned about in the beginning.
It isn't, the point is that it isn't that they, I didn't summon any of these people, they just should, or can arrest, but it is a good all-in-one, it isn't that I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I,
I don't want to know that I know him.
It was the last time.
One of the last times.
I don't want to hear that kind of crap.
I don't want to hear that kind of crap.
I don't want to hear that kind of crap.
beyond the uh
And then it created the establishment of the Dillons and the, you know, the Meyers.
Well, that doesn't make any difference.
You're the president.
That's what some of us made.
In Britain, it would be different.
The Prime Minister at the moment of national tragedy, they couldn't count that the establishment would be there.
Best, Mr. President, for this meeting with the leaders tonight.
I will not make any further hints about negotiations.
Also, I'm a little worried, in fact, already, about Laird.
Laird.
By saying, see, you know, Laird's latest pick is he wants to be the guy who has the negotiations started again.
I think what I was going to say is...
Well, you said cease fires and troop control, but I don't.
I'll touch it up and say you might be a focus on this.
But I wouldn't make any good of it.
No, I won't.
One interesting piece of information, John Mitchell told me that the Abediners, the good ones, were actually from New Mexico.
They were negotiating in Algiers with the Algiers about two months ago.
Yeah, that had been very interesting.
They'd been opening negotiations with one or two out there, which was quite interesting.
I'll tell you what, it just went down that road once.
Yeah, it went down quite a bit.
He asked me whether we wanted to pass any message back.
And I told him, no, they needed to channel it.
Yeah.
That's what I was talking about.
Yeah.
Anderson was again in our area without really confessing back, of course, you know, that's what he said.
There was no further message from the Vietnamese at the outskirts.
They were in a state of stress.
That the Vietnamese are in bad trouble.
At least for Central, they are so reluctant to accept these fires because they have literally troubles.
Even they do this firing at home, and the sailors are firing at the other side.
He thinks that all humans are in very bad shape, and he does not know yet what that means.
I don't know if it's a terrible disease or not, but I think that what you know is the breadth of the disease.
I hope it is the opposite story, that they are shapeable.
We do have some issues in common.
That indicates the morale trouble.
It indicates, you know, the casualty of the woodcutter.
So...
I cannot believe, after the years with the treatment, they checked it out over two or three years.
I think that's why they said that he would be asking me to speak to him for a message.
I think that's why the middle of the man is like this.
It's like the end of the man is like this.
It's like the end of the man is like this.
This is going to hold.
This stage, if not tomorrow, holds until the end of May.
I'd call that an April to May.
April to May.
We've got two months.
Well, we'll stir it a little bit more.
We've got to stir it.
Well, you know, it'll kind of just hang.
The mail layers are trying to hang something from the Missouri draft bill or something.
They do what they do, but it's all right.
I'm going to just hang money.
This is the best I can.
Thank you.
And he said, he wasn't worried.
He didn't care.
I picked him up.
He said, why don't you do this?
And I said, why don't you do this?
The whole question.
They like it fun.
They don't like it fun.
I'm not going to lie to them.
I'm not going to listen to them.
I'm just going to take the message.
I'm not going to be able to.
I can't believe it.
That's what I'm going to do.
I'm going to be ready to rock and roll with anybody who wants to come.
If they happen to call me, I'm sorry.
... ... ... ... ...
Congress, or they're all the other comments that I've heard around, you know, we're the only ones who are right, we're the only ones who are wrong.
It's a heaven to the children.
Well, it is true.
We are good people.
And I'm able to comment on that.
Oh yeah, I don't think so.
But I mean, but among the people who are focused, and they don't have a program, I don't know whether Bob told you about that or not.
No matter what I say, explaining to your mother, you don't have to tell that to your mother again.
But then, I'll tell you what you want the president to do.
You know, he kept saying how hard it is to make a difference in Oregon, and I suppose he's much smarter than me.
I don't know what he wants to do.
He increases the rate of withdrawal.
He's still in the same place.
The difference, in fact, is only a few months.
What do you want them to do?
You know, if you don't discover them, you're going down through the system.
But what do you really want to determine today?
You didn't have to come to say, well, or say when, or when.
But that's the problem with the opposition.
They don't have any alternatives.
I don't know that well that you would go from day to day to be so different.
I mean, it's different at the end of the year.
There's several words in there.
We'll be out again next year.
We'll be out again this year.
We'll be out again next year.
We'll be out again next year.
We'll be out again next year.
that we can't settle this one.
I don't know about you, but you can go to .
But it's your .
It's not an election .
Well, then we have a long ahead.
Then we start debating about the date.
Terminal date and the residual force.
And we'll say, all right, that's what we're going to do.
That's the plan.
Whack.
We checked out the average rate by 20% by just moving it up one month.
We don't have an .
We have to.
Yeah, but you understand very well, then, in reverse, that he's going to get back to the person.
And that is, by early November, they're going to be not about them anymore.
They're negotiating about it.
That's the first thing you know about it.
So you spiral over.
It doesn't mean a whole lot.
They have to negotiate by the end of November.
By the beginning of November, then we know who the other person is.
The bottom of the tank is better, by the way, so it doesn't dissipate.
The bottom of the tank is a different thing.
It's not a big deal.
It's a little ray.
It's a little ray.
It's a little ray.
It's a little ray.
It's a little ray.
It's a little ray.
Today, uh, it's not in good shape, but Mr. Bloddick wants to see you.
I've been over to the same hall again, but I'm home.
You get it.
But with the congressmen, I will get into the details of negotiating the middle.
But I think it's a great feat, Mr. President, that it's such a country that you're going to serve it.
I know it will do that.
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