On April 7, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 7:59 pm and 8:15 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 246-038 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Over the past several weeks, you have heard a number of reports that the U.S. is in a situation of self-destruction.
I have decided to increase the rate of American troop control to greater than 11 percent.
I'm going into details.
I would like to introduce briefly what I found when I came to the office.
The progress we've made today in producing American portions.
I am able to announce a stepped-up withdrawal without jeopardizing our remaining portions of Vietnam.
Today, too, our ultimate goal is attending American involvement in a way that will increase the chances of Alaska's peace.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
There were no American combat forces in Vietnam.
And they killed in combat.
In the present day, two years later, there were 540,000 Americans in Vietnam.
10,000 in Vietnam.
300 Americans in Vietnam.
The French planned to end the United States in 2004.
But they had to plan to train and equip the South Vietnamese.
To draw American forces.
To end American involvement in the war, it is the students of South Korea that needs to develop the capacity to defend their country against crime and suppression.
Mr. Chairman, you can see how our plan has succeeded.
In 1969, an announcement was made for all the 1,500 men.
In September, 40,000 men.
In December, 50,000.
In April, 9,700, 169.
In the next month, we will have brought home more than 265,000 Americans.
Almost half of the truth is now in the United States.
The education of the farmers was made to reduce the American casualties.
The Israelis were five times as great in the first three months of 1969 as the Israelis in 1971.
The Vietnamese casualties were also not significant in the past few years.
The Americans had died in the combat as well.
There was no American fighting and dying in any place in the world.
The decision I made in the past, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made now, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the decision I made in the future, and the
American troops were out of Camp Bolivia in 60 days, by the first day of the week.
The cataclysm did not rise after Camp Bolivia.
They were cut in half.
American troops, after all, were not hauled under their legs.
They continued in an insaturated pace.
In terms of the Laotian operation, on the day of the assault on the two ground forces of the American air support, the South Vietnamese troops had been visiting Laotian territory for six years to attack American and allied forces in Laotia.
The completion of that operation has been a great deal of understandable speculation as to whether it was a success or failure.
But what is important is not the instant analysis of the moment, but what happens in the future.
The completion operation contributed to the goals we saw.
It has completed my assessment of the operation and my conclusions.
The South Vietnamese demonstrated that without American advisers, they could fight effectively against the best troops north of Vietnam in the field.
The Vietnamese suffered in the Cachus.
By the most conservative estimates, the Cachus suffered early on in the war.
But most important, the disruption of enemy supply lines, the consumption of ammunition and arms in the battle, has been even more damaging to the capability of the North Vietnamese to sustain major offenses in South Vietnam.
than were the operations in Cambodia 10 months ago.
I can't report that Vietnamization has succeeded.
We have restrained the South Vietnamese because of the success of the Cambodia operation.
Because of the achievements of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos, I am announcing an increase in the way that America is growing.
On December 1 of this year, 100,000 more American troops will be brought home to South Vietnam.
This would make a total of $365,000.
$365,000.
$365,000.