President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and H. R. Haldeman met to strategize the opening of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), focusing on the logistics of a secret emissary mission to arrange a potential presidential summit. They debated the merits of using public versus private envoys, ultimately favoring a clandestine approach to maintain leverage and control over sensitive issues like Taiwan and the Vietnam War. The President emphasized his desire to manage these negotiations personally through Kissinger to ensure the initiative remained under strict White House control rather than through the State Department.
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I think it's inflationary, so... Well, it must be a thing of looking forward if you're tolerating the charges.
I mean, if you're going to fly out on a...
Oh, you have to make a stop.
but I'm just thinking that's just great.
I just don't know if it'll be as done in class, but that's why I was thinking about the way it's doing it.
It's just keeping the money good in time.
It's just, the, I began listening to this movie when I was a student, when I was a student, I wanted to know, I wanted to know if it was being automated or not.
And I said to him that he should let the audience know the Chinese.
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
You know what I'm saying?
You can't just about everything that you say.
You know what I mean, guys?
You can't just about everything that you say.
You know what I mean, guys?
You can't just about everything that you say.
... ... ...
... ... ... ...
It had nothing to do with the Chinese, except the President has been really, in many sense, negotiating with you, even though I'm questioning who he trusts more, doesn't he?
That's who it all is.
And, uh, since that's all, then, you could promise me that you would resign right away.
The only thing is that I don't think that's what you want to do.
Is that it?
I don't see where the chance is.
But that makes a big difference.
We can't not try.
See how we can front about bureaucracy.
If we want a deal, we can.
So the negotiations start in the context of the negotiation.
And because I told him, I said, Robert, you don't sign the letter.
You're not a family in Vienna, which is where we want to put you anyway.
The letter says you should negotiate in Vienna with the presidential congressman.
I don't see how you will be the presidential candidate, Mr. President.
The debate is going to be in a little bit later on.
I don't know what you think, though, Mr. President.
Your friends and colleagues have pled for it.
In return, we're keeping what they've already got.
And then we have to build one more thing.
And build one more thing.
I think we're better off if that, if we decide on that imbalance.
Because I didn't know each other since I talked to you the other day.
I like it.
I like it.
I'm glad you said no.
I'm glad you said no.
I'm glad you said no.
Check my boy, you're really game.
if that is the case out of our ATM, and they should set up an agreement on their part to agree with all that's in this.
Even though we didn't hear from them, it's weird.
It's undoubtedly weird.
It is weird.
But I mean, it's worth the ATM.
You could justify it.
That's my point.
Here they are.
They're ahead.
If you were a cheap politician,
I think it will help you in the long run.
It is very important.
It takes me to the Pakistan Basin for this.
It is very important.
Can you realize the significance of this?
And I expect that I will always be doing underestimation.
And I think I should be saying that I spent a sleepless night
to try and see how I could help you.
I'll give you his statement.
Oh, yeah.
He says, I don't know where he got that.
He said, large and costly.
He said, rules has the disadvantage that he's involved in.
It's a very nice one.
What rules?
He said, I should go.
True.
uh, my whole turn to is, he doesn't think that it's so, that it would be an argument against him, like, uh, I would, my answer would be, since this check is so, if we have to go to a grove, he's, he would have an argument as well.
And you've really come to the point that you do that, and you've got to understand, you didn't make him rock hard enough.
And that I would love to recommend to him,
Advantage is high visibility.
One step away from the government.
One step away from the government.
Nobody can really take the grumble and deep ditch, but nevertheless, and control the visibility.
Negotiate, but let's move on.
This is an advantage.
You just won't probably have to negotiate, rather than...
There's one problem with the Rockefeller ads.
You may not know the truth, but...
Well, I can't play him.
I don't get consent anyway.
I mean, the guy, like you said, is home.
But the way you can do that is simply say,
on the ground.
What is it?
See, for the best sake, what we shouldn't have...
There's no doubt about it.
Also, if we announce the purpose, it shouldn't be to work out a visit.
The purpose is to have an emissary to discuss problems.
And out of that, the visit should come as a sensation.
I think they're going to bomb.
I'm sure of it.
You've got to deal with the Russians.
The Russians have almost too much trouble.
As far as Saul is concerned, his dad, the Russians, let us suppose that they come back.
Saul gets signed.
It's impossible.
I did the brain and race on it today, and it just didn't break back into it, and I said, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know,
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
That just came out of my mouth very loud.
So that's my voice.
My voice is just better than what we were talking about in the past.
It's the best I've thought of.
It's the best I've thought of.
It's the best I've thought of.
It's the best I've thought of.
I really think he could do it.
I mean, I really think if we could get them to take him, then we could do it.
He could do it.
That isn't the worst part.
The worst part is that he could join the Vietnam Liberation Army.
I don't know if he could do it.
I don't know if he could do it.
I don't know if he could do it.
I don't know if he could do it.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
He said, if you're looking for China to be a constructive country, you don't need to be embedded in the way.
That says that the people there, you can imagine what they're not going to do.
How about one thing?
Well, the price for us is worth it for everything.
The price is worth one thing if you do it, because you are a tough play.
They all know that.
I think the funny thing about this show is that we have Henry Hubbard involved in it.
And there's Noah, who's a great person.
Of course, he's one of the channel hosts.
And the way the flag goes to open the check for the hustle, the way it goes, they want to, you know,
Now that's a perfect position.
I'm going to say one.
I'm not going to say any more than that.
That sounds good.
So long, Chief.
I'm going to, but I'm trying to go for it with this one.
I think I will go for it.
I accept the one thing that they ask about a problem and I'm simply going to brush it off by saying that of course people may not agree with that.
I don't think I'll go on and go into a white towel pile on the very members of the United Nations and all that stuff.
As far as you know, I'm not going to speculate about all those problems.
I think that's the best thing to say.
Because we're not used to
They know damn well we've got to save that much Chinese money.
That's bullshit.
It's a part of our social security.
We're not going to talk about any China policy.
We're not going to talk about any China policy.
We're not going to talk about any China policy.
We're not going to talk about any China policy.
I think it's good to know about this.
In China, policy is not going to happen.
We are better at planning our activities.
You have to get into action.
That policy is going to have us in a confrontation with China every year.
If we did that, that's a good thing.
More market value to stick with that policy.
We could have a double change.
That would be a game-changer.
That's what's going to happen now.
Sure, but you see, if you take good time, well, I mean, I may have to go all the way.
But you have to be realistic.
Without ourselves getting along, it's still considered an important question.
You always consider that.
It's not an issue.
You don't have to make the move.
We don't have to tell anybody in the state.
We'll send another message to China.
It's going to be delayed, so we'll decide when it goes.
It's a business.
Our experience with the state has to be that anything they know is true.
Well, the main point is that we still have to go.
We just move ahead, and then we'll come back
My recommendation, incidentally, is editing.
That's the way to work out the techniques of editing.
We have to communicate the travel of the video.
But that's my understanding.
I really prefer Bruce to many of the people, but the only disadvantage is I don't know whether they take him.
But if they don't take him, it would take four weeks.
And if they have a debate about it, it would be best not to do something that they think is true.
Bruce, we're in retirement.
He'd be the ideal.
He's not such an ass.
I think of
It's just, I don't know, that didn't matter to me.
I, uh, I don't think it's important for you to talk about it.
I don't think it's important at all.
Well, I think it's more important for you to talk about it.
I don't think it's important for you to talk about it.
I don't think it's important for you to talk about it.
The only one who really has the character to do it, all of them, all of them, doesn't necessarily have to do it.
You know, she's got this mind.
She's got this mind.
She's got this mind.
She's got this mind.
She's got this mind.
She's got this mind.
She's got this mind.
You make problems with the best in the world.
And everybody says, you're probably serious when you're all about China.
Listen, I like China.
They are the best.
They're better.
They make me feel uncertain about the way I know them.
I'm Nelson.
I love to talk to them.
Thank you, brother.
You're welcome.
You're welcome to be in the program.
That's fine.
I'm just not sure.
You're welcome on the session to be in the program.
I'll see if it gets over there.
He's smart enough to shut up when he's supposed to, but it's not what he gets.
I don't know what the hell they're trying to accomplish.
They say, well, it's something that's going to take a long time.
He's trying to put us in touch with the Vietnamese.
and they look at it and talk about it, and after six weeks they say yes, but after four weeks they'll say no.
That's what motorists do.
How about pulling groups out of Paris?
No, no, no.
They just give it up now.
That's the best way.
Well, in the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state
Yeah, we do.
It's stupid.
Oh, is it?
Oh, it is.
It says something about that.
Really?
Christ sakes.
I can take back my years of your life and make it end now.
Very good.
What is it?
The one-sided mission, basically.
They've got that, but I can't think of anybody.
I mean, you know, we're seven people in the nation.
Who's going to do it?
Who's going to do it?
You're right.
Nelson, maybe, I just don't know whether he's got the, you know what I mean, there's so much writing on it.
He's over and screwed up.
That would have an enormous impact.
What worries me, he might do it if he could write his first book.
If he had to write the first book, I'd make sure.
That's the best man in the whole world.
Yeah, and Nelson would.
to seize the opportunity to rush around and kiss Chinese bait.
Now, that we can keep.
That I'm not worried about.
What worries me is the point you made.
Supposing they pick up, supposing they throw him a hooker, and it sounds reasonable to them, since he doesn't know many of the other negotiators, and he can't burn the plant, you know.
If that's not the kind of deal he wants, they all change themselves.
It turns out that that's something that's been around for hundreds of years.
Throwing a hooker on the deal is not negotiable.
I don't want you to rule out.
I know that it seems impossible.
It seems impossible.
It's a greater risk.
It's impossible.
It's impossible.
It's impossible.
It's impossible.
It's impossible.
It's impossible.
It's impossible.
and then having me go.
You just, you know what I mean?
You set up the time table and all that sort of thing, but it's, uh, there's no problem.
I mean, we won't just let you go.
Oh, we will, but, you know, without fully understanding, which is what I'm trying to say to you.
That I'm going to go.
My point is that, you see, the thing... Well, that may be a way to sell them Bruce.
We could tell them.
I mean, we could sell them Bruce.
There are some displaces of saying...
The president was wrong.
No.
We could say Bruce.
We can't say Bruce.
There are two people whom we are prepared to let go.
Kissinger, who cannot go to P.K.
for many years.
But he was willing to meet any person who designated him.
Secretly, in any...
Mutually...
In any...
In any...
In any...
In any...
In any...
In any...
that would be in favor of Bruce, the advocate to the credit.
He would also be in power to discuss that.
Well, then we should imagine for Bruce that Bruce would be the advocate to the credit.
We can play it in terms of you offering him the legal he wanted to, so that he would offer a private visit, a private visit where Jim would sit down with the federal representative to discuss
the official modalities of a presidential visit.
But with a high-ranking person.
And he would go to what?
Go around Indiana.
I think that's a nice thing to do.
I guess it's hotter in Carolina, too.
Oh, for me to do that, you'd have to send me to Vietnam.
And then to go on the way back, stop in Delhi, and all those people there.
It's going to work out.
the way to raise it would be to say this way to settle these issues for the president of the federal government requires that the parents of the traditional presidents which have been received
which the President of the United States will not be pleased to see, but is usually believed to play a child.
For example, I will pin him, or any other person, not to teach him.
But if we prepare to send a secret emissary to him, the public emissary in his head is to teach him.
And the best man, he has his rules, but they will not mention to the President of the United States.
And they can either be secretive in the presence of the public, or lose public authority.
I just think it is bad national policy, Mr. President, to have the president go down.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
I get you.
I see your point.
Yeah, my visit would have to come next spring.
I agree.
So that is the problem, and that is the problem, and that is that we then do not use this occasion for the big flood.
We do not use it for the occasion of stopping the goddamn war.
Oh, yes.
You would require the meeting.
Certainly.
I would tell the foreign minister, the president, and I don't know how much I know, honestly, that the president would be prepared to discuss it.
I want to move under the general opinion that the idea comes to us that there's not a good country, a country that is giving, which is supporting, and we must get it settled.
That's why we wanted to meet with you today.
And I hope that you will be able to get in touch with, for example, with...
Another advantage of my meeting with them anywhere at hand is that I could have covered which politicians they must be seeing.
These guys, they have a much greater advantage.
These guys are pros.
You don't have to feed it on the bush and that.
I don't think the public, I don't think they're awkward with Bruce.
I think the best way to do it is to say, look, we're going to have a presidential visit.
We'd like to have a, I'll send my top man, but to arrange that visit, don't talk about the time, but to arrange that visit, I'm prepared to send Dr. Kissinger right away.
They can send a man of equal rank, with full power, to discuss the problems.
for problems, and that they can meet with you, and you're prepared to meet with them, and if not, it's a double A.
Then, the logic of how to do that would be, if you go from, go to Midway, no, you don't need to wait to do that.
You just go right on around with, right after you go to Paris, you just might look all over the world, and there would be a Vietnam going on all over the world.
Now, what is the disadvantage, you see, of a personal MSM?
I know, I know.
Henry, Henry, let me say, there is a risk.
Yeah, yeah.
They're scared of the Russians.
It's got to be it.
The Russians.
The way they put it to them was loud.
They knew that it was.
And they were afraid of the fact.
It's not a great advantage, not to do with publication.
They're not guilty of it, it is a noun.
They can do leashes and flies and jacks.
No, actually, that's the most insidious way of doing it.
There he is.
And actually, I don't want to put my own voice, but I happen to be the only one who knows all the negotiations.
Okay, well, fine.
I know that.
Nobody else can really handle it.
Bruce could.
If he had time for training.
But in your case, I think that the idea of a secret meeting, that you think the meeting should be done at Browell County, but the idea being, but the way I would do it in order to freeze it was telling me, you know, it's going too long in the answer.
And we might get it a week.
so that we get this thing rolling.
Physically possible.
I'll answer to that.
If we think, we think of the way.
In other words, Henry, let's not let time waste too long.
No, no, no.
Now that we've got the formula, we can give it to them.
We just mustn't do it all that fast.
No, no, no.
But you could do it next week.
As soon as you're back, let me be back.
It depends whether we get it right or not.
Yeah, all right.
Here's what I was thinking.
Oh, you could do it.
I think this is clearly the answer.
You see, look, you can't get amateurs in a game of disappointment.
That's the trouble with Rockefeller.
God damn it.
He's got his money, but he's an amateur.
You know, Jesus Christ, I could wrap Rockefeller around my finger.
You'll never know him.
You know it, too.
He just isn't in the game.
He's fine, he's tough, and all that.
But if he didn't have that billion dollars, you know,
He wouldn't be much more than a person.
He's a good leader, but he doesn't have the subtlety of moving around.
He's the kind of a guy also that wants to make a quick shot.
Dramatic, you know, let's do something bold.
Now, God damn it, we want to do something bold, but we don't want to fall in on doing it.
You can do it.
The best thing, the best thing to do, really, is this.
We set up a secret association.
But the way I would start a telegram was I said,
The President has said that he would like to arrange a visit to D.K.
He believes that he would like to come to D.K.
He thinks, however, the best way to arrange it must be arranged at the highest level.
The agenda, the modalities, et cetera, should be arranged by Dr. Kissinger and whatever.
And the circumstances to make it possible.
And the circumstances
there must be certain circumstances that must do, and he would suggest a meeting, and so on and so forth.
After that meeting, the time of the visit could be agreed, and also the agenda, et cetera, et cetera.
In other words, talk about agenda and that sort of thing.
I think, actually, with that, I think what we ought to say is
He does not believe that there should be a public that we should send an F. He doesn't believe this can be handled at the emissary level.
You realize the announcement of the fact that we could bring it down there?
I would call the press conference.
I'd ask, and I'd say, I'd walk in, and I'd say, I'd walk out, and
No, I wouldn't let this be handled.
You know, that's one thing where some of the... What did you do at the press conference?
Oh, hell with the press conference.
Why let them piss all over me?
Yeah, yeah.
I just talked to, I just talked to Oral Olson.
He's perjured himself.
He's worked with the television coverage for the last, I believe, six or seven years.
He's been working with the television coverage for the last six or seven years.
Oral Olson.
I think though that we have a better than that is the better scheme now they come back and say that they may come back and say they want a public business
You're not giving them any timing for all they know you may be doing.
They don't want you in August.
They're so scared of the Russians that they'll have a lot better of having you visit next May or April.
And keeping it hanging and daring the Russians to attack them with the president who visited you.
That's what I think they want.
I do not believe they want you now.
It would be too quick a turn around for us.
I just said, Jim, that once you've announced it, you get this one.
I believe it's all yours.
Nobody can screw you up.
Well, if you could still do that, you see, the advantage of my doing is to tell them, I chose to tell them there may be a run, so that no one could get a draft of it.
It's going to be very hard.
All right.
I think that's the better scheme.
It gets Robert Mueller out of it, and it keeps Bruce out of it, and they don't have to tell the State Department anything.
I think that's the way it ought to be handled.
And also we can advise the beauty of these guys is they may not do it.
But I could just tell them, God damn it, no Manfield, no Scott, no nobody comes through.
The only thing is, the only thing is whether or not they would send anybody.
We're all going to be in that rank.
They could discuss something.
These guys, if they do it, it will be top class.
There's no doubt about it.
They're either too alive or, you might say, they're all going to wait a couple of days.
I don't know.
I don't do it.
I don't know if we should or will.
Will we?
I mean, it doesn't have to do with that.
I don't think that would be the point.
That warrant should signal that the seat present, the seat that's at the highest level.
You didn't say anything about that.
Tell Kendrick.
All right.
Work that out, Henry, but I'm only suggesting this.
He's got to have done many things.
I'm only saying that to him.
Yeah, of course.
Well, I don't know.
I suggest that you go catch the airplane, but I've got a suggestion.
I hope, I hope that time, time to get it over with.
We know what we want to do.
Let's don't fool around.
I'll do it.
in 10 days.
It'll take that long before they get it.
So it's the idea that they shouldn't have to see many American politicians.
We may have that problem on our hands.
There's another way.
They're going to take Mansfield and all the other clowns.
They may take him and give him a tour of China.
So Mr. President, you get us on this meeting.
Thank you.
What we are praying for basically is a Chinese summit.
That's my point with me.
That is the big play.
Now, that's only, that's half of all.
The other part of the play is to do something about this war.
That's the other half of it.
It was that, I think, these guys in 54, they needed peace, and they settled in on that.
They need peace now.
It's got to affect the North.
It's the one advantage of a public emissary.
Don't come around.
We've decided it anyway.
No, no.
I think this is better because after I've met with them, we can announce it within a month.
Well, if they want a public emissary after that, you can make it up.
You can send one.
Yeah, we can.
For cosmetics.
We can send an in-carriage of that.
Yeah.
You can say this, that we ought to have the first meeting should be...
I'll tell you, I've got a better idea.
Let me...
The first meeting should be, if you would like to meet with the president, if you'd like to talk to Manelli and so forth.
Also, we can also discuss whether or not there should be another envoy prior to the presidential election on a public basis.
And you work that out at the same time in the event they also want that.
Fair enough?
In other words, give them the whole bag and take them.
The point being that our answer is that you've got to discuss it.
But tell them, sure, in other words, don't turn down their proposition.
Say, that's fine.
We're willing to consider both the presidential visit and the end point.
But this is a matter that you want to discuss, that you'll be involved in, and that you say that you cannot come to be king at this time.
Okay, goodbye.
Have a good time.
that Pakistan ambassador said he had no other possibility.
And he also said, I could go.
I thought I'd be the best man who could go simultaneously, but the disadvantage of it is it's almost like the president going to the door and shouting through the door rather than going all the way in.
And it's too dramatic.
No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
Henry, it's a hell of a lot more, believe me,
It's a bigger bang for you than it was for Rogers to go home to.
Jesus Christ.
I mean, sure, it's a lot of cosmetics, but they know where the power is.
And that's why you can't go.
You can't go if you can't.
And thus we have decided that that's what we want to do.
I think it's important, frankly, I think it's important that I talk to them because I'm the only one who knows all this.
We know that.
But I think the secret of his ideals
Then we can set up any eye watch we want.
We can send rules to Murphy or anybody after that if they want a public plan.
In degree.
But that depends how it would go.
They may not agree to settle the Vietnam War.
But they may never let settle.
Well, let me say, before I get there, say the war has to be pretty well settled.
And I just simply say, gentlemen, we can't come there until we have some idea that there must be, that the fact must be known in the United States that the war is settled, and I can't come to China before that.
I'll just say, how do you think we're going to do it?
I can't say.
We'll find ways, Bill.
In the meantime, having gotten to this point, Mr. President, you know, kind of,
Of course, you want to... That's right.
You want to... We're going to get some of the Russians who were wrong.
I'm not so sure if we want to do that.
That's right.
My instinct tells me they're going to get dissolved in the summit.
I'll get their choices.
Once we get out there, they're going to go.
We're here to work, isn't it?
You're going to get us the, you know, draft piece after July 1st, maybe.
You're trying like hell to get the, we'll have a little statement on prisoners of war that Bruce will make tomorrow.
You're making that good.
All right.
Go on.
I'll be talking to you about the other one.
Unless you've got something else.
This is a press conference, isn't it?
I'm not even going to come out against homosexuals, no.
I need them all.
Any day, sure.
Well, the whole world now is
I just can't do it.
I think you've got to make the change.
You've got to put Elliot Richardson in.
You can't screw around with Nelson Rockefeller or anybody else.
You've got to have a pure mechanic in there who will run the department the way you want to run it.
I don't think so.
Well, I'm sure you can, but I'm not sure you want to.
He's good where he is.
I think you're going to make the... Well, he sure as hell will.
How do you handle the Rogers thing?
Yep.
Henry and so forth.
It's a very, all this delicate balancing thing that's clear that there can't be two people who want to simply build up here, that Henry is just essentially the state.
And it doesn't recognize it.
And it doesn't recognize it, so they're cutting.
The state's got to be run by a mechanic rather than by a, I think you've got to downplay Richardson a little bit.
to build up Rogers' ego.
He can't have a tough, you know, fun.
I don't know how he's got Rogers' league without horrible errors and so forth.
That's the problem.
He has to do it on his initiative.
He does it on the basis that he's preserved peace in the Middle East and he thinks things are going to go fine there and he's now got negotiations going and he's got everything going with Russia and he's accomplished what he really set out to do at the State Department and he told you all along that
and would be able to stay beyond the first term, and that he needs to get back to private practice.
He's always just a guy to be understanding.
There's been some, he indicated, apparently the rest of them did.
I mean, that would astonish me.
I think he likes money too well.
Well, except he may have enough.
He may have only what he's got enough.
Pretty corporately bad for Paul, but he likes Warren very, very much.
He's a good guy.
He's a good guy.
That would be the neatest thing.
That would be the neatest thing.
That would be the neatest thing.
That would be the neatest thing.
Bernie Goldberg went to Tennessee and announced he was going to launch the TVA.
St. Peter's Group is saying he's going to get rid of Social Security.
I wonder if any of the press took him online.
Yeah.
They were, you know, Mark and Cal were commenting on him.
Basically, it was rather odd that the CEO was just formed to meet the menace of China.
It's an indication of whether it was the right thing to do or the wrong thing to do.
Of course, he wasn't doing it without anybody knowing him.
And on that one, by the gosh, Bill Rogers knows very well where it all started.
I started him along.
He started shooting.
Joe Schultz says it's important to see him on the minimum wage question.
After you see Dr. Ryan.
No, I can't see him until then.
Because he's got a decision he has, but it's a decision I don't understand how.
No, no, I asked Patrick to answer.
No, no, well, I don't.
Listen, I don't want to answer.
I'm not going to answer that question.
What I meant is that I don't want to hang around George if I wasn't afraid to see him on the minimum wage question.
I mean, it's a decision they have to do tomorrow.
How does he testify?
I don't know.
He's busy with it now.
He wouldn't be ready himself for half an hour.
I won't be ready at all, so that's too bad.
He doesn't mean it.
He could be tied up after the doctor leaves.
I am tied up.
I am my brief.
Which way does he come out?
The whole point is this, about the main.
You are to find out from Schultz whether or not the purpose of this is to tell somebody who says it's not a testimony of mine.
If that's the case, then of course I have to see it.
But he wants to get with me about the minimum wage.
I'm not going to make a minimum wage decision because I've got a press conference.
I'll dodge it.
Sir, this is what happens here.
I ask Buchanan for the answer to this.
Buchanan calls Chelsea to discuss it with him, and Chelsea has to come to the press conference.
I go, I go, well, that's the way it always works, and they don't have to do that.
They ought to just give Buchanan the facts, and he can make up a hell of a lot better answer than George Hillary.
I understand.
I understand.
That's not the way.
Just say it.
That's what I think is the right thing to say.
will testify as the administration's position, or will present the administration's position on the issue.
That will be put out of our consideration.
That's the way I think it ought to be answered, and I think it ought to be answered that way yesterday and today, but maybe Hudson to see his off on it.
Now, you call me back on it once you find out.
I think on the Rogers thing, that you think Laird about him.
He can't oppose, and I think he can control Laird.
In a lot of ways, much better than Dan Rodgers.
Laird has less problems anyway in his area.
He has a much better hook on Laird because he knows, presumably, he wants to go back and run for governor.
That's the story now.
And that's his way of accomplishing.
But if that's what he wants to do, he's got to play along.
He can't get across the line.
You've got to have a true limit.
Where if Rodgers wants to just go back to private practice, you've got to have a true limit at all.
I think he thinks he's doing the right thing.
He rationalizes all these things out for himself.
But it always serves him.
And it's all where he serves us, in my opinion.
I should agree.
And all these kind of folks, when he comes back, he always is a damn smart lawyer.
He always has a good answer, but then you can always get around and find out, you know, and you can do it with that answer.
So it bolstered off.
I said, don't get too excited.
I don't understand.
And I said, well, I'm going to have to do this.
And I said, well, that's fine.
It didn't allow us to do it.
And all the rest of them, I said, I'm just going to let you know about it.
And I said, well, I'm going to have to do this.
And I said, well, I'm going to have to do this.
So he called around the country and said, well, hey, there's shares in around the country.
They're not as disturbed as I am.
They aren't at all.
He did a pretty good check around the country and got exactly the reading that everybody else gets from around the country.
There's nobody who knows, who cares about the debt.
Except the Tibetans think that.
Some, some.
I say this about, I really think the network thing is just impossible.
All we can do is try to get on on ourselves.
One, two, three.
Get on and screw them every time we can.
I think for that reason, one thing we do, we've got to get Agnew, keep Agnew off of those.
That's where Agnew would be with Scali.
Every time he's like, attacks of same-the-media are bad, that's right.
If he wants to hit specific lives, that's fine.
CBS is selling the Pentagon.
Sure, hit that.
If it was bad, they want a bad one because it was a good one to hit.
Not just to say the media does everything wrong.
Because they don't do everything wrong.
They don't host everything wrong.
You know, and like the way I handled the editors, more of the sorrow than the anger.
Everybody knew that I felt they were lousy bunch of bastards.
But I said it nicely.
Remember, I laughed at all.
I said, well, I expressed my views about you in 62, and I'm not done doing it again.
And there it is.
Right.
There it is.
You get it.
You get it.
You get it.
You get it.
That's the other problem, right?
That's the problem, right?
What do you think?
I have no problem with Connor Hill with the trolls.
Because, basically, he's so smart and tough and, frankly, honest.
In order to use an honest man...
He isn't as devious as Robert.
Bill will go around with him.
And God damn it, with Tom, he'll come in, he'll blow his head off.
He'll say, I don't think you did that well, or this well, or I like this, I didn't like that, and so forth.
That's all right.
I can do that, but somebody who's basically an equal, there's no problem.
I should have been with others.
And you can't do that, because otherwise you're going to have every little boy around this shop here running in saying, well, I didn't put it on the phone.
You just don't do that.
It's good to have a guy like Connie that we came to meet just fine.
See, in this China thing, it's ridiculous for me to be worried about whether Kissinger goes over there.
Maybe it's the best time to go.
God, how many are gone?
Well, that's good.
Henry says, if Elliot were secretary of state, I'll just call up Elliot and say, I'll send Henry over to Elliot and say, fine, I'll go out and announce it.
Then he'd go out on the TV and say, I've suggested to the president to send Dr. Kissinger over to work this out.
The doctor is better at
I'd rather have a private team than a public commissary at all.
The public commissary is going to take a lot of that cream off the game, right?
The first bang for the wall is going to be the guy who gets there.
He's going to get enormous publicity.
The second one is that he ought to be private.
And then I am told that I'm still not going to feel as strong as he does, but you wait until the spring.
I don't know, sir.
That's the right way to go.
Well, if they've been to the water, well, our cooperation, that's all.
That's the reason why I say they have a connection to Vietnam and those messages.
That's the odd thing.
So it means, well, the odd thing.
I'm not putting that as a condition.
I'm not putting that as a concern.
If you say Vietnam is our condition, Taiwan is their condition.
That's right.
Well, I'll be back.
No, I won't be back for a few more days.
It's, uh, come on.
It's quite clear from their message that they want to visit.
Just to go over all the marbles, the brass ring, I belong.
You know, what the hell?
Why, let somebody else go.
That's, you know.
Why, you sure you won't let Nancy go?
Yes.
Bob.
Andrew, it doesn't seem to bother him.
He says, well, we'll just take him on a tour.
He won't be with the leaders.
Who the hell cares?
Any political figure goes in there, doesn't matter if he doesn't see anybody.
He's walking in the gate.
Yeah, okay.
He says that it's the highest he's testified on, so whether or not he should testify, I don't know.
Maybe he just, maybe he knew it was on the telephone.
Yeah.
If it is on the testimony, probably better.
Well, I have to go to see Riley now, so.
All right, where's he going to be?
Fort Romani.
Why don't you just call him?
All right.
Well, I mean, does he have to have the call right away?
That's my point.
He says he has to know tonight.
He will be standing by himself.
I'm telling him that I'll be, I'm telling him that I am out, that you can't reach me, or does he know that I'm in?
He knows that you're over here.
I'm tied up right now.
I'm telling him that you'll be able to reach me in about 45 minutes.
I'll try to reach you sometime between 6.30
3637.
Yeah, 3637, I'll call it.
All right.
All right.
I'm sorry.
Sir, I've been up there looking for a bunch of papers.
NARA Description
On April 28, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 4:51 pm to 6:08 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 252-020 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 252-20
Date: April 28, 1971
Time: 4:51 pm - 6:08 pm
Location: Executive Office Building
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger’s trip to California
-Schedule
-Timing
Kissinger’s conversation with Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly
People’s Republic of China [PRC]
-Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan
-US policy
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Negotiations
-[David] Kenneth Rush and Philip J. Farley
PRC
-Chou En-lai
USSR
-Negotiations
-Kissinger’s conversation with Dobrynin
-Vienna
-Arms control
-Possible agreement
-US policy
-Possible agreement
-Anti-ballistic Missile [ABM] treaty
-Soviet strength
PRC
-Pakistani ambassador
-US emissary
-Possible candidates
-Dr. David K. E. Bruce
-Vietnam negotiations
-Kissinger
-[Unintelligible name]
-Nelson A. Rockefeller
-Taiwan
-Chiang Kai-shek
-John B. Connally
-Personal style
-H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
USSR
-Cuba
-Middle East
-Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
-Prospects
-Kissinger’s discussion with Dobrynin
-Possible summit
-SALT
-US position
-PRC
PRC
-Possible US emissary
-Rockefeller [?]
Vietnam
-Paul N. (“Pete”) McCloskey, Jr.
-PRC
-US policy
-Possible withdrawal of US forces
-Thailand
-Indonesia
-William P. Rogers’ speech
-Criticism
-Cambodia and Laos
PRC
-Kissinger’s conversation with Henry Hubbard
-Donald H. Rumsfeld
-Marshall Green
-Rogers
-State Department
-Goal of US policy
-End isolation of PRC
-President’s possible statement on April 29, 1971 regarding Taiwan
-US relations
-Treaty commitments
-United Nations’ [UN] representation
-Two-China policy
-US policy
-State Department
-Negotiations
-Pakistan
-Rawalpindi
-Bruce
-Robert D. Murphy
-Chiang Kai-shek
-Haldeman
-Chou En-lai
-Rockefeller
-Taiwan
-Bruce
-Vietnam negotiations
-State Department
-Signal to the USSR
-Berlin talks
-Bruce
-Rockefeller
-Vietnam
-USSR
-Timetable
-Bruce
-Kissinger
-Bruce’s possible role
-Kissinger
-Possible visit by President
-Vietnam
-Meeting in Rawalpindi
-Possible US emissary to Peking
-Bruce
Haldeman entered at 5:20 pm
-Possible summit meeting
-Timing of President’s visit
-Vietnam negotiations
-Taiwan
-Vietnam
-Announcement
-Kissinger’s possible role
-Bruce
-Visit by President
-Arrangements
-Kissinger
-Meeting with PRC representatives
-Kissinger’s possible itinerary
-Timing
-General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Personal emissary
-Risks
-USSR
-Laos, Indonesia, and Thailand
-Kissinger
-Bruce
-Meeting in Rawalpindi
-Timing
-USSR
-Rockefeller
-Need for subtlety
-Preparation for meeting with President
-Arrangements
-Agenda
-Kissinger
-Agenda
-Emissary
-Announcement
-Press conference
President’s conversation with Charles W. Colson
-Television coverage
PRC
-Timing of President’s visit
-USSR
-Announcement
-Kissinger
-Rockefeller and Bruce
-State Department
-Meeting in Rawalpindi
-PRC emissaries
-Chou En-lai
-Timing
-Michael J. (“Mike”) Mansfield
-Tour of China
-Purpose of negotiations
-Summit meeting
-Vietnam
-Emissary
-Possible discussions
-Purposes of Kissinger’s visit
-President’s visit
-Possible visit by “public” envoy
-US position
-Meeting in Rawalpindi
-Pakistan ambassador
-Kissinger and Rogers
-Negotiations
-Possible “public” emissaries
-Bruce and Murphy
-Condition of presidential visit
-End of Vietnam War
-Timing of President’s visit
USSR
-Summit meeting
Vietnam
-Bruce’s statement on Prisoners of War [POWs]
[A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under court order from
December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access [SA] 8, Ronald V. Dellums, et al. v.
James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records Administration
produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]
[End of transcript]
Kissinger left at 5:49 pm
State Department
-Possible change of secretary
-Rogers
-Elliot L. Richardson
-Rockefeller
-Connally
-Rogers
-Kissinger
-Need for “mechanic” as secretary
-Richardson and Rogers
-Rogers
-Accomplishments
-Middle East and USSR
-Career aspirations
-Supreme Court
-Warren E. Burger
-John M. Harlan
-President’s PRC policy
-Taiwan
-Speech
Barry M. Goldwater
-Tennessee Valley Authority [TVA]
-Comments in Tennessee
-Social Security
-Comments in St. Petersburg, Florida
-Press
-Television
-Marvin L. Kalb
State Department
-Rogers
-President’s PRC policy
-Green
-President’s PRC policy
-Kissinger
-Rogers
Alexander P. Butterfield entered at 5:55 pm
George P. Shultz
-Minimum wage
-President’s schedule
-Dr. W. Kenneth Riland
Minimum wage
-Decision
-James D. Hodgson
-Testimony
-President’s schedule
-Shultz
-President’s instructions to Haldeman
-Purpose of Shultz’s request to discuss minimum wage
-President’s upcoming press conference
-Patrick J. Buchanan
-Administration’s position
-Hodgson
State Department
-Rogers
-Melvin R. Laird
-Career aspirations
-Rogers
Television networks
-President’s conversation with Colson
-Demonstrations
-Public opinion
-Veterans
-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
-John A. Scali
-Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS]
-Pentagon [Department of Defense]
-Media
-President’s reaction to media in 1962
President’s meeting with editors
State Department
-Connally
-Rogers
PRC
-Visit by US emissary
-Kissinger
-Richardson
-Announcement
-Emissary
-Public and private
-Timing
-Conditions
-Vietnam
-Taiwan
-President’s visit
-Mansfield
Shultz
-Hodgson’s testimony
-President’s schedule
-Call back
Butterfield left at 6:06 pm
-John D. Ehrlichman
The President and Haldeman left at 6:08 pm
Also recorded on April 28, 1971
042-066 3:57 PM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:57 pm and 4:33 pm.
042-067 3:57 PM · 3 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:57 pm and 4:33 pm.
252-015 3:57 PM · 16 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:57 pm and 4:33 pm.
042-068 4:33 PM · 14 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson talked on the telephone from 4:33 pm to 4:37 pm.
252-017 4:33 PM · 8 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 4:33 pm to 4:47 pm.
252-018 4:47 PM · 23 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:47 pm and 4:49 pm.
042-069 4:49 PM · 3 min — H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman and President Richard M. Nixon talked on the telephone from 4:49 pm to 4:50 pm.
252-019 4:49 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 4:49 pm to 4:50 pm.
Conversation 252-020, April 28, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/252-020 (accessed October 3, 2026).