Nixon, Kissinger & Moorer on India-Pakistan relations and US foreign policy

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I thought that would be the one with the bill out there.

Oh, fine, fine.

I thought I was supposed to call you.

I'm sorry.

Oh, I heard that Steve Fultz just called and said you were there.

He probably was doing it according to the time.

No, that's right.

I mean, Steve didn't.

He wasn't trying to say no.

But I remember we talked this morning.

He said it would be better if I called him directly.

That's right.

So I left.

I thought to stay because we had started in the middle of the night.

Sure.

I thought that that would be a good second.

I wouldn't get into a discussion with them.

Just emphasize that if we even refugee and stay out of the portals as much as we can, and that we have to show some, that we shouldn't balance it too much towards India, because of all the challenges.

Sit down right here.

I really haven't had a chance in a long time.

Oh, dear.

We don't have to do anything.

... ... ... ... ... ...

Should I wish to make others worse than me?

Two subjects are, and are not, the same.

They are the same.

We should, as other people, consider that these two subjects are the same.

They are the same.

We should, as other people, consider that these two subjects are the same.

They are the same.

Yeah.

Well, there's two problems.

Because one is the danger of banning the Pakistanis to generate more refugees, which is more resilient than really developing a very national plan.

The other is that the refugees that already exist

You have to bring them back, or any of them.

However you get them back, .

I said, well, how much do we provide?

I'm talking about what they say.

I'm talking about what we're doing.

We are doing that all the time.

I don't know how much of the money.

They all want to help.

I said, sure.

I wanted other countries who were not doing as much as they should be there.

That was one of the weird ones that we were dealing with.

I doubt that this is one that we were going to be in a very, very narrow museum.

I'm not sure.

Hey.

on the political side, and on the legislative side, as well.

We, first, we begin with the prosecution.

The interest of Kennedy was the faith that would be served by a woman.

The interest of Pakistan is that they would be willing to have a woman.

The Pakistanis would be willing to have a woman.

One of the answers to the Soviet question is sort of where I want to come from.

But I do know that the interest of the United States should not be served in the same way as the Chinese.

It is better to have our relations with the Chinese.

And that is my understanding.

I do not care.

It could also be something very different from the Soviet.

That would be hurting the strength of the Second World War.

.

are very straightforward, non-legal, and sometimes, as a consequence, extremely stupid.

They're not stupid, but they're totally unscrupulous.

And as a consequence, they're so smart that they make the complete American whole world.

I know Indians, and I know the Pakistanis, and I know all the reasons why we ought to understand the situation.

Let us understand one thing.

We must not allow you to tell a lot of your friends that you didn't tell them to do this the next few years.

You cannot allow them to use the strategy problems that are very real and in pretext of breaking them down.

That's what I want to do.

But as far as ironing,

I'm sorry.

I'm going to be late.

I'm sorry.

So what I'm saying is that

There must not be a water conversation.

There is.

No question about that.

I will go on national television.

and I will ask the countries to put on all angles.

I'm sure you don't fall if they don't get money then they don't.

Now they talk about how you're not going to be in Pakistan.

That's not the kind of thing you do.

You can't fall into that game.

.

I would like to thank them as well, and thank you for this, and thank you for that.

Thank you.

We have a lot of people who came to the U.S. in the mid-90s and 90s who had all kinds of different, every possible product.

We've got a lot of people who came to the U.S. in the mid-90s and 90s who had all kinds of different, every possible product.

We've got a lot of people

That is not our job.

Right.

Second, there must not be a war on the U.S. economy.

A war on the U.S. economy.

Anybody who engages in a war on the U.S. economy.

Third, that as far as the political problem is concerned, I would say that we have to do everything we can.

to saturate the situation, to get involved in it.

And because of that, we've hurt both our efforts to help the rest of the community and our efforts to support the poor.

So that's my take on it.

Any questions?

As you say, we've really followed this three-pronged policy of restraint .

I agree fully with everything that you said.

I would make one observation on the third point, which I want to be very sure .

We can't, obviously, get into the posture of cutting coffee down the drain and so on .

I hope that from what you say, you don't intend to preclude us, and I don't think you do, of having Bill Farris go in to Gaida, as you say he's not a politically sophisticated Gaida, but in terms of cooperative, friendly relationships, where we have not general exhortations about the desirability of political accommodation, where we have concrete suggestions

that might be helpful to him where we have any change of view privately, because Joe doesn't have very good relations.

The reason why I say this is this, Mr. President.

My fear is, given our overall principle objective, prevent the war from going on.

I happen to believe that the real Indian policy, as you believe, is to establish an independent Bangladesh.

preferably by political means, but without precluding the use of force if necessary.

I happen to think that the Soviets may have some short-run gain from this treaty.

But I think the most serious repercussion of this treaty is that the Indians will feel, regardless of the fact that Promeko probably went there to say, restraint, that the Indians will feel they can't cross borders in a traditional military path

against Pakistan, but they will feel even freer today to support the guerrilla border crossing and to permit the instability to continue in such a way in East Pakistan that Yahya may come to the point where he will feel, my God, I'm about to lose East Pakistan as a result of this guerrilla movement.

And as irrational as it is, he may decide to attack him.

In other words, this is your fear, I know it's intolerable.

Now, the reason why I think that within the framework of what you have said, it's important where we ask concrete suggestions, and I mean only concrete suggestions, which we would obviously check with you and so that we're all aware of.

We ought to help Yahya to the degree that we can

He's trying to move a little political accommodation because relief alone, Mr. President, I'm afraid is not going to do it.

This is what I'm afraid to do.

The course that Yadier is on, he may have, the political reality may be such that he can't go beyond 30 years.

I don't think that the course he's on is in the direction of political accommodation.

If there isn't a tiny bit of progress on political accommodation, the insurgency in Pakistan will continue.

The cross-border guerrilla activity will continue.

And if it doesn't, from the Indian point of view, work politically, then I fear as to what the results are in the long run.

I think the Indians have been positively vested on this.

They are preventing the UN from establishing a presence on their side of the border.

They're discouraging the refugees from going back.

I think their real policy is a policy of establishing something in these countries in which they can work.

Now, if we ever have to accommodate for that particular aspect, I'm sure we can.

I mean, our national interest wouldn't irreversibly be damaged as a result of that, if that's what came at the end of the line as a result of basic political means.

Our interest is that whatever the result, we don't care what the result is, so long as it's achieved by peaceful means rather than by force.

The only point I really want to make was that I hope that if we can, you know, as a friendly possible, not as a way of saying, you know, unless we have our own blueprint, which we damn well don't.

I don't know how to solve this problem in terms of political accommodation.

But if we have a concrete idea, I hope that we can feel free to put it forward without feeling that we're interfering.

For example, we've said to them very politely, look, it really isn't in your interest to

in order to do this with Eugene.

They put together 88 people that they think they can deal with.

The founder, Henry, in our review group, they suggest some ideas of what else Joe might talk about.

I can't think of a better time.

Because they're telling me that we're not in a relationship in Pakistan that I can have a classroom conversation.

They feel we're on the only computer that's helpful in this whole thing.

But you were the guy.

You were the guy.

I think far less important than any kind of suggestion.

I think if I talk to .

I don't know.

I think the basic stress is clear.

And in specific, we will have to bring the U.S. and I to say whether there can't be some political proposal to say whether we will play along with the Indian game, which they can be no refugee settlement unless there's a political accommodation that can be part of a political accommodation.

in such a way that if we play that game, then we have to deliver the political accommodation before the refugees go back.

And we are getting, we are in the break-up of Pakistan.

If the Indians need a golden thread and some excuse for which to call up the other in the form of ya-ya, making some particular move, that's fine.

This is what I'm trying to do.

And that we should do, and must do.

But if the Indians say that unless

According to their definition of things, he's dealing with people that are living in Calcutta, whom he considers repulsive by asking them to deal with them.

You can't ask him to do one of those first thoughts, that he can't wheel at home in Anaheim or Asia.

It may sound like that, but I think that .

But on the other hand, I think that .

I think far from the fact that we can talk just as strongly as we want and should.

It's like we've got to talk to the Greeks, frankly.

Right?

And this really hasn't done much good with the Greeks.

It might do more.

I don't know.

I don't know what it is.

I think it's worried.

and we'll send out there to the next few days to look into relief, but in my judgment, in the face of my conversation with Jahlia, he will listen to a lot if we look into relief and rest in peace, even if it is for the next few days.

That would be a good way to put it.

That's a very good count on it.

You see, the way that you've shown us millennium

How do you do something in the name of one thing that really accomplishes something else?

He cannot say it wouldn't accomplish anything.

He could say it in the interest of all these 45 people.

Or he makes a very good case, for example, that if he should use the schools that he's using there, it would be better than if he didn't.

That's how the military is.

He's putting in the strictest pragmatic rules.

That's true.

The army in that area has never had a big civil war.

I think, based on my conversation, if you put it in that way, you may listen to it.

As a victim of it from somebody, you know, if you were a director there, you'd say, I mean, I supported you on that.

And yet, of your time, who would go?

I think that's a good ending message for it.

I'll answer that way.

The main thing on the other side of the coin, the other side of the coin, it isn't going to get caught or pulled down so publicly with its size on a political issue, if you understand.

on the issue of hunting at West London.

And I know, of course, that all the press out there, the press here and all the rest of them, they have other issues to talk about.

And our people have gotten to stay neutral on the political issues.

Public, private, we feel very strongly, of course, that we ought to shoot this guy on the issue.

Let's make some accommodation and shoot this guy.

You've got to keep it sober.

But how is it going to come to you?

You've got to pull it off somehow.

I feel for you, you've got to have the courage to say your statement.

You've got to give a way for you to do it.

That might be an idea.

I think that's a good idea.

The degree with which you can get out of the opportunity is far less.

altering the foundation, whatever it is now, to that degree, you increase the ability of our belief system, our humanitarian belief system.

You decrease the potential flood in the energy of the people and back into the energy of the people.

So if we can move behind the scenes directly with the Aoyama, that's very directly to the energy of the people.

And if we can be accomplished, even if it's a little bit,

I think if we do it in the form of a refugee program.

But the thing we have to make is whether we're going to use

be relieved, and the residency program hasn't been used to squeeze in any political accommodations, which is what a lot of people want to do.

But now they've turned it out.

All the people who want to use the political accommodations, they went out of their sails at the end of it.

And they've run it for almost three decades at a time.

So that's a strategic decision.

And that's exactly what we want to do.

That's exactly what we want to do.

That is exactly what we couldn't care less about.

But we do care a great deal about building something that gives the enemy an excuse to attack or the other side of the line.

It never puts him in a corner where he feels he's got a chance.

The fire might come either way, and the Indians were just smart enough to trick him.

He's not going to drive that guy into the room, I think.

He would go pretty far if the guys from the Navy couldn't get him to go back to their projectors.

of dealing with the not very high .

whether or not

I think that, I think, too,

I would not order, I tell you what I would not do, Jack.

I would not go from here, try to order the tablecloth and do this or that.

Before you, whenever you call us, we have no plan on this deal.

I would strongly recommend that you proceed with it.

And I think that's important.

I think that that is what I'd have had to do.

But actually, Farland also is sitting there.

He isn't going to come up.

We just might come up with a day or two after New Year's to get him out of it.

But we look by him to see how he thinks he can handle it.

And then he'll come back.

And I think it would be better if he showed them how it needed them.

The Secretary and I were reassured by what we found with the U.N. illegally, so we thought we were going to find utter chaos.

And I must say, they're in a little better shape or organization than either Maury or I or the Secretary-General.

Well, they're all out on relief.

We'll be all out in support of the U.N. in the East Pakistan.

On the Indian side, Mr. President, the prosecutions are coming in from other countries.

The total now is a hundred, the U.S. Hypo-History just reported a hundred and seventy to a hundred and seventy-five, of which our contribution is seventy, and I'm going to put together a hundred and seventy of other package reports as well.

Fine.

All right.

Thank you, sir.

Now, Dan, many of us love to hear some more of that.

Good luck.

You're going to get down in the bowels of that situation when we get there.

I'm setting up the report for you.

Yes, you know.

Nixon, Kissinger & Moorer on India-Pakistan relations and US foreign policy

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on August 11, 1971

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